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Abstract 
The recent burgeoning of sensory history has produced much valuable work. The sense 
of taste, however, remains neglected. Focusing on the early modern period, my thesis 
remedies this deficit. I propose that the eighteenth-century association of ‘taste’ with 
aesthetics constitutes a restriction, not an expansion, of its scope. Previously, taste’s 
epistemological jurisdiction was much wider: the word was frequently used to designate 
trial and testing, experiential knowledge, and mental judgement. Addressing sources 
ranging across manuscript commonplace books, drama, anatomical textbooks, 
devotional poetry, and ecclesiastical polemic, I interrogate the relation between taste as 
a mode of knowing, and contemporary experiences of the physical sense, arguing that 
the two are inextricable in this period. I focus in particular on four main areas of 
enquiry: early uses of ‘taste’ as a term for literary discernment; taste’s utility in the 
production of natural philosophical data and its rhetorical efficacy in the valorisation of 
experimental methodologies; taste’s role in the experience and articulation of religious 
faith; and a pervasive contemporary association between sweetness and erotic 
experience.  
Poised between acclaim and infamy, the sacred and the profane, taste in the 
seventeenth century is, as a contemporary iconographical print representing ‘Gustus’ 
expresses it, an ‘Apish Art’. My thesis illuminates the pivotal role which this ambivalent 
sense played in the articulation and negotiation of early modern obsessions including 
the nature and value of empirical knowledge, the attainment of grace, and the moral 
status of erotic pleasure, attesting in the process to a very real contiguity between 
different ways of knowing – experimental, empirical, textual, and rational – in the 
period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. ‘The Apish Art’ 
 
Two allegorical prints, from separate series published in England between 1625 and 
1640, present the sense of taste, or ‘Gustus,’ as a young woman, smoking a fashionable 
tobacco pipe and with a full wine goblet close to hand (figures 1.1 and 1.2).1 The 
accompanying verses offer a commentary. The first warns that: 
 
Som with the Smoaking Pipe and quaffing Cupp, 
Whole Lordships oft have swallow’d and blowne upp: 
Their names, fames, goods, strengths, healths, & lives still 
wasting 
In practising the Apish Art of Tasting. 
 
The second offers a challenge: 
 
Match me this Girl in London, nay the world 
For Feathered beaver, and her hair well curled 
To none of our Viragos she’ll give place 
For healthing sack, and smoking with a grace. 
 
These women represent taste in two ‘senses.’ Savouring their tobacco and wine, they 
embody the physical pleasures of gustatory taste. Exhibiting their sartorial choices and 
fashionable habits, however, they also stand for the tasteful consumer. Whilst these two 
meanings of taste are conceptually distinguishable, both prints also indicate their 
commensurability. The contiguity is underscored by visual equivalence: the plumes of  
                                                          
1  For an overview of early modern sensory iconography, see Carl Nordenfalk, ‘The Five Senses in Late 
Medieval and Renaissance Art,’ Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 48 (1985): 1-22. For more 
focused accounts, see Timothy Raylor, ‘ “Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue: William Cavendish, Ben Jonson, 
and the Decorative Scheme of Bolsover Castle,’ Renaissance Quarterly 52/2 (1999): 402-409; Gino 
Casagrande and Christopher Kleinhenz, ‘Literary and Philosophical Perspectives on the Wheel of the 
Five Senses in Longthorpe Tower,’ Traditio 41 (1985): 311-27; and Sharon Assaf, ‘The Ambivalence of the 
Sense of Touch in Early Modern Prints,’ Renaissance and Reformation 29/1 (2005): 75-98. See also the essays 
collected in Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice, ed. Alice E. Sanger and Siv Tove 
Kulbrandstad Walker (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 
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   Figure 1.1. Anon., etching depicting taste (Gustus); part of  a series  
   of  five.  London: John Garrett, 1630-1640. First published by  
   Thomas Jenner.  © The Trustees of  the British Museum. 
 
smoke ejected from the women’s mouths, for instance, have a parallel in the plumes of 
their splendid hats, implying a basic similarity between the objects of gustatory and 
consumer taste. The commentary offered by the verses is satirical. In the first print, 
Gustus’ prodigious appetites both for food and drink and for material goods proves 
ruinous, swallowing up the reputation, possessions, and eventually lives, of ‘whole 
Lordships.’  Behind her lurks an unnervingly anthropomorphic ape, munching on a 
13 
 
 
        Figure 1.2. George Glover, engraving depicting taste (Gustus);  
        part of a series of five. London: William Peake, 1625-1635.  
        © The Trustees of the British Museum  
 
piece of fruit. As a traditional symbol, in medieval and renaissance art and iconography, 
of mankind’s degraded hungers, the ape represents the shadow side of Gustus’ glittering 
display of discriminative consumption: rapacious appetite.  The presence of the monkey 
also emphasises the gendered terms of the print’s critique of taste: as Constance Classen 
has shown, the pervasive notion that the ape was a kind of degenerate human echoed 
the classical and renaissance idea of woman as an imperfect man: ‘apes were often typed 
14 
 
as feminine.’ 2  The second print is less overtly censorious, but not entirely good-
humoured: the verse’s description of Gustus as a virago positions her as a brazen, 
impudent scold, whose participation in the rituals of health-drinking and tobacco-
smoking mark her out as culpably transgressive in her masculine desires. 
Gustus, then, emerges as corrupt and dangerous, sullied by her proximity to 
iniquitous and irrepressible appetite. This is consistent with traditional sensory 
hierarchies, which, from Plato onwards, have usually privileged vision and hearing over 
smell, touch, and (often at the very bottom of the heap) taste.3 The full story, however, 
is not quite so simple: in each print, the moralising message does not fully dispel the 
jovial atmosphere, and the images celebrate, even as they apparently condemn, the 
blithe, attractive figure of Gustus. Tasting is undeniably ‘Apish.’ But, crucially, it is also 
(as the verse accompanying the first print acknowledges) an ‘Art’: a form of creative or 
imaginative skill, an embodied craft, and a mode of scholarship or learning.4 In their 
interest in the intimate relation between sensory and discriminative taste, in their 
suggestion that Gustus’ femaleness is one source of her degradation, and finally in the 
tension that they establish between taste’s immoral proximity to sensual appetite, and its 
epistemological potential as a mode of judgement, these two prints encapsulate some of 
the attitudes and ambiguities that are central to this thesis’ account of taste, understood 
both as physical sensation and as a mode of knowledge production, in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century England. 
Early modern literature and culture is saturated with the language of taste. To 
take just one high-profile example, the word and its cognates appears 111 times in 
Shakespeare’s works, and related vocabulary is also frequent: perhaps most strikingly, 
‘sweet’ appears 873 times, and its cognates and compound words including sweet are 
also numerous. 5  Despite this ubiquity, however, and despite a recent explosion of 
interest in the senses, the sense of taste has been largely ignored by scholars of the early 
                                                          
2  Constance Classen, The Colour of Angels: Cosmology, Gender, and the Aesthetic Imagination (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 77. 
3  There are numerous accounts of this traditional sensory hierarchy in scholarly literature, but see 
especially Louise Vinge, The Five Senses: Studies in a Literary Tradition (Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1975), 
especially 18 and 69; Caroyln Korsmeyer, Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 11-37; Constance Classen, Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and Across 
Cultures (London: Routledge, 2003), 3-4; Susan Stewart, ‘Remembering the Senses,’ in Empire of the Senses: 
The Sensual Culture Reader, ed. David Howes (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 59-69 (especially 61-62); Robert Jütte, 
A History of the Senses: From Antiquity to Cyberspace (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 55-71; and Alice E. Sanger 
and Siv Tove Kulbrandstad Walker, ‘Making Sense of the Senses’ in Sense and the Senses, Sanger and 
Walker, 3-5. 
4  See ‘art, n.1.’ OED Online, accessed 24 June 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/11125. 
5  See Marvin Spevack, The Harvard Concordance to Shakespeare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1973), 1253, 1328-1341. 
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modern period.6 A number of the most significant critics of twentieth-century thought 
– notably Lucien Febvre and Michel Foucault – described the sixteenth, seventeenth, 
and eighteenth centuries as defined, in part, by the triumph of the visual, and numerous 
subsequent studies have explored the supposed dominance of sight in early modern 
culture.7 In particular, studies of institutional and political structures of surveillance, of 
theatrical spectatorship, of religious imagery and icons, of the relation between sight and 
subjectivity, and of the putatively visual paradigms of early natural philosophy and 
anatomy, abound.8 As Patricia Cahill has noted, however, it is no longer the case that 
‘topics such as Renaissance visuality and the rhetoric of the visual... eclipses scholarship 
on the other senses.’ Cahill documents ‘a growing scholarly interest in early modern 
conceptualizations of listening and hearing, and… continuing debates about the relative 
dominance of the eye and the ear in early modern English culture.’9 Such scholarship 
ranges from Walter Ong’s narrative of the decline of oral, auditory culture and 
corresponding rise of literate, visual culture to, more recently, Arnold Hunt’s 
exploration of Protestant sermon culture, which traces a transformation in the opposite 
direction: Hunt describes the ousting of a visual Catholic culture in favour of a 
reformist emphasis on hearing of the word of God.10  
                                                          
6 There are a few scattered exceptions. In a recent article, Julia Reinhold Lupton asks ‘how... judgments of 
taste in the higher sense arise out of acts of tasting in the baser sense’ (emphasis Lupton’s own). Focusing on 
Hannah Woolley’s cookbook and housekeeping guide The Queen-Like Closet (1670), Lupton develops a 
notion of ‘culinary judgment... as a form of thinking that is based on experience and intuition rather than 
objective measures or rules,’ commenting that physical taste and judgement work in tandem: for ‘an 
embodied and embedded subject... thinking can be a kind of doing.’ Julia Reinhold Lupton, ‘Thinking 
with Things: Hannah Woolley to Hannah Arendt,’ Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval Cultural Studies 3/1 
(2012): 68, 74.  
7 Febvre argues that ‘the men of the sixteenth century... were open-air men, seeing nature but also feeling, 
hearing, sniffing, touching, breathing her through all their senses.’ ‘It was only,’ Febvre continues, ‘as the 
seventeenth century was approaching... that vision was unleashed in the world of science as it was in the 
world of physical sensations, and the world of beauty as well.’ Lucien Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the 
Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), 424-25.  In Discipline and Punish, Foucault identifies a transformation in the sensory regimes 
associated with institutional and political authority as a constitutive aspect of modernity. Very briefly, 
whereas authority was previously identified with visibility, in the Englightenment it comes to be 
associated with visuality: with the use of surveillance as a disciplinary tool. Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
8  See, for example, Joel Fineman, Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the Sonnets 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Barbara Freedman, Staging the Gaze: Postmodernism, 
Psychoanalysis, and Shakespearean Comedy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); John Michael Archer, 
Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1993); Huston Diehl, Staging Reform, Reforming the Stage: Protestantism and Popular Theater in Early 
Modern England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Eric Langley, ‘Anatomising the Early Modern 
Eye in Phineas Fletcher’s The Purple Island: A Literary Case Study,’ Renaissance Studies 20/3 (2006): 340-55. 
9  Patricia A. Cahill, ‘Take Five: Renaissance Literature and the Study of the Senses,’ Literature Compass 6/5 
(2009): 1014. 
10  See Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), and 
Arnold Hunt, The Art of Hearing: English Preachers and their Audiences, 1590–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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In the last decade or so, research into visuality and aurality has been 
supplemented by a growing body of work – often influenced by the ‘sensory turn’ in 
anthropology 11  – more explicitly concerned with the ‘lower’ senses. 12  Increasingly, 
historians and literary scholars have come to recognise that ‘early modern people were 
simply more inclined to frame crucial questions of ethics, aesthetics, politics and 
epistemology in terms of the nature and value of the senses than we are today.’ 13 
Starting with Bruce Smith’s seminal The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, but also 
encompassing Wes Folkerth’s Sound in Shakespeare and Kenneth Gross’ Shakespeare’s 
Noise, studies of audition have amplified our understanding of sound and hearing, 
particularly in the context of early modern theatre.14 Emily Cockayne’s Hubbub: Filth, 
Noise and Stench in England, 1600-1770 offers a vivid and multi-sensory account of the 
sense-scape of the early modern city, focusing largely on sound and smell.15 Olfaction 
has also found other chroniclers: Holly Dugan’s The Ephemeral History of Perfume: Scent 
and Sense in Early Modern England constitutes a wide-ranging account of the significance 
of aroma, whilst Jonathan Gil Harris has explored the relation between smell and what 
he terms the ‘polychronic’ temporalities of early modern material and theatrical 
                                                          
 11 One helpful outcome of  the anthropological interest in the senses has been an increased awareness of  
the cultural specificity of  sensation. David Howes, for instance, points out that ‘whereas westerners… 
traditionally associate the sun with light and sight... the smell-minded Ongee, who live in the Andaman 
Islands off  the coast of  India, assign an odor to the sun.’ As Howes continues, ‘sensorially speaking, the 
past is a foreign country,’ inhabited by men and women who potentially conceived of  and experienced the 
senses, including taste, in radically unfamiliar ways. Howes, ‘Dry Bones: An Anthropological Approach to 
the History of  the Senses,’ The Journal of  American History (2008) 95/2: 447. There as also been a ‘sensory 
turn’ in sociology: as Patrizia Di Bello and Gabriel Koureas – drawing on the work of  Georg Simmel – 
comment: ‘sensual arrangements and discrimination become crucial for social and cultural purposes – 
people are excluded or included in social groups according to what and how they look, smell, taste, listen 
to and feel. Social and individual identities are created round tastes and preferences at once shared and 
individualized through dinners, concerts, visual spectacles, social chat, personal hygiene, fashion, and all 
the changing varieties of  social and cultural interactions.’ Patrizia Di Bello and Gabriel Koureas, ‘Other 
than the Visual: Art, History and the Senses,’ in Art, History and the Senses: 1830 to the Present, ed. Patrizia 
Di Bello and Gabriel Koureas (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 3. 
12  This interest in the ‘lower’ senses does have precedents. As Holly Dugan notes, in the 1930s Caroline 
Spurgeon collated Shakespeare’s use of sensory metaphors, albeit with the now out-dated intention of 
determining his biographical experience. Spurgeon argues, for instance, that Shakespeare’s ‘images of 
food’ reveal that ‘by 1599, when he was five and thirty, Shakespeare has probably experienced heartburn 
as a result of acidity.’ Caroline Spurgeon, Shakespeare’s Imagery and What it Tells Us (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 117-19. See also Holly Dugan, ‘Shakespeare and the Senses,’ Literature Compass 
6/3 (2009): 730.  
13  Joseph Moshenska, ‘“Feeling Pleasures”: The Sense of Touch in Renaissance England’ (PhD diss., 
Princeton University, 2011), 19 n. 34. 
14  Bruce Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England: Attending to the O-Factor (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999); Kenneth Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); 
Wes Folkerth, The Sound of Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 2002). 
15 Emily Cockaigne, Hubbub: Filth, Noise and Stench in England, 1600-1770 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2007). 
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culture.16 Finally, touch has its champions; Joseph Moshenska’s ‘“Feeling Pleasures”: 
The Sense of Touch in Renaissance England’ has important precedents in Elizabeth 
Harvey’s edited collection Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early Modern Culture, and Laura 
Gowing’s Common Bodies: Women, Touch and Power in Seventeenth-century England, which 
provide sustained and historically sensitive elaborations of the tactile and the haptic in 
early modern culture and literature.17  
Nowhere, however, has the scope, force and complexity of taste in the early 
modern period been fully explored. There are a number of reasons for this omission. 
Most obviously, taste’s low place in the traditional sensory hierarchy offers one 
explanation: whilst sight and hearing are privileged as sources of intellectual 
apprehension and aesthetic pleasure, taste is compromised by its associations with base, 
mute corporeality. Relatedly, we might acknowledge conventional modes of gendering 
the senses: whilst men have traditionally aligned themselves with the historically 
privileged sense of sight, women are usually associated with the lower sense of touch 
(closely allied in this period, as we shall see, to taste).18 Taste occupies the realm of the 
female, and by association, of the domestic, the ephemeral, the inconsequential. It is 
also worth noting that, as the anthropologist David Howes comments, ‘higher 
education caters virtually exclusively to the senses of sight and hearing… academics 
work and think in an audiovisual world.’19 Typically, we attend conferences to ‘see’ and 
‘hear’ papers rather than for the high standards of catering, and the ‘symposium’ has 
regrettably lost its full original function as ‘a drinking-party; a convivial meeting for 
drinking, conversation, and intellectual entertainment.’20 These observations, however, 
are equally applicable to smell and touch. As Holly Dugan and Lara Farina note, ‘too 
ephemeral to persist in their original forms, the odors, flavors, textures, temperatures, 
                                                          
16 Holly Dugan, The Ephemeral History of Perfume: Scent and Sense in Early Modern England (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2001); Jonathan Gil Harris, ‘The Smell of Macbeth,’ Shakespeare Quarterly 58/4 
(2007): 465-86 and Jonathan Gil Harris, Chapter 4: ‘The Smell of Gunpowder : Macbeth and the 
Palimpsests of Olfaction,’ in Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009). See also Colleen E. Kennedy, ‘Performing and Perfuming on the Early 
Modern Stage: A Study of William Lower’s The Phaenix in Her Flames,’ Early English Studies 4 (2011), 
accessed 02 November 2012, www.uta.edu/english/ees/fulltext/kennedy4.html. For a fuller account of 
olfactory historiography, see Mark S. R. Jenner, ‘Follow Your Nose? Smell, Smelling, and Their Histories,’ 
The American Historical Review 116/2 (2001), 335-351. 
17 Elizabeth D. Harvey, ed., Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early Modern Culture (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Laura Gowing, Common Bodies: Women, Touch and Power in Seventeenth-century 
England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Moshenska, ‘Feeling Pleasures.’ 
18 For example, inThis Sex Which Is Not One, Luce Irigaray argues that ‘woman take [erotic] pleasure more 
from touching than from looking, and her entry into a dominant scopic economy signifies.... her 
consignment to passivity.’ Luce Irigaray, inThis Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985), 26. See also Classen, The Colour of Angels, 61-85. 
19 Howes, ‘Dry Bones,’ 445.  
20  ‘Symposium, n.’ OED Online, accessed 29 June 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/196317. 
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and somatic pressures of the past appear destined to linger primarily through textual 
description. And reading texts, for us in the present, all too often registers as entirely 
visual activity.’ 21  A more compelling reason for the neglect of taste, I suggest, is 
precisely its omnipresence in early modern literature and culture. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the language of taste is so ubiquitous that it becomes 
unremarkable, and therefore inconspicuous; so overdetermined as to be indeterminate.  
The language of sweetness is exemplary here. Take, for instance, Francis Meres’ 
famous assessment of Shakespeare, included in the 1598 printed commonplace book 
Palladis Tamia: ‘the witty soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous & honey-tongued 
Shakespeare, witness his Venus and Adonis, his Lucrece, his sugared sonnets among his 
private friends.’22 Shakespeare is honey-tongued because his writing is ‘mellifluous,’ a 
word which – in its etymological derivation from the Latin mel, honey – conveys multi-
sensory connotations of gustatory as well as auditory sweetness.23 Here, the experience 
of sweetness is a marker of the musicality of Shakespeare’s verse. Simultaneously, it 
invokes his rhetorical (as opposed to poetic) virtuosity: ‘sweet’ shares its Indo-European 
root word, swad, with ‘persuade’ (or ‘perswade,’ as it is often spelled), and early modern 
authors often exploited this affiliation.24 As the comparison to Ovid, famous for his 
amatory verse, as well as Meres’ specifying of Shakespeare’s most notoriously licentious 
works suggests, however, the language of sweetness also invokes the eroticised 
sweetness of a beloved’s cherry lips and honeyed kisses. Elsewhere in early modern 
literary culture, the language of sweetness is used to indicate, variously, intimacy and 
affection between friends and family; sycophantic, fawning flattery; salutary 
nourishment; nauseous surfeit; the deceptive pleasures of sin; and the experience of 
divine grace.25 
                                                          
 21 Holly Dugan and Lara Farina, ‘Intimate Senses/ Sensing Intimacy,’ Postmedieval: A Journal of  Medieval 
Cultural Studies 3/4 (2012): 374. 
22 Katherine Duncan-Jones and H. R. Woudhuysen comment that ‘for his Elizabethan fans, Shakespeare 
was above all “sweet”... this is what every discerning reader called him.’ Introduction to Shakespeare’s 
Poems, The Arden Shakespeare, ed. Duncan-Jones and Woudhuysen (London: Cengage, 2007), 4-7. On 
Shakespeare’s reputation for sweetness, see also Adam Hooks, ‘Wise Ventures: Shakespeare and Thomas 
Playfere at the Sign of the Angel,’ in Shakespeare’s Stationers, ed. Marta Straznicky (Philidelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 53-54. 
23 ‘Mellifluous, adj.’ OED Online, accessed 01 February 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/116177. 
24 See ‘sweet, adj. and adv.’ OED Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/195665, and ‘persuade, v.’ OED 
Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/141561. Both accessed 27 September 2012. Sidney Mintz notes this 
affiliation in his essay ‘Sweetness and Meaning,’ in The Taste Culture Reader: Experiencing Food and Drink, ed. 
by Carolyn Korsmeyer (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 116. Jeffrey Masten shows that ‘the linking of persuasion 
and sweetness is ubiquitous in English around 1600.’ Masten, ‘Toward a Queer Address: The Taste of 
Letters and Early Modern Male Friendship,’ GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies  10/3 (2004): 374. 
25 Most of these valences are explored in this thesis. On sweetness and sycophancy, however, see James 
L. Jackson, ‘Shakespeare’s Dog-and-Sugar Imagery and the Friendship Tradition,’ Shakespeare Quarterly 
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In this thesis, I aim to recover the connotative richness and complexity of taste 
in the early modern period. I demonstrate, for instance, that the formidable semantic 
range of sweetness makes it indispensable for authors who wish to forge associations 
between apparently distinct realms of experience (for example, between erotic desire 
and rhetorical expertise – a link explored in greater depth in chapter 5), or who wish to 
mark moments of unsettling incongruity or ambivalence. 26  Our instinct, as literary 
scholars, is often to strive to resolve or at least account for conflict or ambiguities in the 
texts we study, but the language of taste frequently insists that we suspend such 
exegetical efforts, holding the reconciliation of contraries in suspension in order to 
reach a fuller understanding of the tensions inherent in human experience. 
 
II. ‘the savour called greene’ 
 
Mark Jenner has warned that: 
 
most metanarratives of sensory history either build upon, or test, the idea that if 
one sense grows in significance, others must decline correspondingly... there is 
precious little evidence that the history of the human sensorium is this kind of 
zero sum game. Furthermore, and more significantly, this approach neglects the 
synaesthetic nature of human perception. Monosensual histories obscure the 
ways in which the senses work and worked together and occlude the reasons 
why one or more sense is, or was, foregrounded by particular historical actors.27 
 
It is certainly true that, in the early modern period as today, many authors stressed the 
multi-sensory nature of perception.28 As Michel Serres puts it: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1/4 (1950): 260-263. In his allegorical poem The Purple Island (1633), Fletcher describes personified flattery 
(who goes by the name of Colax) as sweet: ‘all his words with sugar [he] spices.’ Phineas Fletcher, The 
Purple Island, or, The isle of man (Cambridge: 1633), P3r (117).  
26 Mary Carruthers suggests that medieval uses of the Latin vocabulary of sweetness to describe the 
effects of rhetorical language derives from the ‘morally ambivalent reputation’ that both held in common: 
‘I wonder,’ she speculates, ‘if the choice of suadeo [to describe rhetoric] was intended to convey some of 
that ambivalence.’ Carruthers, ‘Sweetness,’ Speculum 81/4 (2006): 1009.  
27  Mark S. R. Jenner, ‘Tasting Lichfield, Touching China: John Floyer’s Senses,’ The Historical Journal 53/3 
(2010): 669. 
28 See also, for exampe: Patrizia Di Bello and Gabriel Koureas: ‘all cultural apparatus organising and 
enabling sensorial experience is multi-sensorial – music, for instance, is also visual, tactile and embodied.’ 
Di Bello and Koureas, ‘Other than the Visual,’ 7. 
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no body has ever smelt and smelt only the unique perfume of a rose. The 
intellect, perhaps, and language most certainly, carry out this performance of 
isolation and selection. The body smells a rose and a thousand surrounding 
odours at the same time as it touches wool, sees a complex landscape and 
quivers beneath waves of sound.29 
 
The senses cannot be shut off from each other: perception is always holistic and 
immersive. And whilst Serres attributes the solecistic ‘isolation and selection’ of the 
senses to language, much early modern vocabulary reflects the experiential imbrication 
of the senses. The modern sense of the word ‘handsome,’ for instance, as indicative of 
visual attractiveness, emerged in the sixteenth century, and coexisted for some time with 
the older sense of the word as indicating a tactile perception of a thing as fit for the 
hand, available and tempting to the touch. 30  In The arte of rhetorique (1553), Thomas 
Wilson squeezes a joke out of this double meaning: ‘when one hath done a robbery, 
some wil saye, it is pitie, he was a handsome man, to... which another made answere you 
saye truthe sir, for he hathe made these shiftes by his handes, and gotte his living with 
light fingeringe.’31 As C. M. Woolgar writes of late medieval England: ‘words used in 
common for more than one sense imply no primary division of ideas relating to these 
senses in general consciousness.’32 Once again, sweetness is representative here: ‘sweet’ 
can describe aural, olfactory, tactile, and even visual sensations, as well as (of course) a 
specific flavour, and  authors exploit this indeterminacy in order to capture moments of 
multi-sensory experience. In his 1603 translation of Ovid’s elegies, for example, 
Christopher Marlowe describes Orpheus’ ‘sweet toucht harp that to move stones was 
able’: here, ‘sweet’ simultaneously describes the pleasant sound of music and the delicate 
plucking of the instrument that produces it.33 
As Marlowe’s ‘sense’ of the simultaneous sweetness of aural and tactile 
experience suggests, whilst the multi-sensory or synaesthetic nature of experience might 
be a historical constant, the particular permutations of the senses involved are not. We 
are used to thinking of taste and smell as intimately linked. In the early modern period 
as today, words for flavours and odours frequently overlap, but further excavation can 
                                                          
29 Michel Serres, The  Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley 
(London: Continuum, 2008), 306. 
30 ‘Handsome, adj., adv., and n.’ OED Online, accessed 26 June 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/83926.  
31 Thomas Wilson, The arte of rhetorique (London: Richard Grafton, 1553), V1r (77). 
32 C. M. Woolgar, The Senses in Late Medieval England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 7. 
33 Christopher Marlowe, All Ovids elegies (London, 1602), F2r. 
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reveal other correspondences. The word ‘spicy,’ for example, can be used to designate 
both a fragrance and a flavour. Etymologically, however, ‘spicy’ and ‘spice’ derive 
ultimately from the Latin speciēs, meaning appearance or form.34 As such, they share a 
root-word with the sensory ‘species’ of faculty sensory physiology, which are often 
represented as visual forms. Similarly, in a section on ‘The sence of Tasting’ included in 
his 1602 translation of Philippe de Mornay’s The true knowledge of a mans owne selfe, 
Anthony Munday describes ‘the savour called greene, which setts the teeth an edge, 
shuts up and drawes backe the tongue.’ Munday’s description establishes a metonymic 
connection between flavour and colour: ‘of such tast are Medlars and other greene 
fruites, before they are come to their maturitie.’35 In the use of ‘green’ as a flavour 
description, taste and visual appearance cohere.   
Whilst taste dovetails with sound, smell, and sight, its closest kinship in early 
modern England was with touch. In De Anima, Aristotle designated taste a particular 
kind of touch, and early modern authors frequently reiterate this description.36 Indeed, 
the word taste meant ‘the sense of touch’ before it referred to gustation.37 Taste and 
touch were not, however, entirely conflated for Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle distinguished between the two by suggesting that the former incorporated a 
crucial discriminative aspect, writing that, whilst both taste and touch ‘are concerned 
with the kind of pleasures that the other animals share in,’ nonetheless: 
 
of taste they appear to make little or no use; for the business of taste is the 
discriminating of flavours, which is done by wine-tasters and people who season 
dishes; but they hardly take pleasure in making these discriminations, or at least 
self-indulgent people do not, but in the actual enjoyment, which in all cases 
comes through touch, both in the case of food and in that of drink and in that 
of sexual intercourse.... To delight in such things, then, and to love them above 
all others, is brutish .38 
 
                                                          
34 ‘Spicy, adj.’ OED Online, accessed 26 June 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/186546. The OED cites 
William Turner’s 1568 Herbal: ‘the shel smelleth well, and is spicie, not onely in smell, but also in taste.’ 
35 Philippe de Mornay, The true knowledge of  a mans owne selfe, trans. Anthony Munday (London: I.R. for 
William Leake, 1602), F4v (104). 
36 Aristotle writes, ‘the taste-object is a kind of  touch-object.’ Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), trans. 
Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 1986), 182. 
37 ‘Taste, n.1.’ OED Online, accessed 12 January 2011, www.oed.com/view/Entry/198052 . 
38 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 93. This 
passage is also quoted in Moshenska, ‘Feeling Pleasures,’ 57. 
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Here, the ‘brutish’ aspects of eating, drinking, and sex reside in their stimulation of the 
sense of touch; the pleasures of taste, on the other hand, are ‘discriminating.’ As Joseph 
Moshenska puts it in his discussion of this passage, ‘here Aristotle states... that it is taste 
which is truly discriminatory, while touch gives rise to a merely supplementary 
enjoyment which should be disdained.’39 
Patricia Fumerton argues that ‘the senses underwent a process of segmentation 
and detachment’ in the renaissance; in particular, whereas ‘the senses mingled 
confusedly in the large dining hall’ of the middle ages, in the ‘smaller, quieter feasts’ that 
become more popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ‘the senses began to 
separate out.’40 Fumerton, I believe, overstates the extent of this ‘detachment’: early 
modern descriptions of food (in the context of dietary advice, as well as aristocratic 
feasts) are often evocatively multi-sensory.  Nonetheless, her basic claim holds water. By 
offering a manifesto for taste’s prominence within the literature and culture of early 
modern England, I do not wish to engage in the ‘zero sum game’ of devaluing historical 
importance of the other senses. Despite the importance of Jenner’s warning, however, I 
think there is some justification for the kind of ‘monosensual’ history that this thesis 
offers, with the proviso that such accounts must remain alert (as I hope this does) to the 
imbrications of the senses in history. It is undeniable that early modern authors – 
perhaps encouraged by the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century revival of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism – often engaged in comparisons of the senses. 41  Sometimes such 
comparisons constituted neutral observation: in Skeptick, or speculations (1651) for 
instance, Walter Raleigh notes that ‘Ointment doth recreate the Smell, but it offendeth 
the Tast,’ taking this disjunction as evidence for the broader epistemological unreliability 
of the senses. 42  Elsewhere, however, comparisons between the senses are clearly 
evaluative. In particular, numerous authors establish an opposition – explored at a 
number of points in this thesis, but especially in chapter 3 – between vision and taste; 
and the latter does not always, as we might expect, come off worse for the comparison.  
  
                                                          
39 Moshenska, ‘Feeling Pleasures,’ 57. 
40 Patricia Fumerton, Cultural Aesthetics: Renaissance Literature and the Practice of Social Ornament (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 126. 
41 As Stuart Clark has shown, neo-Pyrrhonist sceptics believed that ‘it is not... the inaccuracy of sensory 
experiences when compared to the external world that is crucial; it is their difference when compared to 
each other’ (emphasis, Clark’s). Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 271. 
42 Walter Raleigh, Sir Walter Raleigh’s Sceptick, or speculations (London: W. Bentley for W. Shears, 1651), C2r 
(27). 
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III. ‘the Gusto of the fond Feminine’ 
 
In his influential Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Bourdieu asserts that 
‘the dual meaning of the word “taste”... remind[s] us that taste in the sense of the 
“faculty of immediately and intuitively judging aesthetic values” is inseparable from taste 
in the sense of the capacity to discern the flavours of foods which implies a preference 
for some of them.’43 Bourdieu, of course, is interested not in early modern England but 
in 1960s France, and his study is ultimately less interested in the relation between taste 
and judgement than in the ways that different kinds of foodstuffs signify, thus placing 
their consumers within a particular social class. Nonetheless, his work is an important 
precursor for the historical reintegration of discriminative and physiological taste that 
this thesis undertakes. 
The influence of  Bourdieu’s work in clear in Denise Gigante’s Taste: A Literary 
History, which offers ‘a literary history of  taste in all its full-bodied flavor.’44 Gigante’s 
focus is on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature and culture, rather than the 
early modern period; her book opens, however, with a discussion of  Milton’s Paradise 
Lost (1667; 1674) and Paradise Regained (1671).  For Gigante, Milton is a liminal figure, 
‘on the verge’ of  what she calls an ‘eighteenth-century effort to repress, sublimate, or 
otherwise discipline appetite into aesthetics.’45 Whilst Milton himself, Gigante argues, 
‘described an embodied mode of  taste’ in Paradise Lost, the poem ‘complicates the 
category of  physiological taste in such a way as to set the terms for the emergence of  
aesthetic taste theory in the early years of  the eighteenth century.’46 In particular, a 
‘Miltonic possibility of  tasting and expressing (rather than tasting and excreting) paves 
the way for eighteenth-century taste theory,’ understood as a ‘symbolic economy of  
consumption.’47 For Gigante, the ‘ambiguity between eating and tasting’ that Milton 
establishes in the poem ‘signals the tension between physiological and philosophical 
taste bound up in... [the] gustatory trope.’48 Eating is the disavowed term which allows 
the subsuming of  gustation into abstract ‘philosophical taste’ – a term which, for 
                                                          
43 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, 
M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 99.  
44 Denise Gigante, Taste: A Literary History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 2. The influence of 
Bourdieu’s emphasis on tracing relations between culinary, commerical, and aesthetic tastes is evident, for 
example, in Gigante’s assertion that ‘the connoisseur by the end of the eighteenth century worked for his 
taste, comparatively shopping for comestibles and earning his reputation as a discerning consumer.’ 
Gigante, Taste, 9. 
45 Ibid., 17. 
46 Ibid., 17 and 23. 
47 Ibid., 29 and 46. 
48 Ibid., 24. 
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Gigante, is nearly synonymous with aesthetic taste.  
In the early modern period, I propose, we can discover a more complex model 
of  the relation between physical and mental taste than that described by Gigante’s 
narrative of  repression, sublimation, and discipline, and a more inclusive notion of  how 
taste functions as a mode of  discrimination. In particular, it is my contention that the 
eighteenth-century association of  taste with aesthetic and consumer discernment 
constitutes not – as is usually thought – an expansion of  the term’s meaning, but rather a 
reduction of  its epistemological jurisdiction. Focusing on the period between circa 1558 
and 1688 (between Elizabeth I’s accession and the so-called Glorious Revolution), I 
show how the terminology of  taste was used to describe the production, evaluation, and 
communication of  knowledge in a range of  spheres. Such uses of  the language of  taste, 
moreover, are not straightforwardly metaphorical, for they echo a wider cultural 
fascination with the epistemological possibilities of  the physical sense of  taste: the ways 
in which gustatory experiences constituted a source of  knowledge in themselves. In the 
early modern period, taste as a term for discrimination is deeply bound up with 
embodied experience in ways which could be morally and epistemologically hazardous, 
but also profoundly pleasurable and productive. 
I have already commented on the use of the term ‘Virago’ in the verse 
accompanying the second ‘Gustus’ print, noting how it positions Gustus as 
problematically masculine in her prodigious appetites. ‘Virago,’ however, also had 
another set of associations, for in the Vulgate rendering of Genesis it is the name given 
by Adam to prelapsarian Eve.49 Gustus, then, is a woman on the brink; it is only a 
matter of time before she succumbs to temptation. The verse thus chimes both with 
what chapter 3 of this thesis argues is a pervasive early modern propensity to accord 
taste the dubious honour of being the sense which initiated the Fall, and with a wider 
cultural tendency to associate gustatory appetites with what Joseph Glanvill, clergyman 
and propagandist for the new experimental philosophy, calls ‘the fond Feminine.’ Writing 
in his 1661 The vanity of dogmatizing, Glanvill complains that: 
 
The Woman in us, still prosecutes a deceit, like that begun in the Garden: and our 
Understandings are wedded to an Eve, as fatal as the Mother of our miseries. And 
while all things are judg’d according to their suitableness, or disagreement to the 
                                                          
49 As George Gascoigne notes, ‘Before Eva sinned, she was called Virago, and after she sinned she 
deserved to be called Eva.’ Gascoigne, Droomme of Doomes Day (London: T. East for Gabriell Cawood, 
1576), A3r. 
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Gusto of the fond Feminine; we shall be as far from the Tree of Knowledge, as from 
that, which is guarded by the Cherubin... intellectual representations are received 
by us, with as unequal a Fate upon a bare Temperamental Relish or Disgust.50 
 
For Glanvill, the postlapsarian corruption of intellect by affect is a consequence of 
mankind’s subjection to hungers that are gendered as distinctly female. ‘Gusto’ and Eve 
are conflated: simultaneously ‘Mother’ and ‘wedded’ bride, taste yokes the rational (and 
implicitly masculine) intellect to the idiosyncratic and capricious preferences and 
aversions of the appetite. 
In his 1665 Scepsis scientifica, however, Glanvill carves out a more positive role for 
the sense of taste within the epistemological projects that he endorses. Glanvill 
responds to the question of ‘whether ’twas likely that Aristotle was so farr beyond other 
Philosophers in his Intellectuals, as these latter Ages have presumed,’ by stating his belief 
that in ‘a near connection between Truth and Goodness... there’s a taste in the soul 
whereby it relisheth Truth, as the Palate Meats; which sence and gusto vice depraves and 
vitiates.’51 Given, Glanvill goes on, that a variety of classical and patristic sources charge 
Aristotle with vices including sodomy, drunkenness, and avarice, the great philosopher 
must forfeit his right to the acclaim he had so far enjoyed.52 Glanvill’s demolition of 
Aristotle’s reputation for moral probity and consequently intellectual superiority – part 
of his wider project of overturning the scholastic and humanist authorities in favour of 
experimental learning – is articulated using the language of gustation. Whereas in The 
vanity of dogmatizing Glanvill conflated ‘Gusto’ with taste, here he strives to separate them 
out, in the process attributing a high level of epistemological competence to the latter: 
the physical sense of ‘gusto’ compromises the soul’s ability to ‘taste... Truth.’ In his use of 
taste to further the cause of experimental philosophy, and in his suggestion that taste 
maintains some epistemological value despite its postlapsarian degradation, Glanvill is – 
as I argue in chapter 4 – characteristic of his fellows within the early Royal Society. 
A brief  consultation of  the Oxford English Dictionary reveals some of  the 
                                                          
50 Joseph Glanvill, The vanity of dogmatizing (London: E.C. for Henry Eversden, 1661), K3v (118) and K5v 
(122). For an account – focusing on the physician Franciscus dele Boe, Sylvius – of how ‘the new 
philosophers’ shored up the epistemological utility of the senses by regulating the passions, see Pamela 
Smith, ‘Science and Taste: Painting, Passions, and the New Philosophy in Seventeenth-Century Leiden,’ 
Isis 90/3 (1999): 445-49. See also Steven Shapin, ‘The Philosopher and the Chicken: On the Dietics of 
Disembodied Knowledge,’ in Christopher Lawrence and Shapin, eds., Science Incarnate: Historical 
Embodiments of Natural Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 21-50. 
51 Joseph Glanvill, Scepsis scientifica (London: E. C. for Henry Eversden, 1665), N1v (90). 
52 Ibid., N1v (90). 
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epistemological range of  the word ‘taste’ in the early modern period. 53 
Contemporaneously, definitions of  the noun ‘taste’ include ‘a trying, testing; a trial, a 
test, an examination,’ whilst definitions of  the verb to ‘taste’ encompass ‘to put to the 
proof; to try, to test.’ To take just one example, Edmund uses the word in this way in 
King Lear (c.1603; 1608): ‘I hope, for my brother’s justification, he wrote this but as an 
essay or taste of  my virtue.’54  More broadly, to taste can mean ‘to have experience or 
knowledge of,’ as when, in Pericles (c.1607; 1609), Cleon implores ‘O, let those cities that 
of  plenty’s cup / And her prosperities so largely taste... heed these tears!’55 Here, ‘taste’ 
is a synonym for experience or knowledge. Relatedly, ‘a taste’ can indicate – as it does 
today – a small sample or slight experience of  something, as in As You Like It (c.1599; 
1623) when Touchstone offers Rosalind ‘a taste’ of  his ability to compose bad love 
poetry. 56  Finally, taste could indicate ‘mental perception of  quality; judgement, 
discriminative faculty.’ It is this kind of  ‘taste’ that Nathanial claims in Love’s Labour’s 
Lost (c.1595; 1598), when he proclaims himself  a man ‘of  taste’ (a moment I explore in 
greater detail in chapter 1).57 Frequently, such uses of  taste to indicate processes of  
knowing are given force and focus by their deployment in proximity to more explicitly 
gustatory language. When Cleon makes envious reference to cities that ‘taste’ prosperity, 
for example, his use of  the word is not entirely abstracted from embodied experience: 
the reference to ‘plenty’s cup’ keeps physical sensations of  sipping and drinking firmly 
in mind. His words, furthermore, come shortly after his lament that his citizen’s 
‘palates,’ which, only two summers previously, ‘must have inventions to delight the taste 
/ Would now be glad of  bread, and beg for it....’ (1.4.39-41) Prosperity is experienced in 
literally gustatory terms, as an abundance of  culinary delights.  
Both the term ‘taste,’ and the experience of  taste, enfold a fascinating and 
productive tension. On the one hand, as part of  the activity of  eating, the sense of  taste 
plays a preliminary role, evaluating or testing the suitability of  a consumable for 
digestion. Correspondingly, as an epistemological term, to taste something is to try, test, 
or examine it. In such cases, the forms of  enquiry indicated by the language of  taste are 
                                                          
53 ‘Taste, n.1’ OED Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/198050, and ‘taste, v.’ OED Online, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/198052. Both accesesed 18 June 2009. 
54 William Shakespeare, King Lear, The Arden Shakespeare, ed. R. A. Foakes (London: Thomson, 2005), 
1.2.45. 
55 William Shakespeare, Pericles, Prince of Tyre, The Arden Shakespeare, ed. Suzanne Gossett (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2004), 1.4.52-54. Further in-text references are to this edition. 
56 William Shakespeare, As You Like It, The Arden Shakespeare, ed. Juliet Dusinberre (London: 
Thomson, 2006), 3.2.97. 
57 William Shakespeare, Love’s Labour’s Lost, The Arden Shakespeare, ed. H. R. Woudhuysen (London: 
Thomson, 1998), 4.2.28. 
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tentative, preliminary, and probative or exploratory. On the other hand, conceived of  in 
its relation to the other senses, taste represents the culmination of  our experience of  our 
environment: taste’s status as a proximity sense – a sense that is stimulated only by 
direct contact with the object of  sense – gives rise to its associations with forms of  
knowledge that are immediate, experiential, immersive, and apparently definitive. 
‘Knowledge’ is, of course, an extraordinarily capacious term, able to designate a 
wide variety of states, objects, and processes ranging from dim intuition to confident 
certainty, and from familiarity with theoretical concepts to embodied practical skills. It 
is often conflated with, but also importantly separate from, wisdom; a distinction 
schematised by Augustine in the opposition between scientia (humane and historical 
knowledge) and sapientia (divine and theological knowledge).58 Objects of knowledge 
range from the brute facts of the material world to the nebulous realm of moral truth; 
and the routes to it are manifold, embracing everything from syllogistic logic to 
rhetorical inventio to sensory observation, from scholastic deduction to empirical 
induction.59 In this thesis, I use the term ‘knowledge’ in a number of its senses; in each 
case, the particular mode I refer to should be clear from the context. In particular, 
however, my epistemological focus is determined by the associative scope of taste as a 
term for knowledge production, and by taste’s associations with specific realms of 
experience. Thus, the (often interlocking) types and spheres of knowledge that I explore 
encompass processes of textual discrimination and judgement in the literary realm; 
empiricism (inductive knowledge garnered through experience and experiment) and 
erudition (second-hand knowledge) in the early modern anatomy theatre and in the 
early Royal Society; sapientia, or divine knowledge, in the context of post-Reformation 
religion; and social or intersubjective knowledge (associated variously with intuition, 
discrimination, and rhetorical inventio) in the realm of erotic love poetry and drama. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 On the disctinction between sapientia and scientia in the Renaissance, see Margaret Spire’s discussion in 
‘The True Face of Philosophy as Magical Object: The Limits of Wisdom and the Constitution of the 
Supernatural in Montaigne’s Essays 1.26 and 1.27,’ in Wonders, Marvels, and Monsters in Early Modern Culture, 
ed. Peter G. Platt (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1999), 206-207. 
59 The distinction between knowledge, understanding and wisdom (and, in some cases, data and 
information) is schematized in recent research in knowledge management. See Russell Ackoff, ‘From 
Data to Wisdom,’ Journal of Applied Systems Analysis 16 (1989): 3-9, for an exposition of the differences 
between these categories. 
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IV. ‘de  Gustibus’ 
 
Ever since Stephen Greenblatt’s enduringly influential Renaissance Self-Fashioning made its 
mark on the landscape of early modern studies, accounts of subjectivity in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries have placed a heavy emphasis on the formative role of 
language in the constitution of a sense of self. For Greenblatt, the acts of self-
fashioning whereby ‘middle class’ and aristocratic individuals shaped their attitudes and 
behaviours in response to culturally and politically prescribed norms were ‘always, 
though not exclusively, in language.’ 60  In recent years, however, both Greenblatt’s 
Foucauldian emphasis on the institutional structures which produce the illusion of 
individual agency precisely through the regulation of agency, and his insistence that 
language forms the principal medium through which subjectivity is generated, have 
been contested.  
Notably, a number of scholars have documented the intimate links between 
humoral complexion, the passions, and subjective identity. Gail Kern Paster, for 
instance, identifies ‘psychological materialism – what I call psychophysiology’ as a 
definitive difference between early modern and modern men and women.61 ‘Substance,’ 
Paster affirms, ‘embodied significance, because there was no way conceptually or 
discursively to separate the psychological from the physiological.’ 62 Most pertinently 
here, in his 1999 Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England, Michael Schoenfeldt departs 
both from Greenblatt’s disempowerment of the early modern individual, and with his 
suggestion that language forms the primary fabric of the human self.63 In a humoral 
economy, Schoenfeldt argues, individuality is constituted through the self’s capacity to 
                                                          
60 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 9. 
61  Gail Kern Paster, Humouring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 12. Gail Kern Paster’s, Katherine Rowe’s, and Mary Floyd-Wilson’s edited 
collection Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) has also been influential in this regard, as has Mary Floyd-Wilson’s and 
Garrett A. Sullivan’s edited collection Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Brian Cummings’ and Freya Sierhuis’ forthcoming collection Passions and 
Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture (Farnham: Ashgate, forthcoming) promises to further enrich our 
understanding of the relations between humoralism, the passions, and subjectivity. 
62  Gail Kern Paster, Humoring the Body, 12. 
63 For ‘the empowerment’ which his account, in contrast to the standard new historicist narrative, accords 
to the early modern individual, see Michael Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology 
and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
11-12. Schoenfeldt also offers an important modification to the association by Gail Kern Paster of 
humoral psychology with a carnivalesque, Bakhtinian body, emphasising instead the Renaissance 
prioritization of self-control and containment: ‘the Renaissance seems to have imagined selves as 
differentiated not by their desires, which all more or less share, but by their capacity to control these 
desires.’ Schoendfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 15-17. 
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regulate his or her corporeal processes: ‘in early modern England, the consuming 
subject was pressured by Galenic physiology… to conceive all acts of ingestion and 
excretion as very literal acts of self-fashioning.’64 
Much work in the realm of humoral subjectivity is alert to the ways in which 
texts represent physical sensations: Schoenfeldt’s insistence that accounts of humoral 
theory ‘describe not so much the actual workings of the body as the experience of the 
body,’ for example, offers a compelling way to think about medical concepts in early 
modern England.65 Subsequently, the recent turn towards sensory scholarship has often 
located itself within this genealogy. In their introduction to Shakespearean Sensations: 
Experiencing Literature in Early Modern England, for example, Katharine Craik and Tanya 
Pollard assert that their volume ‘is informed by recent interdisciplinary conversations 
about emotion,’ particularly those that are predicated on an ‘attention to embodiment.’66 
Sensory studies are thus absorbed into an established model according to which 
humoralism, the passions, and subjectivity form an uninterrupted and mutually 
constitutive continuum.  I want to propose that the critical concentration on this trinity 
– rich and revealing as it continues to be – has somewhat obscured the ways in which 
early modern subjectivity was constituted, in part, by sensory knowledge. In the early 
modern period an individual’s humoral constitution does not only affect what he or she 
feels (the passions), it is also a formative condition of what he or she knows (the intellect). 
Undeniably, the senses and the passions worked in tandem to make subjectivities; but 
so did the senses and the mind. Recognising this allows us to appreciate the 
epistemological as well as the affective underpinnings of early modern selves. In effect, 
I propose that in early modern culture there is a degree of slippage between subjectivity 
as an epistemological concept, denoting contingent, and variable knowledge, and 
subjectivity as selfhood or individual identity.  
In particular, this thesis will suggest at various points that early modern selfhood 
is produced, to a significant extent, through gustatory experiences. Because of the 
extreme subjectivity of taste sensations – a commonplace in the early modern period – 
taste is uniquely revelatory of humoral (and hence ‘psychophysiological’) constitution: 
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gustatory sensation can become a kind of performance of preference or aversion which 
actualizes, even as it articulates, individuality. De gustibus non est disputandum, as the Latin 
proverb goes: there is no disputing about taste.67 Whilst today this motto, or a variant 
translation of it, is usually deployed in response to a clash of aesthetic tastes, in the early 
modern period it just as often referred to gustatory tastes.68 In a chapter on ‘how to judge 
of the Maturity and Goodness of Fruits’ included in Jean de La Quintinie’s The compleat 
gard’ner (1693), translated by John Evelyn, for example, Quintinie suggests sight, touch, 
and smell can judge the outward appearance of fruits, but argues that ultimately ‘the 
Tast is the only and real Judge to whom it belongs to Judge Solidly... of the Goodness’ 
of a fruit.69 The subjectivity of taste, however, causes him some discomfort: ‘a thing 
which may please one Man’s Pallat, may displease another’s: But this discussion is out 
of my Province; the Ancient Maxim (de  Gustibus) forbids my medling with it, and thus I 
can only speak of my own in particular...’70 Here, the conventionality of the ‘de Gustibus’ 
maxim is signalled by its casual truncation: the reader, it is presumed, will be able to fill 
in the rest.  
‘The truth of being, and the truth of knowing,’ Francis Bacon states in his 1605 
Advancement of learning, ‘are one, differing no more than the direct beame and the beame 
reflected.’71 Bacon’s point is of course an ethical one: as with Glanvill (who drew heavily 
on Bacon’s works) the validity of knowledge depends on the moral rectitude of its 
producer. In the contexts of humoral psychology and Aristotelian physiology, however, 
it accrues a more immediately corporeal significance, as a brief consideration of Walter 
Raleigh’s Sceptik suggests. Raleigh argues that sensory perception is affected by the 
specific constitution of an individual’s sense organs. ‘To a rough and drie tongue,’ for 
instance,  
 
that very thing seemeth bitter... which to the moister tongue seemeth not to be 
so. Divers creatures then having tongues drier, or moister according to their 
several temperatures, when they tast the same thing, must needs conceit it to be 
                                                          
67 Steven Shapin notes that ‘no one seems to know where [this] phrase originated, though some think it 
must be scholastic.’ Steven Shapin, ‘The Sciences of Subjectivity,’ Social Studies of Science 42/4 (2012): 172. 
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according as the instrument of their tast is affected, either bitter, or sweet, &c.... 
one and the same outward object is diversly judged of, and conceited, according 
to the several and divers qualities of the instrument of Sence, which conveieth it 
to the imagination.72 
 
Raleigh’s account of the senses, which draws heavily on Michel de Montaigne’s 
discussion in his An Apology of Raymond Sebond, is concerned with variations across 
species, and the weakness of man’s claims to sensory and intellectual superiority over 
the animals, but it also applies to inter-species differences in perception. Humoral 
‘temperature’ or constitution affects sensory perception, and subsequently affects the 
knowledge derived from those perceptions: objects are ‘judged of, and conceited,’ or 
known, ‘according to.... the instrument of Sence.’   
The conviction that the body of sensor is a formative condition of what he or 
she perceives, and therefore what he or she knows, is articulated by Raleigh in terms of 
Galenic humoralism. It is also, however, traceable to Aristotelian and faculty sensory 
physiology. In particular, it derives from the Thomist dictum unumquodque recipitur per 
modum recipientis, which – in his translation of the Dominican prior Giacomo Affinati’s 
The dumbe divine speaker (1605) – Anthony Munday renders as ‘every thing is received, according 
to the nature of the bodye that receives it, and not according to the nature of the thing it selfe received.’73 
Again, because knowledge derives ultimately from sensation, this principle also extends 
to the intellect: ‘wee may example the same by our intelligence or understanding,’ claims 
Affinati, because the ‘understanding’ itself is dependent on the constitution or 
complexion of the body which receives it: ‘our understanding sits as mid-way seated, 
betweene the thing apprehended or entertained, and the body which receives the 
same.’74 
Human perception, then – including the sense of taste – is a process of 
transformation, according to which the alterity of the world is absorbed by, and at least 
in part remade in the image of, the sensor. Perception can also, however, be a 
metamorphosis in the other direction: the transformation of the vulnerable self by the 
world. The Aristotelian notion that sensation occurs via a literal imprinting of the form 
or image of the object of perception on the perceptual organs of the sensing subject is 
                                                          
72 Raleigh, Sceptick, sig B4v-B5v (8-10). 
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(London: R. Bradock for William Leake, 1605), K5v (138). 
74 Ibid., K6r (139). 
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key here. As Edward Reynolds puts it in his 1677 Meditations on the fall and rising of St 
Peter: 
 
All knowledg consists in mixture and union, whereby the understanding 
receiveth into it the image and similitude of the thing which it knows; which 
made the Philosopher [Aristotle] say, That the Soul in understanding a thing is 
made the very thing which it understands; namely, in that sense as we call the 
Image of the Face in a Glass, the Face it self; or the Impression in Wax, the Seal 
it self.75 
 
Corporeal experience and the knowledge derived therein is thus a process of 
transformation:  a sensation reforms the body and soul of the sensor in the image of its 
object. Knowledge deriving from sensation is not something which the subject 
possesses, but is coterminous with the emergence of the knowing subject. Contra the 
new historicist conflation of knowledge and power, the acquisition of sense-based 
knowledge for early modern men and women involved a degree of subjection, of 
abjection almost – a risky and potentially transformative opening up of the self to the 
world. 
Strikingly, Reynolds’ emphasis on the ways in which the self emerges in tandem 
with sensory knowledge is consistent with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s assertion, in his 
1945 Phenomenology of Perception, that: 
 
The subject of sensation is neither a thinker who takes note of a quality, nor an 
inert setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a power which is born into, 
and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or synchronized with 
it.76 
 
The subject is not prior to the world he or she perceives – a distinct observer – but 
emerges as a subject precisely in the act of sensing. Similarly, the peripatetic claim that 
understanding is situated between the thing apprehended and the receptive body 
resonates with Bruce Smith’s insistence that ‘colour is not an object out there in space, 
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waiting to be named; it is a phenomenon, an event that happens between an object and 
a subject.’ 77  For both Affinati and Smith, a perception is something which occurs 
‘between[e]’ the world and the self. 
In noticing these parallels, I signal my allegiance to a mode of scholarship that, 
following Smith’s seminal work, has in the past few years become current in early 
modern studies: historical phenomenology. Smith outlines the fundamental insight that 
is the motor of this approach with admirable concision: ‘you cannot know anything 
apart from the way in which you come to know it.’78 Or, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, 
‘all my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own 
particular point of view.’79 More specifically, Merleau-Ponty explores the ways in which 
the body itself serves as a formative condition of engagement with the world, and thus 
of the knowledge derived from that engagement. Sense perceptions are shaped by, and 
cannot be understood apart from, the contexts in which they take place. As Julian 
Thomas puts it, ‘perception is not simply a cognitive activity, for the subject who 
engages in experience is always embodied... [Sensations] can be understood only in the 
wider context of a person’s immersion in the world.’ As such, ‘perception is inherently 
meaningful... The body’s relationship with the world it inhabits is charged with 
meaning.’80 Sensation, then, emerges as historically specific, but resistant to historical 
objectification.81 
Historical phenomenology offers an indispensable methodological tool, 
enabling us to interrogate a range of common critical presumptions and approaches. In 
particular, in the last decade or so early modern studies has undergone what has been 
called ‘a material turn,’ as scholars have increasingly attended to the physical things of 
early modern literature and culture.82 Whilst this ‘turn’ has proved fertile in myriad 
respects, Jonathan Gil Harris has argued for the need for a more sophisticated approach 
to material culture. Too frequently, Harris argues, the scholar treats the object of his or 
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her interest as a kind of magic key with the capacity to unlock the past, identifying his or 
her experience of it directly with that of its earlier owners and users. 83 In contrast, 
sensory scholarship argues for the historical specificity of the lived experience of the 
material world. ‘Historical phenomenology,’ as Kevin Curran and James Kearney put it, 
‘emphasizes how meaning accrues from the way sensing bodies experienced and 
perceived objects.’84 
The reasons that phenomenology works so well as a kind of conceptual toolbox 
for understanding early modern thought have not, however, been fully considered. 
Whereas Smith, for example, sees certain early modern writers as prefiguring the later 
insights of phenomenologists, I wish to emphasise how twentieth-century 
phenomenologists overtly drew on and developed much earlier conceptions of selfhood 
and knowledge. Smith comments, for instance, of Edward’s Herbert’s 1633 De Veritate 
that ‘here, several centuries too early, are the grounds for… the phenomenological 
writings of Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.’ 85 Such statements imply a 
teleological mindset according to which a few authors managed to achieve insights 
worthy of a later, more advanced historical period, and ignores the fact that twentieth-
century phenomenology was shaped to a significant degree by its foremost practitioners’ 
self-conscious engagement (part of a wider project of challenging the assumptions of 
Enlightenment philosophy) with pre-Cartesian conceptions of selfhood and knowledge, 
and particularly with the works of Aristotle and his medieval commentators. 
Intentionality is a case in point. Formulated by Franz Brentano in the 1870s, and later 
elaborated by his student Husserl, phenomenological ‘intentionality’ designates the 
contention, put simply, that all mental phenomena (thoughts, consciousness, cognition) 
must be directed towards an object (whether real or imaginary). Brentano’s work on 
intentionality drew on scholastic philosophy, particularly the peripatetic school and 
commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. 86 From this perspective, affinities between early 
modern ideas about perception and twentieth-century phenomenology, derive not from 
the historical precocity of figures such as Edward Herbert, but from their shared 
heritage of Aristotelian and peripatetic philosophy. Recognition of this fact encourages 
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critical humility, but also allows us to develop a more nuanced appreciation of the 
intricate and diverse, but in many respects continuous, fabric of ideas about the human 
sensorium, prompting acknowledgment of the extent to which apparently fresh 
hermeneutic strategies are entangled in the histories and texts that they propose to 
unravel.  
This thesis offers an exploration of early modern taste which strives to balance 
awareness of the historical specificity of sensation with consideration of perception’s 
epistemological weight. I begin with an interrogation of literary taste, often understood 
as a variety of aesthetic ‘taste.’ The emergence of taste as a literary and aesthetic term is 
usually seen as a process of metaphorical abstraction beginning in the late seventeenth 
century and reaching its culmination in the eighteenth. In contrast, in chapter 1, I argue 
that the language of literary good taste is nascent much earlier, in the anti-theatrical 
controversy and in commonplace culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Focusing on the pervasive humanist trope of the reader as a bee, using his or her sense 
of taste to discriminate between and subsequently digest the honey-laden flowers of 
rhetoric, I make an excursion into early modern metaphor theory in order to argue that 
the language of literary tasting in this period should be understood not as purely 
figurative but as rooted in readerly practices.   
In a range of paratexts, ‘taste’ serves as a mediating term, helping the reader to 
negotiate the transition between lived and readerly experience. Turning to anti-theatrical 
tracts and responses to them, I demonstrate that the debate surrounding the moral 
value of theatre and of other forms of vernacular literature is consistently articulated in 
terms of taste. Whilst opponents of vernacular drama such as Stephen Gosson use the 
language of taste to associate theatre-going with a sinful and insalubrious sweetness, 
their adversaries, including Philip Sidney, frame the Puritan ‘distaste’ for poesie as 
pathological. Focusing on Anne Southwell’s commonplace book, I argue that, within a 
humoral economy, the language of literary taste and distaste refers to actual corporeal 
experience. In the final part of the chapter, I explore the implications of this for how we 
understand the politics of taste and the formation of publics, arguing that the language 
of taste democratizes judgement.  
Taste is a mode of knowing, but – for anatomists – it was also an object of 
knowledge, a function of the body that might be studied and understood. Chapter 2 
turns to the evidence of medical practice and writing in order to probe the relationship 
between literary taste, and taste as a faculty and topic of empirical investigation. 
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Focusing on Helkiah Crooke’s 1615 Mikrokosmographia, I show how, in anatomical 
textbooks, ‘taste’ slides referentially between gustation and discrimination, including 
readerly discrimination, and investigate what this semantic duality has to tell us about 
the experience of early modern anatomy. The conventional scholarly presumption is 
that the history of anatomy in the west follows a trajectory away from the authority of 
classical texts towards the empirical certainties of sensory experience, with the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries emerging as a key period of transition. Focusing on the 
language of touch, scholars including Elizabeth Harvey have suggested that sensory 
metaphors for producing and communicating knowledge in early modern anatomical 
texts register this putative rise of empiricism. 
In contrast, I argue that Crooke exploits the semantic flexibility of taste, which 
can refer both to sense experience and to readerly discrimination, in order to establish 
the reciprocity of bodily sensation and mental judgement as routes to anatomical 
knowledge. Turning to Mikrokosmographia’s discussion of the senses, and particularly 
taste, as an object of knowledge, I demonstrate that, for Crooke, sensation involves not 
merely the passive reception, but an active grasping, of meaning. The mind, Crooke 
argues, must be present in sensory experience; as such, sensation is a process of, not 
simply prior to, judgement and discrimination. Conversely, Crooke describes acts of 
reading and judging texts as physiological, involving tactile and gustatory sensitivity. 
Crooke’ use of sensory metaphor, then, attests not the victory of proto-scientific 
empiricism over classical erudition, but rather the fundamental affinity of sense-based 
and textual knowledge.   
 Taste’s epistemological utility in the early modern period was compromised by 
its disreputable moral status. Retellings of, and commentaries on, Genesis in the early 
modern period overwhelmingly describe the Fall in gustatory terms; ranging across early 
modern devotional literature, chapter 3 investigates the significance of this tendency. 
The lapsarian myth, I argue, haunted quotidian culinary experience: tableware decorated 
with images of the fall ensured that diners saw mealtimes in typological terms. 
Nonetheless, a pervasive sense of taste’s culpability for mankind’s sin and subsequent 
misery is complicated by an equally pervasive interest in taste’s redemptive potential: in 
particular, its centrality within Eucharistic ritual. I ask what kind of epistemological 
value gustation might have when the desired object of knowledge is God, arguing that 
Protestant writings frequently employ the terms of taste to avow the superiority of 
scriptural engagement, and sometimes of a purely experiential faith, over ecclesiastical 
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authority. The distinction between fallen and salvific tasting corresponds broadly to the 
distinction between physical and spiritual tasting. It does not, as we might expect, 
entirely compromise the former, which retains some devotional value as an aid to 
morally instructive, self-reflective meditation. 
Tracing taste’s role in the negotiation of confessional identities in post-
Reformation England, I focus in particular on the language of sweetness, which is used 
both to indicate a commendable intimacy with the divine, and as a weapon in the anti-
papist polemical arsenal. The final section of the chapter establishes the frequency with 
which – following Eve’s initiatory part in the Fall – the sense of taste was gendered as 
female. Focusing on Aemilia Lanyer’s Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum, I show how Lanyer 
appropriated and reconfigured the traditional association between her sex and Eve, 
emphasising instead the role of Eve’s typological antitype, Mary, as bearer of the ‘sweet 
foode’ of Christ. 
Chapter 4 makes a case for the importance of taste to the development of 
experimental science; in particular, to members of the early Royal Society. Chemists, 
botanists, and physicians, I show, used their sense of taste to generate data about the 
material world. Gustation was particularly important to physicians such as Nehemiah 
Grew, who attempted to taxonomize the flavours of plants in the hope that doing so 
would reveal new medical uses for them. Influenced by Parascelian medical theory, by 
taste’s prior epistemological associations, and by Protestant rhetoric, Society 
propagandists implied that such acts of natural historical tasting could serve as a 
redemptive reversal of Adam and Eve’s tasting of the fruit of knowledge, returning the 
body to an Edenic state of health and vigor.  
This celebratory story, however, was compromised by microscopic 
investigations into taste as a physiological process. Such investigations led to a more 
complicated sense of taste experiences as shaped by a range of factors, including the 
specific form of an individual’s taste organs. In the mechanistic, tactile theories of 
gustation adopted by Grew, but also by contemporaries including Robert Boyle and 
Thomas Willis, taste – and thus the information it produces – is deeply subjective and 
unstable. Grew’s work in particular testifies to an unresolved conflict between its 
author’s desire to categorically determine correlations between the flavours of plants 
and their medicinal virtues, and his understanding of tastes as circumstantial and 
contingent, produced jointly by tasting subject and tasted object.  
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My fifth and final chapter asks how the correlation between taste and 
knowledge that my thesis charts relates to a cultural obsession with what is frequently 
figured the sweetness of courtship, kissing, and coition. This heavy emphasis on 
sweetness, I argue, is a distinguishing aspect of early modern eroticism, and prompts us 
to think about the ways in which the history of sexual desire and pleasure might be best 
understood as a matter neither of sex, nor of sexuality, but rather of sensuality. 
Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century uses of the language of taste to describe erotic 
experience both reflect a range of cultural practices, and participate in wider debates 
surrounding the epistemological and moral status of gustation. Focusing on 
Shakespeare’s Othello, but also engaging once again with the bee trope, I suggest that 
whilst sexual tastes are often presented as animalistic and irrational, a number of authors 
exploit taste’s prior connotations of discrimination and experiential knowledge in order 
to imply that desire is a mode of judgement, and that sensuality offers a route to 
intersubjective certainty. Use of the language of taste, then, underwrites a (limited and 
localized) recuperation of sensual passion in seventeenth-century England.  
Consideration of taste, furthermore, encourages recognition of authors’ use of 
the realm of erotic love as a kind of testing ground to comparatively assess definitions 
of and routes to knowledge. In particular, works employing the banquet of the senses 
theme – notably George Chapman’s 1595 Ovids banquet of sense – present the conflict 
between Ovidian eroticism and neo-Platonic chastity as a battle between two types of 
knowledge: rhetorical knowledge, which is rooted in sensation, and philosophical 
knowledge, which is rooted in remembering a priori ‘ideas.’ Crucially, the contest is 
articulated using the language of taste: whereas neo-Platonic chastity is associated with a 
pathological corruption of appetites, sensual pleasure is presented as a corollary of 
sweetly persuasive and epistemologically substantial rhetoric.  
Poised between acclaim and infamy, the sacred and the profane, taste in the 
seventeenth century is an ‘Apish Art.’ My thesis illuminates the pivotal role which this 
ambivalent sense played in the articulation and negotiation of early modern obsessions 
including the nature and value of empirical knowledge, the attainment of grace, and the 
moral status of erotic pleasure, attesting in the process to a very real contiguity between 
different ways of knowing – experimental, empirical, textual, rational – in the period.  
 
39 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 ‘To dream to eat Books’:  
Of Bibliophagy, Bees, and Literary Taste 
 
I. ‘A Banquet of Wit’ 
 
In her 1664 Sociable Letters, Margaret Cavendish responds to a correspondent’s request 
‘to send you word how the Poets were Feasted,’ with the following description, worth 
quoting at length: 
 
Nature sent the Muses to Invite all the Poets to a Banquet of Wit, and Invited also 
me a Poetess, or rather Poetastress; I went, and entred into a Large Room of 
Imagination... then was every one Placed round about the Table... the Table we 
were set to, was a strange Table, for never was seen the like, it was made of all the 
Famous Old Poets Sculs, and the Table-cloth or Covering was made of their Brains, 
which Brains were Spun by the Muses... into Cobweb Threads, as Soft and Thin as 
Air, and then Woven into a Piece, or Web... the Napkins for the Hands was Pure 
Fine White Paper, all over-wrought with Black Letters, and the Edges round about 
were Gilded; also there were upon the Table, Plates, Salt-sellers, Knives and Forks, 
the Plates were made of the Films or Drums of Sensible Ears, and the Knives that 
were to cut the Meat laid thereon, were Orators Tongues, the Trencher Salt-sellers, 
which were set by every Plate, were made of the Chrystalline part of Observing 
Eyes, and the Salt that was put therein, was made of Sea-water, or Salt-tears, which 
usually Flow from a Tragick Vein, the Forks that were to bear up the Meat to the 
Tast of the Understanding, were Writing pens; The Table being thus Covered and 
Ordered, and the Guests set round, ready for the Feast, in came the Muses with 
Basons of Water, fetch’d from the Well, or Spring of Helicon, for the Poets to Wash 
before they did Eat, and after they had Wash’d, the Muses carried those Basons 
forth, and then brought in many several Dishes of Poetical Meats, Placing them on 
the Table; the first was a Great dish of Poems, Excellently well Dress’d, and 
Curious Sawce made of Metaphors, Similitudes, and Fancies, and round the Sides or 
Verges of the Dish, were laid Numbers and Rimes, like as we use on Corporeal 
Dishes and Meats, to lay Dates, or Flowers, or Slices of Limmons, or the like; then 
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was there a Dish of Songs, brought by the Lyricks, it was very Delicious Meat, and 
had a most Sweet Relish, it was Dress’d with a Compounded Sawce of many several 
Airs, Notes, and Strains; then were there two Dishes of Epigrams, I think one of 
them was Martial’s, for they were Powdered, or Brined Highly with Satirical Salt, the 
other Dish was so Luscious with Flattery, as I could not Feed much thereon; then 
there was a Dish of Epithalamiums, but that Meat was Dress’d so Strong and Rank, 
as it was Nauseous to me; then there was a Hash of Anagrams, Letters, and Names, 
Hashed, or Minced together, but I did not like it; then there was a Dish of Funeral 
Elegies well Drest, but it was so Sad and Heavy Meat, as I durst not Feed much 
thereon; then there was a Dish of Comedies, Excellently well Drest, with Scenes, 
the Sawce was Compounded, but very Savoury, being Compounded of divers 
Humors, and the Dish Graced or Garnished with Smiles and Laughter; the next 
dish to that were Tragedies, but those were Drest as we Dress Corporeal Shoulders 
of Mutton, or Venison, in the Blood, Stuff’d with Sighs, as the other with Herbs, 
and Salted with Tears. Then came an Olio, or Bisk of Characters, and after that was 
a Dish of Morals, which is a Meat more Wholsome than Pleasant, the Chief Sawce 
was Temperance, but it was mix’d with other several Virtues and Passions... then 
there was a Grand Sallet of Rhetorick, with Oil of Eloquence... then there was a 
Quelquechose of Rallery, but whatsoever the Meat was, the Sawce was Naught, for 
it was made of Ingredients, as bad as Poor People Dress their Corporeal Meat with, 
as Lamp-oil, Dead Vinegar, Rotten Pepper, and Stinking Garlick, as Foolish Jests, 
Dull, Spiteful Replies, Rude Familiarity, often Repetitions, and Reproaches, so as 
there was Sweet, Bitter, Sour, and altogether Mixd, of this Dish I Tasted not, I was 
Sick at the Presence of it; as for the Desert, it was Musick of all sorts, Sweet, and 
Harmonious....1 
 
This is Cavendish in full imaginative flow, blending the grotesque and the gorgeous, the 
bizarre and the banal, with characteristic exuberance. The passage, however, is more 
than a fantastical curiosity piece: like the muses spinning table-coverings from poets’ 
brains, Cavendish’s multi-stranded description of the ‘Banquet of Wit’ intertwines 
physicality and phantasy, sensation and intellection, and the culinary and the literary, in 
ways which are pertinent to the concerns of this chapter. What the muses make of the 
brain matter they work with is not only a fabric but a form of skin: the ‘Cobweb 
                                                          
1 Margaret Cavendish, CCXI sociable letters (London: William Wilson, 1664), Gggr1-r3 (417-421). 
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Threads’ they weave into a ‘web’ recalls the iconographic association between spiders 
and the sense of touch, a connotation which is strengthened by Cavendish’s delicately 
haptic description of the threads ‘as Soft and Thin as Air.’ 2  Reversing the usual 
physiological trajectory – according to which disparate sensations are organized, 
aggregated, and transformed into knowledge in the mind3 – Cavendish’s muses spin the 
poets’ brains out into a kind of tactile tablecloth, an object which furnishes the 
simultaneously mental and material space of the ‘Large Room of Imagination.’  
This, then, is a feast where the sense organs serve not (or at least not only) as 
conduits of pleasure, but as part of the material culture of dining. The suggestion that 
perception does not belong exclusively to the banqueters, but is distributed across 
plates, knives, and salt cellars constituted respectively of ear-drums, orator’s tongues, 
and eye-whites, is compounded by Cavendish’s insistence on the sensitivity of the 
organs she evokes: the drums come from ‘Sensible Ears,’ the cellars derive from 
‘Observing eyes.’4 Not all the tableware, however, has an anatomical origin: the napkins 
are written-on paper, and ‘the Forks that were to bear up the Meat to the Tast of the 
Understanding, were Writing pens.’5 Here, there is an implied functional equivalence 
between sense-organs, dining equipment, and writing tools: all are equally instrumental, 
enabling the poet-guests to apprehend, engage with, and negotiate the literary banquet 
set before them. The multiplicity of these ambiguous implements corresponds to the 
duality of the sense they serve: ‘the Taste of the Understanding,’ which – as the faculty 
of both gustation and intellectual comprehension – is capable of appreciating a feast 
where the sauces are ‘Similitudes,’ and the dishes are garnished with ‘rimes’ rather than 
dates and lemons. At this point, it becomes possible to hear the pun in Cavendish’s 
designation of herself as a ‘Poetastress’ (my emphasis). Cavendish is not simply making a 
                                                          
2 Touch is represented by a spider in John Davies’ poem Nosce teipsum this oracle expounded (London: 
Richard Field, for John Standish, 1599), G3r (45), and in Thomas Middleton’s pageant The triumph of truth 
(London: Nicholas Okes, 1613), B4v. For the spider as an iconographical image of touch, see Casagrande 
and Kleinhenz, ‘Literary and Philosophical Perspectives,’ 311-27; Assaf, ‘The Ambivalence of the Sense 
of Touch,’ 85 and 88; Carla Mazzio, The Inarticulate Renaissance: Language Trouble in an Age of Eloquence 
(Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009),  194-95; Moshenska, ‘Feeling Pleasures,’ 3-4; and 
Helen Smith, ‘Grossly Material Things’: Women and Book Production in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 11. 
3  I explore this model further in chapter 2. 
4 As such, Cavendish’s feast adds weight to John Sutton’s and Evelyn Tribble’s insistence that ‘mental 
activities spread or smear across the boundaries of skull and skin to include parts of the social and 
material world... Many cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across the physical, 
social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains.’ John Sutton and Evelyn Tribble, 
‘Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies,’ Shakespeare Studies 39 (2011): 95.  
5 Cavendish’s rhetoric reflects historical practice here. As Wendy Wall has shown, writing implements 
were often used as culinary tools in the early modern period: ‘the kitchen was filled with the materials of 
writing.’ Wendy Wall, ‘Literacy and the Domestic Arts,’ Huntington Library Quarterly 73/3 (2010): 401. 
42 
 
joke about the unskillfulness of female poets (as a poetess, she is also a poetaster, an 
inferior versifier). Rather, she is asserting the conceptual and, indeed, syllabic centrality 
of taste, understood as both a sensory and a discriminative faculty, to her literary 
identity.6 
Whilst Cavendish’s subsequent enumeration of the ‘many several Dishes of 
Poetical Meats’ she and her fellow diners are served is unusual in the thoroughness of 
its commitment to the guiding association between language and food, the association 
itself is conventional, as is Cavendish’s pairing of different flavours and culinary styles 
with specific genres. Her description of the ‘most Sweet Relish’ of the ‘Dish of Songs,’ 
for instance, derives ultimately from Horace, who, in his ‘Ars Poetica,’ influentially 
expressed poetry’s capacity to both delight and instruct via the formula ‘dulce et utile’: 
sweetness and usefulness. 7  Correspondingly, Cavendish’s assertion that Martial’s 
epigrams are ‘Brined Highly with Satirical Salt,’ reflects an ancient and enduring 
characterisation of comedic satire as salty.8 More directly aggressive satire, on the other 
hand, was associated with bitterness: thus, invoking the conventional connection 
between iambic trimester and satirical attacks, Philip Sidney suggests in his 1595 An 
apologie for Poetrie that the least popular kind of poetry might be ‘the bitter but 
wholesome Iambic, who rubs the galled mind, in making shame the trumpet of 
villainy.’9 
‘To eat,’ argues Robert Appelbaum, ‘is not only to consume; it is also to 
communicate... Food is... a kind of language, a system of communication.’ 10  The 
converse, it seems, is also true: language is a kind of food. In this chapter, I interrogate 
early modern instances of bibliophagic and alimentary metaphors – metaphors which 
figure texts as consumables, and reading as a form of eating – in order to propose that 
renaissance authors appropriated conventional pairings of literary modes and particular 
                                                          
6 Cavendish’s playfulness here echoes that of the female devotional writers, notably Amelia Lanyer, who I 
discuss in chapter 3 of this thesis. Cavendish’s ‘Poetastress’ joke hints at the conventional misogynistic 
association between the sense of taste and women’s epistemological and sensual appetites. Like Lanyer, 
however, she ultimately rejects this association in favour of a more positive, acclamatory model of taste as 
a mode of selection and discrimination.  
7 ‘Who can blend usefulness and sweetness wins every / Vote, at once delighting and teaching the reader.’ 
Horace, ‘Ars Poetica,’ trans. A. S. Kline, Poetry in Translation, accessed 26 March 2013, 
www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Latin/HoraceArsPoetica.htm.  
8 Eric Byville similarly comments that, historically, ‘satire is neither sprinkled with sugar nor smeared with 
honey, but rather doused in salt, vinegar, and gall. (The satire closer to comedy tastes of sal, whereas that 
closer to tragedy tastes of fel.).’ Byville also notes that ‘the gustatory trope is pervasive in Renaissance 
literary theory, which used the terms sweet and bitter to classify works according to their effect on 
readers.’ Eric Byville, ‘Aesthetic Uncommon Sense: Early Modern Taste and the Satirical Sublime,’ 
Criticism 54/4 (2012): 592.  
9 Philip Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie (London: James Roberts for Henry Olney, 1595), F3r. 
10 Appelbaum, Aguecheek’s Beef, 10. 
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flavours, and developed them into a substantial and subtle poetics of taste.11 I will focus 
largely, although not exclusively, on late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
commonplace books and related forms including anthologies and miscellanies. Such 
works frequently and self-referentially describe the processes of readerly and editorial 
discrimination, extraction, collation, and composition which undergird them by making 
use of the widespread humanist trope of the reader as a bee, using his or her sense of 
taste to distinguish between and recombine the flowers of rhetoric. This trope, I will 
argue, is an important precursor of what we usually think of as the abstracted, 
eighteenth-century definition of ‘taste’ as aesthetic discernment. Early seventeenth-
century uses of ‘taste’ in this context, however, are not disconnected from, but to the 
contrary repeatedly invoke, the phenomenal reality of gustatory sensation. For many 
early modern readers and authors, the bee trope possessed a literal dimension: literary 
discrimination is experienced as gustatory preference and aversion. Bibliophagy is not 
merely a metaphor: it is grounded both in a historically specific conception of the 
human body, and in a range of material practices.  
 
II. ‘the dainties that are bred in a booke’ 
 
In his commonplace book, posthumously published in 1641 as Timber; or, discoveries made 
on men and matter, Ben Jonson lists the skills which a poet must possess. Amongst them, 
he numbers ‘Imitation,’ which he defines as the poet’s ability: 
 
to convert the substance, or Riches of an other Poet, to his owne use... Not, as a 
Creature, that swallowes, what it takes in, crude, raw, or indigested; but, that 
feedes with an Appetite, and hath a Stomacke to concoct, devide, and turne all 
into nourishment. Not, to imitate serviley, as Horace saith… but, to draw forth 
out the best, and choisest flowers, with the Bee, and turne all into Honey, worke 
it into one relish, and savour: make our Imitation sweet...12 
                                                          
11 For an account of the history of ‘alimentary metaphors,’ see Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature 
and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Task (New York: Pantheon, 1953), 134-37. For ‘metaphors of 
bibliophagy’ in the renaissance, see Michel Jeanneret, A Feast of Words: Banquets and Table Talk in the 
Renaissance, trans. Jeremy Whiteley and Emma Hughes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 
especially 130-31. For a discussion of ‘the figurative physiology of reading as eating’ in relation to 
women’s reading in the early modern period, see Helen Smith, ‘“More swete vnto the eare / than 
holsome for ye mynde”: Embodying Early Modern Women’s Reading,’ Huntington Library Quarterly 73/3 
(2010): 423-26.  
12 Ben Jonson, Timber: or, Discoveries; Made upon Men and Matter in The workes of Benjamin Jonson, vol. 3 
(London: James Dawson for Thomas Walkley, 1640), R2r (127). See William P. Williams, ‘Chetwin, 
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Jonson describes a form of active, selective reading that scholars agree was central to 
early modern literate English culture, and which was facilitated by the widespread 
practice – recommended by influential humanists and pedagogues including Erasmus, 
Vives and Melanchthon – of keeping a commonplace book.13 Strictly a collection of 
classical and patristic quotations, culled from its owner’s reading and transcribed, or 
‘digested,’ under a series of thematic heads, the commonplace book was a repository of 
material intended for future deployment in contexts ranging from political oratory to 
personal conversation, or – as Jonson suggests – in literary composition. By the 
seventeenth century, however, the doxographical emphasis had begun to diminish, and 
commonplace books had begun to incorporate vernacular and ephemeral material such 
as original poems, recipes, witticisms, and inventories. A new market of printed 
commonplace books also emerged.14 
If the mode of discriminative reading and appropriative composition that 
Jonson recommends is conventional, so too is the metaphor he uses to describe this 
mode. Jonson compares the reader-poet to a bee, selecting between the ‘choisest 
flowers’ of rhetoric and subsequently converting them into the ‘Honey’ of a new 
composition.15 What I will call the bee trope was itself something of a commonplace, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Crooke, and the Jonson Folios,’ Studies in Bibliography 30 (1997): 75-95 for an account of the convoluted 
publication history of this volume.  
13 Scholarship addressing early modern reading as a dynamic, goal-oriented process is now extensive. Key 
works include Lisa Jardine’s and A. T. Grafton’s seminal ‘“Studied for Action”: How Gabriel Harvey read 
his Livy,’ Past and Present 129 (1990): 30-78; Peter Beale, ‘Notes in Garrison: The Seventeenth Century 
Commonplace Book’ in New Ways of Looking at Old Texts: Papers of the Renaissance English Text Society, 1985-
1991, ed. W. Speed Hill (Tempe: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1993), 131-47; Mary 
Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); Anne Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jennifer Anderson and Elizabeth Sauer, eds., Books and Readers 
in Early Modern England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Kevin Sharpe and Steven 
N. Zwicker, eds., Reading, Society and Politics in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003); Adam Smyth, ‘Profit and Delight’: Printed Miscellanies in England, 1640-1682 (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 2004); Heidi Brayman Hackel, Reading Material in Early Modern England: Print, Gender 
and Literacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); James Raven, Helen Small, and Naomi 
Tadmor, eds., The Practice and Representation of Reading in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); William Sherman, Used Books: Marking Readers in Renaissance England (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Zachary Lesser and Peter Stallybrass, ‘The First Literary Hamlet 
and the Commonplacing of Professional Plays,’ Shakespeare Quarterly 59/4 (2008): 371-420. For a response 
to this body of work which emphasises that ‘some manuscript commonplace books do in fact reflect a 
careful reading of whole literary texts and reveal a respect for the intentions of the author,’ see Jennifer 
Richards and Fred Schurink, ‘The Textuality and Materiality of Reading in Early Modern England,’ 
Huntington Library Quarterly 73/3 (2010): 352. 
14 See Earle Havens, Commonplace Books: A History of Manuscripts and Printed Books from Antiquity to the 
Twentieth Century (Vermont: Stinehour Press, 2001), especially 13-33, for the comprehensive overview to 
which my brief summary here is indebted. 
15 The phrase ‘the flowers of rhetoric’ references the medieval genre of the florilegium, collections of the 
‘flowers’ of (usually biblical and patristic) literature. The modern equivalent is the ‘anthology ’ (from the 
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frequently reproduced, in various forms, in the very commonplace books and 
anthologies that were products of the kind of selective reading that it describes. The 
1598 printed commonplace book Palladis tamia, for instance, quotes an example of the 
bee trope attributed to Seneca the younger:  
 
Bees out of divers flowers draw divers juices, but they temper and digest them 
by their owne vertue, otherwise they would make no honny: so… what thou 
readest is to bee transposed to thine owne use. Seneca.16  
 
Other classical sources reinforced the association between bees, readerly discrimination, 
and rhetorical facility: as Felicity Hughes notes, ‘the legend that Pindar was fed honey 
by bees in his infancy as an augury of supreme eloquence’ circulated widely in this 
period.17  Plato, too, described poets as bees: as the figure of Socrates reports in Plato’s 
Ion, lyric poets:  
 
tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the 
gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from 
flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy 
thing...18 
 
Pindar and Plato associate apian activity with divine inspiration, rather than readerly 
diligence, but the outcome – poetic skill – is the same.  
Scholarly analyses of the bee trope have focused on different aspects of its 
symbolic utility. Anne Moss, for instance, comments on its value for writers negotiating 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Greek ἄνθο-ς flower, and λογια collection). ‘Florilegium, n.,’ and ‘anthology, n.’ OED Online, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/71895 and www.oed.com/view/Entry/8369, both accessed 01 April 2013. It 
is perhaps worth noting that whilst we don’t habitually eat flowers today, the consumption of blooms was 
widespread in the first half of the seventeenth century. On their culinary popularity, see Joan Thirsk, Food 
in Early Modern England: Phases, Fads, Fashions 1500-1760 (London: Continuum, 2007), 81 and 105. The 
word ‘miscellany’ is also contains a bibliophagic metaphor in its etymology: it derives from the classical 
Latin miscellānea a hotchpotch, mixture (of food). ‘Miscellanea, n.’ OED Online, accessed 01 April 2013, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/119270.  
16 Francis Meres (compiled by), Palladis tamia, ed. Nicholas Ling (London: P. Short for Cuthbert Burbie, 
1598), Mm4v (268). For the original of this quote, see Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae 
Morales, trans. R. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library series 76, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press), II, 278.  
17 Felicity Hughes, ‘Milton, Shakespeare, Pindar and the Bees,’ Review of English Studies New Series 44 
(1993): 220.  
18 Plato, Ion (380 BCE), trans. Benjamin Jowett, accessed 25 March 2013, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/ion.html. 
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the relation between rhetorical imitatio and authorial originality. 19  Similarly, Richard 
Peterson comments on Jonson’s use of ‘digestive and apian metaphors’ as a strategy for 
discriminating between properly transformative and slavishly derivative models of 
imitatio. 20  Michael Schoenfeldt focuses instead on the digestive trope’s frequent 
deployment as a means of describing readerly discrimination,21 and Peter Stallybrass, 
Roger Chartier, J. Franklin Mowery, and Heather Wolfe – citing Philip Melanchthon – 
note its significance as an analogy for the workings of memory.22 All these scholars, 
however, concentrate on one specific stage in the alimentary process: digestion. In 
contrast, in this chapter I emphasize the extent to which late sixteenth-century and early 
seventeenth-century authors focus on a slightly earlier moment. In my opening 
quotation Jonson invokes not only the physiological process of digestion, but also 
gustatory sensation.23 The poet turns his multifarious materials into a single, distinct 
‘savour,’ or flavour; the success of his ‘imitation’ is attested by its sweetness. Before a 
person can digest a meal, he or she must taste it, and the same goes for literary feasts. 
Take Francis Bacon’s famous exhortation in Of Studies. ‘Some bookes,’ writes Bacon: 
 
are to bee tasted, others to bee swallowed, and some few to bee chewed and 
disgested: That is, some bookes are to be read only in partes; others to be read, 
but cursorily, and some few to be read wholly and with diligence and attention.24  
 
Bacon understands the moment of discrimination to take place in the mouth, not in the 
stomach: digestion is a form of incorporation equivalent to reading thoroughly, which 
follows on from an initial, probative tasting.  
The possession of taste in this literary sense, moreover, can serve as a 
constituent of personal identity – as it does, for instance, for the pompous Nathanial in 
Shakespeare’s 1598 Love’s Labour’s Lost. Nathanial compares himself and Holofernes to 
the aptly-named Constable Dull. ‘Sir,’ he says to Holofernes: 
                                                          
19 Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books, 105. 
20 Richard Peterson, Imitation and Praise in the Poems of Ben Jonson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 
16-17. 
21 Michael Schoenfeldt, ‘Reading Bodies,’ in Sharpe and Zwicker, Reading, Society and Politics, especially 219. 
22 Peter Stallybrass et al., ‘Hamlet’s Tables and Technologies of Writing in Renaissance England,’ 
Shakespeare Quarterly 55/4 (2004): 379-419. 
23 Chris Meads notes the use of  the language of  taste to describe literary discrimination in early 
seventeenth century theatrical prologues. See Meads, ‘Narrative and Dramatic Sauces,’ in Joan Fitzpatrick, 
ed., Renaissance Food from Rabelais to Shakespeare: Culinary Readings and Culinary History (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2010), 145-66. 
24 Francis Bacon, ‘Of Studies,’ in Essayes, Religious meditations (London: John Windet for Humfrey Hooper, 
1597), B1v (1).  
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...[Dull] hath never fed of  the dainties that are bred in a booke.  
He hath not eate paper as it were 
He hath not drunke inke.  
His intellect is not replenished, hee is onely an animall, only sensible in the 
duller parts: and such barren plants are set before us, that we thankfull should 
be: which we [of] taste and feeling, are for those parts that doe fructifie in us 
more then he.25  
 
For Nathanial, to proclaim oneself a person ‘of taste’ is to assert oneself as learned and 
witty. This self-identification derives from a bibliophagic consumption of the materials 
of reading and writing: in comparison to Dull, who ‘hath not eat paper… [or] drunk 
ink,’ Nathanial implies that he and Holofernes are made intellectually fertile by their 
consumption of ‘the dainties that are bred in a book.’ On the one hand, Nathanial’s 
posturing here is meant to be funny: we are laughing at, not with him. Because the 
audience is already well-acquainted with Nathanial’s pedantry and self-importance, his 
words are bathetic: in calling himself a man of ‘taste and feeling [i.e. touch],’ Nathanial 
inadvertently reveals his own immersion in the lower senses he claims to disdain. Like 
the target of his derision, he too is ‘an animal, only sensible in the duller parts.’26 His use 
of bibliophagic images is an aspect of this involuntary self-revelation: Nathanial 
conceives of the exclusively human, reasonable act of reading in terms of the animal, 
irrational activity of eating. Problematic as they may be, however, Nathanial’s words 
nonetheless attest to a wider cultural sense – already evident in Margaret Cavendish’s 
reference to ‘the Taste of the Understanding’ – that ‘taste’ is a marker of aesthetic 
judgement and literary erudition, and as such something to aspire to.  
Nathanial’s words stand in stark contrast to the widespread scholarly 
presumption that the association between ‘taste’ and a capacity to appreciate beauty and 
excellence first emerged in the late seventeenth century, and achieved prominence only 
                                                          
25 William Shakespeare, Loves Labour’s Lost in William Shakespeares comedies, histories, & tragedies (London: 
Isaac Jaggard and Edward Bount, 1623), L6r (131). I follow the Arden edition in adding ‘[of].’ Nathanial’s 
words have a parallel in Richard Carew’s A herrings tayle, published in the same year, in which the snail 
Lymazon describes ‘Wan schollers eating paper, drinking inck, which they / Like Bees disgested up, in 
others bosome lay.’ Carew, A herrings tayle (London: Felix Kingston for Matthew Lownes, 1598), D2v. 
26 This suggestion is confirmed by Nathanial’s tendency to represent learning in terms which draw on the 
language of sexual reproduction and sensual pleasure: dainties are ‘bred’ in books; and his ‘parts... frucify’ 
where Dull’s are ‘barren.’ 
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in the eighteenth century. 27  This presumption is buttressed by the Oxford English 
Dictionary, which identifies Milton’s 1671 Paradise Regained as containing the first instance 
of ‘taste’ in what we today think of the aesthetic sense, defined as ‘the sense of what is 
appropriate, harmonious, or beautiful…. the faculty of perceiving and enjoying what is 
excellent in art, literature, and the like.’28 The OED quotes Book IV, in which Christ 
argues with Satan about the correct route to and use of knowledge. Christ acclaims the 
Hebraic tradition, describing ‘Sion’s songs,’ as ‘to all true tasts excelling, / Where God is 
prais’d aright.’29 In contrast, Greek and Roman literature celebrates ‘the vices of their 
deities… Their gods ridiculous’ (IV.340-342). Significantly, however, Milton has Christ 
define the superiority – the tastefulness – of Hebraic literature not only in terms of its 
more dignified and devout subject matter, but also against the specific modes of reading 
encouraged by the Greco-Roman tradition. Whoever ‘reads / Incessantly, and to his 
reading brings not… spirit and judgement,’ proclaims Christ, is: 
 
Deep verst in books and shallow in himself, 
Crude or intoxicate, collecting toys, 
And trifles for choice matters, worth a sponge; 
As Children gathering pibles on the shore. (IV.319-327) 
 
The image is of a dilettantish commonplacer: in contrast to the readers of ‘Sion’s songs,’ 
who possess ‘true tastes,’ this reader merely accumulates ‘trifles’ which, being ‘crude’ or 
bilious, he or she is unable to properly digest. This is significant because in defining 
literary taste precisely against the classical preferences of the incompetent 
commonplacer, Milton implicitly attests to a long association between literary ‘tasts’ 
(whether good or bad) and the bee-like selective reader. Extracted from its wider 
context within Paradise Regained, the quotation ‘Sion’s songs / To all true tasts excelling’ 
                                                          
27 In the introduction to their Gender, Taste and Material Culture, for example, John Styles and Amanda 
Vickery assert that ‘systematic use of the word “taste” – goȗt – to signify aesthetic discernment emerged in 
later seventeenth-century France.’ Styles and Vickery, introduction to Gender, Taste and Material Culture in 
Britain and North America, 1700-1830, ed. John Styles and Amanda Vickery (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006), 15. See also Stephen Bayley, Taste: The Secret Meaning of Things (London: Faber, 1991), 25. 
Contra to this conflation of discriminative taste and modernity is Raymond Williams’ observation that 
‘“Good taast” in the sense of good understanding is recorded from 1425.’ Williams, Keywords: A 
Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 264. Dabney Townsend 
comments that the artist and polymath Leon Battista Alberti (1404-72) was ‘amongst the first to use the 
metaphor of taste in connection with judgment.’ Townsend, ‘Taste: Early History,’ in Michael Kelly, ed., 
Oxford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 356. 
28 ‘Taste, n.1.’ OED Online, accessed 18 August 2012, www.oed.com/view/Entry/198050. 
29 John Milton, Paradise regain’d a poem in IV books (London: J.M. for John Starkey, 1671), G8v (96), l.344-
45. Further in-text references to Paradise regain’d are also to this edition. 
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might be seen to describe, as the OED intends it to, an originary moment in a semantic 
shift from gustatory to aesthetic taste. Read in the context of Book IV as a whole, 
however, the words point backwards, to the long – and long-neglected – history of taste 
as literary discrimination in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century commonplace culture. 
Two scholars who have discussed taste in early modern literature and culture are 
Allison Deutermann, and Robert Matz. In an article on taste and hearing in Hamlet, 
Deutermann asserts that: 
 
[Whilst] the concept of “taste” as aesthetic discernment has been assumed to be 
anachronistic to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England… this abstracted 
sense of taste was already forming at the start of the seventeenth century.30  
 
The association between taste and aesthetic discernment has a much longer ancestry 
than even Deutermann suggests: it is evident, as Mary Carruthers has recently shown, in 
the medieval monastic tradition of lectio divina, and – as I will go on to show – is densely 
present both in anti-theatrical polemic, and in defences of poetry, in the second half of 
the sixteenth century. 31  More immediately interesting, however, is Deutermann’s 
description of aesthetic taste as the ‘abstracted sense of taste.’ This is characteristic of a 
scholarly narrative – also exemplified by Matz – according to which aesthetic taste 
emerges when the metaphorical comparison that underlies it (namely, that the physical 
process of distinguishing between foods is like the mental process of distinguishing 
between aesthetic artefacts) is forgotten or discarded, and aesthetic taste loses its 
association with gustation.32 In Defending Literature in Early Modern England, Matz links the 
emergence of ‘taste’ as a term to describe readerly discrimination to a contest between 
medieval, feudal modes of social capital, rooted in aristocratic displays of wealth, leisure, 
and military prowess, and newer, humanist modes of social capital, rooted in self-
discipline, industriousness, and rhetorical prowess. Focusing on Thomas Elyot’s 1537 
The boke named The Governour, Matz argues that Elyot’s association of ‘taste’ with the 
faculty of literary judgement is a humanist appropriation of the cultural capital already 
                                                          
30 Allison K. Deutermann, ‘“Caviare to the general”?: Taste, Hearing, and Genre in Hamlet,’ Shakespeare 
Quarterly 62/2 (2011): 236-37. 
31 See Carruthers, ‘Sweetness.’ 
32 This narrative has proponents across disciplines. The sociologist Jukka Gronow, for example, writes 
that, historically, ‘the physiological sense of taste acted as the model for judgement power,’ implying that 
physiological taste is a kind of prototype for aesthetic taste: both a precondition of it, and precisely what 
aesthetic taste must discard or disavow. Jukka Gronow, The Sociology of Taste (London: Routledge, 1997), 
86. 
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attached to the gustatory pleasures of aristocratic feasting in the older, feudal system.33 
Like Deutermann, Matz describes the emergence of taste as a term for readerly 
discrimination as a process of abstraction, yoking this process to the civilizing process 
narrative propounded by Norbert Elias: 
 
The transfer of pleasure from the physical “taste” for sumptuous and delicate 
fare to what Elyot calls elsewhere the “dilectation” of reading... requires a 
change in the nature of “taste” itself... Elyot’s humanist project defines a 
trajectory which ultimately metaphorizes taste, divests it from its physical 
referent, implies the gradual effacement of the body from public sight – honor 
in the community is dissociated from bodily function – described by Elias....34  
 
Both Deutermann and Matz, then, challenge the conventional dating of aesthetic taste, 
but preserve the abstraction narrative. In each case, the birth of aesthetic ‘taste’ is 
understood to originate in the death of a metaphor. Etymology, however, implies an 
alternative relation: the earliest uses of taste as a term for gustation do not precede but 
are concurrent with the earliest uses of taste as a term for discrimination; ‘taste’ as 
indicative of mental judgement does not emerge from, but rather alongside, ‘taste’ as 
indicative of sensory experience. 35  For early moderns, furthermore, metaphor’s 
reification of the relation between bodily experiences and mental processes reverses the 
trajectory (from physical sensation to mental discrimination) that the abstraction 
narrative describes. This is how Thomas Wilson describes metaphor in The arte of 
rhetorique:  
 
Firste we alter a worde from that which is in the minde, to that which is in the 
bodye. As when we perceive one that hath begiled us, we use to saye: Ah sirrha, 
                                                          
33 Robert Matz, Defending Literature in Early Modern England: Renaissance Literary Theory in Social Context 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 39-46. 
34 Ibid., 40. Matz does acknowledge that, whilst Elyot and his fellow humanists ostensibly rejected the 
pleasures of the table, humanist pedagogy often endorsed making use of a child’s physical desires in order 
to stimulate a love of learning. He comments in particular on Elyot’s recommendation that a wet-nurse 
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or late popular Latin tastare, frequentative of taxāre to touch, feel, handle, via the Italian tastare to feel, 
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I am gladde I have smelled you oute. Beinge greved with a matter, we saye 
communelye we can not digest it....36 
 
For Wilson, metaphors cannot be ‘abstracted’ from their physical origin, because the 
route they follow is not from bodily experience to mental process, but rather from 
mental process to bodily experience. As such, metaphors retain their connection to 
physical sensation. This is also the case where the language of flavour, specifically, is 
concerned. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, interest in the ‘Adamic’ 
or ‘natural’ language spoken by Adam and Eve in Eden was widespread. This language, 
it was believed, signified the things that it named according to their inherent qualities: 
Adam’s naming of the animals in Genesis, for example, ‘expressed in some way their 
essential natures, so that naming was equivalent to knowing.’ 37  Many philologists, 
antiquaries, and authors were interested in determining the extent to which the English 
language preserved traces of this natural language, amongst them the poet and classicist 
Thomas Stanley. Pondering the origins of words in his monumental 1656 The history of 
philosophy, Stanley asserts that ‘names were given by nature: the first pronounced voices, 
imitating the things themselves.’38 In the derivation of etymologies, Stanley goes on: 
 
this beginning is to be sought, untill we arrive so far, as that the thing agree in 
some similitude with the sound of the word, as when we say, tinkling of brasse, 
the neighing of horses, the bleating of sheep, the gingling of chains: These words by 
their sound, expresse the things which are signified by them.39 
 
Whilst this example focuses on aural phenomena, Stanley goes on to extend the natural 
language theory to words which describe other kinds of sensations: 
 
But, for as much as there are things which sound not, in these the similitude of 
touching hath the same power: As, they touch the sense smoothly or harshly, 
the smoothnesse or harshnesse of letters in like manner touch the hearing, and 
                                                          
36 Wilson, The arte of rhetorique, Z4r (92).  
37 David Katz, ‘The Language of Adam in 17th-Century England,’ in History and Imagination: Essays in 
Honour of H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl, and Blair Worden (Oxford: Oxford 
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38 Thomas Stanley, The history of philosophy (London: Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring, 1656), 
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39 Ibid. 
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thereby occasioneth their names. As when we say smooth, it sounds smoothly: so, 
who will not judge harshnesse to be harsh by the very word?... Honey, as sweetly as 
the thing it selfe affects our tast, so sweetly doth the name touch our hearing: 
Soure, as harsh in both... These are conceived to be the infancy, as it were, of 
words, when the sense of the thing concords with the sense of the sound.40 
 
‘Honey’ and ‘sour’ are included amongst those words which Stanley singles out as 
retaining their immediate, sensory connection to the phenomena they signify: both 
words affect the ‘tast’ as they are heard. As I go on, in the next section, to further 
consider the bee trope as a privileged locus for the emergence of notions of literary 
taste in the early modern period, Stanley’s assertion that ‘[the word] Honey, as sweetly as 
the thing it selfe affects our tast,’ is worth keeping in mind – or rather, in mouth.  
 
III. ‘curious tasters’ 
 
The importance of the sense of taste to the kinds of literary activity described by the 
bee trope in the early modern period can be brought into focus by consideration of 
agricultural and pastoral works, which often emphasised the acuity of the apian senses, 
including – and sometimes emphasising – gustation. Amongst the ancients, Virgil had 
emphasised that bees use their sense of taste to distinguish between flowers: ‘they sip 
and taste the purple flowers,’ he writes in the Georgics.41 In the seventeenth century, the 
acuteness of the bee’s sense of taste was highlighted by authorities including Charles 
Butler, who wrote in the 1623 edition of his influential The feminine monarchie: or the historie 
of bees that ‘[bees] have the Senses… both outward and inward: which their subtill and 
active spirits do excite and quicken... of their fift sense [i.e. taste] I make no question, 
sithens they are used to things of so different tastes.’42 Similarly, John Levitt writes in his 
1634 The ordering of bees that ‘[bees] have all the five senses which man hath, and in a 
liberall proportion... they have the sense of tasting, being able to judge which Flower is 
sweete and will affoord plenty of Honey, and which is gummy or slimie,’43 whilst in his 
1657 A theatre of politicall flying-insects, Samuel Purchas emphasises the excellence of the 
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41 Cited in Samuel Purchas, A theatre of politicall flying-insects (London: R. I. for Thomas Parkhurst, 1657), 
K2v (68). 
42 Charles Butler, The feminine monarchie: or the historie of bees (London: John Haviland for Roger Jackson, 
1623), C3r-v.  
43 John Levett, The ordering of bees (London: Thomas Harper for John Harison, 1634), H2v (60). 
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bee’s senses before concluding that ‘their taste... is evidently as active as their other 
senses; thereby they make choice of waters, and all other gatherings for their use and 
purpose.’44 Perhaps most compellingly, in his 1632 A good companion for a Christian, John 
Norden writes that ‘many beasts excell man in the perfection of many of the senses... as 
the Eagle, in seeing; the Hart, in hearing; the Spaniell and Hound, in smelling; the Spider, in 
touching; and the Bee, in Tasting.’45 What Alexander Pope calls ‘the nice bee’ is also used as 
representative of the ‘subtly true’ sense of taste in Pope’s Essay on Man (1732-34), 
displacing the more traditional iconographical ape.46 
Significantly, paratexual materials attached to precisely those works which insist 
on the keenness of bee’s sense of taste often also employ the language of literary taste, 
both to describe the author’s methods of collating information, and to negotiate the 
reader’s response to their books. John Bidle’s epistle to his 1634 Virgil’s Bucolicks 
Engished [sic], for example, cautions his readers: 
 
Marvell not, Readers, that I set before you but this Pittance: I was loth to cloy 
your Appetites at the first, knowing (on the one side) that mens quesy and 
squemish stomacks rellish better the poinant suckets of a Love-Sonnet, or the 
Julips of a frothy Epigram, than a Homely (though holesom) dish of Satiricall 
stuffe: And fearing withall (on t’other side) lest having cooked a great deale of 
this hard and sower-Meat ill, I might have so distasted a truely judicious Palat...47 
 
In explaining the brevity of his translation, Bidle articulates the distinction between 
frivolous and ‘judicious’ readers as a matter of ‘rellish’ and ‘Palat.’ The series of 
obsequious poems prefacing Purchas’ A theatre of politicall flying-insects engage with the bee 
trope more specifically (indeed, with a somewhat wearying doggedness). The book itself 
is repeatedly depicted as a hive (‘each page a comb’), and its contents are punningly 
described as ‘mellifluous’ honey. 48  Meanwhile, Purchas’ ‘diligence’ both in ‘reading’ 
previous works about his topic, and in ‘long experience’ of bee-keeping, equals or 
surpasses that of the insects themselves: ‘much labour hath procured this... gathered 
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‘the bee is not common in early texts or images as a representative of taste, but may have been taken up 
[in the eighteenth cetury] to replace the monkey.’ Vinge, The Five Senses, 146. 
47 John Bidle, Virgil’s Bucolicks Engished [sic] (London: John Legat, 1634), C4v. 
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hony sweet suck’d from each flower.’49 Reciprocally, his readers ‘long to taste thy hony 
from the press,’ as Joseph Angier proclaims.50 In each case, the insistence of the texts 
themselves on the intense sensitivity of the bee’s taste, and the role of that sense in 
selecting between flowers to make sweet honey, is paralleled by the paratextual use of 
imagery which associates the efforts of diligent readers and writers with bee-like 
activities. In this context, the trope of the reader-poet as bee is curiously literalized: 
incorporated into texts intended to collate and communicate apian expertise, it seems to 
be no more or less than another nugget of agrarian information about the astonishing 
competencies of these insects.   
Uses of the bee trope to describe tasteful readerly judgements are also 
ubiquitous in paratextual materials appended to commonplace books and anthologies. 
A prefatory poem annexed to the 1598 printed commonplace book Politeuphuia advises 
‘the curious eye that over-rashly lookes, / And gives no tast nor feeling to the mind’ 
that it ‘robs it own selfe’ of the ‘comfort’ that can be found in books.51 ‘Tast,’ here, is 
used primarily in the now largely obsolete sense of experiential knowledge in general: 
the author censures the eye which swiftly ‘lookes’ at the book, rather than slowly 
reading it, for depriving the mind of knowledge of its content. That the sensory 
meaning of ‘tast’ is also present, however – making the image weirdly synaesthetic – 
becomes evident as the poem continues:  
 
But when that sence doth play the busie Bee,  
And for the honny, not the poison reeds,  
Then for the labour it receaves the fee,  
When as the minde on heavenly sweetnes feeds...52 
 
When the eye works like the industrious bee, it receives its reward in the form of 
‘honny’: the reader’s appreciation of the book is indicated by his or her capacity to taste 
its ‘sweetnes.’ Here, the language of taste is used to describe two alternative reading 
practices (hasty looking versus bee-like tasting) and to endorse the second as more likely 
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to inculcate appreciation of the book’s virtues. Properly, reading is a matter of tasting, 
not seeing.   
A prefatory poem to William Basse’s 1619 A helpe to discourse, Or, A miscelany of 
merriment, similarly makes use of the language of taste to discourage inattentive, rushed 
forms of reading: although here it is taste, rather than sight, which is ‘curious.’ The 
poem laments:  
 
Were all the depth and goodnesse can be imposde,  
Or is in all bookes in one booke inclosde,  
Some curious tasters might I thinke come nigh it,  
That would not though they reade, vouchsafe to buye it.53 
 
‘Curious,’ here, is an example of what Christopher Ricks, in relation to Milton, has 
called an anti-pun.54 The modern meaning, ‘desirous of seeing or knowing; eager to 
learn; inquisitive’ is present, whilst the older meaning of ‘careful; studious, attentive’ is 
simultaneously suggested, and pointedly excluded: a person who reads without buying, 
on the bookseller’s premises, is decidedly not a conscientious scholar of the text.55 A 
‘curious taster’ – like the ‘curious eye’ of Politeuphuia – is someone whose hasty reading 
prevents them from appreciating the book’s virtues. 
In contrast to Basse’s anxiety that his miscellany will receive no more than a 
desultory (and financially unrewarding) perusal, a dedicatory letter to ‘Joseph, Lord 
Bishop of Exceter’ which prefaces Richard Younge’s 1638 The drunkard’s character… 
which may serve also for a common-place-booke of the most usuall sinnes anticipates a more 
appreciative response. In a dedicatory letter addressed to the bishop and devotional 
writer Joseph Hall, Younge predicts that his book will ‘answer’ its dedicatee’s ‘sent and 
tast’ because: 
 
Many of these [extracts] are Flowers from your Garden… as the Bee gathers 
from one Flower, Wax; from another, Honey; from a third, Bee-Glew, and 
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bringeth to her Hive that which is profitable from all: so have I... filch’t from 
your Lordships worthy Workes, and other Authors... what soever elegant 
Phrases, pithy Sentences, curious Metaphors, witty Apothegmes, sweet 
Similitudes, or Rhetoricall expressions I could meet withal, pertinent, whole 
some, and delectable…56 
 
Younge’s confidence that his miscellany will prove congenial to the bishop’s literary 
taste derives from the fact that, following the example of the industrious bee, he has 
drawn heavily on Hall’s own ‘sweet’ and ‘delectable’ works.  
Younge’s use of the vocabulary of taste – which manages to combine 
sycophancy with self-congratulation – can be usefully juxtaposed with Gabriel Harvey’s 
vitriolic Pierce’s Supererogation (1593), the third sally in his feud with Thomas Nashe. 
Harvey repeatedly attributes what he presents as the bad taste of Nashe’s literary output 
with his bad practice as a commonplacing reader. Whereas he describes his beloved 
Homer as ‘the hoony-bee of the daintiest flowers of Witt, and Arte,’ Nashe is not ‘A 
Bee’ but ‘a drone, a dorre, a dor-bettle, a dormouse...’57 Nashe, Harvey fulminates, has 
no taste for the classical authorities that Harvey himself reveres: ‘neither curious 
Hermogenes, nor trim Isocrates… are for his tooth.’58 Instead, what Harvey ironically 
calls Nashe’s ‘Imperiall tast’ inclines towards vernacular levity: Nashe supposedly fills 
‘the Common-places of his paperbooke’ with ‘the pickpocket of foolery… and 
knaveries in Print.’59 And it is Nashe’s lack of good taste in his selection of reading 
matter that leads to the tastelessness of his own literary output: ‘I have seldome,’ Harvey 
alleges of Nashe’s literary efforts, ‘tasted a more unsavory slaumpaump of wordes, and 
sentences in any sluttish Pamfletter.’60  
We can see, then, that the prominence of taste as a faculty of readerly discrimination 
in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth- century emerges within and from the 
humanist culture of commonplacing, and is frequently articulated via the trope of the 
commonplacing reader as a discriminative bee. Taste is allied with an appreciative, but 
also a carefully selective, painstaking, and probative mode of reading. In the next 
section, I will suggest that attending to the language of taste reveals how processes of 
literary discrimination in this period are linked to a specific conception of what 
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knowledge, more broadly, is, and how it is best attained. Just as physiological taste 
operates at the border between the body and its environment, literary taste walks a 
tightrope between textual and sensory experience. This liminality, which parallels the 
liminality of the paratext, means that taste serves as a point of transition between 
processes of reading, and wider processes of apprehending and understanding the 
world.  
 
IV. ‘hony and gall’ 
 
In the dedicatory epistle addressed to Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, which prefaces 
John Florio’s miscellany Florio his firste fruites (1578), Florio amplifies the titular metaphor 
which presents the work as his first fruits, asking Dudley to: 
 
weigh the gift given by the givers hart, though too base a gifte to come to your 
Honours hand, too rude a worke for you to reade, and too too unripe, sower, 
and unsaverie fruites for your Honour to take a tast of, yet notwithstanding such 
as they be I give them to you... the which though so they be, are not altogether 
to be rejected, & utterly refused. For the basenes and sowernesse of these, will 
serve to set out the pleasaunt and delectable taste of other mens fruites, for as 
by the bad is the good knowen, so by the sower is the sweete the better 
discerned.61 
 
Florio’s modesty is, of course, deeply conventional, and does not necessarily reflect his 
actual evaluation of his own work. More interesting than his use of the language of taste 
in the service of self-deprecation, however, is the assumption which underlies this 
passage. Specifically, Florio assumes that processes of literary judgement are innately 
comparative. It is the experience of taste that expresses this ‘sense’ that it is only 
possible to assess literary works in relation to other literary works. In the introduction 
to Renaissance Paratexts, Helen Smith and Louise Wilson argue that paratexts ‘operate in 
multiple directions, structuring the reader’s approach not only to the text in question, 
but to the experience of reading, and of interpreting the world beyond the book.’62 
Florio’s paratextual declaration that ‘as by the bad is the good knowen, so by the sower 
                                                          
61 John Florio, Florio his firste fruites (London: Thomas Dawson, for Thomas Woodcocke, 1578), *i4r. 
62 Helen Smith and Louise Wilson, introduction to Renaissance Paratexts, ed. Smith and Wilson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6-7.  
58 
 
is the sweete the better discerned’ is clearly designed to inform the reader’s 
apprehension of the text itself, encouraging an appreciation of the rationale behind its 
‘unripe’ or immature contents. At the same time, however, Florio’s insistence that the 
route to literary knowledge is a process of comparing and contrasting, of judging and 
discriminating, extends outwards into other areas of life. The body of the text of Firste 
fruites itself includes a dialogue on the value of reading, in which one interlocutor asserts 
that:  
 
by reading, we learn to knowe the good from the bad, vertue from vice, & as the 
bee takes from one hearb, gum, from another waxe, & from an other hony, so 
by reading divers books, divers things are learned... we learn to know the good 
from the bad.63 
 
The form of relational knowing that Florio identifies as central to literary judgement is 
also seen to structure wider processes of distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’: 
methods of judging texts constitute a kind of training in judging between other 
phenomena. In this context, the sensorially immediate language of taste forms a kind of 
hinge or gateway between everyday life and the activity of reading: images of tasting at 
once refer the reader outwards to his or her quotidian (culinary) experience, and 
inwards, to the processes of literary judgement. The liminality of taste, then, reflects the 
liminality of the paratext: both form a kind of bridge between everyday, lived 
experience, and readerly activity. From this perspective, the high density of the language 
of taste in paratextual materials becomes intelligible as a way to negotiate the transition 
between life and literature – and back again. 
Taste certainly functions this way in Stephen Gosson’s 1579 The schoole of abuse, 
which opens with the image of a lavish banquet: 
 
The Syracusans used such varietie of dishes in their banquets, that when they 
were sette, and their boordes furnished, they were many times in doubt, which 
they shoulde touch first, or taste last. And in my opinion the worlde giveth 
every writer so large a fielde to walke in, that before he set penne to the booke, 
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he shall find him selfe feasted at Syracusa, uncertaine where to begin, or when to 
end.64 
 
Here, the whole world offers a varied banquet of possibilities for the would-be writer, 
and the image of the perplexingly plenteous Syracusan feast is used to describe the 
difficulty of negotiating the transition to productive absorption in textual endeavours. 
The would-be writer must use his sense of taste to make the pre-requisite distinctions 
between the plethora of lived experiences that will enable him to finally ‘set penne to 
the booke.’  Gosson goes on to lament that most authors, befuddled by the world’s 
bounteousness, make bad choices. In particular, ‘amarous Poets, dwelleth longest in 
those pointes, that profite least’; like ‘the Scarabe,’ the amorous poet ‘flies ever many a 
sweete flower, & lightes in a cowshard.’65  
Earle Havens has pointed out that commonplace culture ‘contributed 
significantly to the invention and consolidation of a “national” vernacular literature 
during the Renaissance.’ 66  In particular, early poetic anthologies – which imitated 
commonplace books in both form and content – helped produce a sense of a distinctive 
corpus of English poetry. Efforts to valorize vernacular literature, however, also have 
their roots in defences of poetry, written in response to the anti-theatrical diatribes of 
puritans and satirists including Gosson. Both anti-theatricalists and defenders of poetry 
often frame the debate about the intellectual and moral status of drama specifically, and 
vernacular literature more generally in bibliophagic, alimentary, and culinary metaphors. 
Debates about the status of literature are thus also debates about the status of taste, and 
vice versa.  
In the quotation from Gosson above, the issue is that amorous poets betray 
their corrupt tastes in their choice of subject matter; not that taste qua taste is morally 
wicked. Indeed, sweetness is a marker of the virtuous ‘flower[s]’ that the amorous poet 
rejects. Elsewhere in The schoole of abuse, however, sweetness itself is revealed as 
deceptive: 
 
I must confesse that Poets are the whetstones of wit, notwithstanding that wit is 
dearly bought: where hony and gall are mixed, it will be hard to sever the one 
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from the other. The deceitfull Phisition giveth sweete Sirropes to make his 
poison goe downe the smoother...67 
 
Whereas Gosson previously suggested that poets deserve blame because their own 
tastes are corrupt, here they are seen to consciously attempt to deceive the tastes of 
others. The sweetness of poetic ‘wit’ masks the poisonous ‘gall’ of iniquity. Gosson’s 
analogy is, however, interestingly ambivalent, for it begs the question of why he chooses 
to compare poets to physicians, rather than to poisoners. Whilst the trope of sweet 
syrups masking bitter poison was conventional in the early modern period, so too was 
the use of syrups to mask the flavour of admittedly unpleasant, but ultimately salutary, 
physic. Analogies between this therapeutic use of sweetness, and the poetic use of sweet 
wit to mask disagreeable but morally-improving didactic satire, can be found in the 
works of both classical and early modern apologists for poetry: notably Philip Sidney, in 
The Defense of Poesy, argues that the poet ‘doth intend the winning of the mind from 
wickedness to virtue; even as the child is often brought to take most wholesome things, 
by hiding them in such other as have a pleasant taste.’68 Although Gosson’s epithet 
‘deceitfull’ attributes malicious motives to the physician’s prescription, then, his 
metaphor nonetheless gestures towards an alternative model of poetic sweetness as an 
aspect of a curative, beneficial literary regime. 
Gosson himself acknowledges – and ultimately denies – just such a model. 
There are, he notes, some partisans of drama who claim that, whilst older theatrical 
styles were indeed immoral, ‘the Comedies that are exercised in oure dayes’ have 
reformed their abuses; whereas ‘the first smelte of Plautus, these tast of Menander... The 
sweetenesse of musicke, and pleasure of sportes, temper the bitternesse of rebukes, and 
mittigate the tartenesse of every taunt.’69 Gosson’s response is conciliatory: 
 
For my parte I am neither so fonde a Phisition, nor so bad a Cooke, but I can 
allowe my patient a cup of wine to meales, although it be hotte; and pleasaunt 
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sauces to drive downe his meate, if his stomake bee queasie. Notwithstanding, if 
people will bee instructed, (God be thanked) wee have Divines enough to 
discharge that...70 
 
Gosson accepts the principle that bitter but morally salutary satire should be tempered 
with sweet music and theatrical ‘sportes,’ but relocates the authority to prescribe such 
physic from the playwright to the divine. Despite this, Gosson’s litotes (‘I am neither so 
fond a Physician...’) circuitously claims the role of rhetorical physician for himself: a 
man with no clerical credentials, and – as he freely acknowledges – a (reformed) 
playwright and performer.71 The ironies here are subtle and unstable, and it is not my 
intention to determine the extent to which they are intentional. Rather, I would like to 
suggest that even as they condemn the compelling sweetness of poetic wit, anti-
theatricalists such as Gosson promote a notion of drama and poetry as sensorially rich 
and intense which eventually facilitates a re-evaluation of the intellectual and ethical 
utility of the senses in general, and taste in particular. More specifically, in denouncing 
poetic wit as dangerously sensuous, they prepare the ground for their respondents to 
celebrate sensuous experience, especially gustatory experience, as valuably ‘witty’: a 
source of intellectual understanding and discrimination. This chiasmic reversal of terms 
(from ‘wit is sweet’ to ‘sweetness is witty’) is apparent in Sidney’s The Defense of Poesy. 
Sidney responds to the accusation that poetry ‘is the nurse of abuse, infecting us with 
many pestilent desires, with a siren’s sweetness drawing the mind to the serpent’s tail of 
sinful fancies’ by countering, conventionally enough, that all powerful forms and 
technologies are subject to abuse, and this is no reason to discard them altogether. He 
goes on to discuss Plato’s prohibition of poetry in his Republic:  
 
a man might maliciously object that Plato, being a philosopher, was a natural 
enemy of poets. For, indeed, after the philosophers had picked out of the sweet 
mysteries of poetry the right discerning true points of knowledge, they 
forthwith... like ungrateful prentices were not content to set up shops for 
themselves, but sought by all means to discredit their masters...72 
 
                                                          
70 Ibid., B5v (13). 
71 In his final address ‘To the Gentlewomen Citizens of London,’ Gosson appropriates the physician’s 
status more definitively. ‘These are harde lessons which I teach you,’ he concedes: ‘neverthelesse, drinke 
uppe the potion, though it like not your tast, and you shall be eased.’ Ibid., F4v. 
72 Sidney, An Apologie, H4r-v. 
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Here, the sweetness of poetry is quietly, but emphatically, reinterpreted: no longer a 
siren-call to sinful fancy, it becomes a marker of the ‘true points of knowledge.’ 
Similarly, Sidney asserts of that those who ‘mislike’ poets who ‘deal with matters 
philosophical’ that ‘the fault is in their judgement quite out of taste, and not in the sweet 
food of sweetly uttered knowledge.’ 73 Sidney’s conflation of ‘judgement’ with ‘taste’ 
culminates in his suggestion that sweetness is characteristic not only, as Gosson would 
have it, of the poetic ‘wit’ which conceals moral poison, but also with the nourishing 
food of ‘knowledge’ itself. 
In commonplace culture, in anti-theatrical polemic, and in defences of poetry, then, 
taste emerges as instrumental in three major projects or tasks. Firstly, taste has a central 
role in authorial attempts to shape readers’ responses to their works by prescribing 
reading practices likely to inculcate appreciation of those works’ virtues; secondly, the 
language of taste is used both to describe and to negotiate the difficult paratextual 
transition between world and book, lived and textual experience; and thirdly, taste is 
prominent in attempts to denigrate, but also to valorize, vernacular ‘poesy.’ In many 
instances, references to familiar flavour sensations, and uses of bibliophagic imagery, 
keep literary taste, and the processes of judgement and discrimination which underlie it, 
bonded to the physical sense of taste. In the next section of this chapter, I will turn to a 
rare example of a (mainly) female-authored and compiled manuscript commonplace 
book in order to explore the extent to which this persistent linking of alimentary and 
literary taste might be grounded in experiential and material reality. 
 
V.  ‘sweete humiddities’ 
 
Folger Ms.VB.198, commonly referred to as the Southwell-Sibthorpe commonplace 
book, was compiled between the years 1626 and 1636, largely by the noblewoman and 
poet Lady Anne Southwell.74 Her poetry forms the majority of its contents, although it 
also includes correspondence, aphorisms, and inventories, inter alia.  In a transcription of 
a letter to her friend Cicely MacWilliams, Lady Ridgway, included in the book, 
                                                          
73 Ibid., C3r. 
74 See Jean Klene, introduction to The Southwell-Sibthorpe Commonplace Book: Folger Ms. V.b. 198, ed. Klene 
(Tempe: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), xxxiii-xxxiv, for a discussion of the extent 
of Southwell’s involvement in the book’s compilation.  
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Southwell responds to Ridgway’s self-description as a ‘sworne enemye to Poetrie.’75 
Drawing heavily, but not slavishly, on Sidney’s Defense, Southwell takes the opportunity 
to offer a spirited justification of the poet’s art. Lady Ridgway’s aversion to verse, she 
asserts, is a perversion of her sense of taste: ‘I will take vppon me to knowe,’ she 
determines, ‘what hath soe distasted your palate against this banquett of soules, devine 
Poesye.’76 This figuration of Ridgway’s dislike as distaste is influenced, of course, by the 
kinds of alimentary imagery which suffuses the anti-theatrical polemic and defences of 
poetry previously discussed. By looking more closely at the contents of Southwell’s 
commonplace book, however, I show that Southwell’s use of the language of taste is 
not merely derivative, but descriptive of what was, for Southwell, an experiential reality 
grounded in humoral psychology. Whatever the precise cause of Lady Ridgway’s 
‘distast’ for poetry, Southwell continues in her letter, it must have its foundation in an 
illness caused by humoral imbalance.77 Southwell depicts God’s creation of the world 
and of man as an act of literary composition, the materials of which were:  
 
poetically confined to 4. generall geenusses, Earth, Ayre, water & fire. The 
effectes wch giue life vnto his verse, were, Hott, Cold, Moist & Drye, wch 
produce Choller, melancholye, Bloud & flegme.78  
 
The human body is portrayed a kind of verse, vivified by the humoral flows of blood 
and phlegm. How then, Southwell enquires, ‘being thus poetically composed... can you 
bee at vnitye wth your self, & at oddes wth your owne composition...?’79  
Southwell’s suggestion that literary ‘distast’ can be attributed to a physiological 
disruption is reiterated in an original creation poem also collected in her commonplace 
book. In this poem, Southwell invokes the image of the reader-as-bee in order to 
anticipate his or her response to her work: 
 
Let your cleare Iudgment, and well tempored soule 
Condemne, amend, or ratiffye this scrole…  
If you haue lost your fflowinge sweete humiddities 
                                                          
75 Anne Southwell, ‘To my worthy Muse, the Ladye Ridgeway,’ in Klene, The Southwell-Sibthorpe 
Commonplace Book, fol. 3r-v. All references to the manuscript in this chapter cite the original folio 
numbers, which are included in Klene’s edition. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
64 
 
and in a dust disdaine theise quantities 
Pass it to oure beloued Docter Featlye  
his tongue dropps honnye, and can doe it neatlye…80 
 
In the early modern period, one way in which the humors were distinguished was by 
their flavours: following Galen, melancholy was ordinarily considered sour, choler 
(sometimes called gall) bitter, phlegm unsavory, and blood sweet. 81  Southwell’s 
suggestion that a ‘cleare Iudgment’ of her poem must derive from the possession of 
‘fflowing sweete humiddities,’ then, is predicated on her conviction that readerly 
discrimination, or taste, is reliant on physical complexion. In particular, she asks her 
reader to approach the poem in what we might call a sanguine mood – bearing in mind, 
of course, the derivation of ‘sanguine’ from the Latin sanguis, blood: the humor generally 
thought of as sweet.82 If you have misplaced your ‘sweete’ humors, Southwell advises, 
then pass on the poem to Daniel Featley (rector of Southwell’s parish).83  In Southwell’s 
somewhat grotesque image, Featley-as-ideal-reader is figured, implicitly, as a bee, not 
insofar as he extracts the nectar of the classics but insofar as the plenteous ‘honnye’ of 
his own humors floods his tongue, enabling him to amend the lack in her poem. 
Literary judgement, according to Southwell, is not determined only by the quality of 
what is read, but by the flavour, or taste, of the reader’s own humors. 
The notion that literary ‘taste’ is a physical, as well as a mental response – a 
sensation, as well as an act of cognition – is buttressed by Southwell’s attentiveness to 
the materials of reading and writing. If the human body is, for Southwell, ‘poetically 
composed,’ then conversely the constituents of poetic composition are corporeal: 
because a poem is made, in its textual instantiation, not just of words and ideas but also 
of paper and ink, it possesses material qualities identical with or a least analogous to the 
humors. Her poem on ‘The ffirst Commandement,’ for instance, condemns recourse to 
the words of secular authorities in religious verse in precisely these terms: poets who 
                                                          
80 Southwell, untitled poem, Southwell-Sibthorpe Commonplace Book, fol. 26r., l.15-22. 
81 The sixteenth-century French surgeon Ambrose Paré, whose works were influential in seventeenth-
century England, is representative in this respect: ‘as Galen notes in his booke De Natura humana, 
Melancholy is acide or soure, choler bitter, Blood sweet, Phlegme unsavory.’ A corresponding table lists 
these characteristics under the heading ‘Taste,’ confirming their status as flavour descriptors. Ambrose 
Paré, The workes of that famous chirurgion, trans. Thomas Johnson (London: Thomas Cotes and R. Young, 
1634), B6v-C1r (12-13). 
82 ‘Sanguine, adj. and n.’ OED Online, accessed 28 September 2012, www.oed.com/view/Entry/170657. 
83 Featley was notorious as an ecclesiastical licenser, as well as (apparently) popular as a clergyman. Those 
whose works he suppressed or corrected in the former capacity found him a less generous reader. See 
Arnold Hunt, ‘Featley, Daniel (1582–1645),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 01 August 
2012, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9242. I explore some of Featley’s own work in chapter 4. 
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‘forsake[s] gods worde’ in favour of ‘vaine fables’ cause ‘a sicknes to, to much infecting 
paper’ and ‘mixe heauens milke with aconite of hell.’84 Like human bodies, the materials 
of literary composition are subject to ‘sicknes’ and infection: the heavenly milk of the 
white page is poisoned by the aconite of ink. For Southwell, there is an essential accord 
between the composition and materials of the body, and the composition and materials 
of poetry: both are humoral entities.  
Ink, in particular, is presented by Southwell as a vital site of  humoral 
transactions between reader, poem and author. This is clear in a poetic ‘Epitaph’ for 
Lady Ridgway, in which Southwell expresses her regret at having written a faux-elegiac 
poem that teased Lady Ridgway for being a lax correspondent by jokingly hypothesising 
that her death had prevented her from replying to Southwell’s last letter. Lady Ridgway, 
it turned out, had indeed shuffled off  the mortal coil. Southwell describes her sense of  
guilt by cursing the pen with which she wrote the faux-elegy: ‘Now let my pen be 
choakt wth gall / since I haue writt Propheticall.’85 The ‘gall’ that she wishes on her pen 
refers to one of  the primary components of  the most commonly-used manuscript ink 
in the early modern period. As Anthony Petti explains, the active ingredients in this ink 
were ‘galls (the round excrescences produced by the gall-fly on branches of  oak trees) 
and iron sulphate (usually known as copperas or Roman vitriol), the reaction of  the 
tannic acid in the galls with the iron salt causing a blackish compound to form.’86 The 
fate that Southwell wishes upon her pen, however, is clearly also a representation of  her 
own grief: ‘gall’ refers not only to an ingredient in ink, but figuratively to bitterness of  
spirit.87 Furthermore, this bitterness of  spirit is associated, in the humoral economy, 
with the choleric humor that produces it, which is also known as gall.88 By exploiting the 
belief  that gall is a substance common both to the human body, and to ink, then, 
Southwell’s elegy insists on the material reality of  the apparently metaphorical contiguity 
between physiological and poetical composition described in the letter to Lady Ridgway.  
Southwell’s suggestion that ink has humoral properties coterminous with those 
of the human body, and that physiological and poetical composition are consequently 
also contiguous, is attested in early modern commonplace culture more generally. In his 
                                                          
84 Southwell, ‘The ffirst Commandement,’ Southwell-Sibthorpe Commonplace Book, fol. 28r, l.25-26. 
85 Southwell, ‘An: Epitaph vppon Cassandra MackWilliams wife to Sr Thomas Ridgway Earle of London 
Derry,’ Southwell-Sibthorpe Commonplace Book, fol. 21r. 
86 Anthony Petti, English Literary Hands from Chaucer to Dryden (London: E. Arnold, 1977), 7. 
87 ‘Gall, n.1.’ OED Online, accessed 03 September 2011, www.oed.com/view/Entry/76229. 
88  In Thomas Middleton’s The Revenger’s Tragedy, Vindice claims that even looking at ink for too long will 
make a man ‘melancholy.’ Middleton, The Revenger’s Tragedy, in Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works, ed. 
Gary Taylor and John Lavagnino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.2.49-50.  
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1646 Pseudodoxia Epidemica, Thomas Browne notes that ink is constituted of a mixture of 
vitriol with an ‘astringent humidity’ such as gall, before going on to assert that just ‘such 
a condition’ can be found ‘naturally in some living creatures.’89 These ‘creatures’ are full 
of a black humor, which Brown calls ‘atramentous,’ a neologism deriving from the Latin 
ātrāmentum: blacking, ink.90 Ink is made of the humor of gall; conversely, human bodies 
can be atramentous, or inky. The idea that bodily fluids and ink are in some respects 
fungible is also present in the work of the Tudor sonneteers, extracts from which largely 
constituted the first poetic miscellanies and anthologies. In particular, poets frequently 
describe the mingling of a lover’s tears with the ink with which he writes. The 
Petrarchan narrator of an anonymous poem included in Tottel’s Miscellany (1557), for 
instance, describes how, frustrated in love, ‘I wrote with ink, and bitter teares,’ whilst 
Francis Davison’s 1611 anthology A poetical rapsodie contains an anonymous poem in 
which the writer’s ‘drisling teares…. falling in my Paper sinke, / Or dropping in my Pen 
encrease my inke.’ 91  In Thomas Lodge’s 1592 Rosalynde, Rosalynde (disguised as 
Ganymede) teases the infatuated Rosander for carving love poems into trees, in the 
process making satirical use of this kind of rhetoric: Ovidian poets, she says mockingly, 
‘have their humors in their inckpot.’92  
Jonson, too, frequently conflates ink with the humoral fluids, especially with 
gall: in ‘To my book,’ the second poem introducing his 1616 Epigrams, Jonson 
anticipates that many readers, seeing the work’s title and author, will expect the book to 
be ‘full of gall.’93 Similarly, in Thomas Nashe’s address ‘To all Christian Readers’ which 
prefaces his 1596 Have with you to Saffron-walden – his coruscating reply to Harvey’s Pierce’s 
Supererogation – Nashe defends himself against Harvey’s accusation that ‘I... used in all 
this space nothing but gall to make inke with,’ and complains that ‘these bitter-sauced 
Invectives’ return little in the way of pecuniary remuneration.94 In both cases, the joke 
hinges on gall’s double status as metonymic both of bitter ink, and of bitter bile. And 
                                                          
89 ‘The second way whereby bodies become blacke, is an Atramentous condition or mixture, that is a 
vitriolate or copperose quality conjoyning with a terrestrious and astringent humidity, for so is... writing 
Inke commonly made, by copperose cast upon a decoction of infusion of galls.’ Thomas Browne, 
Pseudodoxia epidemica (London: T.H. for E. Dod, 1646), Tt4v-Vv1r (336-37). 
90 ‘Atramentous, adj.’ OED Online, accessed 28 September 2012, www.oed.com/view/Entry/12637. 
Browne, Pseudodoxia epidemica, Vv1r (337). 
91 Anon, ‘The lover here telleth of his divers joyes and adversities in love,’ in Henry Howard et al., Songes 
and sonettes [Tottel’s Miscellany] (London: Richard Tottel, 1557), 60; Anon, ‘Elegie II. Of Letters in Verse,’ in 
A poetical rapsodie, ed. Francis Davison (London: William Stansby for Roger Kackson), E2V-E3r (78-79). 
92 Thomas Lodge, Rosalynde (London: Abel Jeffes for T. Gubbin and John Busbie, 1592), H4r. 
93 Ben Jonson, ‘To My Book,’ in The Complete Poems, ed. George Parfitt (London: Penguin, 1988), 35. That 
he refers to the book’s material status, as well as its satirical bent, is made clear in the subsequent 
assertion that such readers will expect it to ‘hurl ink, and wit.’ 
94 Thomas Nashe, Saffron-walden (London: John Danter, 1596), C4r-v.  
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both Nashe and Jonson associate ink with urine. In the mock biography of Harvey 
appended to Saffron-walden, Nashe invents a rumour that Harvey ‘pist incke as soone as 
ever hee was borne,’95 whilst in the ‘Apologetical Dialogue’ which follows Jonson’s The 
Poetaster (1601), the author claims (with a sharp glance at John Marston) that his 
detractors will not take his refusal to answer their ‘Libels’ as ‘stupidity,’ for ‘they know I 
dare / To... squirt their eyes / With ink or urine,’ with the conjunctive ‘or’ implying an 
equivalence between the two.96 Just as the association between ink and gall gains force 
from the facts of manuscript ink production, moreover, so too does the association 
between ink and urine have its roots in the material realities of print culture. As Bruce 
Boehrer has noted, ‘the signature odor of the Renaissance printing-house... was the 
pervasive stench of urine.... Ink balls... permeated with the printers’ urine, must have 
introduced some minute chemical residue of the digestive tract into the ink absorbed by 
the paper of Jonson’s books.’97 Not only manuscript ink, but also print ink, then, was 
both notionally and literally imbricated with human body fluids. 
We can see an awareness of the humoral – and thus the gustatory – qualities of 
ink informing the language of taste as literary discrimination in its early stages. This is 
also suggested by Hugh Plat’s much-cited introductory poem to his 1602 Delightes for 
Ladies: 
 
… my pen and paper are perfum’d 
I scorne to write with Copres or with galle… 
Rosewater is the inke I write withall: 
Of Sweetes the Sweetest I will now commend...98 
 
Plat makes use of the fiction of manuscript circulation in order to assert that he writes, 
not with oak-gall or copper sulphate ink, but with rosewater. In so doing, he evinces an 
awareness of the sensory – particularly the olfactory and gustatory – qualities of the 
former: his assertion that they are unsuitable as writing materials because they are 
insufficiently sweet attests to his sensitivity to the bitterness of their flavour. In fact, 
recipes for manuscript ink included in commonplace books do frequently incorporate 
the same ingredients, implements and processes as the culinary and medical recipes 
                                                          
95 Ibid., sig.K2r. 
96 Ben Jonson, The Poetaster, ed. Tom Cain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 269.  
97 Bruce Boehrer, The Fury of Men’s Gullets: Ben Jonson and the Digestive Canal (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 4. 
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amongst which they are nestled.99 Directions for making ink commonly call for the 
inclusion of consumables such as vinegar, beer, and sugar, whilst Plat’s assertion that he 
writes with rosewater seems less securely metaphorical when we notice that, in a recipe 
for candied flowers included in his 1654 The Garden of Eden, Plat instructs the reader to 
‘make gum water as strong as for Inke, but make it with Rose-water.’100 Such examples 
suggest a degree of contiguity – in space, matter and conception – between the 
composition and production of early modern writing materials and the composition and 
production of consumables, and add further weight to Wendy Wall’s research into 
intersections of culinary and literary skill-sets in the early modern home.101  
An awareness of the ways in which ‘taste’ as discrimination is literally responsive 
to the sensory qualities of its objects is also evident if we shift our attention from 
literary artefacts to the visual arts. In his The Arte of Limning (c.1600), Nicholas Hilliard’s 
recommendation that ‘a good painter hath tender senses, quiet and apt,’ is ratified by his 
remarkable sensitivity to the olfactory and gustatory, as well as the visual, qualities of his 
materials.102 Thus, emphasizing the importance of fastidious cleanliness, he suggests 
using ‘water distilled from the water of some clear spring,’ as a base for making paints; 
or even better, ‘from black cherries, which is the cleanest that ever I could find, and 
keepeth longest sweet and clear.’103 Hilliard uses ‘sweet’ to indicate water which does 
not go immediately stale, but given that this water is extracted from cherries, the word 
surely retains some of its gustatory connotations. More explicitly, Hilliard prohibits ‘all 
ill-smelling colours, all ill-tasting, as orpiment, verdigris, verditer, pink, sap-green, 
                                                          
99 The 1596 A Booke of Secrets gathers together ink formulas which incorporate ‘vineger,’ ‘beere’ and ‘the 
shels of hazell nuts.’ William Phillip, A Booke of Secrets (London: Adam Islip for Edward White, 1596).  In 
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102 Nicholas Hilliard, The Arte of Limning, ed. R.K.R. Thornton and T.G.S. Cain (Manchester: Carcanet 
Press, 1992), 45. 
103 Ibid., 53. 
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litmus, or any unsweet colours’; these, he warns ‘are naught for limning; use none of 
them if you may choose.’104 His concern registers an awareness of portrait miniatures as 
entities intended to stimulate the senses in unexpected ways; at the very least, they must 
not be ‘ill-smelling’ or ‘ill-tasting’ (my emphasis). And elsewhere in The Arte, Hilliard 
recommends the use of salt and sugar ‘candie’ in limning colours.105 In his directions for 
paint-making, then, Hilliard reifies the language of aesthetic sweetness; The Arte offers a 
material grounding for the pervasive early modern association between saccharinity and 
pleasure in the literary and visual arts.  
From this perspective, we can see how – pace the abstraction narrative discussed 
earlier in this chapter – the language of literary and aesthetic taste in this period 
resonates with material, sensory experiences of reading, writing, and printing.106 In the 
final section of this chapter, I focus on Ben Jonson’s paratexts in order to explore 
briefly some of the implications of this for how we understand the politics of taste and 
the formation of publics.107 
 
VI. ‘Men of better Pallat’ 
 
Thus far, I have discussed ‘taste’ largely as a faculty associated with a courtly and noble 
elite, or at least with those who aspired to such a status: with men like Florio, Sidney, 
and Hilliard, and women like Cavendish and Southwell. For such figures, I have argued, 
‘distaste’ for vernacular literature in general, or their own works in particular, is 
attributable to a distemper: a humoral imbalance experienced as a physical pathology. 
Patrician loftiness resounds in Cavendish’s disgust, in the opening quotation to this 
chapter, at the ‘Quelquechose of Rallery... made of Ingredients, as bad as Poor People 
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Dress their Corporeal Meat with’; in his 1591 Second frutes, Florio abandons the humility 
which ostensibly characterised his dedication to Dudley in the First fruites, writing in the 
dedicatory epistle to Nicholas Saunder of Ewel:  
 
I dare vaunte without sparke of vaine-glory that [here] I have given you a taste 
of the best Italian fruites... but if the pallate of some ale or beere mouthes be 
out of taste that they cannot taste that, let them sporte but not spue...108 
 
Similarly, in his address to the reader, Florio proclaims that, ‘if thy sight and taste be so 
altred, that neither colour or taste of my fruites will please thee, I greatly force not, for I 
never minded to be thy fruterer.’109 Florio’s disdain for the tasteless palates of the ‘ale or 
beere mouthes’ of some of his readers, however, serves as a reminder that it was 
precisely the aspirational, but by no means aristocratic, middling sort that his work 
appealed to. David Summers has pointed out ‘the extreme democratic implications to 
be drawn from the commonness of sensation,’ when sensation is taken as the basis of 
aesthetic discrimination.110 Because the capacity to sense – unlike, say, classical learning 
– is almost universally shared, everyone has an equal claim to make judgements on its 
basis. In the case of taste, the democratic quality of judgements of sense collides with 
the inherent subjectivity of gustation: everyone has their own tastes, and everyone’s 
tastes are different. As Richard Brathwaite puts it in his 1620 Essaies upon the five senses, 
‘of all others, this Sence produceth the diverst qualities... [taste] showes this pleasing and 
acceptable to one, which is noisome and different to an other.’111 Because an objective 
standard of taste is impossible to determine, individuals at all social and economic levels 
can claim authority for their opinions.  
Jonson and his literary inheritors – the ‘sons of Ben’ – are deeply interested in 
the role which taste plays both in enfranchising, and in managing and regulating, the 
faculty of literary and aesthetic judgement. Like the more securely courtly and 
aristocratic figures mentioned in this chapter, Jonson certainly does exploit the idea that 
appropriate literary judgements are reliant on a healthy humoral constitution. As he 
writes in the Prologue to his 1629 The New Inn: 
                                                          
108 John Florio, Florios second frutes (London: by T. Orwin for Thomas Woodcock, 1591), A3r. 
109 Ibid., A5v. 
110 David Summers, The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 326. 
111 Richard Brathwaite, Essaies upon the five senses (London: E. Griffin for Richard Whittaker, 1620), D4r 
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 If anything be set to a wrong taste, 
’Tis not the meat there, but the mouth’s displac’d,  
Remove but that sick palat, all is well.112  
 
Attempting to pre-empt and guide his audience’s responses to his play, Jonson 
attributes any criticism of it to a pathological palate. Earlier in his theatrical career, 
however, Jonson had articulated a more compliant attitude to his audiences’ varied 
tastes.113 The prologue to his 1609 Epicene bemoans that: 
 
...in this age a sect of writers are, 
That only for particular likings care  
And will taste nothing that is popular.  
With such we mingle neither brains nor breasts;  
Our wishes, like to those make public feasts,  
Are not to please the cook’s tastes, but the guests’.  
Yet if those cunning palates hither come,  
They shall find guests’ entreaty and good room... 
The Poet prays you, then, with better thought  
To sit, and when his cates are all in brought,  
Though there be some far-fet, there will dear-bought 
Be fit for ladies; some for lords, knights, squires,  
Some for your waiting-wench and city-wires,  
Some for your men and daughters of Whitefriars.114 
 
In Jonson’s account, Epicene caters for both ‘popular’ and ‘cunning’ palates: he claims 
that he has prepared his play not to suit his own ‘tastes,’ but rather to please the tastes 
of his audience, which encompasses members from serving girls, to the middling 
                                                          
112 Ben Jonson, The New Inn, ed. Michael Hattaway (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). All 
further in-text references are to this edition. 
113 Hillary M. Nunn argues that in the Renaissance theatre, ‘eating, both onstage and among playgoers, 
provided a vital part of  the play going experience, and audiences... enjoyed ample opportunity to purchase 
food during performances.’ Nunn, ‘Playing with Appetite in Early Modern Comedy,’ in Craik and Pollard, 
Shakespearean Sensations, 101. From this perspective, Jonson’s alimentary rhetoric seems less metaphorical 
than we might presume. 
114 Ben Jonson, Epicene, or the Silent Woman, ed. Richard Dutton (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2003), Prologue, l.4-24. In a prefatory poem to Fletcher’s The Purple Island, William Benlowes paraphrases 
Jonson: ‘O judge not Thou, let Readers judge thy book: / Such Cates should rather please the Guest, then 
Cook.’ William Benlowes, ‘To the Learned Author,’ ¶ ¶1v. 
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denizens of commercial Whitefriars, and grand lords and ladies. Jonson’s preface is 
remarked by the Cavalier poet Thomas Carew in a prefatory poem defending William 
Davenant’s 1636 play The wits A Comedie. Carew hints that the Epicene preface was an 
influential factor in an increasing tendency for early modern audiences to claim 
authority in theatrical judgement: 
 
It hath beene said of old, that Playes are Feasts,  
Poets the Cookes, and the Spectators Guests,  
The Actors Waitors: From this Similie,  
Some have deriv’d an unsafe libertie  
To use their Judgements as their Tastes, which chuse  
Without controule, this Dish, and that refuse: 
But Wit allowes not this large Priviledge...115 
 
In contrast to Jonson’s avowed cooperation with popular tastes, Carew condemns those 
readers or spectators who take their own preference or aversion as a sufficient 
foundation upon which to assess a play. Carew strives to retain a level of objectivity for 
critical taste: ‘though sweets with yours, sharps best with my taste meet,’ he points out, 
‘Both must agree this meat’s or sharpe or sweet.’116 Carew goes on to directly address 
those who would claim that Davenant’s play is tasteless:  
 
…if, as in this Play, where with delight  
I feast my Epicurean appetite  
With rellishes so curious, as dispence  
The utmost pleasure to the ravisht sense,  
You should professe that you can nothing meet  
That hits your taste, either with sharpe or sweet,  
But cry out, ’tis insipid; your bold Tongue  
May doe it’s Master, not the Author wrong;  
For Men of better Pallat will by it  
Take the just elevation of your Wit.117 
                                                          
115 Thomas Carew, ‘To the Reader of Master William Davenant’s Play,’ in William Davenant, The wits A 
Comedie (London: Richard Meighen, 1636), A3v.  
116 Carew, ‘To the Reader,’ A3v. 
117 Ibid. 
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Despite his censure of those who ‘use their Judgements as their Tastes,’ Carew follows 
Jonson in locating critical authority in the ‘Pallat’; he only objects to the presumption 
that this analogy entails a critical free-for-all, where one man’s opinion is as valid as the 
next. Anyone who declares Davenant’s play ‘insipid,’ Carew explains, divulges more 
about his own poor critical faculties than about the work he evaluates. As with 
Nathanial in Love’s Labour’s Lost, judgements of taste function as a form of self-
revelation, according to which others can gauge the opinionated critic’s place in an 
intellectual hierarchy: one’s palate is intimately tied to one’s public identity, and – by 
extension – to one’s social position.  
Pierre Bourdieu argues that judgements of taste are both determined by social 
class, and reciprocally determinative of an individual’s place within the class hierarchy. 
‘Taste,’ writes Bourdieu, both ‘classifies, and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects... 
distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make.’ 118  Bourdieu reaches this 
conclusion via sociological fieldwork undertaken in 1960s France, but his observations 
are also applicable to Carew and Jonson: for both, judgements of taste are central to the 
formation of social bonds, distinguishing an ‘Epicurean’ elite. Jonson’s interest in 
identifying men with ‘cunning palates’ in his prefaces, moreover, resonates with what 
we know of his own social values. Jonson’s Leges Convivials, or ‘Laws of Feasting,’ which 
hung over the mantelpiece in the Apollo room of the Devil and St Dunstan tavern 
where he and his acolytes often met, included injunctions to ‘Let the tasteless, gloomy, 
base man be absent,’ and ‘Let no tasteless poems be read.’119 These precepts evoke 
simultaneously the bonds of fellowship forged by the gustatory pleasures of convivial 
eating and drinking, and the faculty of literary taste as a determinant of poetic worth: 
taste is the decisive standard for inclusion in Jonson’s circle. This is important because it 
has implications for our ideas about the early modern public sphere. In ‘Hamlet and the 
Social Thing,’ Paul Yachnin writes that ‘in part.... the audience becomes a public merely 
by imagining itself as one.’ 120  Whilst Yachnin’s focus is on Shakespeare, Jonson’s 
theatrical prologues and epilogues frequently and forcefully encourage his audiences to 
                                                          
118 Bourdieu, Distinction, 5.  
119 Percy Simpson, ‘Ben Jonson and the Devil Tavern,’ The Modern Language Review 43/3 (1939): 367-73.  
120 Paul Yachnin, ‘Hamlet and the Social Thing,’ in Paul Yachnin and Bronwen Wilson, eds., Making Publics 
in Early Modern Europe: People, Things, Forms of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2011), 87. 
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imagine themselves as publics.121 Because they articulate this encouragement by utilizing 
the language of taste, however, they challenge conventional notions about public 
formation. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jurgen Habermas argued 
that the commercialisation of literary and artistic cultures was a necessary precondition 
for the emergence of a bourgeois public. By providing what he calls a ‘training ground’ 
on which a new class of people could exercise their subjective discriminative faculties, 
and engage in reasoned debate about the conclusions they reached, certain types of 
cultural commodity habituated the nation to such activities. Subsequently, the ‘critical 
debate ignited by works of literature and art was.... extended to include economic and 
political disputes,’ and the bourgeois public was born.122  
Habermas’ emphasis on the kinds of abstract, critical reasoning involved in the 
consumption and consequent appraisal of ‘works of literature and art’ has been highly 
influential, but it has also been contested. Two objections are particularly relevant here. 
The first, a matter of chronology, is easy enough to establish. A number of scholars 
have shown that the public sphere located by Habermas firmly in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries was present, in various forms, much earlier, and certainly by the 
early modern period.123 The second concerns the weight that Habermas gives to rational 
debate. Notably, in an essay on what he calls ‘wild publics,’ Michael Gardiner contends 
that Habermas’ emphasis on the rationality of the public sphere means that he neglects 
the corporeality of publics. 124  In contrast, Gardiner argues for what he calls an 
‘incarnate... moral subject,’ berating Habermas for ‘retaining a sharp distinction between 
impartial reason on the one hand and the embodied and ‘non-rational’ features of 
human existence on the other.’125 Nonetheless, Gardiner’s own essay ends up replicating 
this distinction, asserting that ‘public spheres (or counterpublics) are as much sites of 
                                                          
121 The induction to Jonson’s 1614 Bartholomew Fair is exemplary in its evocation of its audience as a 
public. See Ben Jonson, Bartholemew Fair, ed. Suzanne Gossett (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000). 
122 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 
29 and 33. 
123 See Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker, ‘Discovering the Renaissance Reader,’ in Reading, Society and 
Politics, 8. See also Peter Lake and Steven Pincus, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England,’ 
in Lake and Pincus, eds., The Politics of  the Public Sphere in Early Modern England (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007), 1-30. 
124 In Gardiner’s own words, ‘Habermas’ thoughts on rational dialogue and the public sphere do not in a 
substantive way concern themselves with, much less address, the embodied experiences and activities of 
actual people in the context of their everyday lives.’ Michael E. Gardiner, ‘Wild Publics and Grotesque 
Symposiums: Habermas and Bakhtin on Dialogue, Everyday Life and the Public Sphere,’ The Sociological 
Review 52/s1 (2004): 30-31. 
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impassioned and embodied contestation as arenas of impartial, reasoned debate.’ 126 
Whilst Gardiner argues that public spheres are embodied, his association of 
embodiment with (implicitly instinctual) passion and contestation, and his subsequent 
opposition of these qualities to ‘impartial, reasoned debate’ ultimately denies the 
reciprocity of the somatic and the cerebral.  
As we have seen, however, Jonson’s plays encourage their audiences to imagine 
themselves as publics by referencing and encouraging their capacity neither for impartial 
reason nor for ‘impassioned contestation’ but for a form of cultural consumption 
imagined as indivisible from the consumption of food, and regulated, crucially, by taste: 
the faculty which bridges the divide between intellectual and physical responses. 
Jonson’s alimentary and gustatory imagery speaks for an age in which the kinds of 
judgement which underlie critical responses to theatrical culture, and which thus also 
undergird the formation of publics, are understood not as opposed to somatic 
experience, nor as running parallel to somatic experience, but as identical with it. The 
kinds of public which form around Jonson’s plays are constituted of ‘characters’ written 
in gall ink, simultaneously humoral and literary, sensory and discriminative. 
 
VII. ‘to dream to eat Books’ 
 
Perusing a section titled ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ included in the anonymous 
1698 miscellany Wits cabinet, the reader is advised that ‘to dream to eat Books, is good to 
Schoolmasters, and all that make profit by them, and which are studious for Eloquence; 
to others it is sudden death.’127 In this uncompromising prediction, bibliophagy emerges 
as an apparently conventional dream phenomenon in the seventeenth century; its 
radically divergent consequences form a boundary line between the ‘studious’ and the 
unschooled. In this, the dream of book-eating emblematizes some of the concerns of 
this chapter, which has argued that early modern literary taste is fundamentally rooted, if 
not in the actual alimentary consumption of codices, at least in an acute, distinctly 
wakeful alertness to the gustatory qualities of the materials of reading and writing. 
Against the conventional scholarly presumption that the birth of aesthetic taste 
originates, towards the end of the seventeenth century, in the death of a metaphor, as 
the term lost its notional association with gustation, I argue that the language of literary 
good taste is nascent in the commonplace culture of the first half of the seventeenth 
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century, emerging in part from the trope of the reader as a bee who uses his or her 
sense of taste to select, and subsequently digest, the flowers of rhetoric. In 
commonplace books and anthologies, in paratexts and poems, taste emerges as a crucial 
aspect of the management of readerly expectations and responses; as a point of transfer 
between texts and the material, lived realities they describe, scrutinize, and intervene in; 
and as a key component of efforts to determine the status and value of vernacular 
literature, for better or worse. I have shown, furthermore, that this trope was 
understood as grounded in the material, humoral reality of bodies and books. In its 
earliest incarnations, taste defined as literary discrimination was understood not simply 
as a figurative application of a term that had previously been used only to describe a 
physical sensation, but as rooted in the phenomenal reality of reading and writing as it 
engaged the senses. Within a humoral economy, the bibliophagic trope of the reader as 
bee takes on a literal, as well as a literary, dimension, as the similarity (even the 
fungibility) of the fluids that constituted both the human body and a writer’s corpus 
made an alimentary exchange between the two a real possibility. From this perspective, 
taste’s democratic and public-making capacities can be re-thought as a matter not of 
abstract reasoning, but one of processes of discrimination which are deeply, and 
intensely, embodied. 
In my next chapter, I turn to early modern anatomical textbooks in order to 
explore the relationship between taste in the ‘literary’ sense explored in this chapter, and 
taste as an object and faculty of empirical investigation. In Helkiah Crooke’s popular 
1615 Mikrokosmographia, ‘taste’ slides, referentially, between readerly discrimination, and 
gustation. Gustation itself, furthermore, manifests in Crooke’s text both as an object of 
investigation, and as a route to anatomical and medical knowledge. What might this 
semantic flexibility tell us about the relation between humanist erudition and proto-
scientific empiricism in the early modern anatomy theatre? And what might it reveal 
more generally, about how early modern men and women conceived of the relation 
between sensation and knowledge? 
77 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Touching Taste in Helkiah Crooke’s Mikrokosmographia 
Before we can understand how the brain knows, we need to figure out how the tongue knows.1 
 
I. ‘instead of a preamble’ 
 
At the beginning of ‘Quest[ion] I: What Sense is’ of Book Eight of his 1615 
Mikrokosmographia: A description of the body of man, Helkiah Crooke describes how he 
intends to approach the subject of the senses:2 
 
before we assay their particular handling, we will take a Taste of them in general, 
which may make way to the particulars, and may serve instead of a preamble, 
for the better understanding of the Reader. First of all therefore, it is to be 
considered what Sense is.3 
 
In this quotation, as in the corpus of early seventeenth-century anatomy books, taste 
appears both as a means of enquiry and as an object of knowledge. Most obviously, ‘a 
Taste’ is employed as an epistemological term to describe the ‘general,’ preliminary 
account of ‘what Sense is’ that Crooke will proceed to offer the reader. Simultaneously, 
physiological taste, one of the particular faculties addressed here under the broad rubric 
of ‘Sense,’ is also evoked as a subject of Crooke’s enquiries. Finally, the anatomist’s own 
sense of taste is implicitly invoked: medical practitioners had been encouraged to taste 
bodily secretions in order to discover humoral imbalances since the classical era, and 
Mark Jenner has shown that this tendency to taste the body for medical purposes 
carried over into post-mortem investigations well into the seventeenth century.4 I would 
                                                          
1 Charles Zuker, Professor of Biochemistry and Molecular Biophysics and Neuroscience. Quoted in 
Michael Eisenstein, ‘Taste: More than meets the mouth,’ Nature (23 December 2010): S18-S19. 
2 The structure of Mikrokosmographia is complex. Briefly, the book comprises thirteen books, each of 
which is divided into chapters and concluded by a series of ‘questions’ related to its topic. For a 
discussion of the significance of Crooke’s organisation of his material, see Matthew Scott Landers, ‘The 
Anatomy of Anatomia: Dissection and the Organization of Knowledge in British Literature, 1500-1800,’ 
(PhD diss., Louisiana State University, 2009), 57-58 and 61. 
3 Helkiah Crooke, Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man (London: William Jaggard, 1615), 
Kkk2v (646). 
4 Crooke himself writes that ‘chirurgions... by the savor or smell of a wound are able to judge whether it 
be... of and ill an untoward disposition or no’ [sic]. Ibid., Kkk1v (650). Jenner notes that ‘Reinier De 
Graaf’s investigations of the pancreas relied upon the tasting of its fluids,’ whilst ‘the anatomist and 
physician, Clopton Havers, commented on the flavour of the medullary fluids which he discovered in 
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like to begin this chapter by offering an exploratory ‘Taste’ of some of its major themes, 
introduced through a discussion of my opening quotation. What is the relationship, I 
ask, between the three types of taste Crooke so succinctly invokes? This move is not 
empty wordplay: in circumventing the teleological momentum implied by an 
introduction or ‘preamble’ in favour of the kind of tentative, probatory exploration 
suggested by a ‘Taste,’ I hope to license my taking a less direct route to my conclusions 
than is usual. 
Considering its success and influence throughout the seventeenth century, 
Mikrokosmographia is, as Matthew Scott Landers has commented, a relatively 
understudied book. 5  Exceptions to this rule of scholarly neglect include Elizabeth 
Harvey, who associates Crooke’s pervasive use of the language of touch with what she 
describes as ‘a post-Vesalian anatomy in which the anatomist dissects and handles the 
corpse in order to partition it and demonstrate its structures.’6 Expressions such as ‘the 
hand of speech,’ Harvey writes, register the increased status accorded to first-‘hand’ 
experience in the production of anatomical knowledge, evident on a practical level in 
the merging of the historically distinct roles of the sector, demonstrator and ostensor.7 More 
recently, Alan Salter has argued for a strand in vernacular literature which portrays ‘the 
flamboyant victories of the senses over language.’ Sensory metaphors, Salter argues, 
‘introduce an empiricism that is vital and energetic’ into early seventeenth-century 
anatomical works, notably those of William Harvey.8  
Both Elizabeth Harvey and Salter interpret language referring to the senses (in 
Harvey’s case, to touch specifically) in terms which assimilate that language into a 
conventional, and implicitly Whiggish, narrative of the history of anatomical dissection 
as a battle between the traditional authority of inaccurate canonical (particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                    
human joints,’ and as late as 1726 the physician John Floyer ‘urged ‘Anatomists’ to ‘taste the Lympha in 
the … Spleen.’’ Jenner, ‘Tasting Lichfield,’ 656, 667. 
5 Landers, ‘The Anatomy of Anatomia,’ 59. The ESTC lists five editions of Mikrokosmographia between its 
first publication and 1651. For those without without the resources to access – or perhaps the time to 
read – the whole of Crooke’s magisterial tome, two set of woodcuts and descriptions were available under 
the name Somatographia anthropine (London: William Jaggard, 1616; London: Thomas Cotes for Michael 
Sparke, 1634). It also appeared, in abbreviated form, as The manuall of the anatomy or dissection of the body of 
man, a summary attributed to the surgeon Alexander Read, which went through six editions between 1634 
and 1638. 
6 Elizabeth D. Harvey, ‘The Touching Organ: Allegory, Anatomy, and the Renaissance Skin Envelope,’ in 
Harvey, Sensible Flesh, 81. 
7 Traditionally, as Harvey writes, ‘a dissection was performed by the sector, typically a barber or a surgeon, 
while the ostensor or the demonstrator pointed [to the body parts] and the lector read [from an authorative 
text].’ Ibid., 90.  
8 Alan Salter, ‘Early Modern Empiricism and the Discourse of the Senses,’ in C.T. Wolfe and O. Gal, 
eds., The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2010), 71. 
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classical) texts, and the increasingly victorious (and implicitly more objectively accurate) 
evidence of the anatomist’s senses, with the work of Andreas Vesalius established as 
central to the eventual triumph of empiricism.9 In England, this battle can be seen to 
play out in conflicts between the two organizations licensed to perform dissections: the 
Royal College of Physicians, and the Worshipful Company of Barber-Surgeons. The 
first consisted of high-status, university-trained physicians, who were conversant with 
the classics and advocated a therapeutic approach to maintaining health, the second of 
low-status, largely uneducated barber-surgeons, who intervened only in moments of 
crisis to perform the basic manual work of bleeding, pulling rotten teeth and setting (if 
need be, sawing off) damaged limbs.10 In the words of Crooke, whilst physicians ‘apply 
them[selves] unto the more abstruse part of the Art [of physic] separated from the sense 
and consisting in contemplation and collection; the Chyrurgeon worketh by his eye and 
with his hand.’11 The influence of Vesalius has been observed both in the increased 
status of barber-surgeons in the seventeenth century, and in a weakening of the 
distinction between the two positions, as physicians increasingly undertook the practical 
work traditionally associated with barber-surgeons, and barber-surgeons increasingly 
gained access to authoritative texts.12 
As a vernacular translation and adaptation of a number of classical, medieval 
and contemporary authors, written by a physician for an audience of barber-surgeons, 
Mikrokosmographia played an important role in this second process, as its paratextual 
material anxiously acknowledges. Crooke gives an account of the composition of the 
text in ‘The Præface to the Chururgeons’: 
 
                                                          
9 Andrew Cunningham gives a useful summary of this approach in his The Anatomical Renaissance: The 
Resurrection of the Anatomical Projects of the Ancients (Aldershot: Scolar, 1997), 3. There have been 
modifications of the model, often chronological. Katharine Park, for instance, explores alternative 
contexts of dissection, such as post-mortem caesareans, in order to argue that there were ample 
opportunities to view the inside of the body first-hand before Vesalius. See Secrets of Women: Gender, 
Generation and the Origins of Human Dissection (New York: Zone Books, 2007). Cunningham himself 
challenges the association of dissection and scientific progress, arguing that, ‘unlike science today,’ early 
modern anatomy was ‘religiously formed and constituted’ (202, emphasis in original). Others, including Andrew 
Wear, have pointed out that many classical texts, including those of Galen, emphasised the importance of 
direct observation. Wear, ‘Medicine in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700,’ in Lawrence Conrad et al., The 
Western Medical Tradition 800 BC to 1800 AD (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 272. Even 
Andreas Carlino, whose Books of the Body: Anatomical Ritual and Renaissance Learning (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997) is in many respects exemplary of the traditional model of anatomical progress, 
recognizes that Vesalius did not immediately instigate a revolution in practice: although there was an 
‘epistemological renewal,’ registered in iconographical changes, ‘there was no corresponding revision of 
the academic ceremony... for several more decades.’ Carlino, Books of the Body, 68.  
10 For a more detailed explanation of differences in training, social status and practices, see Hillary Nunn, 
Staging Anatomies: Dissection and Spectacle in Early Stuart Tragedy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 8, 32. 
11 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, ¶6r (unpaginated). 
12 Nunn, Staging Anatomies, 11. 
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My present worke is for the most part out of Bauhine... The Controversies are 
mostwhatout of Laurentius, with some additions, substractions and alterations as 
I thought fit... I also added Praefaces to every booke... & in the subsequent 
discourse many passages partly out of my owne observations, partly as I met 
with them in approved authors. The streame and current of Bauhines discourse 
because it is very hard, intricate, and full of long continued sentences, I have 
broken off and parted as it might best be understood.13 
 
As this passage makes clear, Mikrokosmographia is a hybrid. Whilst Crooke draws heavily 
on ‘approved authors,’ he does not hesitate to revise, truncate, and elaborate on their 
words, and he also includes ‘passages partly out of my owne observations.’ 
Mikrokosmographia, then, occupies a middle ground between approbation of past 
authorities, and a new belief in the utility of first-hand, empirical experience.  
How, in this context, are we to interpret Crooke’s use of the language of taste 
and touch to introduce his discussion of the senses? It is tempting to follow the same 
trajectory as Harvey and Salter, and argue that Crooke’s use of ‘taste’ as an 
epistemological term was influenced by surgeons’ and anatomists’ use of their sense of 
taste as a means of understanding bodies in the period. Crooke’s use of the term ‘Taste’ 
to describe a ‘general,’ preparatory investigation of ‘what Sense is’ would thus reflect the 
increased authority of taste, along with the other senses, over canonical textual accounts 
of bodily processes. According to this logic, however, Crooke misrepresents the content 
of the ‘Question’ he introduces, which is largely concerned with Aristotle’s description, 
in De Anima, of a sense as ‘that which can receive sensible Formes without any matter.’14 Crooke 
discusses this seminal definition in terms informed by a close attention to the text, 
drawing on commentaries by John Grammaticus, Alexander Aphrodisaeus and 
Simplicius, as well as other passages in De Anima itself. Despite an introductory 
emphasis on taste and touch, then, ‘Ques[tion] I’ consists of a discussion of ‘what Sense 
is’ characterised not by the inclusion of empirical, sense-based information, but by an 
attempt to define ‘sense’ which is dependent on the textual subtleties of Aristotle and 
on philological scholarship.  
In this chapter, I argue that the association between metaphors of contactual 
perception and empiricism traced by both Harvey and Salter is a fundemental 
misapprehension of Crooke’s presentation of his own anatomical experience and 
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14 Ibid., Kkk2v (464). 
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expertise, and that this misapprehension is rooted in a specific, and particularly modern, 
way of understanding the processes through which sensory perceptions are reified as 
knowledge. By addressing the slippage between representations of taste as an object of 
knowledge in Mikrokosmographia, and its utility as an epistemological concept, as well as 
its empirical application, I hope to draw a picture of early seventeenth century 
conceptions of anatomy which ultimately resists the dichotomies – between sensory 
knowledge and textual knowledge, empiricism and erudition – that my opening 
discussion establishes as categories of analysis. Essentially, I argue that attending to the 
senses as the subject, as well as the means, of anatomical investigation, compels us to 
recalibrate their role in early dissection.   
For Harvey and Salter, anatomists’ increased use of their senses in the early 
seventeenth century is registered in language which makes metaphors of those senses. 
In other words, the anatomist’s own sensuous experiences provide the resources for 
him to conceptualize and communicate ‘the body’ as an object of knowledge in the 
realm of culture. This paradigm correlates closely to what Tim Ingold identifies as the 
dominant, although erroneous, model of the processes of sensory perception in 
contemporary Western thought in general, and ethnography in particular. ‘According to 
this model,’ Ingold writes: 
 
the mind picks up sensory signals from the world around it and passes them to 
the mind, which processes them to form images or representations. Through a 
logical manipulation of those representations, the mind formulates plans of 
action, which are then passed as instructions for the body to execute in the 
world.15  
 
Perception, then, ‘is a two-stage phenomenon: the first involves the receipt, by the 
individual human organism, of ephemeral and meaningless sense data; the second 
consists in the organisation of these data into collectively held and enduring 
representations.’16 This theory, Ingold points out, ‘rests on a fundamental distinction 
between physical and cultural dimensions of perception.’17 Salter’s contention that in the 
early modern period ‘authors took the physiology of the senses as a foundation on 
                                                          
15 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill (London: Routledge, 
2000), 103.  
16 Ibid., 159. 
17 Ibid., 282-3. 
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which to construct imaginative treatments of epistemology which in turn shaped the 
new philosophy of empiricism’ locates the body as the physical substrate which is made 
meaningful through the intellectual processing of sense data. 18  For Salter, sensation 
itself, represented in language, is metamorphosed into an epistemic category: 
empiricism. In both cases, sensation becomes useful as a source of knowledge only 
when it has been reformulated in the realm of culture: in the first case, the mind; in the 
second, language.   
Ingold associates the representationalist theory of perception with a post-
Cartesian conception ‘of the mind as a distinct organ that is capable of operating on the 
bodily data of sense,’ and the dualisitic approach it reflects informs contemporary 
western science as well as anthropology.19 Evolutionary biology in particular, Ingold 
believes, is riven by a fundamental inconsistency. Its practitioners necessarily conceive 
of themselves both as material organisms locked into the matrix of nature, and as 
thinking minds able to step outside of that matrix and consider it as such.20 To resolve 
this paradox, Ingold engages with a number of scholarly approaches, from ecological 
psychology to phenomenology, which he sees as commensurable with beliefs about 
perception and the relation between being and knowing held by indigenous North 
American peoples such as the Cree and Ojibwa. Where Ingold uses his anthropological 
experience to counter the orthodoxies of contemporary western science, this chapter 
steps not sideways but backwards in order to ask how, in an age when ‘biology’ was an 
unknown term and ‘science’ still encompassed the general sweep of human cognizance, 
the proponants of anatomical dissection understood a self which is both sensate 
material stuff and, simultaneously, the self that conceptualises itself as sensate stuff. I 
begin by examining Crooke’s conception of the functioning of the senses in general, 
and taste in particular, as objects of knowledge. 
 
II. ‘of the mind present in sensation’ 
 
Peter Dear writes that ‘in the sixteenth century, with frequent bows to the example set 
by the ancient Greco-Roman physician Galen, anatomists conceived of their enterprise 
as being above all one of disciplined seeing.’ 21  Elizabeth Harvey’s emphasis on the 
                                                          
18 Salter, ‘Empiricism,’ 60. 
19 Ingold, Perception, 3. 
20 Ibid., 89-90. 
21 Peter Dear, ‘The Meanings of  Experience,’ in Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston, eds., The Cambridge 
History of  Science, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 111. 
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tactility of early anatomy offers an obvious rejoinder to this emphasis on the ocular. 
Indeed, in early modern texts the surgeon is sometimes invoked as a paradigm of haptic 
delicacy: discussing how to determine the ripeness of a fruit in his 1693 The compleat 
gard’ner, for example, Jean de La Quintinie warns against ‘the violent impression of their 
Unskillful Thumb’ but allows that, ‘in case it be a Fig... it is allowable to touch it gently 
with the end of the Finger, almost in the same manner as a Chyrurgeon feels for the 
Vein in order to Bleed.’22 Here, however, I want to emphasise not the prominence of 
one sense over another, but the synasthetic nature of anatomical experience; in 
particular, imbrications of touch and taste.  
In his 1611 Italian-English dictionary, Queen Anna’s new world of words, John 
Florio translates the Italian noun ‘Tásta’ thus: ‘a Chirurgions probe or searching needle... also a 
taste, a touch, or feeling. Also a triall, or assay.’ Correspondingly, the verb ‘Tastáre’ is defined 
as ‘to taste, to assay, to feele, to touch, to grope for, to trye... Also to search a sore...’23 Like the 
English equivalent, taste, the Italian words ‘tásta’ and ‘tastáre’ evoke both gustatory and 
tactile sensation; simultaneously, they have epistemological associations with acts of trial 
and testing. The words, however, have an additional set of meanings: ‘tásta’ can indicate 
‘a Chirurgions probe,’ and ‘tastáre’ describes the searching or probing of a sore. Today, the 
Oxford English Dictionary preserves these surgical associations: citing Florio, its 
etymological account of the noun ‘taste’ invites the philologist to ‘compare... Old 
French taste, Italian tasta, a surgical probe.’ 24  This unexpected connection between 
touching, tasting, and surgical probing surfaces obliquely in John Donne’s ‘The 
Comparison,’ in which Donne likens the ‘filthy’ embraces that his addressee offers to 
his mistress to ‘a worme sucking an envenomd sore.’ In contrast, when Donne and his 
own mistress kiss, they do so with all the tentative delicacy of ‘the Surgeon’ engaged in 
‘searching wounds.’25 From this definitional nexus taste emerges not only as a form of 
knowledge that the body possesses, but also a form of knowledge about the body, a tactile 
tool used to ‘probe’ its flesh.  
In Mikrokosmographia, Crooke frequently notes affiliations between various 
senses. In particular, following Aristotle, Crooke describes touch as ‘the ground and 
                                                          
22 Quintinie, The compleat gard’ner, sig M3v. 
23 John Florio, Queen Anna’s new world of  words (London: Melchior Bradwood and William Stansby for 
Edward Blount and William Barret, 1611), Aaa1v (554). 
24 OED Online, accessed 28 June 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/198050. 
25 John Donne, ‘Elegy 2: The Comparison,’ in Gary A. Stringer, ed., The Variorium Edition of  the Poetry of  
John Donne, vol. 2 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 51-52. 
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foundation’ of all of the senses.26 ‘Touching,’ he writes, ‘is diffused through the whole 
body’: it thus informs and conjoins different sensory experiences. 27  For Crooke, 
however – as for many of his contemporaries – taste in particular ‘hath great affinity 
with the Sense of Touching, in so much that some have made no distinction betweene 
them.’ 28  The sense of taste, Crooke asserts, assimiliates haptic as well as gustatory 
sensation, ‘for the Tongue is apprehensive of all the Tactile qualities,’ as well as 
‘Sapours.’29 In fact, the tongue is more sensitive as an organ of touch than even the 
conventionally acute fingertips, for ‘Jewellers and Lapidaries doe more accurately 
discern the differences of roughnesse and smoothnes, and such touchable qualities by 
the toung then by the hand.’ 30  This intertwining of the senses in experience and 
discourse means that it is frequently easier and more accurate to discuss their 
functioning as a whole, and Mikrokosmographia includes a long and complex, though in 
many respects deeply conventional, description of the the physiological process of 
sensing in general terms. Crooke’s fundementally Aristotelian understanding of this 
process is informed at every turn by a tradition of writings on the organic soul.31 I will 
give a brief account of the mechanics of sensation in Mikrokosmographia before 
proceeding to explore their significance in a phenomenological context.  
 Crooke follows the vast majority of previous commentators in identifying two 
parts to the faculty of sensation, ‘one Externall... the other Internall.’ The external 
faculty consists of the ‘outward senses’ of sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste, whilst 
the ‘Internall Facultie,’ which ‘Philosophers call the Primary or Common sense,’ is 
associated at various points with both the brain and the soul.32 Crooke understands the 
relationship between the two as circular. ‘Vessels or passages [i.e. nerves]’ transport the 
‘Faculty’ of sensing from the brain to the specific organs of sense:33 
 
the Nerves receive from the braine as from a principle... the Animal vertue and 
sensative soule which do reside in his substance and do distribute the faculties 
                                                          
26 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, B6v (12). In the last few decades, Michel Serres has similarly avocated a 
synaesthetic conception of the senses as rooted in and by the skin, which he calls the ‘common sense’ and 
describes as a kind of cloth in which the ‘senses are entwined and attached.’ Serres, The Five Senses, 52, 58-
59. 
27 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, Iii6v (531). 
28 Ibid., Ppp4r (715). 
29 Ibid., Hhh2v (628). 
30 Ibid., H6v (84). 
31 On this tradition, see Katharine Park, ‘The Organic Soul,’ in Charles B. Schmitt et al., eds., The 
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 464-84. 
32 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, Vv5v (502). 
33 Ibid., Oo6v (432). 
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of sense and motion into the Organs or Instruments of sense & motion as it 
were through Channels.34 
 
This journey of the ‘faculties of sense and motion’ from the brain to the sense organs is, 
as Crooke makes clear elsewhere, effected via ‘spirits... engendred of blood and vapour.’35 
Thus infused with the faculty of sense, the organs of sense are able to receive ‘the 
Images of thinges.’ By ‘images,’ Crooke means what what Aristotle’s medieval 
commentators, including Thomas Aquinas, called the sensory species: immaterial forms 
emanated by the object of sense, which literally print the sense organ with its image.36 
Subsequently, according to Crooke, ‘all these individuall formes received by the sences, 
are by them resigned up in token of foealty to the common sense or privy-chamber of 
the soule from whence they received their faculties.’37 Traditionally, the function of this 
extra, internal ‘common sense’ was supposed to be twofold: firstly, to perceive that one 
is sensing, and secondly to aggregate and reflect on the data received from the various 
sense organs, synthesising it into a coherent perceptual whole.38 Crooke describes this 
second process thus: ‘out of those formes the soule gathering phantasmes or notions 
doth either lay them up in the Memory, or worke upon them by discourse of Reason.’39 
In some ways, Crooke’s Aristotelian conception of perception has undeniable 
similarities to the representationalist theory which I outline above, and which Ingold 
refutes. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes it in his 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, this 
representationalist model: 
 
begins by recognizing an anatomical path leading from a receiver through a 
definite transmitter to a recording station, equally specialized. The objective 
world being given, it is assumed that it passes on to the sense-organs messages 
which must be registered, then deciphered in such a way as to reproduce in us 
the original text.40 
                                                          
34 Ibid., Ss2v (472). 
35 Ibid., Q3v (174). 
36 Ibid., Iii5r (504). On the Thomist theory of species, see Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later 
Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4-17. 
37 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, Oo6v (432). 
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Crooke’s peripatetic vocabulary of ‘spirits,’ ‘soule’ and ‘common sense’ might not be in 
evidence here, but his basic narrative – the sense organs receive impressions which are 
transmitted to a central faculty or ‘station’ which then deciphers or ‘workes upon’ those 
impressions – is similar. If we move to a more detailed examination of Crooke’s 
conception of the senses, however, major differences begin to emerge.   
According to Ingold, in western science, ‘life tends to be understood as a 
passive process,’ and contemporary cognitive science is no exception.41 Informed by a 
‘Cartesian ontology... that divorces the activity of the mind from that of the body in the 
world,’ in cognitive science ‘the body continues to be regarded as nothing more than an 
input device whose role is to receive information to be ‘processed’ by the mind, rather 
than playing any part in cognition itself.’ Drawing on the work of the psychologist 
James Gibson, as well as Merleau-Ponty, Ingold proposes that instead we conceive of 
‘the perceiving organism’ not as ‘a passive recipient of stimuli but.... [as] an active agent 
who purposively seeks out information that would specify the meaningful properties of 
his or her environment.’42  
For Crooke, quoting the medieval Arabic philosopher Averroes, ‘the first and 
chiefe consideration of Sense is, Whether it bee to be accounted amongest the Active or Passive 
vertues or Faculties of the soule.’ Crooke goes on to challenge the terms of the question 
itself. It is, he implies, based on an overly absolute division of ‘action and passion’: 
 
Active motion is that which proceedeth from the agent for the effecting of 
some thing; and Passive that which is received of the patient to make alteration 
in it: wherfore both action and passion being indeed one motion, as it commeth 
from the agent is an Action, and as it is received of... [the] Patient is a Passion.43 
 
Action and passion thus exist along the continuum of a single ‘motion’: they are 
opposites which constitute one another. As an act of sensing is understood as a single 
motion or action, it thus involves both an agent and a patient, or an active element and 
a passive element: ‘sense... is absolved and perfected, neither by action onely nor by 
                                                          
41 Ingold, Perception, 50. 
42 Ibid., 165. 
43 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, Kkk3r (653). 
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passion onely but by both together, that is both by action and passion.’44 The point is 
very similar to one made by Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception: 
 
The sensor and the sensible do not stand in relation to each other as two 
mutually external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of the sensor by the 
sensible... in [the] transaction between the subject of sensation and the sensible 
it cannot be held that one acts while the other suffers the action.45 
 
As his descriptions of processes of tasting make clear, Crooke understands gustatory 
sensation as just this kind of mutual ‘transaction.’ ‘When any savoury quality or 
affection... is applied unto the tongue,’ he writes, ‘it stirreth up the taste.’46 Sensation 
occurs as a result both of the purposiveness of the subject who applies the ‘savoury 
quality... unto the tongue,’ and of the force of the sapours themselves, which work 
dynamically to stimulate the taste. Elsewhere, the vitality of sapours is evident in 
Crooke’s belief that they ‘pierce through [the skin] into the pulpe and substance of the 
tongue,’ and his definition of ‘a Sapour’ as ‘a quality... which alone by it selfe is able to 
moove the Taste.’47 However, Crooke also remains aware of the agency of the organ of 
taste, commenting that ‘whilst wee chew our meate the Tongue rowleth it selfe on 
everie side of the mouth and applyeth it selfe to the Viands to take a say or Taste of 
them.’48 Crooke is particularly sensitive to the ways in which the consciously-chosen 
bodily practices of tasting subjects not only faciliatate but inform the experience of taste 
in specific ways. He comments, for instance, that ‘if... we desire to Taste any thing more 
curiously we apply it to the tip of our tongues.’ In contrast, ‘when wee are to swallow 
any thing whose taste is displeasing to us we hasten it to the roots of our tongue as 
soone as we can.’49 Tastes exist simultaneously as objective properties of comestibles 
able to act on the tongue, and as ephemeral sensations shaped by the manner of 
ingestion chosen by the tasting subject (i.e. a thorough chewing, versus a curious 
application to the tip of the tongue, versus a swift swallowing).  
For Crooke, then, the issue is not whether the act of sensing is active or passive, 
but where to locate agency and passivity within the act. As usual, Aristotle’s (alleged) 
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opinion on the matter is expounded first. Aristotle, Crooke suggests, represents the 
sensing body as a ‘passive’ recipient of the ‘species,’ or image, of the objective world: 
‘the act of Sensation’ is associated with the ‘sensible object’ rather than with the self that 
experiences it.50 Crooke goes on, however, to counter that such an argument, ‘though it 
be approved of many and be held for Aristotles, yet... is neither agreeable to Aristotle nor 
to the truth.’51  
 
There must be some part of the mind present in sensation; and hence it is that 
wee sometimes seeke a very small thing and yet see it not though we be very 
neare it, and though it be already received into the eye: Surely this is an 
argument most evident that the mind must be applied to that thing which we 
would see, and that something more is required to Sense then the bare reception 
of the species, for else a glasse might also perceive in as much as it doth receive 
the images...52 
 
Our phenomenal experience demonstrates that the body does not simply receive sense 
impressions, but must actively ‘seeke’ them out. Echoing Aristotle’s De Generatione 
Animalium, which had argued that ‘perception is a kind of cognition,’ Crooke insists that 
the mind does not belatedly process sense impressions; it is also ‘present in sensation’ 
itself. 53  Sensation is thus understood to have cognitive content: as Crooke says 
elsewhere ‘sense is not an alteration, but a discerning or knowing of the alteration.... the 
Action of the sensative faculty is a knowing and dijudication of the sensible thing.’54 To 
qualify as a sensation, a perceptual experience needs to join reception with 
apprehension. As Crooke’s use of the word ‘dijudication’ (judgement or discrimination) 
makes abundantly clear, acts of sensing, including tasting, are understood to quite 
literally incorporate judgement. 
In a recent essay, David Morris connects Merleau-Ponty’s contention, in the 
Phenomenology of Perception, that (in Morris’ paraphrase) ‘perception is not a passivist 
intake of outside sensation, but an active inherence of the body in the world’ to 
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Merleau-Ponty’s later theory of reversibility.55 ‘Reversibility,’ Morris explains, designates 
the fact that:  
 
to see something is to inherently also be a being who can be seen. The seer is 
inherently seen, in something like the way that a front inherently has a back. 
Similarly with... the perceiver and the perceived generally... Perception is 
conditioned by the perceiver’s being part of and open to the perceived world.56  
 
Processes of perception do not only disclose the world to the perceiver, they also reveal 
the perceiver as a being in the world, and as such subject to reciprocal acts of 
perception. Because sensory experiences are constitutionally embodied, that is, they 
simultaneously posit the self as a potential (passive) object, as well as an (active) origin, 
of sense. Morris employs the example of touch to illustrate this concept: ‘the hand,’ he 
writes, ‘in the very activity of touching, inherently opens itself to being passively 
touched by things, such that the touching hand can reverse to a passive thing touched 
and the thing can reverse to something active.’57 Put simply, if the hand touches the 
table, the table also touches the hand. 
I would like to suggest that Crooke similarly evinces an awareness of the way in 
which acts of sensing – including tasting – necessarily establish the perceiver as 
reciprocally subject to perception. Furthermore, because the active dimension of 
sensing corresponds to what Merleau-Ponty would call its intentionality, and what 
Crooke describes as the application of ‘the mind... to that thing’ which we would 
perceive, the passive dimension of sensing correspondingly opens up the perceiver not 
only to recognition as a sensible thing, but also to judgement as a thinking being. In the 
case of touch, Crooke writes:        
 
the more simple and pure the touching is, the clearer also and the purer is the 
sence, and the phantasmes or imaginations the more subtle: by meanes whereof, 
the operation of the soule, is so much the more lofty and profound. And for 
this reason, Aristotle in his second Booke De Anima, is of opinion, that the 
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strength and vigor of the wit and understanding, are to bee judged of by the 
coursenesse or finenesse of the touch...58 
 
Because the act of touching encompasses, rather than precedes, ‘the operation of the 
soule,’ haptic sensitivity both conditions, and provides a guide to, the acuity of the 
mind.  A ‘simple and pure... touching’ does not only provide the subject with accurate 
information about the world, it also positions the subject as someone who can be ‘bee 
judged’ to be in possession of a strong and vigorous ‘wit and understanding.’ Touch is 
concurrently world-disclosing and self-revealing: an active striving for knowledge and a 
passive susceptibility to being known. 
The same can be said for the sense of taste, both insofar as it ‘hath great affinity 
with the Sense of Touching,’ and in terms of the perception of sapours specifically. 
Indeed, Crooke uses taste as a test-case for the Aristotelian contention that ‘the Organ 
must potentially be the same thing which the object is actually, that so it might be 
altered & actually receive the nature of the object... [and] put on the qualities thereof.’ 
This necessary indistinction – even reversibility – between the organ and object of taste 
is confirmed by the substance of the tongue, which ‘is moist and hot neare of kinne 
unto the Nature of a Sapour, that it might more easily bee altered thereby.’59 Elsewhere, 
Crooke emphasises what we might conveniently, if anachronistically, call the subjectivity 
of the sense of taste: 
 
Because the Sapours themselves are infinite, their proportion very divers, and 
their causes so transcendent, it is not possible to make any definition or 
description of them to any purpose, who can deny but that some creatures, yea 
some men doe vehemently desire bitter things and abhorre that which is sweete? 
are bitter things therefore sweete to the one and sweet things bitter to the other? 
You will say no, because the difference ariseth from the diversity of his 
Temperament that Tastes it. I confesse it, but seeing there are almost so many 
divers Temperaments as there are indivdidua [sic] or particular creatures in the 
world I would aske the question whether it bee possible that so many different 
kinds of Sapours may be reckoned or deduced from them? By no meanes...60  
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Crooke’s conviction that it is impossible to ‘make any definition or description’ of the 
sapours stems not only from their multiplicity and the obscurity of their causes, but also 
from the ‘diversity of his Temperament that Tastes.’ The manifold vagaries of the sense 
of taste mean that expressions of gustatory preference and aversion are less 
representative of properties of foodstuffs – that is, of actual sapours – than they are of 
the peculiarities of ‘his Temprament that Tastes.’ A man who, contrary to the instincts 
of the majority, ‘desire[s] bitter things and abhorre[s] that which is sweete’ does not 
reveal any new information about the gustatory qualities of what he consumes. Instead, 
he displays the specificity of his own nature. Crooke’s affirmation of the impossibility of 
identifying and describing sapours as objective properties of things thus comes to mark 
any expression of gustatory sensation – whether in words or actions – as a form of self-
revelation.  
So far, I have stressed imbrications of the commonly accepted senses as objects 
of knowledge, particularly between taste and touch. As I note in the introduction, 
however, history is also riddled with attempts to define their differences and arbitrate 
their relative worth, and – according to many scholars – such attempts frequently, if not 
overwhelmingly, privilege vision.61 The ranking of the rest of the senses is understood 
to be more fluid, although the distal senses – those which, as Crooke says, ‘apprehend 
their objects by the interposition of an other, as Sight and Hearing’ – are usually 
prioritized over the proximity senses, which ‘woorke by contaction, as the Touch and 
the Taste.’62 Recently, however, some scholars have begun to complicate this picture, 
pointing to individuals and genres of texts who or which have offered alternative 
hierarchies. Charles Burnett’s essay arguing for the superiority of taste in the medieval 
period is probably the most comprehensive revision of the traditional model, although 
others have also contributed to a reassessment of the putative degradation of this sense 
throughout history.63 Robert Jütte notes that the conventional association of taste and 
touch meant that for the medieval Persian physician and philosopher Avicenna: 
 
the haptic comprehension of the world is… of central importance for the 
survival of the individual and the species, since it is the means by which we 
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distinguish between the edible and inedible… With the exception of taste, the 
other senses merely serve to make life agreeable.64  
 
According to Jütte, when taste achieves priority over sight, smell and hearing it does so 
insofar as it is understood as vital to sustaining human life. The influence of this view in 
the seventeenth century is evident in the reactionary peripatetic Alexander Ross’ 
assertion, in his 1652 Arcana microcosmi, that ‘tact and taste... are the two absolutely 
needfull senses, without which we cannot live, (whereas without the other three we 
may).’65 The value usually granted to sight, in contrast, is generally understood to stem 
from the status it bestows on mankind as epistemologically capable beings. Taste and 
touch are ontologically ‘needfull,’ vision is epistemogically ‘agreeable.’ As Ingold 
comments, conventionally, ‘the superiority of vision over touch is not that of one sense 
over another, but that of cognition over sensation.’66 
Up to a certain point, Crooke’s assessment of the relative value of the senses 
accords with such interpretations. His approving citation of Plato and Aristotle does 
indeed align vision and epistemological authority: 
 
Plato said wel, that if we wanted our Eyes wee should bee ignorant of that 
excellent order which Nature hath established in the frame of the world and of 
our own bodies. Aristotle addeth that the Science or exquisite knowledge of all 
things is exceeding much furthered by the eyes.67 
 
Later, having affirmed Aristotle’s assertion that there are five senses, Crooke offers two 
alternative ways of ordering them, namely, by ‘dignity,’ and by ‘necessity.’68 The order of 
dignity, he explains, is largely followed by philosophers and prioritizes sight, whilst 
medical practitioners, following the order of necessity, prioritize touch, closely followed 
by taste. Crooke’s accumulative methodology, as he gathers and recounts the opinions 
and counter-arguments of numerous authorities, can be confusing: contradictory views 
are frequently juxtaposed without any evaluation of their relative validity. Here, however 
– with rare self-assertion – Crooke interposes a ‘Quest.[ion]’ on ‘the Authors owne opinion,’ 
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coming down firmly if unsurprisingly on the side of the profession he practised: 
‘because the Schoole of Physitians hath alleadged the more waighty arguments, I will 
more willingly cast in my lot with them.’69 As we might expect, the reason he gives is 
that both touch and taste are absolutely essential to human life, for ‘if any Creature be 
deprived of this Sense of touching death will of necessity ensue.’ Similarly, taste is ‘not only 
commodious (for so are the other subsequent Senses) but also necessarie unto the 
conservation of the Individuum.’70 Where Crooke does distinguish himself from other 
accounts which associate sight with epistemological dignity and taste with bare 
necessity, is in his insistence that it is impossible to disassociate the pleasures of taste 
from its necessary function of conserving life:  
 
....without taste the creature cannot live... because all creatures taking delight in 
some one kinde of food or other when the Sense of pleasure is taken away, they 
abstaine from those meates, or take but little and so pine away to death.71 
 
Crooke places a high premium on the pleasures of taste as the motivation for eating. 
The close association of taste and ‘delight’ is underscored by his punning reference to 
‘the Sense of pleasure,’ which not only refers to one kind of experience provided by 
taste, but also names taste as inherently pleasurable. Utility does not exclude pleasure, 
nor is pleasure a mere by-product of usefulness. On the contrary, the utility of taste as it 
sustains life is a consequence of the delight it provides. For Crooke, then, taste is a kind 
of indispensible excess, which spills across and erodes the boundary between the 
exigencies of being and the ephemeral pleasures of perceiving.72  
 
III. ‘of the Taste and of the Voice’ 
 
Crooke’s discussion of the hierarchy of the senses addresses only the five accepted by 
Aristotle. Elsewhere, however, he acknowledges the claims of another contender to the 
title in the early modern period: speech. That speech might be considered as an adjunct 
to the senses is evident throughout Book Eight of Mikrokosmographia, entitled ‘the 
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Senses and their Instruments, as also of the Voice.’73 The voice is a somewhat awkward 
addition; not included in the category of ‘the Senses,’ but articulated alongside them. 
Crooke writes that from the brain ‘doe issue.... all the instruments of the senses of 
seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching yea and speech also.’74 Certain kinds of verbal 
utterance, Crooke asserts, can express the experiences and desires of ‘the Sensative 
soule,’ for ‘the tongue of a man, sometimes... expresseth onelie those things that fall 
under the Sense, as when wee crie for paine, or for Foode and succour.’ The voice has 
the ability to express sensations as well as meanings, or ‘those things that fall under our 
understanding.’75 Speech is thus peripherally but decidedly located with the senses.  
Crooke’s suggestion that speech should be counted alongside the senses, even if 
it is not counted amongst them, has precedents. As C. M. Woolgar notes, speech was 
one of the ‘prime candidates for inclusion in the late medieval sensorium.’ 76 
Ambivalence about whether or not speech could be a sense lingered into the 
seventeenth century, with Thomas Tomkis’ academic comedy Lingua: Or The Combat of 
the Tongue, and the five Senses for Superiority (1607) providing a prime example of arguments 
for and against. The play dramatises the attempt of Lingua, or speech personified, to be 
accepted as a sense. Throughout, she is closely identified with Gustus. The relation is 
invoked both by Lingua herself, in defense of her cause, and by Common Sense as part 
of her punishment. ‘Oft,’ Lingua declaims proudly, ‘have I seasoned savorie periods / 
with sugred words, to delude Gustus taste.’ 77  The language of sapour, here, 
encompassing ‘savorie’ and ‘sugred,’ has a strangely liminal status. It hovers between a 
literal application, as the sapours evoked are supposed to stimulate Gustus, and a 
metaphorical application, as it qualifies ‘periods’ and ‘words.’ This ambiguity underlies 
Lingua’s appeal to be considered a sense, which rests partially on her self-proclaimed 
capacity to stimulate – and so deceive – Gustus. Lingua’s boast also proleptically 
undermines the punishment which Common Sense assigns to her for her many acts of 
deception in the play, for he ‘commit[s]’ her ‘to close prison, in Gustus his house,’ 
ordering Gustus to ‘keepe her under the custody of two strong doors... see she be well 
garded with 30. tall watchmen...’ 78 If it is true that Lingua is as adept at beguiling 
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Gustus as she previously claimed, one might imagine her incarceration will not last too 
long. 
The metaphor of the mouth as a prison which restrains the unruly tongue is 
conventional, as is Lingua’s close association of speech and taste. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the conceptual propinquity of the two stemmed mainly from 
their spatial propinquity: Carla Mazzio notes that ‘early etymologies of ‘lingua’ traced the 
word to its root in the activites of both eating and speaking.’79 Henry VIII’s surgeon 
Thomas Vicary commented of the tongue that ‘by him is received the taste of swéete 
and sower, and... by him is pronounced every speache.’80 Both speech and taste, then, 
take the mouth, and particularly the tongue, as their common origin. Crooke himself 
repeatedly gestures to the multiple functions of the tongue, commenting that the tongue 
is ‘a notable instrument both of the Taste and of the Voice,’ and describing it in quick 
succession as ‘the Sensator of Tastes’ and ‘the very organ of [verbal] Articulation.’81 
Indeed, Crooke subsumes tasting and speaking into each other as the single, ‘primarie 
use’ of the tongue: 
 
The use... of the Tongue is either primary or secondary. The primarie use is, that 
it might be a convenient and fit organ or instrument both of the Sense of 
Tasting & of the Speech.... The Secondarie Use of the Tongue is for mastication 
or chewing, or breaking of the meate, and for diglutition or Swallowing.82 
 
Here, Crooke makes a distinction between the intimately allied acts of tasting and 
speaking, and the tongue’s secondary function, ‘chewing.’ Elsewhere, however, he 
emphasises that taste is predicated on mastication, for ‘that a Sapor may be exactly 
judged of or apprehended, the body wherin that Sapor is, must be broken between the 
Palate and the Tong.’83 Tasting thus follows from the fracturing of foodstuffs in the 
mouth. The belief that we access a sapour only by breaking the body in which it resides 
provides another correspondence to speech, which is similarly predicated on the 
fracturing, or ‘articulation’ of the voice. ‘The body of the Tongue,’ writes Crooke, is 
‘continuall not divided by any partition, whereby it becommeth fitter to Taste with, to 
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breake the meate, and to articulate the voice.’84 The basic formal integrity of the tongue 
facilitates its dual role, as the parallelism of ‘to breake the meate, and to articulate the 
voice’ underscores the relation between the two. Both the tongue’s experience of taste 
and its production of speech are thus based on division and ‘partition,’ as ‘Taste’ 
succeeds the breaking of ‘meate’ and  ‘the voice’ works to ‘articulate,’ in the sense of 
divide as well as express, the stream of language.  
 
IV. ‘to have in minde... at fingers end’ 
 
At this point, it becomes possible to explore how Crooke’s discussion of the senses – 
and taste in particular – as an object of knowledge might affect our conception both of 
how the dissector himself makes use of his senses in the anatomical theatre, and how 
‘taste’ operates as an epistemological term in anatomical texts. Recent scholarship has 
begun to recalibrate the relationship between text-based, scholastic fields of learning 
and the empirical emphasis of natural historical knowledge. Whilst, as Kevin Killeen 
writes, ‘the presumed divergence of textual scholarship from empirical study... is still 
seen, in some accounts at least.... as as one of the defining attributes of the [early 
modern] period’s scientific practices,’ other accounts have highlighted imbrications of 
‘the craft of observation’ and the ‘scholastic, Aristotelian and emblematic past.’85 Gianna 
Pomata’s and Nancy Siraisi’s edited collection, Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early 
Modern Europe, has played in important part in this recalibration. Invoking research on 
Renaissance anatomy as characteristic, Pomata and Siraisi comment that:  
 
empiricism and book learning have conventionally been seen as almost 
antithetical. Scholars have found it hard to reconcile the emphasis on direct 
observation, in Renaissance anatomy for instance, with the enormous baggage 
of philological skill and antiquarian learning that Vesalius and his peers brought 
to the dissecting table. This philological and antiquarian apparatus has been seen 
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mostly as a handicap, an oppressively constraining theoretical filter that limited 
and distorted observation.86 
 
In contrast, Pomata and Siraisi demonstrate that examples of early modern historia 
‘highlight... one of the most intriguing features of the early modern descriptive sciences, 
namely the interlocking of observational skills and philological learning – the coupling 
of empiricsm and erudition.’ Early modern texts, they argue, present textual, scholastic 
learning and empirical, body-based knowledge not as opposed but as complementary, 
and the essays they collect ‘point out striking parallels between ways of observing and 
ways of reading, close links between firsthand observation and book learning.’87 
Pomata and Siraisi’s concept of what they summarily call ‘“learned” empiricism’ 
provides a useful way of thinking about Crooke’s depiction of the anatomist’s use of his 
senses in Mikrokosmographia.88 For Crooke, the anatomist’s use of his senses – including 
taste – to produce anatomical knowledge is structured by and understood in terms of 
humanist practices of reading and writing, particularly the practice of commonplacing. 
Conversely, Crooke also appears to think of and experience reading and writing as 
deeply embodied, sensuous practices; engagement with texts is a physical process, 
something like engagement with bodies. Because of this, the distinction between 
physiological taste as it operates in the realm of the anatomical theatre, and readerly 
taste as it operates on the authoritative text, begins to break down in ways which 
encourage us to rethink the critical distinction between empirical, body-based 
knowledge and the authority of language.  
The sense that the body is a textual entity, and conversely that texts are 
produced and consumed through embodied processes, suffuses Mikrokosmographia. The 
literary work of writing an anatomical textbook is depicted as deeply physical, in ways 
which resonate with the embodied work of dissection itself. We have already seen a hint 
of this in Crooke’s assertion in ‘The Præface to the Chururgeons’ that ‘the streame and 
current of Bauhines discourse... I have broken off and parted as it might best be 
understood.’ The acts of reading and collation that undergird Mikrokosmographia are 
figured as processes of breaking asunder and parting that are implicitly akin to the 
processes of opening and parting the body itself. And, just as a skilful anatomical 
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dissection involves tactile senstivity, so too does reading. In Crooke’s dedicatory 
defence of his decision to write Mikrokosmographia in English, for instance, he responds 
to opponents who say he ‘should have written in Latine’ by asserting ‘that indeed had 
bene easier for me by far, having the words made to my hands, the passages chalked 
out.’89 Crooke experiences his familiarity with the Latin language as physical intimacy: 
his proficiency in using it is expressed in terms of manual skill, whilst the breadth of his 
learning is hypostatized in the physical traces of his reading, the ‘chalked out’ passages 
of books. The surgeon – and later physician – John Banister uses similar terminology in 
The historie of man, advising the ‘frendly Reader... exactly to learne, and to have in minde 
(as the Proverbe is) at fingers end, those fewe deciffered names [for the bones].’90 For 
both Crooke and Banister, then, mastery of language is founded in haptic competence. 
Correspondingly, if the manipulation of language is effected via manual as well as 
mental skill, readerly incompetence is described as a type of physical violence akin to an 
unskilfull dissection. Thus, Crooke writes of Galen that ‘almost all the new Writers, do 
continually carpe and barke at him, yea teare and rend him, whether it be by right or 
wrong, wounding and lancing his credite upon every slight occasion.’91 In deploring the 
disrespect of ‘new Writers’ for ancient authority, Crooke does not, as we might expect, 
oppose the authority of the text and the evidence provided by empirical experience. 
Instead, he identifies book and body, corpus and corpse: it is not Galen’s works, but 
Galen, that his detractors ‘teare and rend.’ Crooke figures his opponents’ encounters 
with textual authority as a sensory experience in itself, and as a form of rough, crude 
anatomization. 
Books, then, are like bodies for Crooke, and reading and writing them is 
something like the tactile and embodied experience of dissection. Conversely, in 
Mikrokosmographia the body is described as a kind of book, ‘imprinted’ with the image of 
the God which created it.92 This image is literalized both in its pictorial representation 
and in the vocabulary used to describe it. Many of the anatomical illustrations which 
accompany the text are densely crowded with letters which refer the reader to 
explanatory captions. The idea that the body is inscribed is also evident in the self-
reflective language used to describe the organs of speech: the ‘Genuoglossi or the chin-
tongue Muscles’ which move the tongue, for instance, ‘have also certaine lines in them 
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which Anatomists call inscription [from the Latin inscrībĕre, to write in or upon].’93 A 
humanist vocabulary of reading and writing infuses Crooke’s conception of the practical 
work of dissection. He writes, for example, that the sixteenth-century French anatomist 
Jacques Dubois (called Jacobus Sylvius, the Latinized version of his name, by Crooke), 
‘hath digested in a most exquisite order, the vast and wilde Forrest as it were, and 
confusion of all the Muscles and Vessels, and given them particular and proper 
names.’94 Crooke’s depiction of the work of Dubois stands as a prime expression of 
‘learned empiricism’: humanist textual practices of digesting and naming are presented 
as contiguous with the surgeon’s practical exploration of the ‘vast and wilde Forrest’ of 
the body,  with its corporeal ‘confusion of... Muscles and Vessels.’ 
The body understood as a textual entity is subject to modes of interpretation, 
and capable of forms of action, that we more usually associate with books. In 
Mikrokosmographia, Crooke asserts that it is possible for the corpse to provide a 
commentary on and illuminate the sometimes incomprehensible ‘body’ of texts: 
 
...how profitable and necessary it [i.e. anatomical dissection] is for the explaining 
of the writings of Hippocrates, Galen, and all the ancient Physitions. For in them 
there are many passages darke and obscure, whereunto the knowledge of 
Anatomy will give a great light and splendour.95  
 
According to conventional scholarly accounts, the relationship between canonical texts 
and empirical experience in early modern anatomy was one-way. Images such as figure 
2.1, a frontispiece painting dating from circa 1580 which shows John Banister teaching 
from the second edition of the Paduan anatomist Realdo Colombo’s De re anatomica 
(1562), are usually taken to represent that way that, for anatomists in the vice-like grip 
of authoritative texs, classical and other canonical works were supposed to provide a 
guide to the interior of the body. According to this model, Banister’s experience of 
bodies – the skeleton he looks towards, the viscera his hand rests on – would be filtered 
through and skewed by the inaccuracies that books propagate. As the quotation from 
Crooke makes clear, however, the direction of exegesis might just as well go the other 
way: first-hand ‘knowledge of anatomy’ enables the student to understand ‘the writings 
                                                          
93 Ibid., Ttt3v (762). ‘Inscribe, v.’ OED Online, accessed 16 December 2012, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/96648. 
94 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, D1r (25). 
95 Ibid., C3r (17). 
100 
 
of... Physitions.’ According to this model, the body provides a commentary or gloss on 
the book, not vice versa. Crooke’s conception of the sensory experience of dissection is 
thus consistent with his ideas about the senses as objects of knowledge. Sensory data is 
not ‘filtered through’ a mental frame, and in the process reshaped according to cultural 
(textually inculcated) prejudice, as in a modern representationalist theory of perception. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Anon., Antomical Tables, frontispiece painting commissioned by John 
Banister (c1580). Ms Hunter 364, V.1.1. © University of Glasgow Library Special 
Collections. 
 
Instead, sense perceptions always already have cognitive content: as Crooke says right at 
the beginning of Mikrokosmographia, the senses are ‘ordained’ not only to receive 
impressions, but ‘also for contemplation.’96 The anatomist can think with his senses, as 
well as with his mind. 
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V. ‘a confusion of hungers’ 
 
In order to uncover the relevance of Crooke’s depiction of the interimplication of body 
and book to his conception of the relation between physiological and epistemological 
taste, I turn now to Richard Selzer’s depiction of the modern surgeon’s experience of 
his craft. As a medical practitioner operating in the second half of the twentieth century, 
Selzer works not with criminal corpses but with anaesthetized bodies, and his aim is to 
cure rather than explain; nonetheless, his work offers an insight into the sensations, 
emotions and skills employed in the act of cutting human flesh. In Mortal Lessons: Notes 
on the Art of Surgery, Selzer poses a question: ‘could this one-pound loaf of sourdough,’ 
he wonders, ‘be the pelting brain?’ 97  Selzer might not know it (and elsewhere he 
deplores the ‘reprehensible penchant’ of pathologists for ‘comparing the manifestations 
of disease to items of food’) but his use of a food image to describe the interior of the 
body has a rich history.98 However, whilst for Selzer the material similarity of the vital, 
dynamic brain to a loaf of leavened bread is bathetic, and the comparison of, for 
instance, a diseased liver to a ‘nutmeg’ registers ‘a confusion of hungers,’ for early 
modern surgeons and physicians the (usually visual) similarity of bodily organs and 
consumable foodstuffs is simply consistent with the use of taste as a diagnostic and 
epistemological faculty.99 
Selzer’s disapproval of the use of food tropes to describe the body’s interior is 
tinged by disgust at the implicitly cannibalistic association of corpse and consumable. In 
the early modern period, anatomical dissection and cannibalistic eating were frequently 
affiliated in both popular culture and learned discourse. In Ben Jonson’s Bartholemew Fair 
(1614; 1631), for instance, Littlewit invokes ‘the pothecary’s wife... that longed to see 
the anatomy’ in order to demonstrate to his pregnant wife Win, who craves pork, that 
‘you may long to see as well as to taste.’100 For Littlewit, a desire to watch a dissection 
being performed is analogous to the desire to consume – or more specifically, ‘to taste’ 
– pork (the meat that was understood to be closest in constitution to human flesh).101 
Anxieties about the potential overlap between anatomical dissection and cannibalistic 
consumption were exacerbated by the use of Egyptian mummy in medicine. The 
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sixteenth-century French surgeon Ambroise Paré, whose works were translated from 
the Latin by Thomas Johnson and published in England in 1634, vigorously denounced 
this practice, calling it a form of ‘barbarous inhumanity’ and listing its less-than-
salubrious effects: ‘this wieked kinde of Drugge, doth nothing helpe the diseased... it 
also inferres many troublesome symptomes, as the paine of the heart or stomacke, 
vomiting and stinke of the mouth.’102 Little wonder, especially if, as Paré asserts, the 
rarity of genuine mummy led: 
 
certaine of our French Apothecaries... to steale by night the bodyes of such as 
were hanged, and embalming them with salt and Drugges they dryed them in an 
Oven, so to sell them thus adulterated in steed of true Mummie. Wherefore wee 
are thus compelled both foolishly and cruelly to devoure the mangied and 
putride particles of the carcasses of the basest people.103 
 
The endurance, nonetheless, of a popular identification of anatomical dissection and the 
provision of mummy is clear from Jonson’s Volpone (1606; 1607), in which the 
eponymous villain, in the guise of the celebrated mountebank Scoto Mantuano, sells an 
oil which contains ‘some quantity of human fat... which we buy of anatomists.’104 For 
anatomists, Jonson seems to suggest, the human corpse is a source of medicinal 
consumables as well as of knowledge, and the hungers that it provokes might result in 
forms of tasting that are alimentary, as well as epistemological.  
In early seventeenth-century anatomical texts, the slippage between dissection 
and (cannibalistic) consumption is manifest in the frequency of the use of the kind of 
food images deplored by Selzer to describe the body. Thus, the anonymous author-
compiler of the 1595 The problemes of Aristotle compares conception to cheese-making: 
 
The seede of the father and the mother doth goe into the substance of the 
childe in the wombe: because that as creame doth goe into the substance of 
cheese, so the seede of man into the fruite in the wombe like unto the creame, 
and the flowers of the woman doth enter in like unto the milke.105 
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Here, a familiar domestic process of food production provides a set of explanatory 
terms which make the process of conception – also common, but less visible – 
comprehensible.106 Elsewhere, food images provide a way to make physiological forms, 
as opposed to physiological processes, understandable to the reader. From the evidence 
of The historie of man, Banister was particularly fond of nuts and pulses: he describes ‘the 
Membran envolving the whole hart’ by asserting that ‘the image, or portraiture’ of it ‘is 
very like unto ye fourme of a Pine nut,’ whilst ‘the figure of the christalline humor [of 
the eye]’ is compared to ‘a lentill.’107 Similarly, Paré describes the ‘Tonsillae’ as ‘like in 
substance to blanched Almonds.’ 108  And, like Selzer’s pathologists, he also invokes 
foodstuffs to depict the pathological body: thus the corruption of ‘the melancholoy 
humour,’ which usually ‘resembles the yolkes of eggs,’ is evident when ‘by adustion’ it 
‘becomes leeke-coloured.’109 It is in Mikrokosmographia, however, that food-comparisons 
most abound. When, for instance, Crooke declares that the cheek is sometimes called 
‘the Apple of the Face, beecause in forme and colour it is not unlike an apple,’ and 
compares ‘the outward circumference of the eare to the writhen Tendrill of a Vine,’ the 
reader’s mental impression of the body he describes begins to resemble one of 
Giuseppe Arcimboldo’s bizarre portraits, a being constituted of fruits and legumes, 
pulses and grains.110 The frequency of Crooke’s use of foodstuffs as comparative terms 
can be illustrated by a reading of just one organ. If the eyes are observed, Crooke writes, 
‘together with their muscles which grow to their back-sides, then is their figure 
turbinated like a sugar-loafe.’ 111  Elsewhere, the cornea, which Crooke calls the 
‘membrane,’ is described as ‘like the inward skinne of an Onion,’ whilst the pupil is the 
‘Aple of the eye’ and the ‘watery humour’ contained in the eye ‘is much like the white of 
an egge.’112 Finally, ‘the magnitude’ of the lens ‘is much like a lupine or small pease’ 
whilst its ‘figure’ is ‘somewhat flat like a greater Lentile... yet a little rising like a 
Lentile.’113  
As Banister’s characterisation of the ‘image, or portraiture’ of the heart’s 
‘Membran’ as analogous to that of a pine cone suggests, the comparisons cited above 
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primarily evoke the visual qualities of foods. They invoke familiar consumables in order 
to illustrate the shape, size, substance and colour of various body organs. Nonetheless, a 
secondary effect is to call up the tastes of the food items mentioned. In 
Mikrokosmographia, the association of specific foodstuffs and tastes is underscored by the 
fact that the only other context in which Crooke mentions food frequently in is his 
discussion of flavours. Whilst the most extreme ‘Sapors,’ he writes, ‘may fall under 
some... rude discription’ (although ‘no man for ought I know hath hitherto sufficiently 
described these maister Sapours, nay not so much as given them apt and fit names’) the 
less definite sapours evade language: ‘whose pensill can drawe so fine a line as to 
describe the intermediate Tastes?’ Consequently, the only way ‘to note them out’ is by 
giving ‘examples or instances’ of the foods which manifest them. A ‘sweet Sapour,’ for 
instance, ‘doeth consist in.... Figges, Hony, ripe Grapes, sweete and mellow Apples and 
such like.’ 114  Certain types of food, then, serve a dual descriptive function in 
Mikrokosmographia: they serve both to represent the tastes that belong to them, and the 
visual (or occasionally textural or haptic) qualities they embody. The association is 
stronger in some cases than in others. The relevance of the sensation of taste to the 
description of body parts is, for instance, particularly manifest in the case of the 
pancreas, which both Banister and Crooke call ‘the sweet-bread,’ and note, in Crooke’s 
words, that ‘in Swine it is esteemed a sweete morsel’ and in Banister’s that ‘in Calves, 
and such others creatures, [it] is most pleasaunt to be eaten.’115   
Richard Sugg offers an interpretation of the interimplication of cannibalism and 
anatomical dissection in the early modern period in a number of contexts, including the 
anthropological, religious and medical. Sugg’s cogent analysis is compromised by its 
reliance on Jonathan Sawday’s seminal, but flawed, account in The Body Emblazoned.116 
Most pertinently here, Sugg inherits Sawday’s teleological emphasis on the rise of 
science, suggesting that what he calls ‘the sharply perceptual images’ – including William 
Harvey’s description of the brain as a ‘divine banquet’ – found in anatomical texts 
‘represent a decisive shift away from the medieval dominance of theory over practice... 
painstaking attention to the world of the senses is a vital step on the way toward an 
effective material science.’ 117  Images which draw on or evoke sense experience – 
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including taste sensations – are thus inscribed into the narrative described earlier of 
scientific progress as a move away from textual authority to empiricism. 
To some extent, it is accurate to suggest that use of the vocabulary of the feast 
to describe the interior of the body is rooted in the first-hand, empirical experience of 
dissection. Crooke stresses the active, albeit structural, role of the senses, including 
taste, in the anatomy theatre. ‘The subject of.... Anatomy,’ he writes, is ‘a Part.’ 118 
Crooke’s definition of a part is not of an isolated, physically disengaged fragment, for 
one of the necessary qualities of a part, he specifies, is that ‘it should cleave unto the 
whole.’119 A part is instead constituted by a perceptual sectioning off: it is identified by 
its ‘Substance,’ which in turn ‘is knowne by sensible qualities, such as are hardnesse, 
softnes, thicknes, thinnesse, raritie, density or thightnes [i.e. compactness], colour, and 
savour or taste.’ 120  The senses, including taste, take an active role in dissection, 
distinguishing the parts that the knife then moves to separate in space. The surgeon’s 
knife can thus be thought to complete the process of separation that the eyes, hands, 
and tongue begin.  
Anatomists were also, as mentioned above, encouraged to literally taste the 
bodies they examined. The sense of taste was understood as particularly useful in 
determining humoral composition: as noted in chapter 1, Paré distinguished the humors 
partly by taste, finding ‘Melancholy... acide or soure, choler bitter, Blood sweet,’ and 
‘Phlegme unsavory.’121 The association must also have been encouraged by the location 
of many public dissections. As Hillary Nunn notes, until the completion of Inigo Jones’ 
Anatomical Theatre in 1638, members of the Company of Barber-Surgeons ‘had no 
permanent facilities for… [anatomical] demonstrations,’ and consequently dissections 
‘took place in the hall’s kitchen.’ Furthermore, ‘the stern atmosphere of these 
dissections… dissolved into the festive spirit of the banquet hall, for the guild 
traditionally provided a lavish meal for those who attended its anatomy lectures.’122 In 
contrast to Sugg’s approach, I want to accentuate the fact that in Crooke and Banister, 
the use of the sense of taste to produce anatomical knowledge takes place in and is 
informed by contexts and expectations very different from those which shape modern 
conventions of controlled experiment. 
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Crooke’s use of taste to understand the body, and food images to describe it, is 
located not in a rarefied experimental context, but works by invoking quotidian culinary 
experiences. After noting that the ‘third coat’ of the stomach ‘is not unlike to the hony-
combe,’ for instance, Crooke goes on to explain that ‘this crust may be separated from 
the Membrane or coate in bruit Beasts, yea also in the stomacke of a man if it be perboiled’ 
(my emphasis). 123 Dissection is thus effected via the domestic arts of cookery, as well as 
by the force of blades, and the taste experience of sweetness suggested by the formal 
comparison of the alveolate stomach to honeycomb is mediated – perhaps intensified – 
by the mention of the processes of cooking which usually precede a meal. Crooke’s use 
of taste in the course of intellectual enquiry and to communicate the results of that 
enquiry is inflected by the everyday experience of eating, and by expectations of 
enjoyment and nourishment. This is also the case when the object of Crooke’s enquiry 
is an organ of sense. Thus, in an intriguing moment of self-reflectivity, he uses a 
culinary example to confirm the Aristotelian contention that ‘every instrument of sence 
should be... devoide of all qualities whereby that sence is affected’ in order not to mask 
or dilute the perception of external qualities, with specific reference to the tongue.124 
Crooke writes of the ‘substance’ of the tongue that: 
 
because it was made to receive all Sapors was to be devoide of all Sapor, that is 
insiped or having no Taste at all as we usually speake, and that it is so any man 
may perceive if hee eat of the Tongue of any beast boiled fresh and without any 
sauce.125 
 
Here, the tongue is depicted not only as the organ of taste, but as the – admittedly 
insipid – object of taste. Perversely, the tongue’s lack of sapour is confirmed by tasting 
it. Anatomical knowledge is apprehended or confirmed, according to this passage, in a 
culinary as well as a quasi-scientific context, borne out by the disappointing gastronomic 
experience offered by a beast’s tongue ‘boyled fresh and without any sauce.’ The same is 
true of Banister, who writes in the Historie of man that: 
 
those Particles so annexed to the bones, are called Appendances: which (contrary to 
the minde of Galen) we must needes affirme to be softer then the bones them 
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selves: since we delite of[t] tymes with our téeth, to plucke the Appendances of 
small Bones, & to chewe of them in our mouthes: for the pleasaunt juice that 
often they retaine. Which contrariwise we cannot do to the bone.126 
 
As evidence for his contention that the ‘Appendances’ of bones are ‘softer then the bones 
them selves,’ Banister describes the ‘pleasaunt juyce’ which they release on mastication. 
He seems to presume that the ‘delite’ which supposedly accompanies the chewing of 
these appendances will be immediately familiar to his readers, as he imagines the 
experience as collective: ‘we delite.... to chewe of them in our mouthes.’ Banister thus 
invokes this particular taste as a corrective to Galen, but the conclusions he draws from 
it are shaped not by a desire for accuracy but by the context of the meal and the 
expectations of pleasure and convivial shared experience which eating raises. 
How are we to understand Crooke’s and Banister’s location of the forms of 
anatomical knowledge produced and communicated by taste experiences and food 
images in culinary contexts? It would be anachronistic to see their emphasis on the arts 
of cookery and on gustatory pleasure or disappointment as a deficiency of practice, a 
neglect of the ideals of objectivity which structure scientific knowledge today. Instead, 
given Crooke’s insistence on the subjectivity of taste as an object of knowledge, his 
references to the culinary and domestic contexts of anatomical knowledge production 
are commensurate with Merleau-Ponty’s argument that ‘the sensation and images which 
are supposed to be the beginning and end of all knowledge never make their appearance 
anywhere other than within a horizon of meaning.’127 
 
VI. ‘sucked from the sappe of... anathomistes’ 
 
In the above instances, Crooke uses his sense of taste to confirm Aristotle’s argument 
about the insipidity of the tongue, whilst Banister uses his sense of taste to contradict 
Galen’s ideas about the ‘Appendances’ of bones. When they use the language of taste to 
describe the production and communication of anatomical knowledge, however, it 
expresses the influence not of a new, ‘scientific’ emphasis on empirical experience, but 
of ancient modes of organising, expressing and absorbing information textually, in the 
form of commonplaces. As Crooke’s dedication ‘to the worshipfull Company of the 
Barber-Chyrurgeons’ makes clear, the ways in which body parts correspond to 
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consumables informs not only the anatomist’s experience of dissection, but also his 
conception of his pedagogical task. In the dedication, Crooke modestly acknowledges 
that ‘there are some among you.... able to have set out this Banquet with greater variety 
and to have Cooked it fitter for you as being better acquainted with your diet and 
appetites.’128 Crooke thus figures his work as a feast, and his own work as an anatomist 
and teacher as a form of cooking. The sense that the body provides a feast of cheese, 
lentils, egg yolks, apples, and sweetbreads slides into the implication that the text which 
describes that body offers the same. Cautiously advising the barber-surgeons to make 
use of opportunities to learn from physicians, Crooke admonishes them ‘to feed... upon 
that which is good for nourishment rather than uppon that which will delight and fill 
but not feed your minds’; soon after, in the first book, he comments that ‘Platerus is 
acurate, but not fit Lettuce for every mans lips, hee must picke nicely that will gather a 
Sallet out of him, hee is so intricate and full of his Dicotomies.’129 Those who desire to 
know anatomy, then, must ‘feed’ selectively, on texts and parts of texts which will 
nourish their minds. Notably, such language reveals that Crooke’s approach to classical 
and other authorities was selective, critical and appropriative, rather than passive and 
assimilative. 
In making use of bibliophagic figures, Crooke echoes earlier anatomical texts, 
and recalls the role of taste as an epistemological faculty involved in acts of readerly 
discrimination and epitomization. Banister in particular invokes literary ‘taste’ 
frequently, both in asserting that his works are the product of careful and selective 
attention to past authorities, and in urging his readers to afford his books the same kind 
of assiduous attention. The full title of The historie of man asserts that the text has been 
‘sucked from the sappe of the most approved anathomistes,’ whilst the dedication to ‘To the right 
Worshipfull, Sir Frauncis Willoughby’ expresses the hope that: 
 
as Darius denounced that to be the sweetest draught that ever he dronke, which, 
in his wearie flight, he had drawne from a filthy standing puddle, because, it 
seemeth before, he had never drunke thirstie: even so, I hope, my labour shalbe 
thankfully taken, of all honest Chirurgians, considering the barren draught, that 
Chirurgerie, throughout the Realme of England, in this present age, endureth: 
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and which can never be quenched, by the fruitefull water that floweth from the 
fountaines of Anathomie.130 
 
Banister alludes to the fact that both embodied taste sensations, and judgements of taste 
in the realm of anatomical discourse, are influenced by contextual factors. Just as thirst 
transforms what appears as a dirty puddle into the ‘sweetest’ tasting drink, Banister 
anticipates that The historie of man will be more acceptable to ‘honest Chirurgians’ 
because of the current dearth of such books. The point is underscored by the play on 
‘draught,’ which Banister uses in the first instance to signify a drink, and in the second 
as in irregular form of drought: the paucity that ‘Chirurgerie.... endureth’ is expressed by 
a word which refers both back the sweet ‘draught’ which pleased Darius’ palate, and 
forward to the ‘fruitfull water that floweth from the fountains of Anathomie.’ 
Elsewhere, Banister recommends more explicitly the use of taste in the consumption of 
his works: the prefatory poem to his earlier A needefull, new, and necessarie treatise of 
chyrurgerie (1575) reads: 
 
Ye learned dames that doe delite, 
in sciences devine: 
Refuse not now to taste a while, 
this sacred sap of mine.131 
 
Banister calls on women that ‘delite, / in sciences devine’ to ‘taste’ the ‘sap’ of the text, 
suggesting that the ‘dames’ who might purchase his book are motivated by the pleasures 
of learning as well as by practical considerations of healing. In contrast to this exclusive 
emphasis on the pleasures of taste, Banister’s 1589 An antidotarie chyrurgicall is figured as:  
 
a fruitful medow, with some things serving to necessitie onelie, & other things 
affording delight besides: also as a faire forest which (besides the large scopes & 
delitesome chases) conteineth trees likewise of all growths, and required uses: 
for in like maner, here are medicins, some of them bitter, biting & painful, 
serving wher neither ease, nor delight of taste, but recoverie of health requireth 
to be cared for.132 
                                                          
130 Banister, The historie of man, A3v. 
131 John Banister, A needefull, new, and necessarie treatise of chyrurgerie (London: Thomas Marshe, 1575), C8r. 
132 John Banister, An antidotarie chyrurgicall (London: Thomas Orwin for Thomas Man, 1589), *2r. 
110 
 
 
The passage makes use of the conventional trope of the silva rhetoricae, or forest of 
rhetoric, in order to conflate the text itself with the plant-based medicines it 
recommends: both, it suggests, might stimulate the taste in unpleasant ways, being 
‘bitter, biting’ and even ‘painful,’ but both also have undoubted salutary effects.  
 
VII. ‘the Art of Chyrurgery’ 
 
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed a frontispiece painting of John Banister, suggesting 
that it illustrates, not the distortion of sensory evidence by textual authority, but the use 
of sensation to apprehend authoritative texts. This painting is part of a set of three, and 
figure 2.2 shows another painting from the trio. The image shows the dissection of a 
dog and a pig; the wall and table display the chief instruments of the surgeon’s art.  The 
anatomist himself, however, is oddly absent; and in his place is an ape. Most obviously, 
the monkey is present as another potential object for anatomical dissection; the ape’s 
anatomical similarity to the human body made it a common substitute for actual human 
cadavers in an age when the latter were difficult to acquire. So far, however, it has 
escaped its fate, and – given the absence of a human figure – the proprietorial air with 
which it surveys the scene suggests that the ape stands in as a temporary substitute for 
or double of the anatomist himself. What are we to make of this? On the one hand, the 
presence of the ape can be read as a implied joke about or criticism of anatomists’ 
reliance on authorities; I have already commented on the animal’s associations with 
mindless imitation, and in Mikrokosmographia Crooke calls Averroes ‘Aristotles Ape’ 
because he follows the philosopher too slavishly.133 On the other hand, the ape also 
seems present as in iconographical image of taste: holding a piece of fruit to his mouth, 
the animal serves as a reminder of the ways in which anatomy is bound up with 
gustatory appetites; of the mutuality of the anatomical and the alimental.   
To finish this chapter, I’d like to return to the beginning. ‘Taste’ used as a term 
to describe modes of knowing – and the vocabulary of the senses in general – I argued, 
does not manifest the increasing predominance of empirical practices in early modern 
anatomy. Such an argument is based on a conception of perception which sees 
knowledge as achieved in the operation of the mind on the raw data of sense 
experience. This is not how Crooke understood taste. So how did he conceptualise the 
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work of dissection in sensuous terms? The following quotation, taken from 
Mikrokosmographia’s dedication ‘to the worshipfull Company of the Barber-
Chyrurgeons,’ is informative: 
 
...for my part I conceive of the Art of Chyrurgery as a part of Physick; and 
therefore of Chyrurgens as Citizens of the Physitians Commonwealth: the 
difference is, that wee having mostwhat better meanes by education to 
advantage our wittes, apply them unto the more abstruse part of the Art 
separated from the sense and consisting in contemplation and collection; the 
Chururgeon worketh by his eye and with his hand, and dwelleth as it were in the 
Confines of that Countrey whose inner part we inhabit. If therefore they 
warrant the frontiers and keepe their Stations well and duly therein, may not we 
better attend to improove the portion that is allotted unto us?134 
 
In my opening section, I extracted from this quotation in order to illustrate that in the 
early seventeenth century, physicians were understood to neglect the evidence of ‘sense’ 
in favour of ‘contemplation and collection’ whilst the surgeon ‘worketh by his eye and 
with his hand.’ Thus dismembered, the section described only the ‘difference’ between 
knowledge garnered from the sensuous experience, and that cultivated through 
‘contemplation and collection.’ Addressed in more detail, however, the passage clearly 
also expresses Crooke’s appreciation of the similarity of the methods of both groups. 
The surgeon, guided by his senses in his performance of the practical work of attending 
to the body, ‘dwelleth as it were in the Confines’ of the ‘Countrey whose inner part’ the 
physicians ‘inhabit.’ 
Crooke’s use of the language of dwelling and inhabiting recalls Heidegger’s 
important essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking,’ in which he claims that ‘the way in which 
you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is buan, dwelling.’ 
Heidegger’s central tenets in the piece are, firstly, that locatedness, being-in, is a 
necessary, constitutive condition, not a contingent ‘state,’ of Being, and secondly that 
being-in is not to be identified with extension in space, but with modes of habitation, 
interaction and familiarity: dwelling. Ontology, ‘Being’ in the purest sense, is 
indistinguishable from ways of being; an insight that Merleau-Ponty exploited in his 
insistence that it is a ‘fact’ that ‘sensory experience’ is ‘the assumption of a form of 
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existence.’135  Sensory perception, then, is not an addendum to the bare fact of the 
body’s existence, but constitutive of it: it is a form of familiarity which brings the self 
into being. For Crooke, both the sensory practices of surgeons and the cerebral 
preoccupations of physicians are forms of dwelling in this sense, jointly constituting the 
‘Commonwealth’ of physiological knowledge. The positioning of the two professions is 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Anon., Anatomical Table 1. Painting commissioned by 
John Banister (c1580). Ms Hunter 364, V.1.1. © University of  
Glasgow Library Special Collections. 
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significant, however. Whilst physicians ‘inhabit’ the interior of this shared ‘Countrey,’ 
surgeons ‘dwelleth’ in its ‘confines,’ at its border. The significance of this, I believe, can 
be understood only if we abandon a characteristically modern set of binaries which 
associate the ‘inner part’ with authenticity and selfhood and the border with the 
marginal, the extraneous. 136  For, to call on Heidegger again, ‘circumscribing gives 
bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing does not stop; rather, from within them 
it begins to be what after production it will be. That which gives bounds, [is] that which 
completes.’ 137  A periphery, that is, does not have to be peripheral: it can be a 
constitutive circumference, delimiting and defining the thing. The point is underscored 
by the association of a country’s ‘Confines’ with military defense (a figuration which 
also recalls Crooke’s assertion that ‘the organs and instruments of the Sences are placed 
in the head as it were in a Citadell or Sconce’).138 The profession of surgery provides a 
constitutive circumference which describes the outer edge of physic’s territory; similarly, 
the workings of the senses provide a defensive, constitutive circumference for the self. 
In this chapter I have shown how, according to conventional accounts of early 
modern anatomy, an emphasis on the dissector’s accurate first-hand experience 
gradually replaced a reliance on error-riddled canonical texts. These accounts, I have 
argued, are flawed because their absolute distinction between embodied experience and 
textual authority is inconsistent with the picture presented in Mikrokosmographia, which 
presumes a degree of overlap between the two. Attention to Crooke’s conception of the 
senses – taste in particular – as objects of knowledge helps to explicate the significance 
of this overlap. For Crooke, the senses are ‘framed’ by circumstance and temperament 
in the same way that the skeleton ‘frames’ the human body.139 That is to say, the data 
they make available to the mind is always already informed by a range of expectations, 
intentions, contingencies, and conventions, and as such is inherently meaningful. 
Conversely, acts of reading and writing are apprehended as deeply embodied, as sensory 
experiences in themselves. Mikrokosmographia thus encourages us to rethink the 
relationship between what I have termed physiological taste on the one hand, and 
epistemic or epistemological taste on the other. If acts of reading and writing are 
embodied, then epistemological taste – manifest in Mikrokosmographia both explicitly in 
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uses of the term ‘taste’ to describe summaries of information and implicitly in Crooke’s 
use of the humanist bibliophagic metaphors – is rooted in physical sensation. Similarly, 
just as sensory experiences in general have cognitive content, the physical act of tasting 
is epistemologically significant, a way of producing and organizing information. 
Ultimately, taste as it operates in the anatomical theatre, and taste as it operates in the 
text, are conceptually and practically interlinked. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Bitter Sin, Salvific Sweetness: 
Piety and Palate in Devotional Literature 
 
I. ‘wanton plenty’ 
 
In his 1578 theological epic La Sepmaine; ou, Creation du monde, a poetic retelling of the 
first two chapters of Genesis translated into English by Joshua Sylvester as the 1611 Du 
Bartas his devine weekes and workes, the Protestant poet Guillaume de Salluste Du Bartas 
describes Eden immediately following the Fall:  
 
...For I should say that still with smiling face 
Th’al clasping heavens beheld this happy place; 
That hunny sweet, from hollow rocks did draine; 
That fostering milke flow’d up and down the plaine; 
That sweet as Roses smelt th’il-savory Rew, 
That still all soiles, all seasons, all things grew: 
That still there dangled on the selfe-same treen 
A thousand fruites, nor over-ripe, nor green: 
That egrest fruits, and bittrest hearbs did mock 
Madera sugars and the Apricock 
Yeelding more holesome food then all the messes, 
That now tast-curious, wanton plenty dresses, 
Disguising in a thousand costly dishes, 
The various stoare of dainty foules and fishes, 
Which far and neere we seeke by land and seas, 
More to provoke then hunger to appease.1 
 
Du Bartas depicts a paradisal landscape characterised by alimentary abundance: 
unshackled from the dictates of seasonal decay and regeneration, fruits hang suspended 
at the pinnacle of ripeness, whilst honey streams from rocks and nourishing milk flows 
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on the plains. In enumerating the gustatory pleasures of Eden, Du Bartas ratchets up 
the pathos: paradise’s enduring perfection is in stark, uncanny contrast to the calamitous 
alteration to human nature recently precipitated by Adam and Eve’s consumption of 
one particular fruit. The point is driven home by the subsequent comparison between 
the sweetness of Edenic fruit and herbs, and the lavish but unwholesome ‘messes’ 
devised to titillate the vitiated tastes of Adam and Eve’s fallen descendants, amongst 
whom the narrator numbers himself and his readers.  
Du Bartas’ interest in the degeneration of postlapsarian appetites is 
characteristic of what this chapter will argue is an early modern obsession with the 
dangers, but also the utility, of the sense of taste as an aspect of religious experience. 
When early modern men and women discuss the Fall they describe it, almost 
ubiquitously, as precipitated by an act of tasting. Again, Du Bartas is representative: 
‘Adam did revolt from thee,’ he informs God, ‘and (curious) tasted of the sacred Tree.’2 
In this, they depart from all notable contemporary translations of the bible into English, 
which translate the Hebrew verb ἐσθίω, to eat, literally. The 1611 King James Version, 
for example, recounts how Eve ‘took of the fruit... and did eat, and gave also unto her 
husband with her; and he did eat.’ 3  In shifting the focus from consumption to 
gustation, poets, polemicists, and theologians made a subtle but profound alteration: 
mankind’s postlapsarian misery and wickedness is not attributable to an act of ingestion, 
a full digestive incorporation, but to a sensation.  
The weight that Du Bartas gives to the word ‘curious’ is significant. Contained 
but also accentuated by the parentheses which surround it, ‘curious’ modifies both 
Adam’s originary act of tasting, and his descendants’ ‘tast-curious’ desire for the 
‘wanton plenty’ of exotic viands. The term hints that the Fall’s atrophying of appetite 
also constitutes an epistemological decline, for contemporaneously its semantic reach 
embraced both finicky culinary tastes, and a depraved inquisitiveness about trifles or, 
more dangerously, occult knowledge.4 Correspondingly, Du Bartas laments the loss of 
prelapsarian certainty in terms which recall his mellifluous depiction of Edenic produce: 
‘Knowledge was then... / Not sower, but sweet: not gotten, but infus’d.’5 In Eden, 
gustatory pleasure and intellectual illumination were all of a piece.  
                                                          
2 Ibid., M3r (149).  
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Despite the sense’s postlapsarian dissipation, however, Du Bartas retains taste’s 
connection to knowledge of the sacred for contemporary readers:  
 
God, of himself incapable to sense,  
In’s Works, reveales him t’our intelligence:  
There-in, our fingers feel, our nostrils smel,  
Our palats taste his vertues that excel:  
He shewes him to our eyes, talks to our ears,  
In th’ ord’red motions of the spangled Sphears.6 
 
Whilst a marginal note to this stanza asserts that God ‘makes himselfe (as it were) 
visible in his Workes,’ the verse itself stresses the extent to which divine presence is 
apprehended through taste. Whilst the other four senses are paired two to a line, ‘taste’ 
takes up a full pentameter, and its object is more specific: the palate apprehends not just 
the divine, but the excellency of divine ‘vertues.’ The ‘mature and settled Sapience’ of 
the soul, as Du Bartas writes elsewhere in the Devine weekes, implicitly punning on the 
Latin etymon sapĕre, to have a taste or savour, ‘Hath som alliance with [God’s] 
Providence.’7  
Du Bartas’ suggestion that taste – compromised though it may be – retains 
some value as a way of accessing the divine, finds its counterpart in post-Reformation 
ritual praxis.8 In line with the reformist insistence that the laity should partake, as the 
1549 Book of Common Prayer puts it, of ‘both parts of the Lords Sacrament,’ the 
sacramental tasting of bread (or wafer) and wine replaced the visual spectacle of the 
elevation of the Host as the climactic moment of the Eucharistic ceremony in England.9 
This new emphasis on taste over vision was reflected, as we shall see, in Protestant 
poetics and polemic. Through consumption of the elements, the pious individual both 
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1662, ed. Brian Cummings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 682.  
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commemorated Christ’s redemptive sacrifice, and regained some of the intimacy with 
God forsaken by Adam and Eve.10 
This chapter explores the role played by taste in the cultivation of pious 
knowledge, and in the experience, articulation, and negotiation of religious identity, in 
the wake of the English Reformation. In this, I follow a number of scholars who have 
explored the relation between confessional allegiance and attitudes towards the senses. 
Two narratives – both of which bear traces of the religious commitments of their 
proponents – are particularly influential here. The first, represented by Eamon Duffy’s 
seminal The Stripping of the Altars, presents early Protestants as cultural bogeymen whose 
iconoclastic distrust of the sensory stimulation offered by late-medieval religious art and 
ritual resulted in their vandalism of a vibrant cultural heritage, and richly affective form 
of worship.11 The second presents reformist attitudes to sensory worship not as an 
outright rejection, but rather as a shift of sensory emphasis, arguing that a Protestant 
suspicion of visual images was compensated by a simultaneous (Lutheran) elevation of 
the status of hearing.12 This putative shift from the visual to the aural corresponds to 
what Matthew Milner calls the ‘inherently “protestant”’ notion that the Reformation 
intellectually enfranchised the English nation, allowing access to the word of God 
unmediated by clerical authority.13 
Whilst these approaches differ in their assessment of the impact of the 
Reformation on devotional sensing, both are united in a focus on the traditionally 
‘higher’ senses of vision and hearing to the exclusion of the ‘lower’ senses of smell, 
touch, and taste.  As Matthew Milner points out, however, ‘sixteenth-century religion 
was more than eyes and ears; it was a full, synaesthetic experience.’14 Milner’s own 
account highlights continuities between traditional and reformist approaches to the 
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12 See, for example, Mark Robson, ‘Looking with Ears, Hearing with Eyes: Shakespeare and the Ear of 
the Early Modern,’ Early Modern Literary Studies 7/1 (2001): 1-23, and Cynthia Marshall, ‘Sight and Sound: 
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aural theatre, and that this correlates to Protestant orthodoxy. Tiffany, ‘Hamlet and Protestant Aural 
Theater,’ Christianity and Literature 52/4 (2003): 307-323, especially 308, 313. Wes Folkerth argues that ‘for 
the early modern Protestant, the ear is the primary corporeal agent spiritual transformation.’ Folkerth, The 
Sound of Shakespeare, 51. 
13 Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 2.   
14 Ibid., 6. 
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senses, arguing that ‘protestantism was itself dependent on sensual experience.... 
reformers were still governed by traditional assumptions on sensory propriety and 
sensory theory.’15 Other scholars have offered different ways to understand the early 
modern use of sensory metaphors in pious discourse. Holly Dugan argues that whilst 
‘Catholic theology.... emphasized a direct, experiential link to God through sensory ways 
of knowing,’ including the use of fragrant incense, within Protestant ritual ‘sacrifice and 
prayer emerge as true censing, displacing the abject materiality of the censer.’ In English 
reformist sermons however, incense was used as ‘a metaphorical abstraction.’16 Here, 
metaphors of scent and incense are a counterpart to the supposed disembodiment of 
reformist worship. Joseph Moshenska offers a more helpfully nuanced reading of 
sensory metaphors in devotional discourse. For Moshenska, Thomas Cranmer’s 
sensuous descriptions of communion and baptism are neither straightforwardly abstract 
or metaphorical, nor clearly corporeal and literal. Instead, Cranmer’s cautious use of the 
qualifier ‘as it were’ to describe the sensory qualities of the elements ‘suspends the 
sensory practices that he describes between the literal and the figurative.’17 
Attending to the ‘lower’ senses, then, offers a means to escape the dichotomy 
between a sensorially rich but corrupt Catholicism, and a sensorially impoverished but 
intellectually inclusive Protestantism, that has structured accounts of the period. Whilst 
my first chapter explored the relation between the sense of taste and the forms of 
mental judgement associated with discriminative reading, and my second chapter 
described imbrications of literary and empirical taste in the production of anatomical 
knowledge, this chapter asks what kind of value taste might have when the ultimate 
object of knowledge is not a worldly entity, but transcendent and ineffable God. I 
focus, in particular, on the pervasive distinction between the physical and the spiritual 
senses. Briefly, the doctrine of the spiritual senses – which originated with the Church 
Fathers, and remained influential throughout the early modern period – draws on 
instances of sensory language in scripture to posit that the physical senses have a parallel 
in the form of a set of internal, spiritual senses, belonging not to the body but 
(variously) to the spirit, soul, heart, or intellect, and capable of apprehending the 
divine.18 Within this schema, taste occupied an important place, for the transition from 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 3-4. 
16 Dugan, Ephemeral History, 30-31. 
17 Moshenska, ‘Feeling Pleasures,’ 124-27. 
18 See Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, introduction to Gavrilyok and Coakley, eds., The Spiritual 
Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-19, for an 
overview of the history of the concept. 
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physical to spiritual sensation also entailed a reorganization of the conventional sensory 
hierarchy. Anne Astell comments that, although it was ‘at the base of all the physical 
senses, touch was paradoxically at the pinnacle of the spiritual senses in the view of 
medieval mystics,’ and the same can be said of taste (often considered, of course, a 
variety of touch) in early modern England.19 Witness the moderate puritan Richard 
Sibbes in his posthumously-published 1650 The glorious feast of the Gospel:  
 
it is the very beeing of a Christian to have a taste of spirituall things... the other 
senses fetch their objects afarre off, but as for taste there is a neer application in it, 
and therefore most necessary: every life is maintained by tast. Taste and see how good 
the Lord is.20 
 
Quoting Psalm 34:8 (the locus classicus for early modern discussions of spiritual taste), 
and invoking the Aristotelian notion – also endorsed, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, by Helkiah Crooke – that taste is the most essential sense, Sibbes asserts the 
paramount importance of spiritual taste to Christian identity.  
If spiritual taste comes, in some contexts, to be privileged over spiritual sight, 
we might expect both to take precedence over their physical equivalents. 
Unsurprisingly, given the neo-Platonic slant of the patristic tradition that formulated the 
doctrine of the spiritual senses, this is sometimes the case: the physical senses are often 
thought inferior, and, ideally, subservient, to the spiritual. Physical taste was, however, 
valued as a means to spiritual illumination, not despite, but in many cases because of, its 
worldly qualities – notably its transience. There was no clear line between secular and 
sacred experience: faith was not an immaterial, intellectual addendum to the lived facts 
of everyday life, but inherent in the sensuousness of the quotidian. Establishing a 
liminal position between sensuous corporeality and intellection, the terms of taste allow 
us to appreciate the extent to which religious knowledge in the early modern period was 
itself grounded in embodied experience. At the same time, devotional writing offers a 
neglected source to uncover common understandings and experiences of the physical 
experience of tasting.  
                                                          
19 Anne Astell, Eating Beauty: The Eucharist and the Spiritual Arts of the Middles Ages (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 3-4. 
20 Richard Sibbes, The glorious feast of the Gospel (London: John Rothwell, 1650), D3v (22). In his 
annotations on scripture, John Diodati glosses the psalmist’s use of the word ‘taste’ thus: ‘V. 8. Taste] 
cleere your judgements, that you may rightly know Gods goodnesse, examine the trials and proofes which 
hee gives you of it, and take pleasure and delight in it.’ John Diodati, Pious annotations (London: T.B. for 
Nicholas Fussell, 1643), Oo3r (109). 
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Given the enormity of the corpus of seventeenth-century religious writing, a 
comprehensive account of the uses of taste within contemporary religious literature and 
culture would be a gargantuan task. Accordingly, I focus on four broad ‘classes’ of text, 
each of which evidences a particular intensity in its use of the language of taste: 
devotional poetry; Eucharistic polemic; homiletic commentary addressing key ‘taste’ 
moments in scripture; and radical Protestant genres such as the spiritual testimony. 
 
II. ‘the Corporall and Spirituall taste’ 
 
In Book 4 of his influential Confessions, translated by the Church of England clergyman 
and author William Watts in 1631, St Augustine wonders at the disjunction between his 
instinctive grasp of the liberal arts and sciences, and the obtuseness of his pre-
conversion self in matters of religion. ‘What-ever was written,’ he boasts, ‘either of the 
Art of Rhetoricke, or Logicke, what-ever of Geometry, Musicke, and Arithmeticke, I attain’d 
the understanding of by my selfe, without any great difficulty, or any instructor.’21 His 
studious labours were of little avail, however: ‘what good did then my nimble wit, able 
to runne over all those Sciences... seeing I err’d so fouly, and with so much sacrilegious 
shamefulnesse in the Doctrine of Piety?’22 His mistake, he explains in Book 6, lay in 
expecting religious knowledge to have the same unassailable logic as secular arithmetical 
and propositional knowledge: ‘my whole desire was to be made so well assured of those 
things which I saw not, as I was certaine that seven and three make tenne.’ 23  For 
Augustine, the difference between the unconverted self and the genuine Christian is not 
equivalent to the difference between disbelief and belief, or between ignorance and 
knowledge. Rather, it lies in the rejection of one mode of knowledge (namely scientia) in 
favour of another (namely sapientia).  
Augustine’s distinction between secular and devout certainty allows us to 
consider religious belief as founded on distinct, and historically specific, conceptions of 
knowledge. Whilst today we tend to understand ‘belief’ as acceptance of a claim or 
creed, this is a relatively recent way of conceiving of faith. In the pre-modern world, 
belief in God did not equate to the opinion that God exists; rather, belief was 
understood as a kind of habitual trust which was both predicated on and enabled the 
                                                          
21 Augustine, Saint Augustines confessions, trans. William Watts (London: John Norton for John Partridge, 
1631), K6r (203). Kathleen Lynch calls this a ‘solidly Protestant’ edition. Kathleen Lynch, Protestant 
Autobiography in the Seventeenth-Century Anglophone World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 43. 
22 Augustine, Confessions, K7r (205). 
23 Ibid., N10r (283). 
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embodied, sensory practices (from ritual to asceticism) which constituted religion.24 In 
the words of David Morgan, belief was understood ‘not as a linguistic phenomenon, but 
as a psychological and physiological one... Belief was feeling and habit intimately linked 
to action... belief happens as touching and seeing, hearing and tasting.’25  
In his 1679 Contemplations upon the remarkable passages in the life of the holy Jesus, the 
writer, satirist, and Bishop of Norwich Joseph Hall discusses faith in precisely these 
terms: 
 
the endeavour and issue of all, both humane and spiritual, things depends upon 
our Faith. Who would commit a plant or a seed to the earth, if he did not 
believe to have it nursed in that kindly bosome? What Merchant would put 
himself upon the guard of an inch-board in a furious Sea, if he did not trust to 
the faithfull custody of that planck?... What benefit can we look to carry from a 
Divine exhortation, if we do not believe it will edify us? from a Sacramental 
banquet, (the food of Angels) if we do not believe it will nourish our Souls?... 
Oh our vain and heartless services, if we do not say, May I drink but one drop 
of that heavenly Nectar, may I tast but one crum of that Bread of life, may I 
hear but one word from the mouth of Christ, may I send up but one hearty sigh 
or ejaculation of an holy desire to my God, I shall be whole!26 
 
Just as ‘humane’ faith is understood as a kind of implicit, enabling trust which forms a 
necessary precondition for man’s negotiation of and action within the world – from 
husbandry to maritime trade – so too is spiritual faith a precondition of action and 
edification in the realm of the divine. For Hall, religious belief is not a matter of 
knowing things about God; rather, it is to have had an experience of God. Faith is a 
form of trust made manifest in affectively-charged ritual practice, and the sensory 
perceptions attendant on that practice. Just as worldly faith is experienced as trust in 
materiality (the firm tactility of the plank), religious faith is experienced sensorially, as a 
yearning to ‘tast’ the ‘Sacramental banquet’ undergirded by a confident faith in its 
efficacy. The sort of ‘tast’ that Hall invokes, however, is not exclusively corporeal; it is 
simultaneously physical and spiritual, equally alert to the perceptible ‘sweetness’ of the 
                                                          
24 See David Morgan, ‘The Matter of Belief,’ in Morgan, ed., Religion and Material Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 1-3.  
25 Ibid. 3, 8.  
26 Joseph Hall, Contemplations upon the remarkable passages in the life of  the holy Jesus (London: E. Flesher for 
Jacob Tonson, 1679), Hh1v-Hh2r (234-35). 
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wine and the friable ‘crum’ of the bread, and to the ‘heavenly’ sacredness of the 
elements. 
Whilst the phrase ‘the spiritual senses’ (sensus spiritales) can be traced back to the 
church fathers, in the early modern period arguably the most influential expression of 
the doctrine was to be found in the Confessions. In Book 10, Augustine asks of God, 
‘what… do I love, whenas I love thee?’ Answering his own question, he articulates the 
difference between corporeal and spiritual sensation: 
 
…not the beauty of any corporall thing... not the brightnesse of the light, which to 
behold, is so gladsome to our eyes: not the pleasant melodies of songs of all kinds; 
not the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices: not Manna and 
honey, nor any faire limbs that are so acceptable to fleshly embracements.  
 
... and yet I love a certaine kinde of light, and a kind of voice, and a kinde of 
fragrancy, and a kinde of meat, and a kind of embracement. Whenas I love my God; 
who is both the light, and the voice, and the sweet smell, and the meate, and the 
embracement of my inner man: where that light shineth unto my soule, which no 
place can receive; that voice soundeth, which time deprives me not of; and that 
fragrancy smelleth, which no wind scatters; & that meate tasteth, which eating 
devoures not; and that embracement clingeth to mee, which satiety divorceth 
not…27 
 
Against Manichean doctrine, Augustine forcefully insists that God is not a ‘corporall 
thing,’ and love of God does not take the form of sensuous delight. This assertion is 
swiftly qualified, however, by Augustine’s introduction of a form of sense experience 
belonging to ‘my inner man... my soule.’ This spiritual sensing is distinguished from 
ephemeral worldly sensing by the endurance of its divine object, God, who is ‘that 
meate... which eating devoures not.’ The relationship between the corporeal and the 
spiritual senses is not – as we might expect – schematically hierarchical (with physical 
taste subservient to spiritual taste), or even analogical (with the spiritual and physical 
senses running parallel to, and providing images of, each other), but synecdochical. God 
is emphatically not light, melody, scent, honey, or sex, ‘and yet’ simultaneously he is ‘a 
certaine kinde’ of these things: a subtype of them. By extension, spiritual sensation can 
                                                          
27 Augustine, Confessions, Cc3v-Cc4r (582-83). 
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be understood as not entirely discrete from, but rather as a subcategory of, physical 
sensation; Augustine smudges the line between physical and spiritual sensation even as 
he draws it.  
For many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Protestants, the distinction 
between the bodily and the spiritual senses was supposed to correspond to the 
distinction between fallen and salvific tasting outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter. Physical taste – epistemologically valuable as it might be – was morally 
compromised by the possibility that it might duplicate Adam and Eve’s sinful 
gustation. 28  In the words of a grimly punning Joseph Hall, writing in his 1612 
Contemplations upon the principall passages of the holy storie, ‘the sons of Eve inherit [the] saucy 
appetite of their grandmother.’29 Conversely, for Protestants, Eucharistic ritual properly 
engaged the spiritual, rather than the physical, sense of taste. The ‘exhortation’ from 
priest to congregation, as prescribed by the 1559 Book of Common Prayer, encouraged this 
approach, pronouncing that ‘if with a truly penitent heart and lively faith we receive that 
holy Sacrament... then we spiritually eat the flesh of Christ, and drink his blood, then we 
dwell in Christ and Christ in us...’30 In the context of the Eucharistic ritual, salvation and 
spiritual tasting we supposed to coalesce. As we shall see, however, in practice these 
distinctions were difficult to maintain. Where physical and spiritual tasting were 
conceived of on a continuum, it could be difficult for early modern men and women to 
precisely identify their own taste experiences as one or the other, and subsequently to 
determine whether a particular sensation was fallen or salvific.   
Both Augustine’s criterion for arbitrating the difference between spiritual and 
physical sensation, and his blurring of the boundary between the two, recur in works by 
early modern authors. In a short chapter titled ‘The difference betweene the Corporall 
                                                          
28 The notion that physical taste is inherently fallen surfaces repeatedly in the prayers collated in Thomas 
Bentley’s 1582 The monument of matrones, many of which are intended to precede, accompany, or follow on 
from a meal. Bentley’s orisons consistently encourage diners to interpret their own culinary experience in 
terms informed by scriptural precedents, including the Fall. In a ‘praier before meat, to be used that daye 
that you have received the holie Communion,’ for example, Bentley ponders the disjunction between 
fallen, worldly tasting, and the spiritual feast of the communion table. After thanking God that ‘after the 
banket of paradise troubled by the divell & man, thou hast againe of thine infinite goodnesse, through thy 
sonne, prepared a sumptuous supper, and great feast,’ Bentley goes on to lament that ‘thy people... 
togither with the most part of the world, do despise thy holie table, and suffer themselves to be caried 
about unto the bankets of Satan, and vaine pleasures of this world.’ The ‘vaine pleasures’ of worldly feasts 
are implicitly aligned with the Satanic act of tasting which resulted in Adam and Eve’s exile from Eden. 
Bentley, The monument of matrones (London: H. Denham, 1582), Ccc1r (629). 
29  Joseph Hall, Contemplations upon the principall passages of  the holy storie (London: M. Bradwood for Sa. 
Macham, 1612), D1r (49). Hall makes full use of  the semantic range of  saucy, which had a stronger 
connotation in the early modern period than today, indicating hubristic insolence, wanton lasciviousness, 
and finicky, fastidious tastes. ‘Saucy, adj.1.’ OED Online, accessed 25 April 2013, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/171348. 
30 Cummings, The Book of  Common Prayer, 258. 
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and Spirituall taste’ included in A good companion for a Christian (1632), for example, John 
Norden echoes Augustine’s emphasis on the permanence of the objects of the spiritual 
senses:  
 
corporall food, bee it never so sweete and pleasing to the Taste, yet it loatheth at 
length... the sweet milke of the Word, hath the vertue to season the inward taste, and 
to prepare the spirituall Appetite, to feed the soule unto salvation; and the more hee 
tasteth of it, the more his appetite (through Faith) inflamed is to hunger for 
more, hee cannot be satisfied with little, for the more hee tasteth, the sweeter he 
findes it, and the more he hungers for it.31 
 
Spiritual taste is privileged because it endures: whereas corporeal taste sensations are 
inherently transient by virtue both of the natural confines of our appetites, and of the 
fact that the consumption of food is also its destruction, the insatiability of ‘the inward 
taste’ is amply supplied by its object: the ‘sweet milke’ of the divine word, or scripture.32  
Richard Brathwaite, in his 1620 Essaies upon the five senses, also stresses transience 
as a constituent attribute of fallen, physical taste, and he similarly privileges spiritual 
taste on that basis. ‘This Sence,’ he laments at the beginning of the essay ‘Of Tasting,’ 
‘makes mee weeppe ere I speake of her; sith hence came our greefe, hence our miserie... 
how pure I had bin, if this one Sence had not corrupted my pristine innocencie.’ Physical 
taste is held responsible for the Fall; subsequently, it poses a threat to spiritual taste. ‘I 
will rather distaste mine owne palate to give true rellish to my soules appetite,’ 
Brathwaite goes on, ‘than by satisfying the first, corrupt the puritie of the latter.’33 The 
bodily senses simultaneously parallel the spiritual senses, and jeopardize them. 34 
Brathwaite’s attitude here seems to substantiate Susan Stewart’s description of the 
Essaies as characterized by ‘an atmosphere of prurience and regulation.’35 The ‘concern 
with regulating the senses’ which structures Brathwaite’s work, Stewart claims, ‘tends to 
increase our alienation from the senses.’ 36  For Stewart, Brathwaite’s advocation of 
‘regulation’ of the senses equates to ‘alienation’ from them. This very modern attitude 
                                                          
31 Norden, A good companion, H2r (163). 
32 Norden echoes 1 Cor 3:2, Heb 5:12-13, and 1 Pet 2:2 (KJV). 
33 Brathwaite, Essaies, D3r (45).  
34 Maggie Kilgour similarly notes that, for Augustine, ‘spiritual desire is analogous to bodily hunger yet 
also threatened by it... literal eating provides a model for his quest that may also become a dangerous 
substitute for it.’ Kilgour, From Communion to Cannibalism: An Anatomy of Metaphors of Incorporation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 48.  
35 Susan Stewart, Poetry and the Fate of  the Senses (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2002), 39. 
36 Ibid., 40. 
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overlooks the ways in which regulation functions, in Brathwaite’s text, as a form of 
attentiveness. Restricting the scope of the senses serves not to distance the individual 
from his or her corporeal life, but to reconcile her to it: delimiting the scope of the 
senses is a way to manage the physical world’s assault on the contours of the self, 
enabling the individual to inhabit her experiences in a more focused, and thus fuller, 
way. Thus, bodily taste may pose a threat to spiritual gust according to Brathwaite, but – 
properly managed – it also has the potential to provide spiritual edification, and self-
definition, for the believing subject.  
It is important to note that, for Brathwaite, worldly taste is such a threat to 
spiritual taste precisely because the two are on a continuum: the physical palate could 
not corrupt the spiritual taste if it were not in some way affiliated with it. Likewise, for 
Joseph Hall, the distinction between the physical and spiritual senses is legitimate, but 
by no means absolute: ‘those two parts whereof we consist (the bodily, the spiritual),’ he 
asserts in his Contemplations upon the remarkable passages, ‘do in a sort partake of each 
other.’37 This sense that physical and spiritual perception exist in a relation of kinship, as 
well as antagonism, extends into a suggestion that they may be functionally indistinct. 
Thus, for Brathwaite, physical taste’s ephemerality is a marker of its inferiority; but it is 
also morally and spiritually instructive: 
 
Hence doe I gather the frailty and brevity of all earthly pleasures? Whatsoever 
ministers singular’st content unto our appetite, is no longer satisfieing then in the 
palate; for after going into the stomach, that content is done. So delights 
momentary, and limitarie to an instant, may for the present yeild a satisfaction, 
but how soone be these joyes extinguished, how soone forgotten?38 
 
It is the transience of worldly taste – the very attribute which identifies it as worldly – 
which enables it to communicate a spiritually edifying momento mori message.39 It is worth 
noting that Brathwaite’s rhetoric may have had a material application for early modern 
readers: as Robert Appelbaum demonstrates in a discussion of Hamlet’s ‘funeral baked 
meats,’ the vocabulary of early modern food preparation and the processes of 
consumption could verge on the macabre: pie-crusts were ‘coffins’; ‘one recipe for 
                                                          
37 Hall, Contemplations upon the remarkable passages, Hh3r (237). 
38 Brathwaite, Essaies, D3v (46). 
39 In an article on Richard Crashaw, Ryan Netzley argues similarly that ‘it is the very failure of taste as a 
sense that reaffirms its privileged devotional value.’ Ryan Netzley, ‘Oral Devotion: Eucharistic Theology 
and Richard Crashaw’s Religious Lyrics,’ Texas Studies in Literature and Language 44/3 (2002): 251. 
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baked leg of lamb has an undertone... of internment, disinterment, and embalment.’40 
For Brathwaite, bodily taste is indubitably fallen, inherently corrupt, and potentially 
sinful. Simultaneously, however, the phenomenal experience of worldly taste prompts a 
recognition of our inherent fallenness and corruption which is itself potentially virtuous, 
a form of humility and a necessary precondition of spiritual reformation. The moral 
dubiety of physical taste is at least partially compensated by its capacity to invoke a state 
of intensified self-awareness, a self-reflective scrutiny of sinfulness which might precede 
salvation.41 
The relation between the physical sense of taste and spiritually redemptive self-
knowledge is attested by chapter xvi of Philip Sidney’s 1587 translation of the French 
Protestant Philippe de Mornay’s A woorke concerning the trewnesse of the Christian religion, 
‘That mans nature is corrupted, & man falne from his first originall: and how.’42 Mornay 
suggests that the capacity of worldly taste to perceive and arbitrate between a diversity 
of flavours makes it capable of apprehending spiritual truths about our fallen condition:  
 
...the Vintener [createth not] the sowernesse in the Wine, nor the Smith the rust 
in the iron; but they come in from elswhere. Neverthelesse, the man that never 
dranke other drinke than Vineger, would think it to be the naturall sap and taste 
of the Grape. And wee likewise who never felt other in ourselves than 
corruption... would beare ourselves on hand, that GOD is the cause and author 
thereof. Now, let us which have tasted both the Wine and the Vineger, judge 
what maner of creatures we may have bin in our first creation: in doing whereof 
there is yet notwithstanding this great difference, that the palat of our bodily 
mouth is able to discerne the swéete from the sower; but the palat or tast of our 
soule, is unable to do either of them both the one, because corruption can not 
judge of cleannesse; and the other, because it cannot judge well of it selfe. In 
Wine and Vineger we discerne a liquid nature common to them both: but as 
concerning their qualities, the Wine is swéete, warme, and friendly to nature; 
whereas the Vineger is sharpe, cold, and corrosive: yea and the very colours of 
them are unlike one another... Let us judge of our Soules with like discretion. 
                                                          
40 Appelbaum, Aguecheek’s Beef, 15, 19. 
41 Several scholars have noted a relation between taste sensations and spiritual self-reflection. See, for 
example, Terry Sherwood, ‘Tasting and Telling Sweetness in George Herbert’s Poetry,’ English Literary 
Review 12/3 (1982): 339-40; Rachel Fulton, ‘“Taste and see that the Lord is sweet” (Ps. 33:9): The Flavor 
of  God in the Monastic West,’ The Journal of  Religion 86/2 (2006): 193. 
42 Philippe de Mornay, A woorke concerning the trewnesse of  the Christian religion, trans. Philip Sidney (London: 
John Charlewood and George Robinson for Thomas Cadman, 1587), S8r-U2r (287-307).  
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We finde there a spirituall nature, immateriall and immortall; and that is the 
onely remainder of her first originall.43 
 
We only blame God for the evil in our own natures, Mornay argues, because we cannot 
remember the time when we were – as we were created – purely good. We can learn, 
however, to recognise that the source of our sinfulness is not God, the divine vintner, 
through an act of comparative tasting: the difference in flavour between sweet and 
salutary wine, and ‘corrosive’ vinegar allows us to ‘judge’ of the difference between the 
perfection of our created natures, and the degeneration of our postlapsarian selves. 
Significantly, the ‘bodily mouth’ has an explicit advantage over the spiritual ‘palat.’ 
Whereas Brathwaite suggests that physical taste’s utility as a prompt to spiritually 
edifying self-reflection is despite its fallen condition, which is in contrast to the enduring 
purity of spiritual taste, according to Mornay physical taste escapes infection by original 
sin. Instead, it is mankind’s spiritual taste which is compromised by Adam and Eve’s act 
of eating. The postlapsarian corruption of spiritual taste precludes it from discriminating 
between sweet and bitter, for ‘corruption can not judge of cleannesse,’ nor can it ‘judge 
well of it selfe.’ We must, then, understand the soul by extrapolating from the corporeal 
palate. Once again, the phenomenal experience of physical taste is an occasion for, and 
provides a way of articulating, spiritual self-reflection. 
The transience of taste – spiritually instructive as it may have been for 
Brathwaite – presents a challenge to modern scholars. It is impossible to archive a 
flavour, and even apparently historically accurate recreations of early modern dishes are 
freighted with anachronism: agricultural and genetic changes mean that basic foodstuffs 
may have altered dramatically in nature and taste; we lack the kinds of vernacular, 
embodied knowledge needed to accurately recreate historical recipes; the physical and 
mental contexts of consumption have been transformed. Whilst it is impossible to fully 
recapture past repasts, however, consideration of what does endure – the paraphernalia 
of the table – offers some insight into how early modern men and women conceived of 
and experienced the physical sense of taste.  
In particular, the evidence provided by the material culture of dining adds 
weight to my argument that physical taste was thought of and experienced as inherently 
fallen; and that its transience was an aspect of this fallenness, as well a memento mori 
prompt to spiritual self-scrutiny. ‘Apples,’ writes Brathwaite, ‘are suspicious to me, being 
                                                          
43 Mornay, A woorke concerning the trewnesse, T9r-T9v (303-304). 
129 
 
the first that depraved me.’44 Items such as the seventeenth-century earthenware dish 
shown in figure 3.1 suggest that Brathwaite was not alone in framing quotidian acts of 
eating in scriptural terms.45 The dish represents Adam and Eve by the tree of  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Pickleherring Pottery, tin glazed earthware dish. London, 1635.  
© Victoria and Albert Museum, London. 
                                                          
44 The forbidden fruit was usually thought to be an apple, although some alternatives were suggested. 
Thomas Browne writes: ‘that the Forbidden fruit of  Paradise was an Apple, is commonly beleeved... [but] 
some have conceived it a Vine, in the mystery of  whose fruit lay the expiation of  the Transgression.’ 
Thomas Browne, Pseudodoxia Epidemica, Vv2r. Thomas Buttes suggests ‘a Figge.’ Thomas Buttes, Diets dry 
dinner (London: Thomas Creede for William Wood, 1599), B2r (339). 
45 The V&A’s catalogue description of the first dish notes that ‘it is unclear whether dishes painted with 
this subject were intended to have a deep moral message, or whether it was simply considered an 
appealing and decorative theme.’ I believe that such items were ‘intended to have a deep moral message.’ 
As the painted initials suggest, the platter was probably made to commemorate a marriage, and possibly 
given as a marriage gift. As such, its message might be seen as didactic: a pointed reminder to a soon-to-
be wife about the consequences of female insubordination. See 
http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O11566/the-temptation-of-adam-and-dish-pickleherring-pottery, 
accessed 03 January 2012. 
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knowledge, the latter reaching out to accept the forbidden fruit from the serpent’s 
mouth. This example is by no means isolated: the temptation and Fall was a common 
decorative theme for pottery from the early seventeenth to the early eighteenth 
centuries, and whilst many of the surviving examples (including the dish shown in figure 
3.1) were probably destined not for use but for display, the endurance of cruder, less 
well-preserved instances suggest that the topic was also thought appropriate for items 
intended for use at the table.46 Such dishes suggest that diners saw their own quotidian 
acts of physical tasting in typological terms, as potentially repeating Adam and Eve’s 
catastrophic gustation. By the same token, the popularity of momento mori cutlery (figure 
3.2) reifies Brathwaite’s assertion that the transience of taste exemplifies the ‘brevity of 
all earthly pleasures’ (my emphasis), serving as a reminder of human mortality and thus 
as an incitement to moral and spiritual rectitude.  
 
 
      Figure 3.2. Thomas Mangy, silver spoon. York, England, 1670.  
      © Victoria and Albert Museum, London; photo © Simon Moore. 
 
                                                          
46 Cruder examples are often found in auction catalogues rather than in museums. 
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I use the term ‘typological’ with intent: understanding the ways in which early 
modern men and women experienced eating as haunted by scriptural precedents also 
encourages us to expand the jurisdiction of typology as an aspect of religious, and 
particularly Protestant, experience. A number of scholars have explored the Protestant 
expansion of typology from an exegetical mode, to a model of historical time, focusing 
for example on the ways in which the fate of the English nation under perceived 
tyranny (whether Papist, Stuart, or Cromwellian) was believed to replicate the suffering 
of the Israelites in Egypt.47 Less frequently noticed than the typological explanation of 
national, political events, however, is the way in which more immediate, transient 
moments of sense experience were also construed as echoing scriptural precedents. The 
famous madeleine episode which opens Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (1913-27) 
established an influential association between taste and involuntary, individual 
memory. 48  I propose that, for early modern men and women, the sense of taste 
functioned not to prompt private reminiscence, but to recall and reanimate key 
moments in the Christian narrative. Taste’s multilayered temporality brings into focus 
the individual’s place in a gustatory genealogy stretching from Adam and Eve through 
Christ to the present moment. If Adam and Eve provided the archetypal model of how 
not to taste, Christ was often evoked as a paradigm of gustatory propriety, and physical 
acts of tasting in imitation of this exemplar could be appropriately pious.  If a sense that 
physical tasting is inherently fallen can be characterised as broadly Protestant, an interest 
in Christ’s status as ‘the most experienced and perfitt taster,’ as Robert Southwell puts 
it, is typical of Catholic writers.49 Ignatius of Loyola’s A manuall of devout meditations and 
exercises, translated by the Jesuit Henry More in 1618, advises moderation at the table by 
contemplating the Last Supper, emphasising its function as a typological figure of 
Christ’s self-sacrifice. In partaking of the paschal lamb, Ignatius writes, Christ was 
indicating his intention to ‘fullfill that ceremony of the Law, & for the accomplishing of 
the shadows and figures of the old law, be sacrificed as the true Lambe.’   Ignatius urges 
his readers to ‘consider, how christ our Lord did behold and contemplate that Lambe 
which he had before him on the table,’ seeing in it ‘himselfe represented more innocent 
                                                          
47 See, for example, Alice A Dailey, ‘Typology and History in Foxe’s Acts and Monuments,’ Prose Studies, 25/3 
(2002): 1-29. Steven Zwicker’s Dryden’s Political Poetry: The Typology of  King and Nation (Providence: Brown 
University Press, 1972) was influential in establishing this approach. 
48 Marcel Proust, In Search of  Lost Time, vol. 1, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and 
Andreas Mayor, revised by D. J. Enright. (London: Random House, 2005), 51-55. 
49 Robert Southell, An epistle of comfort to the reverend priestes (Paris [London]: John Charlewood [?], 1587), 
M8r (95). 
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then a lambe, and how without any his deserts, he was to be... put as it were upon the 
spit, & stretched on the table of the Crosse, where, with the hote burning coals of love, 
he was to be rosted to death.’ Ignatius goes on: 
 
Ponder how bitter this supper was unto thy Redeemer, being mingled with 
sauce of so distastfull a representation, as was that of his death and passion. 
 
Purpose, when thou sittest at table, to mingle thy meat with this sauce, to wit, 
with the consideration of the passion and paines of thy Saviour, that thou be 
not carried away with the gust and savour of the meat: and that if thy meat be 
not good, or not so well dressed or seasoned, or not in such due time prepared 
[as] thou wouldst, thou mayst have patience... & make thy spirituall profit 
therof.50 
 
With the evocative detail characteristic of his meditative method, Ignatius imagines 
Christ’s response as he sat to his final Passover meal: mingling the emblematic and the 
edible, the lamb vividly invokes Christ’s own incipient fate, and his experience of it is 
flavoured by the ‘bitter’ knowledge of his imminent death. The believer, Ignatius 
advises, should imitate Christ in this regard, blending and tempering pleasure in ‘the 
gust and savour’ of ‘thy meat’ with thoughts of Christ’s suffering. Conversely, the minor 
dissatisfactions of a bad meal must be accepted with a patience analogous to that of 
Christ on the cross: from this perspective, minor culinary disappointments become 
opportunities for ‘spirituall profit.’  
My suggestion that early modern diners experienced food in terms informed by 
scriptural precedents has implications for the way in which we understand the relation 
between the domestic and the divine in early modern culture. Both Caroline Walker 
Bynum and Matthew Milner refer to what Bynum calls ‘basic medieval attitudes toward 
food’ and Milner calls ‘secular feasts’ as interpretive contexts for Eucharistic 
experience.51 Bynum argues that the fact that ‘the [medieval] feast was a banquet for all 
the senses,’ involving music, elaborate visual displays and so on, ‘helps us to understand’ 
sources which describe the Eucharistic ritual in multi-sensory or synesthetic terms: 
‘given such assumptions about and expectations of food, it is small wonder that 
                                                          
50 Ibid., O7r-v (325-26). 
51 Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of  Food to Medieval Women 
(Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1987), 60. Milner, The Senses and the Reformation, 151. 
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medieval mystics considered sounds and sights as crucial to the Eucharistic banquet as 
eating.’ 52  Similarly, Milner references the trompe l’oeil cookery characteristic of 
aristocratic feasts in the sixteenth century as an explanatory background for the Catholic 
acceptance of the ‘sensory disjuncture... at the very heart’ of Eucharistic 
transubstantiation. 53  In both cases, worldly dining practices provide a rational 
explanatory framework for what, to modern scholars, are the more specious and bizarre 
features of devotional ritual experience. The influence, however, is mutual: in early 
modern culture, quotidian corporeal acts of tasting are imbued with spiritual 
significance.54  
Milner’s reference to the ‘sensory disjuncture’ which marked the Eucharistic 
ritual for Catholics demands some exposition. The question of the nature of the 
Eucharistic elements, and the most appropriate forms of ritual for their celebration, was 
of course one of the major theological battlegrounds of the Reformation and its 
aftermath. The conflict hinged on participants’ understandings of Christ’s words at the 
last supper: hoc est corpus meum, translated in the King James Version as ‘this is my 
body.’55 Following the fourth Lateran council of 1215, which ratified the doctrine of 
transubstantiation, most Catholics took this literally: the Eucharistic elements were 
supposed to be transformed by consecration into the actual body and blood of Christ. 
Making use of the Aristotelian distinction between substance (the essential nature of 
something) and accidents (including sensory qualities such as smell, texture, taste, and 
colour), medieval apologists for this doctrine – notably Aquinas – argued that the fact 
that the latter miraculously remained consistent with bread and wine was a divine 
concession to our revulsion at the idea of eating a human body.56 Such is the sensory 
disjuncture Milner refers to: what is perceived as bread and wine, is in fact body and 
blood.  
Protestants, on the other hand, usually argued that hoc est corpus meum must be 
taken metaphorically: the Eucharistic elements only represented, or symbolized, Christ’s 
body and blood. Subsequently, building on the Book of Common Prayer’s assertion, 
quoted earlier, that the communicant ‘spiritually eat[s] the flesh of Christ,’ polemicists 
                                                          
52 Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, 60. 
53 Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 151. 
54 Food culture thus participates in what a number of  scholars have identified as a Protestant impulse to 
collapse the boundaries between the secular and the sacred, infusing everyday life with devotional 
meaning. See Elizabeth Clarke, ‘Women in Church and in Devotional Spaces,’ in Laura Lunger Knoppers, 
ed., The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Women’s Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 110-23. 
55 Luke 22.9 (KJV). 
56 See Kimberly Johnson, ‘Crashaw’s Indigestible Poetics,’ Modern Philology 107/1 (2009): 49-50. 
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repeatedly highlight spiritual taste as the most appropriate means to apprehend Christ’s 
metaphorical body.57 As the clergyman and polemicist Daniel Featley insists in his 1638 
Transubstantiation exploded, ‘wee eate not Christs flesh in the Sacrament with the mouth, 
after a carnall manner, but onely by faith after a spirituall.’58 From this perspective, the 
mystery of the sacrament resided not in the gap between the substances and accidents 
of the elements, but in the gap between the bodily and spiritual senses of the percipient. 
A genuine alteration occurs, but it occurs in the believer, rather than in the elements 
themselves.59 
I have argued that – from the evidence both of scriptural commentary and 
material culture – physical tasting was conceived of and experienced as inherently fallen. 
Nonetheless, properly regulated and in some contexts, it could occasion spiritual self-
reflection and improvement. Conversely, in the context of the Eucharistic sacrament, 
spiritual tasting – understood as salvific – had a tendency to collapse back into the 
physical. The issue is complicated by the fact that, for Protestants, the physical senses 
were not entirely irrelevant to the Eucharistic ritual: indeed, they had a more prominent 
role than for their Catholic counterparts, for whom the sensory accidents of the 
elements were ontologically irrelevant. In particular, reformers argued that the physical 
sense of taste testified to the absurdity and impiety of the doctrine of transubstantiation. 
According to this logic, if the elements retain the appearance, smell, texture, and, most 
importantly, the flavour of bread and wine, then that is precisely what they are.60 To 
take just one example, in his 1608 A sermon preached in the cathedrall church of Yorke against 
popish transubstantiation, Thomas Dodson contended that: 
 
                                                          
57 On the spiritualisation of  Eucharistic tasting, see also Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 264. 
58 Daniel Featley, Transubstantiation exploded (London: G. Miller for Nicholas Bourne, 1638), F2r (99).  
59 Many Protestants claimed that their approach was not new. William Guild’s 1624 Three rare monuments of 
antiquitie, part of the Protestant effort to counter accusations of novelty by claiming distinguished 
precedents for reformist doctrine, includes an abridged translation of ‘De corpore et sanguine Domini,’ a 
tract on the Eucharistic elements written by the ninth-century monk Ratramnus. ‘Taste it,’ writes 
Ratramnus, of the Eucharistic wine, 
 
and it is Wine; smell it, and it savours Wine; looke to it, and you shall beholde the colour of 
Wine: But if it bee considered inwardlie in the minde, it tasteth not as Wine, but as the Blood of 
Christ, unto the Believers soules, and is acknowledged so while it is seene, and is approven while 
it is so smelled. 
 
Ratramnus, ‘De corpore et sanguine Domini,’ in Three rare monuments of antiquitie, trans. William Guild 
(Aberdeen: Edward Raban for David Melvill, 1624), C1r (33). 
60  See, for example, Featley, Transubstantiation exploded, E2v (76), and Thomas Gataker, A discussion of  the 
popish doctrine of  transubstantiation (London: John Legat for William Sheffard, 1624), C4v (18). 
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there is no mutation in the substance of [the elements] but onely in the use; I do 
for... proofe in this behalf, appeale to the outwarde senses: as, to the eyes, nose, 
mouth, taste, hands, and even to the reason of man, what it is, that wee do 
receive, when wee come at the feast of Easter, and at other times to the Lords 
table. Whereunto in answering if these senses jumpe and agree, that it is bread 
and wine consecrated to a holy and heavenly use; they verilie speake the truth 
and lye not, for there was never any transubstantiation and conversion of one 
substance into another, but the outwarde senses judged it to be so.61 
 
In their alacrity to affirm that the elements are no more than consecrated bread and 
wine, the senses ‘jumpe’ in agreement, refusing to ‘lye’: that is, both to deceive, and to 
remain prone. ‘Taste,’ in particular, stands out as the only sense which is directly named, 
rather than indicated metonymically by reference to the sense organs. 
As Milner acknowledges, in order to ratify their argument that the 
communicant’s sensory experience of the Eucharistic elements disqualifies the doctrine 
of transubstantiation, Protestant polemicists needed to bolster the accuracy and the 
reliability of the senses more generally. 62  Reformers had to prove, in the words of 
Cambridge Platonist Henry More, that ‘the outward Senses... are fit Judges touching 
sensible Objects.’63 Daniel Featley cites Tertullian, arguing that ‘you must not question the 
truth of your senses, lest thereby you weaken the sinewes of our faith... Were not the senses 
competent judges of their proper objects... Christ would never have appealed to them as 
hee doth. Behold my hands and my feet, that is, I my selfe, handle me and see....’64 Featley refers 
to Luke 24:39, in which Christ urges his sceptical disciples to accept the truth of his 
resurrection by using their senses to confirm his physical presence. As Thomas Gataker 
writes, ‘our Saviour himselfe teacheth us by... sense to judge.’65 In this way, Christ is 
supposed to offer divine sanction for the accuracy of the human senses, and the 
admissibility of their evidence regarding the nature of the world. The role which taste 
played in the experience of the Eucharistic sacrament for Protestants, then, was 
twofold: whilst spiritual taste apprehended Christ’s spiritual flesh and blood, physical 
taste focused on the flavours of bread and wine as ‘proof’ of the absurdity of 
                                                          
61  Thomas Dodson, A sermon preached in the cathedrall church of  Yorke against popish transubstantiation (London: 
H. Lownes for Mathew Lownes, 1608), C1r (9). 
62 Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 241. 
63 Henry More, A brief discourse of the real presence (London: Walter Kettilby, 1686), C1r (13). 
64 Featley, Transubstantiation exploded, E2v (76). 
65 Gataker, A discussion of  the popish doctrine, D1r (17). 
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transubstantiation. Milner reads the reformist emphasis on the trustworthiness of the 
senses as a guide to the nature of the Eucharistic elements as an aspect of a wider 
cultural move towards empirical epistemologies: reform, he writes, ‘rested solely on 
increasing legitimation of sensible realism to religious life and empirical accuracy to 
scripture.’66 But this is not the whole story. For some Protestant authors, the taste 
sensations attendant on Eucharistic ritual are significant not because they confirm, with 
proto-empirical accuracy, that the elements do not undergo a substantial 
transformation, but rather because they can illuminate apparently unrelated doctrinal 
issues. 
In his Contemplations upon the principall passages, Hall brings doctrine into dialogue 
with sensation in order to cast light on the former. Hall begins by considering Edenic 
arboriculture. ‘The tree of knowledge, and the tree of life,’ he claims, were placed in the 
garden in order that Adam might see ‘his Saviour before him; ere hee had need of a 
Saviour... after man had tasted of the tree of knowledge, hee might not taste of the tree 
of life: Yet then did he most savour that invisible tree of life, when he was most 
restrained from the other.’67 The trees offer Adam and Eve a proleptic reassurance, 
before the Fall has even occurred, that it will be redeemed by Christ, ‘that invisible tree 
of life,’ of whom the tree of life mentioned in Genesis is a typological symbol. Behind 
this lies the Augustinian notion of the Fall as felix culpa: what was lost to man when the 
primordial parents tasted of the tree of knowledge, is more than recompensed by 
mankind’s subsequent ability to ‘savour’ Christ in the Eucharistic elements. Hall 
describes this communion in intensely sensory terms:   
 
O Saviour, none but a sinner can rellish thee: My tast hath bin enough seasoned 
with the forbidden fruit, to make it capable of thy sweetnesse; Sharpen thou as 
well the stomacke of my soule by repenting as by beleeving, so shall I eate [and] 
in despight of Adam, live for ever.68 
 
Hall’s plea to Christ to ‘sharpen.... the stomacke of my soule’ frames the form of ‘tast’ 
involved in consuming the Eucharistic elements as spiritual, rather than physical. 
Simultaneously, however, his strikingly gustatory language of appreciative relishing, 
seasoning and sweetness, evokes the experience of worldly tasting. A familiar 
                                                          
66 Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 241. See also 246. 
67 Hall, Contemplations upon the principall passages, C8r (47). 
68 Ibid., C8r-C8v (47-48). 
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gastronomic phenomenon – that the tongue is more sensitive to sweetness after it has 
been ‘seasoned’ with something salty, bitter, or sour – expresses, in immediate and 
recognisable terms, the knotty theological concept of the Fall as felix culpa. The spiritual 
experience of tasting God, like the physical tasting of food, is intensified through the 
contrasts: the spiritual palate perceives the sweetness of the divine more intensely once 
it has been made keener by the bitterness of sin.  
For Hall, then, physical taste has a role to play in the Eucharistic ritual not because 
it verifies empirically the reformist conviction that the elements undergo no substantial 
change, but rather because the experience of taste provides a vivid and comprehensible 
way of articulating complex theological issues. As such, Hall’s way of thinking pushes in 
the opposite direction to that of most modern scholarship on religion and the senses, 
which typically explores how theological debates influenced the embodied, sensory 
experience of worship via transformations in ritual practice. Hall, however, is less 
interested in how doctrine informs the sensory experience of worship, than in how 
ideas about and experiences of sensation (particular, gustation) provide a set of terms 
for the negotiation and elaboration of key doctrinal issues.  
 
III. ‘ruminate and chew these things’ 
 
At this point, it should be clear that in early modern England both physical and spiritual 
taste were central to ritual experience, to domestic dining, and to the negotiation of 
doctrine. Simultaneously sacred and profane, taste provided a set of terms for 
navigating the postlapsarian human condition, similarly poised between perdition and 
grace. In this section, I consider more closely the role that taste played as a mode of 
religious knowledge, and in particular as a route to God. I bring some of the findings of 
my previous chapters to bear in order to consider the relation between ritual, scripture, 
and intuition as competing routes to knowledge of the divine, and the role which the 
language of taste played in defining and arbitrating between all three. What utility does 
‘taste,’ understood as a mode of literary discrimination, have when its object is not a 
secular poem, but the Gospel? Do taste’s associations with experiential immediacy hold 
when they are used to assert knowledge, not of human cadavers, but of the 
transcendent deity? 
Taste – indeterminately indicating corporeal and spiritual apprehension – is a 
central term in articulating the kind of experiential, affective knowledge of the divine 
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associated with faith in early modern England.69 This is the case across confessional 
divides: both John Calvin and Ignatius of Loyola use the language of taste to describe 
intimacy with God. Humility, Calvin claims in Arthur Golding’s 1567 translation A little 
booke of John Calvines, is a necessary precondition of religious wisdom: in order to have 
the ‘taste’ of ‘heavenly Philosophy,’ it is ‘requisite’ to have ‘a subdewed minde.’70  In 
contrast, those who are ‘voide of the feare of God... have no taste at all of the spirituall 
doctrine.’ At the other end of the confessional spectrum, for Ignatius, too, the 
apprehension of God is both predicated on passionate affect, and expressed using the 
language of taste.  In his A manuall of devout meditations, Ignatius insists that the 
‘understanding’ is ‘exercised’ in prayer only when one considers: 
 
those things which best may help to move the Will, pondering and as it were 
chewing them againe and againe by leasure to the end we may find our selves 
moved with the vertue and fruite included therein. For that which is not well 
chewed, is neither bitter nor sweet: and so neither Sinne, nor Death, nor 
Judgment, nor Hell it selfe, is bitter or loathsome unto the sinner, because he 
doth not ruminate and chew these things, but swalloweth them whole... 
 
Hence it is also, that we take no gust, nor have any feeling in the Misteries of 
the Incarnation, Passion, & Resurrection of Christ: because we doe not 
throughly ruminate & chew them. Let us therefore bruize and chew with our 
Understanding this graine of mustard seed, searching out the precious & divine 
vertue which therein is hidden, that is to say, within this holy and divine Mistery: 
and we shall see by experience that it doth not only heat and bite us, but also 
provoke and cause in us teares of devotion.71 
 
‘Gust,’ or taste, mediates between and unites the understanding and will, reasoned 
consideration and passionate affect. In ‘chewing’ over concepts such as sin, death, and 
judgement, the individual cultivates in him or herself a state of intense, transformative, 
affective awareness: he or she is moved away from ‘bitter’ vice, and the human will is 
aligned with the divine. Ignatius invokes Christ’s parable of the mustard seed: where the 
                                                          
69 Mary Carruthers comments that in Bernard of Clairvaux’s sermons, ‘tasting flavors is also a means of 
knowing, even knowing God.’ Carruthers, ‘Sweetness,’ 1001. 
70 John Calvin, A little booke of John Calvines, trans. Arthur Golding (London: H. Wykes for William Seres, 
1567), B5v (13).   
71 Ignatius, A manuall, B7r-v (37-38). 
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original focuses on scale, however, exploiting the contrast between the smallness of the 
seed and the large size of the plant in order to describe the kingdom of heaven, Ignatius 
shifts the emphasis to flavour.72 In this case, the mustard seed represents the mystery of 
Christ’s corporeal life: incarnation, passion, and resurrection. Ruminating on, or 
chewing, this mustard seed is an act of violence: it ‘bruize[s]’ it, a term that implicitly 
holds the meditating subject liable for some of the violence inflicted on Christ’s body 
during the passion.  Such violence, however, rebounds on the individual, who finds him 
or herself reciprocally subject to the ‘bite’ of the seed, its hot sapour provoking ‘teares 
of devotion.’ Pious contemplation of the divine, figured as a form of gustatory practice, 
physically transforms the subject’s body as it stimulates his or her passions.  
 Over the course of the seventeenth century, Ignatius’ meditative method proved 
influential across denominational boundaries.  Hall’s 1606 The art of divine meditation is 
notable in this respect: as Richard McCabe notes, the work ‘served to introduce 
continental contemplative methods to an English protestant readership.’73 Hall writes: 
 
After that the minde hath… traversed… throgh all the heads of reason, it shall 
indevour to find in the first place some feeling touch, & sweete rellish in that 
which it hath thus chewed …. In Meditation wee doe both see and taste; but we 
see before we taste: sight is of the understanding; taste, of the affection; Neither 
can we see, but we must taste; we can not knowe aright, but wee must needes 
bee affected…. Let the heart therefore first conceive and feele in it self the 
Sweetnesse or bitternesse of the matter meditated; which is never done without 
some passion…74 
 
For Hall as for Ignatius, the processes of ‘reason’ must be completed by a more direct, 
affective appreciation of the object of knowledge, effected through a chewing and 
tasting which provides access to the nature of ‘the matter meditated.’ Hall’s tortured 
syntax mirrors his convoluted negotiation of the temporal and epistemic priority of 
taste and affect, versus sight and intellection, and his ultimate refusal to promote one 
over the other. His initial statement, ‘we see before we taste,’ is complicated, rather than 
                                                          
72 For the parable of the mustard seed, see Mark 4:30-32, Matthew 13: 31-32, Matthew 17:20, Luke 13:18-
19, and Luke 17:6 (KJV). 
73 Richard A. McCabe, ‘Hall, Joseph (1574–1656),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 02 
March 2012, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11976. 
74 Joseph Hall, The arte of divine meditation (London: Humfrey Lownes for Samuel Macham and Mathew 
Cooke, 1606), G12v-H1v (150-52). 
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simply buttressed, by his subsequent statement, ‘neither can we see, but we must taste.’ 
The conjunction ‘but’ is ambiguous: overtly, it suggests that taste necessarily follows on 
from sight, but a secondary implication that taste is a necessary precondition of sight is 
retrospectively reinforced by Hall’s ensuing exhortation to ‘let the heart therefore first 
conceive and feele in it self the Sweetnesse or bitternesse of the matter meditated.’75 Taste 
and ‘affection,’ and sight and intellection, exist in a shifting and unstable hierarchical 
relation, in which precedence is ambiguous and negotiable. 
Drawing on the Protestant meditative tradition, George Herbert’s ‘The Agonie’ 
uses the opposition between affective taste and intellective sight to describe the forms 
of knowledge appropriate to ‘Sinne and Love,’ both of which are exemplified 
simultaneously in the crucifixion. Herbert advises anyone who wishes to ‘know’ sin to:  
 
...repair 
Unto Mount Olivet; there shall he see 
A man so wrung with pains, that all his hair, 
        His skinne, his garments bloudie be...76 (My emphasis) 
 
Knowledge of sin, Herbert advises, is attained through seeing. Specifically, it is attained 
through meditation on the spectacle of the crucified Christ: through noticing, as 
Herbert’s poem does, the visual details of his bloody hair, skin, and garments, and 
subsequently comprehending the sinfulness of those who condemned the son of God 
to death. In contrast, Herbert recommends: 
 
Who knows not Love, let him assay  
And taste that juice, which on the crosse a pike  
Did set again abroach; then let him say  
If ever he did taste the like.  
Love is that liquour sweet and most divine,  
Which my God feels as bloud; but I, as wine.77 (My emphasis) 
 
                                                          
75 The suggestion that affective taste must precede intellective sight has a precedent in the works of  
Bernard of  Clairvaux. See Fulton, ‘Taste and See,’ 192. 
76 George Herbert, The Temple (Cambridge: Thomas Buck and Roger Daniel, 1633), B3r (29). 
77 Herbert, The Temple, B3r (29). 
141 
 
Whereas knowledge of sin is associated with seeing, Herbert associates knowledge of 
divine love with tasting. Vision, of course, is a distal sense, whereas taste is a proximity 
sense: whilst sight maintains a safe distance between perceiving subject and the 
perceived object (in this case, sin), tasting is predicated on direct contact between 
subject and object (in this case, the blood or wine which manifest divine love). ‘The 
Agonie,’ then, recommends alternate forms of sensory engagement in order not only to 
describe, but to covertly prescribe, the nature and intensity of the reader’s engagement 
with sin and love: whilst the first may be apprehended and understood, but only at a 
distance, the second invites the more direct, experiential form of knowledge represented 
by the sense of taste.  
Herbert’s description of celestial love as liquour negotiates deftly the 
convolutions of the Eucharistic controversy: his invitation to the reader to ‘taste’ the 
blood which flows from the crucified Christ’s side flirts with Catholic dogma, even as 
his circumvention of the word ‘blood’ itself in favour of the non-committal ‘juice’ 
sidesteps transubstantiation.78 Herbert, then, roots the association between taste and 
experiential immediacy in ritual practice. This is also the case for Edward Reynolds, 
whose 1638 Meditations on the holy sacrament includes a call to readers to partake frequently 
and fully in the Eucharistic sacrament:   
 
we should use this pretious gift of Christ crucified, not to look on, but to eat, 
not with a gazing, speculative knowledge of him, as it were at a distance, but 
with an experimentall and working knowledge, none truly knowes Christ but he 
that feels him. Come taste and see saith the Prophet, how gracious the Lord is: in 
divine things, tasting goes before seeing, the union before the vision Christ must 
first dwell in us, before wee can know the love of God, that passeth knowledge.79  
 
Whereas Hall reserves judgement about whether taste or vision should be prioritized as 
a mode of religious knowledge, for Reynolds taste emerges as the clear victor in the 
epistemological clash between them, and this triumph is tied to the importance of the 
Eucharist as a source of  ‘experimentall and working knowledge’ about Christ.  
                                                          
78 Herbert’s precise place on the sliding scale between Laudianism and Puritanism is a matter of much 
debate. Whilst he acknowledges that ‘Herbert... no doubt saw himself in the tradition adumbrated by the 
Thirty-Nine Articles of the Elizabethan and Jacobean mainstream,’ Brian Cummings  stresses the 
distinctly Calvinist aspects of his thought. Brian Cummings, The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar 
and Grace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 319-27, especially 322. 
79 Edward Reynolds, Meditations on the holy sacrament (London: Felix Kingston for Robert Bostock, 1638), 
Ll3r (93). 
142 
 
In the meditative tradition, then, ‘taste’ as a term to describe a practical, 
experiential, and passionate form of religious knowledge is intimately associated with 
the ritual practice of sacramental tasting. For many Protestants of the ‘hotter’ sort, 
however, the Eucharistic sacrament remained suspiciously redolent of the Popish 
mass.80 Instead, reformers emphasised the authority and efficacy of the word of God.  
Indeed, even those more moderate Protestants who continued to affirm the Eucharist’s 
value as a means of communion with the divine stressed that the outward forms of 
ritual were no match for the divine word. The transition from bread and wine to 
scripture does not equate to a transition from the physical to the intellective or spiritual, 
however, for, following Origen, scripture itself was understood as incarnational: just as 
Christ embodied the word, the word embodied Christ.81 Protestantism’s status as a 
religion of the book, moreover, complicated the reformist adoption of the Pauline 
elevation of spirit over letter.82 In this context, anxieties about the materiality of the 
word – its reification as paper and ink – abounded.  
In his recent study of Protestant sermon culture, The Art of Hearing, Arnold 
Hunt highlights reformist concerns that the written word was a form of image, subject, 
like all images, to idolatrous misinterpretation.83 Many responded to this danger, he 
argues, by emphasising the importance of the spoken word, apprehended aurally, over 
the written word, apprehended visually. Consequently, influenced by Romans 10:17 
(‘faith cometh by hearing’), ‘many early modern Protestants were adamant that only the 
word preached – not the word read – could suffice for salvation.’84 In stressing the 
importance of hearing the word of God for many Protestants, Hunt’s research 
complicates a still-dominant scholarly presumption that the early modern period 
participated in a shift, originating in the medieval period but ‘accelerated’ by the 
invention of printing, from predominantly aural / oral cultures to predominantly visual 
/ literate cultures.85 Hunt’s own model, however, can be further nuanced if we attend to 
the ways in which both vision and hearing were themselves understood and experienced 
synaesthetically, as deeply imbricated with the apparently lower senses of touch, smell, 
                                                          
80 On hot Protestants, and on problems of  classification, see Ian Hugh Clary, ‘“Hot Protestants”: A 
Taxonomy of  English Puritanism,’ Puritan Reformed Journal 2 (2010): 41-66. 
81 On Origen’s notion that ‘the Word... is made flesh in scripture,’ see James Kearney, The Incarnate Text: 
Imagining the Book in Reformation England (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 244 n. 25. 
Kearney cites Origen’s Homilies on Leviticus (c.238-244 C.E.). Milner argues that the reformist move to 
replace the Eucharistic elements with scripture as the site of  ‘a corporeal real presence... [was] more than 
simply hermeneutic; it was very real and formal.’ Milner, The Senses and the English Reformation, 266 
82 See 2 Cor. 3:6 (KJV): ‘the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.’  
83 Hunt, The Art of  Hearing, 29. 
84 Ibid., 25. 
85 Ibid., 56-7.  
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and taste. For, in privileging the word over the elements as a site of divine presence, 
reformers did not discard the language of tasting and consuming; far from it. 
‘How sweet are thy words unto my taste!’ exclaims King David in the Psalms, 
‘yea, sweeter than honey to my mouth!’86 St Peter enjoins Christian converts to desire ‘the 
sincere milk of the word.’87 The prophets Ezekiel and John, meanwhile, describe visions 
of eating, respectively, a scroll and a book; in both cases, they find the repast ‘sweet’ to 
the mouth, but ‘bitter’ in the belly.88 ‘Doth not,’ a beleaguered Job asks, ‘the ear try 
words? And the mouth taste his meat?’89 All these scriptural examples imply that words 
– and in the case of King David, the divine Word – are fundamentally similar to food: 
both nourish, and both are assessed using the sense of taste. Drawing on these 
moments, Western Christianity developed a long and rich tradition of what might be 
called biblical bibliophagy: imagery which conflates reading the word of God with 
tasting and eating. In the middle ages, the four-stage Benedictine practice of lectio divina, 
or divine reading, was often compared to the stages of eating: lectio, or reading, 
corresponded to biting or tasting; meditatio or meditation to chewing; oratio or prayer to 
savouring and enjoying; and contemplatio, or contemplation, to digesting and absorbing.90 
In the early modern period, Protestants both radical and moderate continued to 
advocate the practice of lectio divina, and retained the alimentary rhetoric used to 
describe it. To take just one example, George Gascoigne advises in his 1576 The droomme 
of Doomes day that ‘even as the taste of the mouth doth discerne and taste everie morsell 
or péece of the bodily sustenaunce, whilest it cheweth and gnaweth it, even so the 
inwarde taste of the soule oughte in prayer and singing of Psalmes to marke and taste 
the sence of everye worde and sentence.’ 91  In Gascoigne’s formulation, Job’s 
comparison between the discerning ear and the discerning mouth is amalgamated with 
the doctrine of the spiritual senses: the ‘inwarde’ or spiritual taste ‘marke[s]’ or meditates 
on the holy words of the psalms.  
James Kearney offers one way to read the reformist use of bibliophagic images 
to describe devotional reading in relation to anxieties about the materiality of scripture, 
                                                          
86 Psalm 119:103 (KJV). 
87 1 Peter 2:2 (KJV). 
88 Rev. 10:9-10 and Ezekiel 3:1-3 (KJV).  
89 Job 11:12 (KJV). John Norden appropriates this association in A good companion: ‘yet is thine eare an 
excellent and necessary Organ, it tryeth words (as thy taste tryeth meat, and thy palat Wine) whether good 
or evill.’ Norden, A good companion, F5r (121). 
90 On lectio divina and its connection to physical acts of  eating, see Mary Carruthers, The Book of  Memory: A 
Study of  Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 204-212. 
91 Gascoigne, The droomme of  Doomes day, R8r. 
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and the threat of bibliolatry. 92 Kearney contends, somewhat counter-intuitively, that 
reformers used ‘the conceit that one could smell or taste the gospel not because they 
wanted to locate authority in the body, but because they wanted to illustrate that their 
response somehow bypassed the intellect... This kind of affective response to scripture 
authenticates one’s reading as the work of the spirit.’ 93  According to Kearney, the 
corporeal is a metaphor for the affective, which in its turn is opposed to the intellective. 
Gustatory and spiritual modes of reading are aligned only insofar as both are antithetical 
to intellectual, mental modes of reading: bodily metaphors attest, paradoxically, that 
‘one’s reading [is] the work of the spirit.’ In contrast, I want to emphasise how 
frequently the corporeal, the affective, and the intellective were conceived of and 
experienced as deeply imbricated. Biblical bibliophagy draws simultaneously on the 
sensory, the epistemological, and the spiritual connotations of ‘taste’ in order to 
describe a mode of reading which exercises every aspect of the tripartite self: body, 
mind, and soul. 
This is evident if we consider the ways in which the language of biblical 
bibliophagy is used to valorize the Protestant project of making scripture more widely 
available. In chapter 1, I argued that authors including Philip Sidney made use of the 
language of taste in order to defend vernacular poesy. Similarly, for both radical and 
moderate reformers, the association between the sense of taste and discriminative 
reading constitutes a crucial rhetorical tool in efforts to defend the notion that scriptural 
meaning is inherently lucid, and should be made accessible to the laity in the vernacular, 
without the need for clerical or learned exegesis. In his De Scandalis, for example, 
published in Arthur Golding’s English translation in 1567, Calvin builds on Matthew 
4:4, asserting that ‘the Gospell is the bread of life,’ and going on to coruscate those 
‘Papists’ who ‘scarre the siely people from taking any tast of the Gospell.’94 Calvin 
suggests that, like bread, scripture is a basic human need, shared by learned and ‘siely’ 
people alike. By suggesting that the gospel is apprehended by ‘tast,’ furthermore, Calvin 
draws on what, in chapter 1, I identified as taste’s democratic associations: if a 
discerning reading is rooted not in extensive education, but in physical sensation, then it 
is common both to the clergy and the laity.  
                                                          
92 As Kearney puts it, ‘for some the book became an emblem of the desire to transcend the merely 
material and irredeemably fallen world of objects, of things. At the same time, Reformers were suspicious 
of all human media, of the fallen material dimension of all representation... all that might be associated 
with the letter rather than the spirit.’ Kearney, Incarnate Text, 3. 
93 Ibid., 34. 
94 Calvin, A little booke, J4r, K4v (63, 73). 
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The translators’ address ‘to the reader’ which prefaces the King James Version 
attests to the cultural and political legitimacy of biblical bibliophagy. The address 
compares the ‘spiritual and sincere milk of the word’ to: 
 
...a whole paradise of trees of life, which bring forth fruit every month, and the 
fruit thereof is for meat, and the leaves for medicine. It is... a shower of 
heavenly bread sufficient for a whole host... it is a panary of wholesome food 
against fenowed traditions; a physician’s shop (as St Basil calls it) of 
preservatives against poisoned heresies...95 
 
The address to the reader departs from the model offered by Calvin in associating 
readerly consumption of the word with ritual consumption of the sacramental bread 
and wine. In describing the translation that the ‘address’ introduces as ‘a whole paradise 
of trees of life... a shower of heavenly bread [i.e. manna],’ this passage positions 
vernacular scripture both as a version of the Eucharist, and as a replacement for it. Like the 
elements, salutary scripture fulfils the promise made by the Old Testament ‘types’ of the 
tree of life and of manna, offering a redemptive antidote to the menaces of ‘fenowed’ 
(mouldy) traditions and ‘poisoned heresies.’ In this context, then, biblical bibliophagy 
serves to downplay the potentially radical implications of making gospel more widely 
accessible by associating reading scripture with older, more ritualistic forms of worship.  
The association of scripture with manna is an early modern commonplace. 
Palladis Tamia, for example, cites Origen’s warning that ‘as... Manna was wholesome 
foode unto some, and corruption and wormes unto others: so the same worde of God 
is salvation unto some, and destruction unto others.’96 Importantly, the analogy insists 
on the formative impact of the bodily state of the reader on his or her reception of 
gospel: both manna and scripture are either salubrious or hazardous, depending on the 
prior constitution of the recipient or reader. Pace James Kearney, the imagery of biblical 
bibliophagy positions the devout reader’s experience of scripture as concurrently 
discriminative, or intellective, affective, and corporeal. 
 
 
  
                                                          
95 Anon., ‘The Translators to the Reader,’ in The Bible: Authorised King James Version, with Apocrypha 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),  lvi.  
96 Meres, Palladis tamia, D7r (23). 
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IV. ‘his palate that could judge’ 
 
So far, I have argued that in post-Reformation England, taste, understood as 
indeterminately physical and spiritual, functions as a reminder of mortality and prompt 
to self-reflection; as a means to experiential intimacy with the divine in the context of 
the Eucharistic ritual; and as a term in the legitimization of vernacular scripture. If 
mankind can taste God, however, might the opposite also be true? In his 1652 
devotional epic Theophilia, the poet Edward Benlowes writes of Adam and Eve that ‘both 
taste, by tasting, tastlesse Both became.’97 Benlowe’s use of polyptoton both accentuates 
the instrumental role of taste in precipitating Adam and Eve’s downfall, and extends the 
action through history, as the simple present tense of ‘both taste’ is repeated as the 
present continuous ‘tasting.’ In tasting, Benlowes continues, Adam and Eve become 
‘tasteless’: a word that indicates both that they become devoid of the capacity to taste, 
and that they themselves become insipid, flavourless. Coversely, for the radical Essex 
minister John Smith, tasting the Eucharistic wine effected a change for the better in the 
sensory attributes of the communicant’s body: ‘a man having tasted of it,’ he claims, ‘it 
will make his very breath smell the sweeter for it.’ ‘The blood of Christ’ operates in the 
same way: ‘a man having tasted of it by faith, all his actions and all his thoughts will be 
full of the good taste, and good relish of the same.’98 
But who are Adam and Eve, and their descendants, tasteless or tasty to? We are 
very used to thinking of God’s omnipotence in terms of the comprehensive scope and 
penetrating acuity of the divine senses, but usually the emphasis is on God’s aural and 
visual supremacy: God is all-seeing and all-hearing. A number of early modern authors, 
however, suggest that God also makes use of the traditionally lower senses of smell and 
taste.99 In his An exposition uppon the v. vi. vii. chapters of Mathew, for example, included in 
his 1573 Works, William Tyndale argues that those who fast for self-serving reasons 
such as pride in their own piety are tasteless to God: ‘thy sacrifice were cleane without 
salt, & all together unsavery in the tast of God.’100 Blurring the line between spiritual 
                                                          
97 Edward Benlowes, Theophila (London: R.N. for Henry Seile, 1652), E1r (25). 
98 John Smith, Essex dove (1629), K5r (137). 
99 Potentially, this tendency might be understood as an aspect of  the reformist abjuration of  visual 
imagery. Psalm 115:4-7, an important source for debates about idolatry, reads: ‘Their idols are silver and 
gold, the work of  men’s hands. They have mouths, but they speak not: eyes have they, but they see not: 
They have ears, but they hear not: noses have they, but they smell not: They have hands, but they handle 
not.’ (KJV) The idol has something of  the nightmarish quality of  the automaton, fusing the appearance 
of  life with a lack of  senstivity, and thus of  vulnerability. Emphasising God’s sensitivity is therefore one 
way to define the divine against the dead image. 
100 William Tyndale, Robert Barnes, and John Frith, The whole workes of  W. Tyndall, John Frith, and Doct. 
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and physical tasting, Tyndale implies that there is a direct link between the individual’s 
physical tastes, and the ‘tast’ which God has of the individual.101  
On the face of it, this need not be controversial: earlier in this chapter, I cited 
Robert Southwell’s description of Christ as ‘the most experienced and perfitt taster,’ and 
in his Christological incarnation the trinitarian God would of course be expected to 
possess the full quota of human senses. Consideration of the 1616 A divine herball, a 
collection of sermons by the episcopal Calvinist clergyman Thomas Adams, however, 
reveals that a keen sense of smell and taste also belong to God in his transcendent, 
paternal manifestation: God the lawgiver and judge. 102  In his third sermon, Adams 
expounds on Hebrews 6:7, ‘the earth which drinketh in the rain that cometh oft upon it, 
and bringeth forth herbs meet for them by whom it is dressed, receiveth blessing from 
God.’103 His exegesis expands on the ‘meetness’ of the herbs produced by the earth – 
which represent those believers who drink in the ‘rain’ of God’s grace – by stressing 
their sensory qualities. In particular, Adams stresses that the herbs (that is, the believers) 
must ‘taste well’:  
 
Many a flower hath a sweet smell, but not so wholsome a taste. Your 
Pharisaicall prayers and almes smelt sweetly in the vulgar nosthrils: taste them, 
and they were but rue, or rather worme-wood. When the Pharise sawe the 
Publican in the lower part of the Temple, standing as it were in the Belfrey; he 
could cry, Foh this Publican: but when they were both tasted, by his palate that 
could judge, the Publican hath an herbe in his bosome, and the Pharise but a gay, 
gorgeous, stinking weede.104 
 
In a peculiar departure from scripture, Adams describes God’s arbitration between the 
Pharisee and the publican, recounted in Luke, as an act of tasting.105 Taste’s associations 
with discrimination are apotheosized as divine judgement: the capacity to discriminate 
between adherence to ritual forms, and genuine faith.   
                                                                                                                                                                    
Barnes (London: John Daye, 1573), Ff5r (229). 
101 Matthew Milner comments on a pervasive belief  that the believer must be ‘seasoned by the salt of  
faith. [The Eucharist] was a meal where both God and communicant were both feast and feaster...’ The 
Senses and the English Reformation, 152.  
102 For Adams’ episcopal Calvinism, see J. Sears McGee, ‘Adams, Thomas (1583–1652)’, Oxford Dictionary 
of  National Biography, accessed 01 August 2012, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/131. 
103 Heb. 6: 7 (KJV). 
104 Thomas Adams, A divine herball (London: George Purslowe for John Budge, 1616), K1r-K1v (65-66). 
105 See Luke 18:9-14.  
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At moments, Adams’ insistence on a sensing deity slips into bathos: to God, 
Adams suggests, ‘A good life is a good sallet... the true Gods diet, is the vertues of his 
Saints... Faith, love, patience, meeknes, honestie; these dishes are his dainties.’106 God, 
Adams imagines, similarly has an intensely sensory response to sin. Whilst ‘man is 
naturally delighted with pleasant savours, and abhorres noisome and stinking smels,’ 
God is even more susceptible to olfactory stimulation: ‘our God hath purer nosthrils, 
and cannot abide the polluted heapes of iniquities.’107 In the third sermon, human virtue 
and vice emerge as sensible, subject to the perceptual acuity of a deity with eyes, palate, 
and even nostrils. God’s perception might be inherently spiritual, but in Adam’s 
description it also has distinctly corporeal aspects.  
Adam’s portrayal of a deity who is partial to a nice salad also presents us with a 
somewhat epicurean God. Augustine’s Confessions, too, implies at points a God who is 
susceptible to the pleasures of the table. In a discussion of Luke 15:7 (‘joy shall be in 
heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, 
which need no repentance’), Augustine draws a parallel between God’s pleasure at the 
conversion of a sinner, and the drinker’s pleasure in quenching a painful thirst.108 ‘There 
is no pleasure in eating and drinking’ he asserts, 
 
unlesse the pinching of hunger and thirst goe before it. The Drunkards eate 
certaine salt meats, with purpose to procure a thirstie hotnesse in the mouth, 
which whilest the drinke quenches, the pleasure is procured.109 
 
The suggestion that the pleasures of eating and drinking are enhanced by the natural 
rhythms of abstention and consumption – the necessary gaps between meals which 
allow hunger and thirst to develop – slides into a more artificial cultivation of gustatory 
pleasure, in the image of the drunkard who procures thirstiness intentionally to heighten 
his enjoyment of drinking. God’s pleasure in the conversion of the sinner is similarly 
epicurean, a relish which draws its intensity from the relief of an intentionally cultivated 
self-deprivation.  
 
 
                                                          
106 Adams, A divine herball, K1r (65). 
107 Ibid., I4r (63). 
108 Augustine, Confessions, T10r (227). 
109 Ibid., T11v-T12r (230-31). 
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V. ‘sweet sins’ 
 
Above, I argued that, understood as the incarnate word, scripture demanded a mode of 
reading which blended spiritual receptivity, mental acuity, and physical sensitivity. The 
vocabulary of taste – with its traditional associations with intimate, experiential 
knowledge of the divine, with discrimination and judgement, and of course with 
corporeal gustation – provided a way to describe and advocate this form of reading. As 
always, however, this promising association of embodied and redemptive readerly 
interpretation of scripture had a diabolical twin: fallen, corrupt readerly tasting. If 
scripture could serve as a locus for real presence, then conversely, secular literature 
could be akin to the forbidden fruit of knowledge; and readerly gustation could have 
similarly catastrophic consequences.110  
The language of sweetness is important here. Augustine’s suggestion that the 
conversion of a sinner is a culinary event for God, resonates with his descriptions of his 
own particular conversion in terms of taste. On the one hand, Augustine opposes the 
sourness or bitterness of a heathen life to the sweetness of Christian faith; on the other, 
he opposes the corrupt sweetness of sin to the pure sweetness of virtue. He also uses 
the language of sweetness to map both his confessional conversion from the intellectual 
temptations of Manichaeism to the rectitude of Christianity, and his moral conversion 
from the carnal delights of his mistress to devout chastity. The erotic pleasures to which 
he is susceptible are a form of ‘deadly sweetnesse’; conversely, God is ‘my most sweet 
God,’ ‘the onely assured sweetnesse,’ a ‘sweete light,’ and ‘secure sweetnesse.’111 The 
moment of conversion is thus described as a transformation not of bitter to sweet, but 
of types of sweetness: 
 
How pleasant was it all on the sudden made unto me, to want the sweets of those 
Toyes? Yea, what I before feared to lose, was now a joy unto me to forgoe. For 
thou didst cast them away from me, even thou that true & chiefest sweetnesse. 
Thou threwest them out, and instead of them camest in thy selfe, sweeter than all 
pleasure, though not to flesh and blood...112 
 
                                                          
110 Here, I use ‘secular literature’ to refer to literature written by laypeople, which may or may not have a 
religious theme.  
111 Augustine, Confessions, P6v (324), V3v (438), Dd12v (624), Ee1r (625). 
112 Ibid., Y4r (407). 
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Sweetness is highly over-determined, indicative at once of deep spiritual danger and the 
most profound virtue. 
Augustine’s sense of the profound moral duality of sweetness is also widely in 
evidence in early modern devotional discourse; and early modern writers similarly use 
the language of sweetness to articulate and negotiate confessional identity. We have 
seen ample evidence of reformist uses of sweetness to indicate pious intimacy with the 
divine: the chapter is saturated with examples, from Du Bartas’ dulcet depiction of 
paradise onwards. Conversely, however, sweetness could have strongly Catholic 
associations. Sweetness was central to the devotional culture of medieval England: 
scholars including Caroline Walker Bynum, Mary Carruthers, Rachel Fulton, and 
Richard Newhauser have documented its ubiquity in monastic and mystical writings, 
and its importance to female piety in particular.113 In the early modern period, notorious 
Catholic converts including Robert Southwell and Richard Crashaw consciously and 
skilfully maintain this tradition: their verse is dense with voluptuous descriptions of the 
intense sweetness of Christ’s blood, sweat, and tears.  
Reformists, then, might be expected to eschew the language of sweetness as part 
of the project of overturning the sensual indulgences of the old faith. As we have seen, 
they do not do so. 114  In some cases, however, they do utilise it in order to align 
Catholicism with the kinds of self-indulgent erotic sweetness which Augustine 
eventually abjured; a pejorative association between Catholicism and confectionary is a 
common feature of reformist polemic. Tyndale’s An exposition, for example, paints a 
picture of ‘the Pope’s fast’ which employs the saccharine in service of the savagely 
satirical. The pontiff eschews ‘fleshe,’ Tyndale acknowledges, only ‘to banquet with... all 
maner of fruits and confections, marmelad, Succad, Grenegynger, comffettes, 
sugerplate, with malmesay & romney burnt with suger, Synamond & cloves, with 
bastarde, Muscadell and Ipocrasie.’ 115 Tyndale’s pointed punning – which aligns the 
sweet Spanish wine bastarde with illegitimacy, and the spiced wine hippocras with 
hypocrisy – extends the accusation of gluttony into an allegation of sexual licentiousness 
                                                          
113 See Bynum, Holy Feast; Carruthers, ‘Sweetness’; Fulton, ‘Taste and See’; Richard Newhauser, ‘John 
Gower’s Sweet Tooth,’ Review of  English Studies 64 (forthcoming, 2013). Advanced access at 
10.1093/res/hgt027. Accessed 01 May 2013. 
114 Peter Marshall notes – specifically in regard to Henrician ‘evangelicals’ – most reformers ‘seem to have 
had few qualms about this adjective.’ Marshall’s cautiousness, evident in his qualifier and his tentative 
litotes, is belied by his examples: he collates a plethora of instances of reformers enthusiastically 
employing the language of sweetness in order to describe a transformative encounter with vernacular 
scripture. Marshall, ‘Evangelical Conversion in the Reign of Henry VIII,’ in Marshall and Alex Ryie, eds. 
The Beginnings of English Protestantism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 26-27.  
115 Tyndale, Workes, Ff5r (299). 
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and duplicity. In the following century, Andrew Marvell’s ‘Upon Appleton House,’ 
written around 1651, describes the seduction of one of Thomas Fairfax’s ancestors, the 
heiress Isabel Thwaites, by the inhabitants of the Catholic convent at Nunappleton.116 A 
nun enumerates the sensory pleasures of convent life in terms highly reminiscent of the 
erotic banquet of the senses trope, and the penultimate sense she elaborates on is taste: 
    
… Here pleasure piety doth meet. 
One perfecting the other Sweet. 
So through the mortal fruit we boil 
The Sugars uncorrupting Oil: 
And that which perisht while we pull, 
Is thus preserved clear and full… 
 
…Balms for the griv’d we draw; and pasts 
We mold, as Baits for curious tasts. 
What need is here of Man? unless 
These as sweet Sins we should confess.117 
 
In the nun’s sibilant, insinuating couplets, culinary trickery replaces virtuous action: the 
nuns ‘boil… Sugars uncorrupting Oil’ through the ‘mortal fruit’ which inevitably recalls 
that tasted by Adam and Eve, preserving as sweetmeats what they should reject as 
poison, in lieu of the preservation of their own souls. The virtuous labour of drawing 
salutary ‘balms’ for the afflicted segues into frivolous efforts to form pastes into 
attractive shapes to entice over-refined tastes. In the context of the previous stanza’s 
image of fruits which are already ‘perisht’ even as they are pulled from the tree, the 
nuns’ ‘mold[ing]’ of pastries accrues shadowy connotations of decay as well as of artistic 
shaping. Spiritual rottenness is made manifest as the effort to stimulate a jaded palate, 
and the nun concludes by undermining her own initial association between sweetness 
and licit pleasure: in the final instance, it is sin, not ‘piety,’ which is ‘Sweet.’ Marvell 
portrays sinful lasciviousness, sweetness, and Catholicism in an alluring but ultimately 
deadly cinch.   
                                                          
116 Blair Worden argues for a 1651-52 composition date in Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John 
Milton, Andrew Marvell, Marchamont Nedham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 400. 
117 Andrew Marvell, ‘Upon Appleton House,’ in Miscellaneous poems (London: Robert Boulter, 1681), N1v 
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Sweetness, then, occupies a somewhat paradoxical position in reformist 
discourse: it is simultaneously a marker of pious intimacy with God, and of (often 
papist) sensuality. Much of George Herbert’s poetry confronts this inconsistency head-
on. Herbert presents himself as engaged in an effort to wrest the affective power of 
what ‘The Forerunners’ calls ‘sweet phrases, lovely metaphors’ away from the ‘stews 
and brothels’ of secular (especially erotic) poetry, and reclaim it for devotional verse. 
Addressing language directly, Herbert goes on:   
 
Lovely enchanting language, sugar-cane, 
Honey of  roses, whiter wilt thou fly?... 
... Wilt thou leave the church, and love a sty?118 
 
In ‘The Forerunners’ the sinful sweetness of desire is mingled with the sweetness of the 
language that describes it. Secular poetry is infected by its lascivious subject matter.  
Amelia Lanyer’s long devotional poem Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum (1611) is, 
amongst other things, a sustained examination of the vexed but immensely fertile 
relations between sweetness, sensuality, the pleasures of poetry, and devotional 
experience.119 It is important to establish that whilst, in the early modern period, there 
was some debate about how to distribute blame for the Fall, it was generally accepted 
that it was Eve, not Adam, who first tasted the forbidden fruit, and whose hubristic 
hunger resulted in the Fall of mankind.120 In the poem, Lanyer offers to exculpate Eve 
both by emphasising her role as the antitype of Mary, bearer of the ‘sweet foode’ of 
Christ, and by declaring the insignificance of Eve’s fault in comparison to the 
exclusively male (according to Lanyer) sin of the crucifixion.121 In order to claim his 
kind of exegetical authority, however, Lanyer must first confront her relation to Eve’s 
appetites. In particular, Lanyer must negotiate the possibility that, in the very act of 
writing and publishing, she demonstrates a level of ambition commensurate with Eve’s 
original sin.   
                                                          
118 Herbert, ‘The Forerunners,’ in The Temple, H2v (171). 
119 For an account of Salve Deus that reads the poem with a different sensory emphasis, as a ‘feminine re-
conception of seeing, reading, and believing which clashed with contemporary patriarchal ideas of vision 
and cognition,’ see Yaakov Mascetti, ‘“Here I have prepar’d my Paschal Lambe”: Reading and Seeing the 
Eucharistic Presence in Aemilia Lanyer’s Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum,’ Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and 
the History of Ideas 9/1 (2011): 1-15. 
120 Some commentators argued that Adam’s culpability exceeded Eve’s, as he received the prohibition 
directly from God, whereas she received it indirectly, from Adam. See Almond, Adam and Eve, 195-96.  
121 Amelia Lanyer, Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum (London: Valentine Simmes for Richard Bonian, 1611), H1r.. 
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In a long dedicatory poem ‘To the Queenes most Excellent Majestie,’ Lanyer 
manipulates what she anticipates will be the reader’s unease at the extraordinary 
spectacle of a women writing and publishing ‘of divinest things’ (l.4):  
 
Behold, great Queene, faire Eves Apologie,  
Which I have writ in honour of your sexe,  
And doe referre unto your Majestie,  
To judge if it agree not with the Text:  
And if it doe, why are poore Women blam’d,  
Or by more faultie Men so much defam’d?  
 
And this great Lady I have here attired,  
In all her richest ornaments of Honour,  
That you faire Queene, of all the world admired,  
May take the more delight to looke upon her:  
For she must entertaine you to this Feast,  
To which your Highnesse is the welcom’st guest.122  
 
The imperative ‘Behold, great Queene, faire Eves Apologie’ is syntactically ambiguous: 
the possessive ‘Eves Apologie’ primarily presents the poem as an apology for Eve, but 
also admits the possibility that the apology is by Eve, aligning her with Lanyer as the 
poem’s author. This suggestion is compounded in the next stanza, which presents Salve 
Deus as a feast presided over by Eve: ‘she must entertaine you to this Feast, / To which 
your Highnesse is the welcom’st guest.’ Lanyer tacitly, but audaciously, conflates herself 
as author/host with Eve, and her poem with the forbidden fruit: in proffering it for 
readerly consumption, she momentarily places her royal addressee (and subsequent 
readers) in the position of Adam, subject to a terrible temptation.  The promise to 
redeem Eve, and consequently women more generally, from the blame and defamation 
of ‘more faultie Men,’ is momentarily compromised by Lanyer’s evocation of Eve’s 
error.  
The succeeding stanza, however, glosses the poetic ‘feast’ over which Eve 
presides in such a way as to disrupt the reader’s premature associative linking of that 
feast with the prohibited fruit: 
                                                          
122 Lanyer, Salve Deus, A4r. 
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For here I have prepar’d my Paschal Lambe,  
The figure of that living Sacrifice;  
Who dying, all th’ Infernall powres orecame,  
That we with him t’Eternitie might rise:  
This pretious Passeover feed upon, O Queene...123 
 
Lanyer identifies the feast of the poem as the feast of the Passover, and hence as a type 
of the Eucharistic feast which represents Christ’s ‘living Sacrifice.’ Lanyer’s initial 
association of Salve Deus with the forbidden fruit is superseded by this subsequent 
identification of it as proto-Eucharistic Passover. The effect of the transition is 
exacerbated in the 1611 edition, in which the stanza break between the invitation to the 
‘Feast’ of the poem, and the poem’s identification with the paschal lamb, corresponds 
to the end of the recto page.124 The shift from implied sin to confirmed grace, then, 
corresponds to a break in the reader’s experience of the poem: a break which is 
experienced both as a narrative pause, and as a physical action – turning over a new leaf 
– which, in the seventeenth century as today, had proverbial associations with spiritual 
and moral renewal.125 
 In offering the reader two alternative images of the collection it introduces, and 
endorsing the second, ‘To the Queenes most Excellent Majestie’ attempts to elicit a 
particular interpretive mood in its readers. In particular, Lanyer hints that Salve Deus 
should be consumed in a sacramental spirit: one which recognises the poem as a vehicle 
of grace. This cultivation of a sacramental hermeneutic is elaborated, in part, through 
Lanyer’s use of the terms of sweetness. In her poem ‘The Authors Dreame to the Ladie 
Marie, the Countesse Dowager of Pembrooke,’ Lanyer dedicates Salve Deus to Mary Sidney: 
 
 
...to this Lady now I will repaire,  
Presenting her the fruits of idle hours;  
Thogh many Books she writes that are most rare,  
Yet there is hony in the meanest flowers:  
                                                          
123 Ibid., A4v (4). 
124 Ibid., A4r-v (3-4).  
125 The OED cites Holinshed’s The firste volume of  the chronicles of  England, Scotlande, and Irelande: ‘he must 
turne the leafe, and take out a new lesson, by changing his former trade of  living into better..’ ‘Leaf, n.1.’ 
OED Online, accessed 22 June 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/106624.  
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Which is both wholesome, and delights the taste: 
Though sugar be finer, higher priz’d,  
Yet is the painfull Bee no whit disgrac’d,  
Nor her faire wax, o[r] hony more despiz’d.126 
 
In a move reminiscent of the authors discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis, Lanyer 
employs the bee trope in order to direct the reader’s response to the ‘fruits’ of her 
poem: even the ‘meanest flowers,’ she claims with conventional humility, offer 
wholesome and delightful sweetness to the discerning reader’s ‘taste.’127 In establishing 
this association between sweet tastes and readerly virtue, Lanyer prepares the reader for 
the deeply eroticised blazon of Christ which forms the climax of Salve Deus itself: 
 
This is that Bridegroome that appeares so faire,  
So sweet, so lovely in his Spouses sight... 
 
His lips like skarlet threeds, yet much more sweet  
Than is the sweetest hony dropping dew,  
Or hony combes, where all the Bees doe meet.... 
 
Sweet holy rivers, pure celestiall springs,  
Proceeding from the fountaine of our life;  
Swift sugred currents that salvation brings... 
 
This hony dropping dew of holy love,  
Sweet milke, wherewith we weaklings are restored,  
Who drinkes thereof, a world can never move,  
All earthly pleasures are of them abhorred.128 
 
                                                          
126 Lanyer, Salve Deus, D3r. 
127 Kim Hall argues that the passages shows that ‘there would have been a keen awareness of  the process 
of  making sugar since the entire metaphor rests on the distinction between honey, a “natural product,” 
and sugar, which results from... African labour.’ Kim F. Hall, ‘Culinary Spaces, Colonial Spaces: The 
Gendering of  Sugar in the Seventeenth Century,’ in Valerie Traub, M. Lindsay Kaplan, and Dympna 
Callaghan, eds., Feminist Readings of  Early-Modern Culture: Emerging Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 177. 
128 Lanyer, Salve Deus, F2r. and G4r. 
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Christ’s superlative sweetness is sacramental, as well as sensual: the ‘swift sugred 
currents’ of his blood convey ‘salvation.’ Simultaneously, however, Lanyer’s depiction 
of Christ’s body as a feast of sweet things – ‘where all the Bees doe meet’ – recalls her 
presentation of her poem as a literary feast, yielding ‘hony’ to the reader’s ‘taste.’ The 
blazon of Christ – the ‘lamb’ of God – integrates the sweetness of sacramental tasting 
with the sweetness of poetry, suggesting that just as partaking of the ‘Nectar and 
Ambrosia’ of Christ’s body is salvific, so too can a judicious tasting of the ‘Passover’ 
feast of poetry prove redemptive. Lanyer employs images of honey, and sugar in order 
to frame a causal association between sacramental virtue and hermeneutic virtuosity. 
 
VI. ‘how sweet a thing grace is’ 
 
So far, I have argued that taste as a mode of religious knowledge is used in two 
main ways by early modern Protestants. Whereas more moderate reformers use the 
language of taste to position Eucharistic ritual as a route to experiential intimacy with 
the divine, others use the language of taste to valorize vernacular scripture as the 
primary locus of divine presence. As the seventeenth century progressed, however, yet 
more radical forms of Protestantism emerged; and with them, the idea that an 
individualistic, experiential faith takes precedence, not only over the dogma of 
organized religion and ritual, but in some cases also over the word of God itself, as a 
route to salvation. Here, too, the language of sweetness has a part to play. In his Ohel or 
Beth-shemesh (1653), the fifth monarchist John Rogers makes extensive use of the 
language of taste to elevate the direct experience of God putatively gained through 
prayer and contemplation over knowledge gained from works of religious instruction. 
In a section on the uses of such spiritual testimony, Rogers writes: 
 
…if so be ye have tasted how gracious the Lord is… not onely taken grace (for so many 
do) but tasted grace (per metonymiam effecti) and found experimentally feelingly, 
feedingly how it tastes: O then, you will say, O it is good! O this is sweet! and say to 
others, Come and taste!129 
 
Like many of the more moderate Protestants quoted in this chapter, Rogers draws on 
Psalm 34:8 in order to highlight the utility of taste as a route to experiential intimacy 
                                                          
129 John Rogers, Ohel or Beth-shemesh (London: R.I. and G. and H. Eversden, 1653), Zz3r  (357).  
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with God. For Rogers, however, the chief object of devotional taste is neither the 
Eucharistic elements, nor the word of God, but ‘grace’ itself.130 Rogers goes on to use 
the language of sweetness in order to advocate a form of faith unshackled from 
scripture:  
 
Now as a Physitian findes those secrets (and oftentimes excellent things) by his 
practise and experience which hee could never attain unto by all his reading or 
search, or study out of books, or out of others mouth; so I say, many sweet Christians by 
experience finde and feed on that sweetnesse and excellency of the love of God in Christ, 
which the greatest Rabbies or learnedst alive cannot acquire or attaine by reading books, 
Scriptures or the like, so that experience teaches more, and better then all.... And 
one that hath tasted honey, and fed on it, knowes better the sweetnesse of it, then 
one that never tasted it, but onely can tell it is sweet by reading (not by eating)...131  
 
For Rogers, genuine faith must stem not from ‘reading books, Scriptures or the like,’ but 
from direct, affective ‘practise and experience.’ In order to drive the point home, he uses 
the example of honey as an analogy: just as its sweetness is indescribable, and must be 
experienced to be known, so too does the experience of God’s grace evade language. In 
this, Rogers is not alone: the notion that the sweetness of honey evades the second-
hand authority of language, and is analogous to the sweetness of divine grace, is 
axiomatic. Similar examples abound in early modern devotional discourse: amongst 
them, Robert Harris’ 1632 The way to true happinesse affirms that ‘a man by discourse can 
never possibly perswade another of the sweetnesse of honey so fully as if himselfe did 
tast it.’ Equally, Harris goes on, ‘it cannot be told how sweet a thing grace is.’132 Or, in 
the words of Richard Younge in his 1638 The Drunkards Character: ‘what is the notionall 
sweetnesse of honey, to the experimentall tast of it?’133 Sweetness is apposite to describe 
the experience of God, and particularly of God’s grace, precisely because it evades full 
articulation: God’s goodness cannot be spoken, only tasted.134 
                                                          
130 Rogers draw heavily on the works of  the Protestant controversialist William Ames, who similarly 
writes that ‘the taste of  the faithful is of  grace.’ An analyticall exposition of  both the epistles of  the Apostle 
(London: E.G. for John Rothwell, 1641), F1r (41). 
131 Rogers, Ohel, Ddd1r (385). 
132 Robert Harris, The way to true happinesse (London: R. Badger[?] and John Beale for John Bartlet, 1632). 
133 Richard Younge, The drunkard’s character, N6r (187). 
134 This has precedents in earlier reformist discourse: in the dedication of  his translation of  Musculus’ 
Common places of  Christian religion, for instance, John Man writes that ‘my selfe doe dailye feele and enjoy 
for my parte the most sweete taste of  [God’s] unspeakable goodnese.’  Man, dedicatory epistle in 
Musculus, Common places of  Christian religion (London: Reginald Woolfe, 1563), ¶2r. 
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In some cases, then, the language of sweetness is used to actively deny biblical 
bibliophagy’s basic premise that scripture is a site of divine presence, and can offer an 
authentic and immediate experience of God. The Leveller and ranter Albiezer Coppe 
was amongst those who rejected the dictates of both ecclesiastical and scriptural 
authority.135 For Coppe, his own spiritual experiences were sufficient assurance that he 
was numbered amongst the elect. Coppe’s confident conviction of his own salvation, 
and concomitant rejection of conventional means of knowing God, is encapsulated in 
an episode, recounted in his 1650 A fiery flying roll, which takes biblical bibliophagy to an 
extreme, claiming a contemporary reality for the eschatological book-eating described in 
Ezekiel and Revelations. 
A fiery flying roll is an extraordinary account of Coppe’s experience of spiritual 
death and rebirth. In the preface, Coppe describes his sense of being ‘utterly plagued, 
consumed, damned, rammed, and sunke into nothing.’136 Coppe calls on God: ‘what 
wilt thou do with me[?]’ God assures Coppe: ‘I will take thee up into mine everlasting 
Kingdom,’ warning him however that ‘thou shalt (first) drink a bitter cup, a bitter cup, a 
bitter cup; wherupon (being filled with exceeding amazement) I was throwne into the 
belly of hell.’137 Coppe spends, he claims, four days and nights in this state, subject 
throughout to ‘visions and revelations of God.’138 Towards the end of this spiritual 
crisis, he hears one voice in particular, urging him to: 
 
Go up to London, to London, that great City, write, write, write. And behold I 
writ, and lo a hand was sent to me, and a roll of a book was therein, which this 
fleshly hand would have put wings to, before the time. Whereupon it was 
snatcht out of my hand, & the Roll thrust into my mouth; and I eat it up, and 
filled my bowels with it, where it was as bitter as worm-wood; and it lay broiling, 
and burning in my stomack, till I brought it forth in this forme.139 
 
Coppe’s vision, as he acknowledges, replicates in some respects that of the prophet 
Ezekiel. As in Ezekiel, the vision of being forced to eat ‘a roll of a book’ initiates the 
prophet’s proselytization to a nation (in Ezekiel’s case, the Israelites, and in Coppe’s, 
                                                          
135 On Coppe’s radicalism, see Ariel Hessayon, ‘The Making of  Abiezer Coppe,’ Journal of  Ecclesiastical 
History 62/1 (2011): 38-58. 
136 Abiezer Coppe, A fiery flying roll (London, 1650), A2v.  
137 Ibid., A2v-A3r. 
138 Ibid., A3v. 
139 Ibid., A3v. 
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England).140 Coppe, however, departs from his source in presenting the text which the 
reader holds as a regurgitated version of the scroll he is compelled to consume. The 
visionary scroll is transformed, by Coppe’s (truncated) digestion of it, into the material 
book. Coppe uses the bibliophagic model offered by Ezekiel in order to transgress the 
boundaries both between Old Testament and contemporary experience, and between 
visionary prophecy, and the phenomenal world of mid-seventeenth-century England.141 
If we can assume the scroll represents scripture, furthermore, then his ingestion of it 
represents an act of violent defiance: as he has been ‘consumed’ by the intensity of his 
spiritual visions, he is able to ‘consume’ (in the sense both of eat, and destroy) scripture, 
replacing it with a work written by himself, and recounting his own experiences.  
 
VII.  ‘by experience tasted’ 
 
On 1st May 1687, Janet Fraser, daughter of a Scottish weaver, went out into the fields 
with a female companion to read the bible. Leaving to get a drink of water, she left the 
bible open. Robert Chambers, author of Domestic Annals of Scotland from the Reformation to 
the Revolution, recounts what ensued: 
 
On returning she found a patch of something like blood covering the very text. 
In great surprise, she carried the book home, where a young man tasted the 
substance with his tongue, and found it of a saltless or insipid flavour. On the 
two succeeding Sundays, while the same girl was reading her Bible in the open 
air, similar blotches of matter, like blood, fell upon the leaves.142 
 
The anonymous young man’s tasting of the matter which stains Fraser’s bible 
constitutes a moment in which the metaphor of tasting or consuming scripture is 
                                                          
140 See Ezekiel 3:1-11 (KJV). 
141 This erasure of the line between between millenarian prophecy and materiality is also present in the 
imprint to A fiery flying roll, which proclaims the book was ‘imprinted at London, in the beginning of that 
notable day, wherein the secrets of all hearts are laid open; and wherein the worst and foulest of villanies, 
are discovered, under the best and fairest outsides.’ The millenarian message of A fiery flying roll infiltrates 
its bibliographic information, troubling the membrane between sacred and secular time. As such, it 
chimes with Helen Smith’s assertion that early modern imprints ‘operate within generic conventions 
which, read carefully, reveal imprints to be fictive engagements with a suprising range of literary and 
cultural concerns.’ Smith, ‘“Imprinted by Simeon such a signe”: Reading Early Modern Imprints,’ in 
Smith and Wilson, Renaissance Paratexts, 17.  
142 Robert Chambers, Domestic Annals of Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution, vol. 2 (Edinburgh and 
London, 1859), 487-88, UK Reading Experience Database, accessed 15 August 2011, 
www.open.ac.uk/Arts/reading/UK/record_details.php?id=21264. 
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literalized, whilst the comparison of the ‘matter’ to  ‘blood,’ and the implication that its 
origin is divine, suggests a sacramental dimension. That the first instinct of the ‘young 
man’ to whom Janet shows the bible to is to taste the mysterious ‘substance’ also, 
however, indicates the importance of gustation to the forms of first-hand, sensory 
enquiry central to the development of what would come to be known as empirical 
science. The young man’s act of tasting plays out at a crossroads between an ancient, 
mystical sense that communion with God might be best achieved through tasting, and a 
newer interest in the experimental, proto-scientific utility of taste. 
Peter Harrison claims that the Puritan insistence on encountering God first-
hand corresponds to the rejection, by experimental philosophers, of written authorities 
in favour of experiential knowledge. 143  At points, this chapter has seemed to 
substantiate this argument. Most obviously, the radical Protestant use of the language of 
sweetness to avow the superiority of ‘experience’ and ‘experiment’ over clerical and 
sometimes even over scriptural authority seems to echo the early Royal Society’s 
determination to, as its motto counsels, ‘take no man’s word for it.’ This narrative is 
also present in my discussion of the reformist investment in shoring up the accuracy of 
the senses as guides to the nature of the Eucharistic elements, and by extension of the 
material world more generally. 
In suggesting that taste is a key term for the articulation of experiential 
knowledge of the divine, I have, however, elided somewhat the historicity of 
‘experience’ and ‘experiment’ as distinct categories in themselves. In the next chapter, I 
investigate the role played by taste in early science, interrogating more closely the forms 
of empirical or proto-empirical ‘experience’ offered by gustation.  
 
 
                                                          
143 Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
133. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
‘Those fruits of Natural knowledge’: 
Taste and the Early Royal Society 
 
I. ‘those fruits of Natural knowledge’ 
 
... as at first, mankind fell by tasting of the forbidden Tree of Knowledge, so we, 
their Posterity, may be in part restor’d by the same way, not only by beholding and 
contemplating, but by tasting too those fruits of Natural knowledge, that were never 
yet forbidden.1 
 
My opening quotation is taken from the prologue to Robert Hooke’s 1665 Micrographia, 
a compendium – as its full title proclaims – of ‘descriptions of minute bodies’ observed 
with the aid of the microscope. Lavishly illustrated by its author, the book is suffused 
with the thrill, recently made possible by improvements in microscopic technology, of 
seeing the world in previously unimaginable detail. 2  Everything from flies’ eyes to 
razorblades, poppy seeds to full stops, falls under the scrutiny of Hooke’s lens: 
Micrographia is a paean to the pleasures of looking, a monument to ocularcentric science. 
What, then, should we make of Hooke’s insistence not merely on ‘beholding’ and 
‘contemplating,’ but also on ‘tasting,’ the ‘fruits of Natural knowledge’? Locating the 
quest for natural historical (and ultimately, natural philosophical) knowledge firmly 
within the narrative framework of the temptation and Fall that I addressed in the 
previous chapter, Hooke posits natural knowledge as a source of redemption, a way to 
regain the Eden lost by the original act of human disobedience. This recovery, 
furthermore, is to be carried out through precisely the same route as the dispossession: 
namely, through acts of ‘tasting.’  
Following Foucault’s influential assertion, in The Order of Things, that early 
natural history is ‘nothing more than the nomination of the visual,’ the historiography 
                                                          
1 Robert Hooke, Micrographia, or, Some physiological descriptions of minute bodies (London: John Martyn and 
James Allestry, 1665), A6r-v. 
2 Hooke had received (prematurely truncated) tutelage in the visual arts as an apprentice of the painter 
Peter Lely.  Patri J. Pugliese, ‘Hooke, Robert (1635–1703),’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 
01 May 2013, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13693. 
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of seventeenth-century science has been dominated by an emphasis on the ocular.3 
Undoubtedly, vision was paramount to seventeenth-century science: from Galileo Galilei 
gazing at the pitted surface of the moon to Isaac Newton’s 1604 Opticks, the increased 
status of empiricism and experimentalism in this period occurs in tandem with some 
spectacular specular discoveries. Nonetheless, as Stuart Clark has recently documented, 
questions of reliability continued to vex visual evidence throughout the seventeenth 
century. ‘Between the Reformation and the Scientific Revolution,’ Clark asserts, ‘vision 
was anything but objectively established or secure in its supposed relationship to 
“external fact.”’ 4  Recognising this instability, I propose, clears the way for a more 
nuanced appreciation of the prominence of the other senses.  
Focusing on the Royal Society, this chapter explores the role played by taste in 
the formation of early experimental and empirical science. Founded in 1660, the Royal 
Society represented, as Michael Hunter puts it, ‘a new type of institution, a public body 
devoted to the corporate pursuit of scientific research.’ 5  Consisting, in its earliest 
instantiation, of twelve members united by an interest in the inductive and experimental 
methodologies advocated by Francis Bacon, the ‘College for the Promoting of Physico-
Mathematical Experimental Learning,’ as it was originally called, was modelled in part 
on Salomon’s House, the fictional foundation described in Bacon’s New Atlantis as ‘an 
Order or Society... dedicated to the study of the works and creatures of God.’6 Granted 
a Royal Charter by Charles II in July 1662, the College adopted the more familiar – and 
somewhat snappier name of the Royal Society of London, along with the motto ‘Nullius 
in Verba,’ or ‘take no-one’s word for it’: a statement of its members’ rejection of 
                                                          
3 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 2002), 144. 
Post-Foucauldian examples of the emphasis on vision in studies of early science include David C. 
Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Catherine 
Wilson, The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); and Langley, ‘Anatomizing the Early Modern Eye.’ The issue of terminology, in 
relation to seventeenth-century natural history and philosophy, is complex and vexed. Here, my use of 
the term ‘science,’ despite its apparent anachronism, is informed my Deborah Harkness’ rehabilitation of 
it in The Jewel House: Elizabethan London and the Scientific Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), xv-xviii. Throughout this chapter, I use both ‘natural history and philosophy’ and ‘experimental 
science’ to indicate the varied activities of the early Royal Society, determining the relative 
appropriateness of each on a case-by-case basis. 
4 Clark, Vanities of the Eye (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1. 
5 Michael Hunter, Establishing the New Science: The Experience of  the Early Royal Society (Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, 1989), 1. 
6 On Salomon’s House as a model for the Royal Society, see Michael Hunter, Science and Society in 
Restoration England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapters 1 and 2, and Chloe Houston, 
‘Utopia and Education in the Seventeenth Century: Bacon’s Salomon’s House and its Influence,’ in 
Houston, ed., New Worlds Reflected: Travel and Utopia in the Early Modern Period (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 
70-71. 
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authority in favour of first-hand experience. 7  The Society’s original members 
incorporated natural philosophers, mathematicians, and virtuosi who had previously 
met under the auspices of more informal groups centred around London’s Gresham 
College and Oxford’s Wadham College, and were similarly interested in the utility of 
experimentalism for natural philosophy.8  
In his 1667 The history of the Royal-Society, which documents the Society’s 
beginnings for partisan ends, the Royal Society fellow and enthusiast Thomas Sprat 
describes ‘those parts of the visible World, about which they [members of the Society] 
have chiefly bestow’d their pains.’9 Despite his emphasis on the ‘visible World,’ however, 
the account Sprat goes on to give describes a perceptually varied experimental program 
of natural philosophical research. Sprat’s catalogue includes: 
 
Experiments of the Propagation of Sounds through common, rarify’d, and 
condens’d Air... of the heat and cold of the Water, at several depths of the Sea... 
of a stinking Wood brought out of the East-Indies... of killing Frogs, by touching 
their skin, with Vinegar, Pitch, or Mercury... Experiments of Light, Sound, Colours, 
Taste... of Ecchos and reflected sounds: of Musical sounds, and Harmonies: of 
Colours...10 
 
In this list, smell, touch, taste, and hearing, as well as vision, are in evidence both as 
topics, and as means of accomplishing, experimental enquiry. Whilst the Society’s interests 
range from the aural (how do sounds propagate in rarefied air?) to the tangible (what is 
the relation between the temperature of the sea, and its depth?), its modes of enquiry 
also range across the senses, encompassing the fatal ‘touching’ of frogs with vinegar, 
and olfactory attention to a malodorous foreign wood. For the most part, this kind of 
multisensory discourse has been overlooked by historians intent on the period’s optical 
innovations. Recently, however, a few scholars have begun to lay the foundations for an 
                                                          
7 On ‘Nullius in Verba,’ see Hunter, Establishing, 17. As Hunter notes here, the motto is ‘a paraphrase of  a 
passage from Horace’s Epistles affirming freedom from any master or school.’ 
8 Kerry Downes writes that ‘the Wadham and Grehsam circles become the nucleus of  the Royal Society.’ 
See Kerry Downes, ‘Wren, Sir Christopher (1632–1723),’ Oxford Dictionary of  National Biography, accessed 
28 June 2012, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30019. 
9 Thomas Sprat, The history of  the Royal-Society of  London (London: T. R. for John Martin and James Allestry, 
1667), Dd4r (215). 
10 Ibid., Ee1v (218); Ee4r (223); Ff1r (225).  
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understanding of the experimental and experiential world of early modern natural 
history and philosophy as sensorially heterogeneous.11  
Most pertinently here, Mark Jenner has recently drawn attention to taste’s role 
in the production and verification of natural historical knowledge within the early Royal 
Society, and early experimental science more generally.12 Jenner focuses on the physician 
John Floyer, who – in his dedication to putting a range of strange and often repulsive 
things in his mouth in the name of experiment – stands out as exceptional amongst his 
contemporaries. The works of many of Floyer’s less obsessive colleagues and precursors 
in the Royal Society, however, also the experimental importance of an alert and 
enquiring palate. Indeed, Hooke himself practiced what he preached. Literally, as well as 
metaphorically, he tasted the fruits of natural knowledge: alongside the objects of its 
author’s technologically-enhanced gaze, Micrographia records the flavours of diverse 
phenomena ranging from frozen urine to mould (the former is apparently 
disappointingly insipid; the latter, ‘unpleasant and noisome.’)13 In The history of the Royal-
Society, Sprat includes an ‘Apparatus to the History of the Common Practices of Dying’ 
by the natural philosopher William Petty, in which Petty remarks that ‘River-water is far 
more fat and oilie, [and] sweeter’ than ‘the Pump water in great Cities and Towns.’14 
This indicates that it retains ‘its fatty earthy particles,’ of which pump water has been 
‘divested,’ and that consequently it will be of more use to commercial cloth dyers, for 
‘soap dissolves more easily in it.’15 Petty’s claims rely on his presumption that there is an 
established link between the flavour of a substance (in this case, water), its composition 
or qualities, and its practical uses. In this presumption, Petty was not alone: as I will 
show, a number of natural historians and philosophers believed that the flavours of 
substances testified to their properties, and that consequently the sense of taste could be 
used to generate reliable data about the material world.  
In chapter 2, I argued that the language of taste in Helkiah Crooke’s anatomical 
compendium Mikrokosmographia (1615) attests not to the incipient epistemological 
triumph of the senses as a source of knowledge about the human body, but rather to 
                                                          
11 Notably, Joseph Moshenska has highlighted the importance of the sense of touch to members of the 
early Royal Society, especially Robert Boyle. Moshenska, ‘Feeling Pleasures,’ 363-82.  On hearing, see 
Penelope Gouk, ‘Acoustics in the Early Royal Society, 1660-1680,’ Notes and Records of the Royal Society of 
London 36/2 (1982): 155-75.  
12 Jenner similarly cites Foucault’s influence on the ocularcentricity of the history of science, and the 
corresponding neglect of taste. Jenner, ‘Tasting Lichfield,’ 655. 
13 Hooke, Micrographia, O1r (90) and S4v (126).  
14 William Petty, ‘Apparatus to the History of the Common Practices of Dying,’ in Sprat, The history of the 
Royal-Society, Oo2v-Oo3r (292-93).  
15 Ibid., Oo3r (292). 
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fundamental imbrications of textuality and sensation, humanist erudition and proto-
scientific empiricism, in the realm of early modern anatomy. In contrast, focusing on 
the botanist, physician, and Royal Society member Nehemiah Grew’s magisterial 1682 
The anatomy of plants with an idea of a philosophical history of plants, and on the works of his 
mentor Robert Boyle (1627-1691), this chapter argues that the early Royal Society’s use 
of gustation to generate knowledge about the material world chimes with Society 
propaganda, in which the language of taste proves indispensable to the rhetorical 
justification of experimental and empirical methodologies. 16  Not everyone was 
convinced by the early Royal Society’s program; contemporaneously, intellectual 
curiosity was viewed with suspicion as well as acclaim, and detractors both censured the 
bold scale of the Society’s epistemological ambitions, and mocked their methods as 
absurd and ineffective.17 Against these criticisms and anxieties, the language of taste 
provided a way to articulate the nature and value of the kind of experimental and 
empirical methods promoted by the Society. In particular, taste’s association with trial 
and testing (preliminary forms of knowledge generation) correlated to the Society’s 
emphasis on tentative experimentalism, whilst taste’s status as a proximity sense was 
exploited to suggest that gustation offered a more intimate, and thus more accurate, 
knowledge of the material world than did the distal senses. 
In a poem dedicated ‘To the Royal Society,’ which prefaces Sprat’s History of the 
Royal-Society, for example, the poet and experimental science enthusiast Abraham 
Cowley describes how the scholastic ‘Guardians’ and ‘Tutors’ of a personified (and 
masculinised) ‘Philosophy,’ anxious that that he should not usurp their ‘Autoritie,’ kept 
him in his ‘Nonage,’ choosing ‘his Eye to entertain... With painted Scenes.’18 Dogmatic 
authority maintains its tyranny by subjecting true ‘Philosophy’ to a series of entertaining, 
but infantilizing, visual images. This deplorable state of affairs is challenged, finally, by 
the ‘mighty’ Francis Bacon: 
 
From Words, which are but Pictures of the Thought,  
(Though we our Thoughts from them perversly drew)  
To Things, the Minds right Object, he it brought,  
                                                          
16 On Boyle’s role as Grew’s mentor, see Michael Hunter, ‘Grew, Nehemiah (bap. 1641, d. 1712),’ Oxford 
Dictionary of  National Biography, accessed 24 May 2012, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11521. 
17 On resistance to and mockery of the early Royal Society, see Peter Anstey, ‘Literary Responses to 
Robert Boyle’s Natural Philosophy,’ in Juliet Cummins and David Burchell, eds., Science, Literature, and 
Rhetoric in Early Modern England (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 145-62. 
18 Abraham Cowley, ‘To the Royal Society,’ in Sprat, The history of  the Royal-Society, B1r-v. 
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Like foolish Birds to painted Grapes we flew;  
He sought and gather’d for our use the Tru;  
And when on heaps the chosen Bunches lay,  
He prest them wisely the Mechanic way,  
Till all their juice did in one Vessel join,  
Ferment into a Nourishment Divine,  
The thirsty Souls refreshing Wine.19 
    
From a sterile epistemological economy in which words and thoughts reflect only each 
other, Bacon shifts the collective attention towards the material world. This transition is 
figured by Cowley as a move from misleading sight to the immediate gustatory pleasures 
offered by real ‘Things.’ 
Rhetorical uses of taste to valorize the experimental enterprise may in some 
contexts refer to empirical uses of taste to generate experimental data. As in my opening 
quotation, however, they may equally associate that enterprise with alternative 
experiential and epistemological frameworks: in particular the framework for 
understanding and producing human knowledge established by Christian history and 
soteriology, explored in my previous chapter. Gustatory rhetoric does not only refer to 
experimental practices; it works to locate those practices firmly within a Protestant 
narrative of the Fall, of moral and epistemological degeneration, and of possible – but 
always uncertain – redemption. Acts of natural historical tasting are framed as a way to 
regain the paradise forsaken by Adam and Eve.20 In particular, gustation could be used 
to develop new medicines that might restore the postlapsarian body to something 
approaching an Edenic state of health.  
The association between gustation and intimate experiential knowledge, and thus 
between gustation and Edenic redemption, rests on the assumption that tastes can 
reveal the innate qualities of the material world. In the second half of this chapter, I 
explore how this assumption was problematized both by a widespread belief that the 
Fall led to the degeneration of the human senses, and by new research into taste 
understood not as a property of things, but as a physiological process. How and why, 
asked Society luminaries including Robert Boyle, Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, Marcello 
                                                          
19 Ibid., B2r. 
20 On natural philosophical experimentalism as part of  an effort to regain Eden, see James Bennett and 
Scott Mandelbrote, The Garden, the Ark, the Tower, the Temple. Biblical Metaphors of  Knowledge in Early Modern 
Europe (Oxford: Bodleian Library, 1998), especially 26-34. 
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Malpighi, and Thomas Willis, does taste happen? Investigating the microscopic structure 
of the tasting organs, and of vegetables and other esculents, early Royal Society 
researchers reflected, indirectly, on their own sensory and gustatory methodologies. The 
mechanistic and corpuscular theories that they developed in the process disrupted the 
association of taste with authentic knowledge. In exploring how flavours are 
experienced by subjects (as opposed to what flavours can reveal about the properties of 
material substances), these researchers came to understand tasting as fundamentally 
(rather than merely incidentally) subjective, comprising not an act of human 
apprehension, which may be more or less accurate, but a transformative interaction 
between self and world.  
 
II. ‘the fruite forbid?’ 
 
Within the complex landscape of early experimental science, the sense of taste had a 
number of related applications. In particular, taste had an important role to play in the 
associated fields of early chemistry, botany, and physic, and it also continued to play a 
part in anatomy and surgery.21 Tastes had long been taken to indicate the composition 
of chemical substances. For example, in his Paracelsian The practise of chymicall, and 
hermeticall physicke (1605), translated by Thomas Timme, the French physician and 
chemist Joseph Du Chesne notes that bitterness attests to the presence of ‘Salt-Niter, or 
Niterous salts’ in a substance; ‘a Sulphurus Salt... yéeldeth out of it a swéete oylely taste... 
Mercurial Salt... representeth a sower taste.’22 The influence of this approach on early 
Royal Society members is clear: Hooke asserts in Micrographia that ‘the business of this 
sense [taste].... [is] to discover the presence of dissolved Bodies in Liquors put on the 
Tongue, or in general to discover that a fluid body has some solid body dissolv’d in it, 
and what they are.’23 In particular, gustatory sampling helped determine the acidity or 
otherwise of a substance: ‘the Tast,’ as Boyle notes in his 1676 Experiments, notes, &c. 
about the mechanical origine or production of divers particular qualities, ‘by many is made a great 
                                                          
21 I use the disciplinary categories of  chemistry, botany, etc. for convenience, but with an awareness that – 
whilst they do map broadly onto the interests of  the early Royal Society – they do not correspond exactly 
to contemporary demarcations of  knowledge. On early modern categorizations of  ‘scientific’ knowledge, 
see Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, ‘The Age of  the New,’ in Daston and Park, The Cambridge 
History of  Science, vol. 3, 2-6. 
22 Joseph Du Chesne, The practise of  chymicall, and hermeticall physicke, trans. Thomas Timme (London: 
Thomas Creede, 1605), D2v-D3r. 
23 Hooke, Micrographia, c2v. 
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Touchstone, whereby to know Acids and Alcalies.’ 24  The importance of taste to 
chemistry is further attested by Margaret Cavendish’s 1666 The description of a new world, 
called the blazing world, in which the Empress of the eponymous Blazing World designates 
its ‘Ape-men’ as ‘her chymists.’25 In part, Cavendish’s intention is satirical: the apishness 
of chemists positions them as essentially imitative, manipulators of nature rather than 
cultivators of it. The apish natures of the chemists correlates to Cavendish’s insistence, 
in her Observations upon experimental philosophy, to which The blazing world is appended, that 
‘chymists need not think they can create any thing anew; for they cannot challenge to 
themselves a divine power, neither can there be any such thing as a new Creation in 
Nature... though they produce new forms, as they imagine; yet those forms, though they 
be new to them, are not new in Nature.’26 However, the iconographical association 
between apes and the sense of taste presumably also informs Cavendish’s choice of 
creature.  
For botanists, tastes offered both a means of recognizing organic substances, 
and of assigning them a place within flavour-based taxonomies. In a letter published in 
the Philosophical Transactions in 1672, the naturalist Martin Lister described the ‘fierce 
biting tast’ of some unfamiliar fungi that had recently provoked his curiosity during a 
walk through Marton woods in North Yorkshire. It was the distinctive ‘great acrimony 
of the Juice’ (alongside the colour and woodland location) which enabled a respondent 
to his letter, the naturalist John Ray, to identify the fungi as pepper mushrooms, 
previously described by the Swiss botanist Johann Bauhin in his Historia plantarum 
universalis (1650-51).27 The intimate relation between tastes and the nature of plants is 
evident in William Coles’ 1656 The Art of Simpling; for Coles, ‘differences in Plants’ are 
                                                          
24 Boyle himself  is sceptical: ‘I consider that there is a multitude of  mixt bodies, wherein we can so little 
discern by the Tast, which of  the Principles is Predominant, that this Sense would not oblige one to 
suspect, much less to conclude, there were one grain of  either of  them to be found there.’ His denial, 
however, acknowledges the pervasiveness of  the notion that taste is useful in this regard. Robert Boyle, 
Experiments, notes, &c. about the mechanical origine or production of  divers particular qualities (London: E. Flesher 
for R. Davis, 1676), B1v (18). 
25 Margaret Cavendish, The blazing world, in Observations upon experimental philosophy to which is added The 
description of a new blazing world (London: A. Maxwell, 1666), E2r (15). 
26 Cavendish, Observations, T2v (72).  
27 ‘A Description of an Odd Kind of Mushrom, Yeilding a Milky Juice, Much Hotter upon the Tongue 
Than Pepper, &c. Observed by Mr. Lister, and by Him Communicated to the Publisher, Novemb. 15. 
1672,’ Philosophical Transactions 7 (1672): 5116-5117. Nearly 30 years later, a Monsieur Reneaume of the 
Royal Academy of Sciences responds in much the same way when confronted with an apparently 
unknown species of tree. See ‘A Description of a New Kind of Walnut Tree, Discovered by Monsieur 
Reneaume,’ Philosophical Transactions 22 (1700 - 1701), 909. 
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not simply indicated by, but rather ‘arise from’ or are caused by their ‘Smells and 
Tasts.’28 
Finally, for physicians, apothecaries, and surgeons, taste had long formed an 
important part of the diagnostic arsenal. The taste of a patient’s urine, for example, was 
supposed to help determine the balance of humors in his or her body. 29 By the middle 
of the seventeenth century, uroscopy was declining in medical prestige.30 Nonetheless, 
in Dr. Willis’s practice of physick (1682), the celebrated physician and anatomist Thomas 
Willis commented on the ‘exceedingly sweet’ taste of diabetic urine; it is, he notes, ‘as if 
there had been Sugar or Honey in it.’ 31  Taste also played a role in port-mortem 
diagnostics. The herbals, dietaries, and medical dispensatories used to determine an 
appropriate course of treatment, moreover, included elaborate information about the 
flavours of the substances they prescribed, and about how these flavours corresponded 
to the substance’s effect on the humoral body.32 Thus, when the physician Thomas 
Muffett describes the properties of the seven ‘ordinary tastes of meats’ in his popular 
1655 Healths Improvement, he notes of ‘soure meats ([such] as sorrel, lemons, oringes... and 
all things strong of vinegar and verjuice)’ that ‘naturally they offend sinewy parts, 
weaken concoction... and hasten old age.’33 For phlegmatic and choleric constitutions, 
however, they may be helpful, particularly ‘in cutting phlegm, opening obstructions, 
cleansing impurities, bridling choler, resisting putrifaction, [and] extinguishing 
superfluous heat.’34 Conversely, ‘Sweet Meats agree well with nature... [they] fatten the 
body, encrease natural heat, fill the veins, digest easily, soften that which is too hard, 
and thicken that which is too liquid.’ Nonetheless, ‘if they be over-sweet and gluttish, 
they soon turn into choler, stop the liver, puff up lungs and spleen, swell the stomack, 
and cause oftentimes most sharp and cruel fevers.’35 In a taxonomy in which sweet 
                                                          
28 William Coles, The art of simpling (London: J.G. for Nathanial Brook, 1656), C10r (43). 
29 Richard Palmer emphasises the importance of smell and sight for uroscopic diagnosis, but also 
acknowledges a role for taste. See Palmer, ‘In Bad Odour: Smell and its Significance in Medicine from 
Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century,’ in W. F. Bynum and Roy Porter, eds., Medicine and the Five Senses 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 67. On medieval uroscopy, see Faith Wallis, ‘Signs and 
Senses: Diagnosis and Prognosis in Early Medieval Pulse and Urine Texts,’ Social History of Medicine 13/2 
(2000): 265-78.  
30 See, for example, Thomas Brian, The pisse-prophet, or, Certaine pisse-pot lectures (London: E. Purslowe for R. 
Thrale, 1637). 
31 Thomas Willis, Dr. Willis’s practice of  physick (London: T. Dring, C. Harper, and J. Leigh, 1684), K4r (71). 
32 For a discussion of the importance of gustation to apothecaries, herbalists, and other medical 
practitioners, see Jenner, ‘Tasting Lichfield,’ 563. 
33 Thomas Muffett, Health’s Improvement (London: Thomas Newcomb for Samuel Thomson, 1655), F4r 
(39). 
34 Ibid., F4r (39). 
35 Ibid., F3v (38). 
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meats are firmly salubrious, but ‘over-sweet’ meats are decidedly dangerous, the 
importance of attending to subtle graduations of taste is clear. 
In the second half of the seventeenth century, this diagnostic and dietetic 
tradition merged with a new emphasis on the experimental analysis of substances, both 
organic and – as interest in the principles of Paracelsian iatrochemistry grew – 
metallurgical and chemical. In his 1663 Some considerations touching the Usefulnesse of 
experimental naturall philosophy, for example, Boyle comments that the ‘Vertues’ of the ‘the 
volatile Salt of Urine’ are attested by that fact that ‘it differs so little in smell, tast, 
volatility, penetrancy and some other manifest Qualities, from the Salt of Harts-horn, 
and that of Mans Blood; that such effects... may be not improbably exspected from it as 
are produc’d by the other.’36 The sensory similarities between the salt of urine and more 
established remedies such as salt of harts-horn offers strong assurance that it will also 
duplicate the medical ‘effects’ of those remedies. 
The intense interest of early Royal Society members in taste’s utility as a means 
of identifying the composition of a range of chemical and botanical substances, and as 
indicative of the medical virtues of those substances, is exemplified by Nehemiah 
Grew’s 1682 The anatomy of plants with an idea of a philosophical history of plants. The 
culmination of nearly two decades of research, The anatomy of plants brings Grew’s 
investigations into the anatomical structure of plants together with a number of lectures 
on their sensible properties, originally read before the Royal Society.37  Called, by A. G. 
Morton, ‘the first comprehensive programme of botanical research,’ the compendious 
Anatomy is something of a hybrid, combining a botanist’s interest in plant physiology 
with a chemist’s interest in the experimental analysis of the substance of plants.38 As a 
physician, however, Grew emphasises his desire to establish the relation between the 
flavours of plants and their medicinal properties: in his ‘Discourse of the Diversities and 
Causes of Tasts Chiefly in Plants,’ originally read before the Society in 1675, Grew 
proclaims that ‘by duly observing the Tasts of Plants, we may be directed to understand 
                                                          
36 Robert Boyle, Some considerations touching the Usefulnesse of experimental naturall philosophy (Oxford: Henry 
Hall for Richard Davis, 1663), Rr3r (325). 
37 On the complicated compilation and publication history of The anatomy of plants, see William LeFanu, 
Nehemiah Grew: A Study and Bibliography of his Writings (Winchester: St Paul’s Bibliographies, 1990). For a 
reading of The anatomy’s use of bibliographic tropes, see Whitney Anne Trettien, ‘Plant→animal→book: 
Magnifying a microhistory of media circuits,’ in Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval Cultural Studies 3/2 
(2012): 97-118. 
38 A.G. Morton, History of Botanical Science: An Account of the Development of Botany from Ancient Times to the 
Present Day (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 194.  
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....the Use and Virtues of those Plants or Parts of Plants in which they reside.’39 Grew’s 
advocation of ‘observation’ – characteristic of the Royal Society – refers not, as we 
might expect, to the appearance of plants, but to their ‘Tasts.’ He comments, for 
example, that plants which have a ‘soft’ and ‘sweetish’ flavour ‘may be accounted good 
Antiscorbuticks’ (that is, they are good for treating scurvy), whereas ‘those Plants, whose 
Parts are not only Hot but Volatile, as Onions, are generally good for Burns.’40 It is Grew’s 
belief in the capacity of the sense of taste to accurately apprehend the medicinal uses of 
plants that motivates, and provides a rationale for, his undertaking to understand, 
describe, and categorize their flavours. Grew’s belief that tastes reflect the nature and 
uses of plants, and thus are a helpful principle for the construction of botanical 
taxonomies, is, moreover, echoed by many of his contemporaries.  For Boyle, the 
unfamiliar fruit and flora of the New World generated excitement, offering fresh 
medical possibilities: ‘how many new Concretes,’ he speculates, ‘rich in Medicinal 
vertues, does the New World present the Inquisitive Physitians of the Old?’ He reports, 
as proof, the efficacy of ‘the American Bark against Agues,’ noting – significantly – that 
he recommends its use ‘after having tasted and considered it.’ 41  Notably, Boyle’s 
conjunctive ‘and’ implicitly forges a relation of equivalence, as well as addition, between 
the sense of taste and thoughtful consideration. 
Grew’s labours to chart the relation between the tastes of plants and their utility 
as physic should be understood in the context of the wider Royal Society conviction 
that natural historical and philosophical research might go some way towards assuaging 
the manifold sorrows of the postlapsarian condition. As Grew writes in a dedicatory 
epistle to Viscount William Brouncker, first president of the Royal Society, the 
president’s ‘command’ that he undertake further research into plants added ‘force to my 
own Desires, of being somewhat instrumental to the Improvement of Medicinal, and 
other wholesom Knowledge: if peradventure, as we increase herein, we may become 
better, and more happy.’42 Grew’s ambiguous syntax is revealing: the knowledge he 
seeks is ‘medicinal’ insofar as it is knowledge of medicine, but Grew also leaves open the 
possibility that knowledge itself is ‘medicinal,’ or more generally curative. As he writes 
                                                          
39 Nehemiah Grew, The anatomy of plants with an idea of a philosophical history of plants (London: W. Rawlins, 
1682), Uu1v (290). 
40 Ibid., D2v (15).  
41 Boyle, Some considerations, H2r (67). 
42 Grew, The anatomy of plants, N3v (102). 
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elsewhere in The anatomy, ‘Nature, and the Causes and Reasons of Things, duly 
contemplated, naturally lead us unto God.’43 
Grew’s semi-utopian goals resonate, not only with the words of Robert Hooke 
in my opening quotation, but also with Royal Society propaganda more generally, which 
frequently utilizes the language of taste. In The history of the Royal-Society, for example, 
Thomas Sprat anticipates the rewards of a pedagogical turn away from the ‘empty 
disputations’ of the scholastics, and the substitution of a curriculum incorporating 
experimentalism, by promising that: 
 
the Beautiful Bosom of Nature will be Expos’d to our view: we shall enter into 
its Garden, and tast of its Fruits, and satisfy our selves with its plenty: insteed of 
Idle talking, and wandring, under its fruitless shadows; as the Peripatetics did... 
and their Successors have done ever since.44  
 
For Sprat, tasting the ‘Fruits’ of natural knowledge is associated with a delightful and 
satisfying productivity, in comparison to the futile endeavours of the Society’s 
predecessors. This progression, moreover, is figured as a re-entry into paradise: the 
fruitful garden, inevitably, recalls the garden of Eden forsaken by Adam and Eve. 
Grew’s project of tasting plants in order to identify their medicinal utility constitutes a 
literalisation of this kind of rhetoric: by advancing the state of physic, acts of botanical 
tasting can help to accomplish a partial restoration of the illness-prone postlapsarian 
body to its Edenic state of vigour and longevity. 
The use of Edenic rhetoric to valorize the work of early Royal Society members 
might seem dangerously audacious: after all, the Fall was frequently read as a cautionary 
tale of epistemological over-reaching.45 As Francis Bacon comments in the Advancement 
of learning (1605), detractors of knowledge claim that ‘th’ aspiring to overmuch 
knowledge, was the originall temptation and sinne, whereupon ensued the fal of Man.’46  
In his long 1599 poem Nosce Teipsum, John Davies laments of Adam and Eve that ‘by 
tasting of that Fruite forbid, / Where they sought knowledge, they did error find.’ This 
mistake is repeated by their descendants: ‘Do not wee still tast of the fruite forbid?’ 
Davies asks rhetorically, ‘Whiles with fond, fruitlesse curiositie / In bookes prophane 
                                                          
43 Ibid., Q4r (79). 
44 Sprat, The history of the Royal-Society, Ss4r (327). 
45 See Harrison, The Fall of Man, and Peter Harrison, ‘Curiosity, Forbidden Knowledge, and the 
Reformation of Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England,’ Isis 92/2 (2001): 265-90. 
46 Bacon, The twoo bookes, A4v. 
173 
 
we seeke for knowledge hid?’47 Whilst Davies links original sin to readerly curiosity and, 
elsewhere in the poem, to scholasticism specifically, opponents of empirical and 
experimental epistemologies also often articulated their anxieties in precisely these 
terms. In his 1652 Arcana microcosmi, or, The hid secrets of man’s body discovered, for example, 
the unapologetic peripatetic Alexander Ross offers an explanation for his censuring of 
Bacon’s works: ‘what hurt is it to tell our friend when he eateth too much raw fruit, that 
his health will be thereby indangered?’48 Under a guise of amiable concern, Ross figures 
Bacon and his devotees as caught in the grip of an epistemological appetite for fruit that 
is at once insalubrious and sinful.  
Given the common assumption that the Fall was triggered by a hubristic hunger 
for knowledge, and that subsequently human curiosity is infected by sin, the Royal 
Society’s attempts to frame their investigations – gustatory and otherwise – as effecting 
a return to Eden is apparently counter-intuitive, if not injudicious. Indeed, respondents 
to The history of the Royal-Society objected vociferously to Sprat’s use of the temptation and 
Fall narrative. In his 1670 A censure upon certaine passages contained in the history of the Royal 
Society, for example, the physician Henry Stubbe criticises Sprat’s suggestion that 
mankind fell because Adam neglected the work of enquiring ‘into the nature of all 
Creatures.’ ‘This,’ Sprat had written in The history, ‘had bin the only Religion, if men had 
continued innocent in Paradise, and had not wanted a Redemption.’49 Stubbe responds 
indignantly: 
 
No man ever taught, that Adam’s fall (which was a breach of his religious duty 
towards God) was a deficiency from the study of Experimental Philosophie: or that he 
was not ejected paradise for the breach of a positive command, but for not minding 
the cultivation of the Garden, and natural curiosities. I never heard that this was that sin 
for which death passed upon all men, nor this the transgression wherein Eve was the 
first.50 
 
I want to suggest, however, that for disciples of the Royal Society, it is precisely the role 
of the epistemological appetite in precipitating the Fall which secures its potency in 
                                                          
47 Davies, Nosce Teipsum, B1v (2).  
48 Ross, Arcana microcosmi, S8r (267). 
49 Sprat, The history of  the Royal-Society, Xx3v (350). 
50 Henry Stubbe, A censure upon certaine passages contained in the history of  the Royal Society (Oxford: Richard 
Davis, 1670), F3v-F4r (38-39). On the exchanges between Sprat and his detractors, see R. H. Syfret, 
‘Some Early Critics of  the Royal Society,’ Notes and Records of  the Royal Society of  London 8/1 (1950): 35-36. 
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reversing it (or at least reversing some of its effects). Inherent in the notion that just as 
mankind fell by tasting the fruit of knowledge, so too might mankind be redeemed, is 
the supposition that – in medical terms – the cure of a disease must resemble its cause. 
This presumption reflects transformations in contemporary medical theory. In the 
second half of the seventeenth century, the Galenic model of human physiology and 
physic, according to which the pathological superflux of one humor should be cured by 
the application of its opposite, was in decline, along with the doctrine of the humors 
more generally. The waning of humoralism is evident, for example, in Grew’s 
explanation of the urgency of his taxonomical project: ‘it much importeth us,’ he 
advises, ‘more precisely to distinguish’ between the ‘Tastes’ of the ‘fluid’ parts of plants 
in part because such distinctions will substitute for the humoral properties of heat, 
moistness and so on that were more usually used as a means of differentiating between 
them.51  ‘Although it may be thought rashness,’ he acknowledges, ‘to take away the 
distinctions of Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, Thin, Gross, and other Qualities... which the Ancients 
have affixed to particular Plants,’ he might be excused in so doing not only by the fact 
that there is ‘much uncertainty’ in such affixations, but also because such attributes ‘are, 
more properly, the Effects and Operations of Plants, than their Qualites.’52 Grew demotes 
humoral properties from the status of innate ‘Qualities’ to secondary and ephemeral 
‘Effects.’  
Conversely, Paracelsian iatrochemistry, or chemical medicine, gained ground in 
this period. The emphasis that Theophrastus von Hohenheim (1493-1541), better 
known as Paracelsus, had placed on first-hand observation and experiment was 
congenial to the interests of later natural philosophers, as were Paracelsus’ efforts to 
yoke physic with the precepts of Christianity.53 In particular, a number of Royal Society 
luminaries declared allegiance to the Paracelsian precept that a cure must approximate 
to the pathology it treats, and that the toxic can segue into the salutary.54 As Boyle 
writes in Some considerations touching the Usefulnesse, ‘many Poisonous Bodies contain their 
own Antidotes… the noxiousnesse of many is not so incorrigible, but that by Mans Art 
and Chymical Preparations, they may be made, not onely innocent and harmless, but 
                                                          
51 Grew, The anatomy of plants, D2r (13). 
52 Ibid. 
53 On Paracelsius’ emphasis on experience and on his incorporation of  Christian beliefs into medical 
practice, see Margaret Healy, Fictions of  Disease in Early Modern England: Bodies, Plagues, and Politics 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 27-8; Dear, ‘The Meanings of  Experience,’ 110. 
54 See Anna Marie Roos, The Salt of the Earth: Natural Philosophy, Medicine, and Chymistry in England, 1650-
1750 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 10-107, and Allen G. Debus, The Chemical Philosophy: Paracelsian Science and 
Medicine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Dover Publications, 2002).  
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useful too.’55 In this context, it is possible to appreciate how, just as many organic and 
chemical substances are simultaneously poison and cure, depending on how they are 
prepared and administered, so too might taste sensations simultaneously rehearse and 
reverse the original sin. The duality of taste – and correspondingly, of the 
epistemological appetites that taste represents – gains force and cogency in the context 
of Paracelsian medicine; the means of restoring spiritual wellbeing echoes the means of 
restoring physical health.  
Boyle’s 1665 Occasional reflections is interesting in this context. Couched in the 
form of short meditations and dialogues, the Occasional reflections extrapolate precepts 
from a plethora of varied phenomena and practices ranging across ague, clouds, a 
branch of coral, distillation, a windmill, a looking glass, and a paper kite. Boyle 
emphasises the celestial over the terrestrial; his ultimate aim is to identify moral laws, 
not natural philosophical causes and effects. Nonetheless, he stresses the wider value of 
the practice of making occasional reflections: the ‘Objects’ which men ‘contemplate,’ he 
affirms, may have ‘not onely a Theological and a Moral, but also a Political, an 
Oeconomical, or even a Physical use’ (my emphasis).56 His methods, furthermore, are 
commensurate with Baconian induction; general rules proceed from, rather than precede, 
the particular examples he collates. As such, the Occasional reflections constitutes an 
intriguing merger of the Protestant contemplative tradition discussed in the previous 
chapter with the methodologies which characterise the emergence of experimental 
science.  
Noticing this composite nature, Scott Black argues that in the Occasional 
reflections, ‘a practice of Protestant reading begins to develop into a desacralized natural 
science.’ 57  In contrast, I argue that the particular form of the Occasional reflections’ 
combination of Protestantism and natural philosophy is not a process of displacement, 
as science comes to supplant the devotional practices it initially develops out of. Rather, 
the influence is mutual: practices of natural history and philosophy are suffused with 
devotional significance. As Boyle proclaims in Some considerations touching the Usefulnesse, 
the ‘born’ natural philosopher is a ‘Priest of Nature... bound to returne Thanks and 
Praises to his Maker, not only for himselfe but for the whole Creation.’58 Crucially, the 
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devotional dimension of natural philosophical research is figured in sensory terms. 
Natural historical ‘knowledge,’ Boyle declares,  
 
will prove the Incense (or more spiritual and acceptable part, of that Sacrifice of 
Praise… wherein the Intelligent Admirer offers up the whole World in 
Eucharists to its Maker…[)] the discerning ones self, and discovering to others 
the Perfections of God display’d in the Creatures, is a more acceptable act of 
Religion, then the burning of Sacrifices or Perfumes upon his Altars.59 
 
Boyle uses the word ‘Eucharists’ in its broad etymological sense of thanksgivings: the 
‘Incense’ of experimental knowledge is, simultaneously, an ‘acceptable’ substitute for 
and a version of the olfactory pleasures offered by the Catholic ritual practice of ‘the 
burning of Sacrifices or Perfumes.’ 
These devotional dimensions of the activities of the early Royal Society, and the 
importance of taste as a mode of simultaneously spiritual and secular knowledge, come 
into focus when we consider the case of the first blood transfusion performed on a 
human being in England, which took place on 23 November 1667, at Arundel House in 
London. The patient was Arthur Coga, a ‘freakish and extravagant’ (according to Henry 
Oldenburg) and ‘debauched’ (according to Samuel Pepys) Cambridge Divinity alumni of 
about 32 years of age; the experiment was performed jointly by the physician and 
physiologist Richard Lower and the surgeon Edmund King. 60  Lower and King let 
approximately 6-7 ounces of Coga’s blood, replacing it with 9-10 ounces (‘by 
conjecture’) of a young sheep’s blood, transmitted into a vein in Coga’s right arm by 
way of silver piping and hollow quills.61  
Coga was selected for the experiment partly because his poverty made him 
willing to participate in this risky new procedure, and partly because of his eccentricity: 
the experiment’s perpetrators were interested to discover whether the influx of the 
blood of an animal celebrated for its meek demeanour would have a calming influence 
on the easily-agitated Coga. A letter describing the transfusion, written by Henry 
Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society, to Boyle, and dated two days after it took 
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place, suggests that the answer was initially thought to be positive. Early on the morning 
of 25 November, Oldenburg and a companion, the natural philosopher, theologian, and 
Royal Society founding member John Wilkins, paid Coga a visit, finding him still in bed. 
Coga assured his callers that he had been ‘more composed’ since the transfusion, an 
assertion which was ‘affirmed’ by his host.62 Oldenburg’s letter, however, is interesting 
for more than its avowal that the transfusion had served to pacify Coga: it contains a 
number of intriguing details that are absent from the official account of the experiment 
given in the Philosophical Transactions, and which are germane here.63 With no way of 
measuring how much blood would be transferred from the sheep’s body into Coga, 
King and Lower ‘let out, before the transfusion, into a porringer, so much of the 
sheep’s-bloud, as would run out in about a minut (wch amounted to 12. Ounces) to 
direct us as to ye quantity to be transfused into the man.’ On seeing ‘that florid arteriall 
blood in ye porringer,’ Oldenburg reports, Coga ‘was so well pleased wth it, that he 
took some of it upon a knife, and tasted it, and finding it of good relish, he went the 
more courageously to its transmission into his veins.’64  
The moment is intriguing, but baffling: what prompts Coga to leap from an 
(implied) visual pleasure in the vivid colour of the sheep’s blood, to his tasting of it? 
Coga’s instinct, however, becomes more comprehensible when we consider an 
exchange shortly following the transfusion. When asked why the animal chosen had 
been a sheep, Coga replied ‘Sanguis ovis symbolicam quandam facultatem habet cum 
sanguine Christi, quia Christus est agnus Dei’: ‘sheep’s blood has some symbolic power, 
like the blood of Christ, for Christ is the lamb of God.’65 On the face of it, his answer 
reflects the interests of Lower and King, who wanted to know if the lamb’s blood had 
the ‘power’ to transmit the animal’s meek temperament to Coga. But in highlighting the 
established symbolic connection between the lamb and Christ – whose meekness was, 
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finally, exhibited as his acceptance of the crucifixion – Coga also retrospectively 
provides an explanatory context for his odd act of tasting.  
When Royal Society members and enthusiasts use the language of taste in order to 
assert the value of the experimental and empirical methodologies they endorse, then, 
they consciously present the gustatory endeavours of the Society’s members as 
sacramental, functioning both as a means to repair some of the disadvantages of the 
postlapsarian condition, and as a route to intimacy with the divine. The rhetorical utility 
of the language of taste for the promotion of experimental science, however, also 
derives in part from its prior epistemological associations and its phenomenal 
characteristics. In the introduction to this thesis, I noted that both the term ‘taste,’ and 
the experience of taste, involve a  tension. On the one hand, as part of the activity of 
eating, the sense of taste plays a preliminary role, evaluating something’s suitability for 
consumption. Correspondingly, as an epistemological term, to taste something is to try 
or examine it. The kinds of knowledge-production indicated by the language of taste are 
therefore cautious, and exploratory. On the other hand, considered in relation to the 
other senses, tasting is the culmination of our experience of our environment: taste’s 
status as a proximity sense associates it with forms of knowledge that are direct, 
immersive, and seemingly conclusive. This duality can be mapped on to the two major, 
related features of the methodology advocated by the Royal Society: namely, an 
emphasis on probative experimentalism, and a corresponding valorisation of empirical 
experience. 
 
III. ‘true Rellish’ 
 
Following Francis Bacon’s warnings regarding the dangers of premature 
systematization, members of the early Royal Society frequently presented their work as 
the earliest stages in what they anticipated would be a long project of knowledge 
production, anticipating and encouraging revision by future generations.66 Just as a taste 
is an act of preliminary testing, experiment was supposed to be the beginning, not the 
end, of knowledge. Indeed, for Thomas Willis, writing in his 1683 Two discourses concerning 
the soul of brutes, tasting itself is a kind of experimental process: 
                                                          
66 In a dedicatory letter to Viscount Brouckner prefacing his An essay towards a real character, for example, 
John Wilkins warns that ‘I am not so vain as to think that I have here completely finished this great 
undertaking.... The compleating of such a design, being rather the work of a College and an Age, then of 
any single Person.’ Wilkins, An essay towards a real character (London: For Samuel Gellibrand and John 
Martin, 1668), A2r. 
179 
 
 
Eating is a certain Kind of Solution, whereby the savory Particles may be the 
better taken in, from the Food by the Sensory [i.e. the sense organs]: Because, 
whil’st solid eatable things are reduced into bits, by Chawing, the Tongue, and 
other parts of the Mouth, and Throat, pour forth as it were a certain 
Menstruum, which washing and as it were Elixivating the savory little Bodies, 
carries them into the Sensory, and insinuates them into the Pores of the 
Tongue.67 
 
Willis’ emphasis on saliva as a necessary condition of tasting bears witness to the 
continuing influence of classical ideas about the senses, echoing  Aristotle’s assertion, in 
De Anima, that ‘nothing produces the perception of flavour without moisture.’68 The 
vocabulary which Willis uses to describe taste, however, is rooted firmly in experimental 
chemistry: saliva is described as a solvent (‘Menstruum’) which extracts the alkaline salts 
from flavour particles via a process of elixiviation (that is, a process of extracting a 
soluble from an insoluble substance by soaking in water), thus producing gustatory 
sensation. 69  Willis’ use of the vocabulary of experiment to describe a physiological 
process reflects his iatrochemicall convictions: for Willis, the body is a chemical entity, 
and its pathologies are most helpfully treated by chemical substances.  Nonetheless, in 
asserting the equivalence of gustatory experience and chemical experiment, Willis also 
underscores the conceptual relation between tasting as preliminary trial, and the new 
methodologies.   
 In other contexts, however, Royal Society apologists exploited taste’s status as 
a proximity sense in order to suggest that gustation offers a form of direct, authentic 
experiential intimacy with the material world. In contrast, the distal senses – particularly 
vision – are associated with the deductive method favoured by scholasticism, and with a 
stale, second-hand knowledge acquired textually from authorities. In Science, Reading, and 
Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-1670, Elizabeth Spiller argues 
that for many early modern natural philosophers reading was aligned with ‘a second-
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hand, thin form of seeing, one that mimicked but did not truly replicate direct 
observation itself.’70 The converse, I propose, is also the case. For some members of the 
early Royal Society, seeing is conceived of as something like reading: a shallow, 
disengaged form of apprehension. Boyle’s meditation ‘Upon his Paring of a rare 
Summer Apple,’ included in the Occasional reflections, for example, associates visual 
appearance with second-hand report and deceitful rhetoric: 
 
How prettily has curious Nature painted this gawdy Fruit? Here is a green that 
Emeralds cannot, and Flora’s self might boast: And Pomona seems to have 
affected, in the fresh and lively Vermilion that adorns this smooth Rind, an 
Emulation at Rubies themselves… In a word, such pure and tempting Green 
and Red dye this same polish’d Skin, that our Vulgar boldness must be no 
longer question’d, for rendring that Fruit an Apple, that inveagled our first 
Parents: But though these winning Dyes delight me strangely, they are Food for 
my Eye alone, and not my Stomach; I have no Palate for Colours, and to rellish 
this Fruit well, and know whether it performs to the Taste what it promises to 
the Sight, and justifie that Platonick definition which styles Beauty the Lustre and 
Flower of Goodness; all this Gay out-side is cut and thrown away, and passes but 
for Parings. Thus in Opinions, though I look with Pleasure on that neat 
fashionable Dress, that smoother Pens so finely Cloath them with, and though I 
be delighted with the pretty and spruce Expressions, that Wit and Eloquence are 
wont to trick them up with; yet when I mean to examine their true Rellish, that, 
upon liking, I may make them mine, I still strip and devest them of all those 
flattering Ornaments (or cheating Disguises rather) which so often conceal or 
mis-represent their true and genuine Nature, and (before e’r I swallow them) 
after they have been admitted by the more delusible faculty we call Fancy, I 
make them pass the severer scrutiny of Reason.71  
 
For Boyle, the everyday act of paring an apple is a prompt to reflect on the source and 
status of human knowledge. Invoking the lapsarian narrative, he suggests that it was the 
attractive appearance, rather than the imagined flavour, of the fatal apple that ‘inveagled 
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our first Parents’; the sensory source of Adam and Eve’s sin is identified not as an act of 
tasting, but of looking. The visually appealing rind of the fruit, furthermore, 
corresponds to the ‘pretty and spruce Expressions’ which people use to embellish their 
opinions; the apple’s vivid colours evoke the compelling but deceptive colours of 
rhetorical language.72 Whilst Boyle’s self-confessed ‘delight’ in the ‘Gay out-side’ of the 
apple parallels that of the first parents, however, he also recognises the need to test the 
allurements of the visual and the rhetorical – the ornamental – against the evidence of 
the palate; in order to discover whether (as Plato would have it) beauty really does 
coincide with ‘Goodness,’ he must ‘Taste’ the apple. Whilst the pleasures of sight are 
associated with the ‘cheating’ deceptions of witty and eloquent, but second-hand, 
‘Opinions,’ gustation offers access to a more authentic reality that is itself figured as a 
form of flavour, a ‘true Rellish.’73  
Such dichotomizing resonates with Protestant meditative and homiletic 
discourse, which – as discussed in the previous chapter – similarly establishes an 
opposition between vision and taste, associating the former with bondage to 
ecclesiastical and scriptural authority, and the latter with an intimate, affective, 
experiential, and practical knowledge of God. Peter Harrison argues that ‘the emphasis 
in Puritanism on the first-person encounter with God bears an important analogy to the 
replacement, in experimental philosophy, of reliance on authorities and written 
traditions with individual experience.’74 Similarly, Kathleen Lynch’s careful excavation of 
‘experience’ as a category in the spiritual testimonies of non-conformist Protestants 
suggests that the emphasis on experience indexes the fact that ‘the methodologies by 
which a truthful identity of the godly is constructed have the same general outlines as 
the methodologies of an emerging experimentalism in scientific communities.’75   
Attending to the language of taste allows us to appreciate the extent to which 
this shared move away from the authority of tradition towards first-hand experience as 
a source of knowledge was conceived of and experienced in sensory terms, as a shift 
from the visual to the gustatory. It also serves as a prompt to consider the historical 
specificity of ‘experience’ as a category. 76  As Adam Rzepka notes, in this period 
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experience and experiment ‘function as partial synonyms.’77 For Rzepka, this hints at 
how, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ‘appeal to experience’ was also ‘a 
claim to a proactive engagement... an experimental troubling of received wisdom.... 
experience is not simply had or gained, but made.’78 The association between taste and 
experience also points to the ways in which experience (both religious and natural 
historical) makes or transforms its subjects. For a number of experimental philosophers, 
taste does not only precede, but is itself a form of, incorporation: the tongue and palate 
are porous, a strikingly permeable boundary between self and world. ‘In tasting,’ writes 
Thomas Willis, ‘the Object’ of sense is not only ‘brought near, and laid upon’ the 
sensing organ: it is ‘admitted... deeply within the Pores and its passages.’ ‘The Tongue,’ 
he continues, ‘consists of a very porous Contexture; for this end, that the savory 
Particles of the thing, might be more plentifully, and more deeply admitted, into the 
passages of the Sensory.’79 Similarly, in a letter to the Royal Society dated 18 October 
1707, the Dutch microscopist Antoni van Leeuwenhoek advises that 
 
I have been long of Opinion, that our Tongue is of such a Form, that... it does 
not only communicate to the Body whatever is agreeable to it self, but also 
admits one part of the Matter that lies upon it... our Tongues are so constituted, 
as to receive a few of those Juices into the Orifices of its Vessels, and that this 
causes the Sensation which we call Taste, and that these Juices are carried or 
press’d by the little Coats or Tunica’s of the small Veins that are in the Tongue, 
and so continued by the great Vein to the Heart.80 
 
According to van Leeuwenhoek, taste is caused by the tongue’s reception of the ‘Juices’ 
of matter; these juices are then transported to the heart. Acts of tasting allow the 
material world to penetrate the body, making the self vulnerable to fundamental change. 
Taste, then, attests to the contiguity between self and world which allows for their 
mutual transformation: it reveals the faultlines in Lynch’s assertion that ‘the 
investigation of the self is unlike the investigation of any other object, each of which 
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may be fully distinguished from its observer.’ 81  For Willis and van Leeuwenhoek, 
objects of taste are not ‘fully distinguished’ from the tasting subject, but infiltrate his or 
her body right to its core.  
For Rzepka, the term ‘experience’ in the early modern period ‘marks a struggle 
to ground knowledge in the non-discursive.’82 In corroborating this assertion, I would 
like to point out how the association between the sense of taste and experiential 
immediacy within the realm of natural history and philosophy derives in part from the 
way in which flavours evade articulation. Once again, we received a hint of this in the 
previous chapter, in which a number of Protestant writers insisted on the importance of 
experiential faith over scriptural precept by analogy with the sweetness of honey, which 
must be experienced to be known. The notion that there is something fundamentally 
indescribable about tastes was proverbial in the early modern period. The 1598 
commonplace book Palladis Tamia, for example, includes Louis de Granada’s 
observation that ‘the tast of delitious meate cannot sufficiently bee expressed nor 
discribed with words to him, who heretofore hath not tasted of it.’83 In the second half 
of the seventeenth century, this proverbial assertion of the impossibility of adequately 
describing tastes came under some pressure from the taxonomic aspirations of natural 
philosophers including Grew and Wilkins. Notably, Wilkins’ monumental An essay 
towards a real character (1668) represents the culmination of a more general seventeenth-
century obsession with developing a universally intelligible language. An essay describes 
its author’s proposal for a new artificial language, or ‘Real universal character,’ in which the 
forms of words would signify ‘things and notions’ not randomly and equivocally, as in 
existing languages, but rather according to the place that those things and notions 
occupied in a logical ‘Scheme or Analysis’ determined by natural philosophy.84 Whereas 
established languages are arbitrary in the pejorative sense that the relation between word 
and thing is meaningless, in the new language words would reflect Wilkins’ arbitration of 
the place of the thing within a pre-determined natural philosophical taxonomy. 85 
Because this new language adheres to a rational system – one which supposedly 
schematizes the natural order of things – it should be more immediately 
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comprehensible. In addition, Wilkins anticipates that it will be unambiguous. Like 
Boyle, Wilkins evinces a strong suspicion of the equivocal flexibility of rhetorical 
language: although he acknowledges that ‘Metaphor and Phraseology... may contribute to 
the elegance and ornament of Speech,’ he concludes that ‘like other affected ornaments, 
they... contribute to the disguising of it with false appearances.’86 His own language will 
banish these ‘defects.’87 
 Artificial language schemes were commonly presented by their proponents as 
a corrective counterpart to the proliferation of languages believed to result from the 
destruction of the tower of Babel, and Wilkins is no exception: ‘how languages came to 
be multiplied,’ he comments, ‘is... manifested in the Story of the Confusion of Babel.’88 
Wilkins dismisses the potential criticism that in inventing yet another new language, he 
adds to this regrettable confusion; to the contrary, he argues, ‘supposing such a thing as 
is here proposed, could be well established, it would be the surest remedy that could be 
against the Curse of the Confusion, by rendring all other Languages and Characters 
useless.’89 As such, An essay takes its place amongst early Royal Society efforts to repair 
the deteriorations wrought by human history. Wilkins aspires to create a language in 
which ‘the Names of things could be so ordered, as to contain such a kind of affinity or 
opposition in their letters and sounds, as might be some way answerable to the nature of 
the things which they signified,’ a language reminiscent of the language spoken by 
Adam and Eve in Eden, which putatively signified the things according to their inherent 
qualities.90 
 Wilkins’ philological-cum-utopian ambitions, however, were thwarted when 
he came to taste, which eludes the necessary systematization which underlies these 
ambitions. In attempting to taxonomize tastes (which he conflates with smells), Wilkins 
offers a rich and evocative list of English flavour descriptors: he lists sixty-three terms 
across seven master categories, including ‘luscious,’ ‘toothsom,’ ‘foetid,’ ‘rank,’ ‘keen,’ 
‘unctious,’ ‘tart,’ ‘styptic,’ ‘saline,’ ‘brackish,’ ‘quick,’ ‘flashy,’ ‘vinewed,’ ‘addle,’ ‘wearish,’ 
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and ‘fusty.’ 91  Nonetheless, he also acknowledges that the numerousness of flavours 
means that individual tastes are ‘not provided for with distinct words,’ but must be 
described ‘by their likeness to such other things as are commonly known.’92 Many tastes 
can be described only by analogy with a third term in the common experience of 
speaker or writer and listener or reader.93 As such, tastes reintroduce metaphor into 
language, and, with metaphor, the equivocalness that for Wilkins was characteristic of 
the deceptiveness of postlapsarian language. Resisting philological schematization, 
demanding metaphorical equivocation, the multifariousness of taste (or, as Wilkins 
glosses the term, ‘Gust, Savour, Relish, Smack, Smatch, Tang’) checks Wilkins’ taxonomical, 
and thus his Edenic, ambitions.  
 The manuscript translations of Antoni van Leeuwenhoek’s letters to the Royal 
Society, prepared for inclusion in the Transactions, offer a clear illustration of the 
difficulties of describing taste sensations. Van Leeuwenhoek is most often remembered 
for his discovery of what he called animalcules (now known as micro-organisms) 
including spermatozoa and bacteria.94 Less frequently noted is that these remarkable 
observations grew out of van Leeuwenhoek’s sustained and intense interest in the sense 
of taste, exemplified above in his comments on the porous tongue. 95  He first saw 
bacteria, for example, on 24 April 1676, whilst examining a three-week-old infusion of 
crushed pepper in water in an effort to determine what gives the spice its powerful and 
distinctive taste.96 Over the next thirty years, van Leeuwenhoek continued to engage in 
an effort to understand taste, using his powerful microscopes to examine both a range 
of gustable substances, and the tongue and palate, and communicating his discoveries in 
letters to the Royal Society (of which he became a fellow in 1680). Van Leeuwenhoek’s 
epistles were written in colloquial Dutch, and the exertions of the Royal Society’s 
translators to render them into English for publication in the Philosophical Transactions 
illustrate the difficulty of describing flavours. In the manuscript translations of the 
sections of the letters which deal with tastes and tasting, words are densely effaced, 
                                                          
91 Wilkins, An essay, Ff1r (217).  
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93 Jonathan Gil Harris makes a similar point about smell: ‘the words used to describe smell tend not to be 
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replaced, struck through, and interpolated. A translation of one 1692 letter, for instance, 
reads: 
 
I have again bent my speculations upon the pepper, and especially, what is  to 
[illegible] the reason, that the particles of pepper lye so prickling painful in our 
Mouths, whereas being conveyed into the inward parts of our Body, viz as into 
our Stomach, and gutts, they cause not the least pricking working or motion… 
 
              many 
              should 
…I have Severall times fancied, when I looked upon the... peper, which wee ^ 
call meat, that the particles, by reason that many of them are very sharp, cause in 
our Mouth upon our tongue theat pricking, which many doe call a is [illegible] 
cald its heat.97                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Hesitation about the most appropriate English word to translate the Dutch equivalent 
intersects with uncertainty about how to describe the taste of pepper, resulting in a 
document shot through with sous rature: is pepper merely ‘prickling,’ or actually ‘painful’? 
Or is it, as ‘many doe call’ it, simply hot? Is it even a ‘meat,’ a foodstuff, at all? ‘Wee’ call 
it so, or at least, we ‘should,’ or rather, ‘many’ do so. And where does the sensation – 
prickly, painful, or hot – take place: in the mouth, or ‘upon our tongue’?  
Wilkins’ grudging acknowledgement that flavours, resisting schematization, generate 
metaphor, and the messy foul papers of van Leeuwenhoek’s translators, attest in 
different ways to the difficulties of precisely capturing taste in language. Ultimately, the 
only way to know the flavour of something, is to taste it; taste cleaves to experience, 
resisting language and report. It is this characteristic that makes taste so appropriate to 
the Royal Society’s rejection of authority in favour of first-hand experience. But taste’s 
protean, elusive nature could also be problematic, as its disruptive place in Wilkins’ An 
essay towards a real character suggests. In the next section of this chapter, I will explore the 
problematic aspects of taste more fully, placing Willis’ and van Leeuwenhoek’s notion 
of taste as penetrative in the context of corpuscular theory, and of microscopic 
investigations into the tongue. 
 
                                                          
97 Translation of  a letter from Antoni van Leeuwenhoek to the Royal Society, Delft, 1692. London, The 
Royal Society Centre for the History of  Science, classified letters, EL/L2/32. 
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IV. ‘the Corpuscularian Doctrine of Tasts’ 
 
So far, I have suggested that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between early 
Royal Society uses of the sense of taste a mode of investigation and rhetorical uses of 
taste to describe the Society’s work as a redemptive reversal of the original, sinful act of 
tasting. This celebratory story is, however, complicated by contemporary research into 
taste understood not as a property of things – ‘taste’ as a synonym of flavour – but 
rather as a physiological, subjective process. Uses of the sense of taste within the early 
Royal Society to discover and taxonomize the constitution and properties of substances 
are matched by the interest of members including Boyle, Grew, and van Leeuwenhoek, 
as well as physicians and anatomists such as the Italian Marcello Malpighi, and Thomas 
Willis, in the anatomy of the tongue and the ways in which people come to apprehend 
flavours. The second half of this chapter will thus explore how an emphasis on how 
flavours are experienced by tasting subjects, as opposed to what flavours can reveal 
about material objects, problematizes the association of the sense of taste with 
authentic, and potentially redemptive, knowledge. 
For Grew and his fellows, the epistemological value of the sense of taste relies 
both on the capacity of gustation to accurately apprehend the qualities and properties of 
the material world, and on its commonality. This evident in Grew’s ‘A Discourse 
Concerning the Essential and Marine Salts of Plants,’ originally read before the Royal 
Society in 1676. Whilst the ‘Discourse’ was revised for inclusion in The anatomy, at points 
it retains a tone of direct address, divulging its original status as an accompaniment to 
an experimental demonstration before an audience. Grew recounts an experiment 
intended to show that there are variations in the types of ‘Lixivial’ (that is, alkaline) salts 
belonging to different plants: 
 
I took an equal quantity of the whitest and purest Salts of divers Plants, all made 
by an equal degree of Calcination [i.e. burning]; and dissolved them all severally in 
an equal quantity of water. And pouring likewise an equal quantity, as about 10 
or 12 drops of each into a spoon, I tasted them severally. Whereby it was very 
evident, that they were not all of one Taste, but of very different ones, both as to 
strength and kind: and therefore different in Nature also... The Solutions are here 
present to be tasted.98  
                                                          
98 Grew, The anatomy of plants, Qq4v (264). 
188 
 
 
Because the flavour of the salt solutions varies in strength and kind, Grew argues, it 
follows that they are also ‘different in Nature,’ or constitution. Taste sensations 
apparently attest to the inherent qualities of plants. Grew presumes, furthermore, that 
his own taste experiences are replicable – a crucial condition, of course, of the success 
of a scientific experiment – and that they are sharable.99 The presumed uniformity of 
taste allows gustation to play a role not only in the production, but also in the 
communal verification, of knowledge: ‘the Solutions are here present to be tasted,’ 
Grew proclaims confidently, apparently assured that the gustatory experience of his 
companions will duplicate his own.  
This confidence in the capacity of taste to accurately apprehend the material 
world reflects a strand of thought according to which it is not the senses themselves, 
but the flawed interpretation of the information they provide, that leads to error. This 
approach is evident in the works of the clergyman and Society propagandist Joseph 
Glanvill. In his 1661 The Vanity of Dogmatizing, Glanvill declares that ‘to do our senses 
right, simply they are not deceived, but only administer an occasion to our forward 
understandings to deceive themselves.’100 This suggestion that epistemological error arises 
not from physical sensation, but from the mind’s misinterpretation of sense data, 
echoes Bacon in the Advancement: ‘the Sences,’ writes Bacon, ‘are verie sufficient to 
certifie and report truth.’101 The scholastic logicians who accuse the senses of deception, 
he goes on, ‘ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual 
powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding on the reports of the 
senses.’102  
Grew’s assumption that the flavours of plants correspond to their innate 
properties, and thus form reliable guides to their medicinal uses, is undermined by his 
affirmations elsewhere in The anatomy of plants that tastes are contingent entities, created 
jointly by tasting subject and tasted object and affected by a range of temporal and 
agricultural circumstances. ‘The Causes of Tastes,’ Grew writes, 
 
                                                          
99 Sprat emphasises the Royal Society’s insistence on the ‘accurate repetition of their Experiments’ in The 
history of the Royal-Society, Dd4r (215) (see also N2r (99)).On the importance (and the difficulties) of 
replicability to experimental science, and on the literary form of the essay as a facilitator of ‘virtual 
witnessing,’ see Steven Shapin, ‘Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology,’ Social 
Studies of Science 14/4 (1984): 489-91. 
100 Glanvill, The Vanity of  Dogmatizing, H6r-v (91-92). 
101 Bacon, The twoo bookes, Nn3r (51). 
102 Ibid, Nn3v (52). 
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are, in general, these Four or Five, sc. [ilicet; namely] The Bed out of which they 
grow; The Aer in which they stand; The Parts of which they consist; The several 
Fermentations under which their Juyces pass; And the Organs by which their Tastable 
Parts are perceiv’d.103 
 
Because environmental factors such as soil, air, and age play a part in the production of 
tastes, the flavour of a single kind of plant can vary significantly, both between distinct 
instances of a particular variety, and also according to the age of the plant. ‘Tulips and 
some other Roots,’ for instance, ‘being taken up, in open weather, sometime before they 
sprout; if tasted, are as sweet as Liquirish or Sugar; and at no other time.’104 Yet more 
surprisingly, Grew lists the taste ‘Organs’ as one cause of the tastes of plants. It is 
important to bear in mind, here, Grew’s use of the word ‘Causes’: Grew is not asserting 
that the taste organs perceive tastes, or that they affect the experience of taste, but that they 
are amongst the factors which constitute or create tastes. 
In what sense do the gustatory organs create, rather than simply perceive, tastes? 
Grew’s inclusion of the tasting organs within his list of the ‘causes’ of tastes becomes 
more comprehensible when it is understood in relation to what Robert Boyle had 
named, in 1676, as ‘the Corpuscularian Doctrine of Tasts,’ and which was also 
advocated by Willis and van Leeuwenhoek.105 Corpuscularian theory – which bore a 
close relation to the mechanical philosophy – held that all matter is composed of tiny 
particles, or corpuscles. The form, arrangements, and motion of these corpuscules are 
supposed to form the basis of, and provide an explanation for, the sensible properties 
of the material world. Boyle’s adherence to corpuscularianism is apparent in his 
Experiments, notes, &c., in which he aims to demonstrate that ‘Mechanical Principles’ 
offer an adequate explanation for ‘the Qualities of bodies,’ including the sensible quality 
of taste. 106  Boyle hypothesises that the ‘Origine… of Sapours’ can be sufficiently 
accounted for by reference to the purely mechanical factors of ‘the bigness, figure and 
motion of the saporifick corpuscles… considered separately… or else in a state of 
                                                          
103 Grew, The anatomy of plants, Tt4v (286). 
104 Ibid., Tt5v (288). 
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conjunction.’107  As with Grew’s The anatomy of plants, however, the Experiments, notes, &c. 
embodies a tension between taste understood as an objective quality of things, and taste 
understood as a subjective experience. Boyle begins by addressing ‘Tast considered as 
belonging to the Object.’ Even as he asserts that his interest will be limited to objective 
taste, however, the distinction between objective and subjective taste breaks down: by 
‘tast… as belong to the object,’ he continues, he means ‘that quality… which enables a 
body by its operation, to produce in us that sensation, which we feel or perceive when 
we say we tast.’108 Objective taste is only comprehensible as that which affects the tasting 
subject. Boyle further acknowledges the importance of the tasting subject when he 
elaborates on his central thesis:  
 
this something, whether you will call it a quality, or whatever else it be that 
makes or denominates an object saporous, or rather (if I may be allowed a 
barbarous term) saporifick, may so depend upon the shape, size, motion, and 
other Mechanical affections of the small parts of the tasted body, and result 
from the association of two or more of them, not excluding their congruity or 
incongruity to the organs of Tasting.109 
 
Tastes arise when minute flavour particles, or corpuscles, come into contact with ‘the 
organs of Tasting’; the specific nature of the flavour perceived depends on the ‘shape, 
size, motion’ of the corpuscules, but also on their ‘congruity’ or otherwise to the 
subject’s palate, tongue, and so on. Boyle’s somewhat torturous syntax here seems to 
encode the process of his thought. In particular, his self-correction, as he retrospectively 
replaces ‘saporous’ with ‘saporifick,’ anticipates his inclusion of the tasting organs in the 
factors which contribute to flavours: whereas the ‘-ous’ suffix of the former term 
implies something ‘abounding in, full of, characterized by’ sapour (that is, something 
which possesses a taste), the ‘-fic[k]’ suffix of the latter term denotes ‘making, causing, 
producing’ (that is, something which causes a taste, presumably in a subject).110 Boyle’s 
‘barborous’ neologism, then, implicitly recognises a tasting subject upon whom the 
‘saporous’ object acts, causing or producing the sensation of flavour. 
                                                          
107 Ibid., A2r (3). 
108 Ibid., A2v-A3r (4-5). 
109 Ibid., A3r (5). 
110 See ‘-ous, suffix,’ and ‘-fic, suffix.’ OED Online, both accessed 23/06/13. 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/133383 and www.oed.com/view/Entry/69793. 
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The corpuscularian doctrine of tastes was given greater anatomical specificity by 
the work of Marcello Malpighi, whose discovery – aided by his colleague Carlo Frascatti 
– of the tastebuds was disseminated in England via the Philosophical Transactions in 1666. 
Having viewed the tongue under a microscope, Henry Oldenburg writes, paraphrasing a 
letter from Malpighi, Malpighi ‘hath discovered in it many little Eminences, which he calls 
Papillary, and believes to be the principal Organ of Taste.’111 Those ‘little Eminences,’ 
located at the back of the mouth, ‘serve,’ according to Fracassati, ‘for Funnels... which 
maketh the Author think it very probable that the finest part of the aliment passeth 
immediately from the Tongue into the Nerves.’112 
The influence of both Boyle’s corpuscularian theory of tastes and the findings 
of Malpighi and Frascatti is apparent in Willis’ and van Leeuwenhoek’s remarks, quoted 
earlier, regarding the porousness of the tongue. It is also evident in Grew’s Anatomy. For 
Grew, tastes are produced by the ways in which the shape and size of flavour corpuscles 
interact with the gustatory organs, particularly the newly-discovered taste-buds. He 
writes that ‘the Principles [i.e. the constituent corpuscles] of Plants’: 
 
affect the Organs of Sense, according to the variety of their Figures... So those 
which are sharp or pointed; and those which are springy; are fitted to produce 
any stronger Taste: and those which are round, are apt, of their own Nature, to 
produce a weaker or softer one.113 
 
Grew’s description, here, presents taste as interestingly tactile. The intensity of gustatory 
sensation derives from the figure, or form, of the plant’s flavour particles. As in 
Aristotelian orthodoxy, in corpuscularian doctrine taste is a kind of subset or variety of 
touch.114 Grew’s ‘sense’ that the tongue is a tactile as much as a gustatory entity is 
reflected in a couple of inconspicuous but telling moments in the The anatomy, in which 
Grew reveals that he uses his tongue as a kind of exceptionally delicate, adept 
experimental instrument. He recommends, for instance, that the ‘Third or Inmost’ skins 
                                                          
111 Henry Oldenburg, ‘An Account of Some Discoveries Concerning the Brain, and the Tongue, Made by 
Signior Malpighi, Professor of Physick in Sicily,’ Philosophical Transactions 2 (1666-67): 492.  
112 Ibid., 492. 
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of Melissa seeds might be removed ‘upon soaking in warm Water or on the Tongue.’115 
Similarly, he enjoins that in order to observe the ‘Milk-Vessels’ of plants such as borage 
and dandelions unobscured by ‘the Milk’ (that is, the milky sap) that they produce, the 
sap ‘is to be taken off, not with the Finger but the Tongue.’ Once this ‘milk’ has ‘been 
frequently licked off,’ the vessels will be ‘visible, even without a Glass.’116 Grew’s use of 
his tongue as a precise, tactile implement (which recalls Helkiah Crooke’s description, 
discussed in chapter 2, of lapidaries’ use of their tongues to determine the quality of 
precious stones) inverts the relation between taste and vision which pertains for 
Malpighi and van Leeuwenhoek. Where the microscopists interrogate taste by looking at 
the tongue through magnifying lenses, Grew uses his tongue in order to be able to see, 
‘even without a Glass.’ 
Grew stresses the importance, not only of the object of taste (the principles of 
plants), but also of the tasting subject’s gustatory organs, in producing tastes:  
 
A Tast is Lingual, Guttural, &c. according to the grosness or fineness or other 
difference of the Membranes into which the tastable parts [of a substance] are 
admitted. For Tasts are made not meerly by the outward Contact, but the Ingress 
of the tastable parts. Now the outer Skin of the Tongue... hath either no sense, or 
much less than that which lies under it; and is therefore, but a Seive or Strainer to 
the tastable parts. So that being of different fineness in the several parts of the 
Tongue; it hereby comes to pass, that according as the tastable parts of any Plant 
are more or less penetrant, subtle, or dissoluble, they are admitted into one part 
of the Tongue, and not another.’117 
 
Whilst he modifies Frascatti’s culinary analogy – calling the tongue a sieve, rather than 
the tastebuds funnels – Grew echoes his assertion that the flavour particles are 
penetrative, entering into the tongue itself.  The new mechanical and corpuscularian 
accounts of gustation, then, posit taste as an interaction between object and subject, 
flavour particles and tasting organs (especially the papillae, or tastebuds). In this context, 
the subjectivity of taste does not derive from the misapprehension of flavours – due 
either to mental misinterpretation of them, or to a superfluity of humors in the tongue – 
but is, rather, a necessary condition of taste. Because the particular form of the subject’s 
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taste organs play a causative role in producing tastes, ‘taste’ as a property of the material 
world (that is, as a synonym of flavour), and taste as a verb, a process, an experience, are 
inextricable: subjectivity is inherent to taste, not incidental, accidental, or pathological. 
Grew’s nomination of tastes as either ‘Lingual,’ or ‘Guttural, &c,’ is also 
significant, testifying to his interest in the organoleptic origins of flavours. The tongue is 
not the only physiological factor in the production of tastes; lingual (tongue-based) 
flavours coexist with guttural flavours (perceived in the throat). Grew’s inclusive ‘&c,’ 
furthermore, can be glossed by cross-reference: elsewhere in The anatomy of plants, he lists 
‘the Seats of Tasts,’ as inclusive of ‘the Lips, Tongue, Palate, Throat and Gullet.’118 Tastes are 
defined, in part, by the body part which apprehends them. One consequence of 
understanding taste in this way is that the number of possible flavours burgeons wildly. 
Following classical and medieval authorities, early modern estimates as to the number of 
basic, or ‘simple,’ flavours usually fell between six and nine.119 In contrast, Grew writes 
that the ‘simple Tasts... are, at least Sixteen.’120 Furthermore, these simple tastes can be 
combined together to make ‘compounded Tasts.’ These compounded tastes ‘are very 
numerous; being made by the various Conjunction of Simple Tasts... Sometimes of two... 
Sometimes three... Sometimes four... And in some Bodies, five or six Species may be 
joyned together.’121 Consequently, ‘the Sensible distinctions [between tastes]... may lie 
almost as wide, as of Plants themselves.’122   
According to Grew, then, the tastes of plants are variable, fluctuating according 
to environmental and temporal circumstance; intrinsically subjective, produced by an 
interaction between the corpuscles of the tasted object and the gustatory organs of the 
tasting subject; and dauntingly multitudinous, potentially as numerous as ‘Plants 
themselves.’ The fundamental instability of tastes, moreover, means that they are 
subject to human manipulation. In his Experiments, notes, &c., Boyle submits that it is 
possible to prove the accuracy of the corpuscularian theory of tastes by showing that 
                                                          
118 The quotation continues to make a distinction between the parts of tongue itself: 
 
Upon the Tongue, Tasts are perceived in Three places... On the Tip or Cone of the Tongue; as most 
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Grew, The anatomy of plants, Tt3v (284). 
119 See Charles Burnett, ‘The Superiority of Taste,’ 232. 
120 Grew, The anatomy of plants, Ss4v (280). 
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‘tast may be diversified [i.e. rendered diverse, altered]’ by changing the texture of the 
flavour particles. 123  If a change in texture results in an alteration in the taste of a 
substance, Boyle suggests, then it is possible to deduce a causal relation between 
corpuscularian form and flavour. His method of demonstrating this is to mix together 
distinctly flavoured substances to produce radically different tastes, explaining the 
transformation as a result of the ‘various justlings and occursions’ of the newly mixed 
flavour particles. These ‘justlings’ work to ‘recompose’ or reform the particles into new 
sizes and shapes, thus producing new flavours.124 Boyle includes numerous experiments 
to illustrate this principle, recording, for example, that ‘aqua fortis’ (that is, nitric acid 
diluted in water) will taste ‘bitter as Gall’ when mixed with refined silver, but ‘of a 
Saccharine sweetness’ when mixed with lead.  
 Boyle also refers, however, to domestic and social experience.  In a 
section on how ‘to imitate by Art… the peculiar Tasts of natural Bodies’ included in the 
Experiments, notes, &c., Boyle divulges an interest in the quotidian culinary and cosmetic 
arts.125 The final example which he gives comes from ‘some ingenious Ladies,’ and it 
instructs readers how to perfume Malaga or Canary wine with the ‘odoriferous’ roots of 
‘Orrice’ (iris).126 Boyle reports how, having tried this himself, and then dyed the wine 
with ‘Cocheneele, or some such tingeing ingredient,’ he tricked ‘a couple of eminent 
Physicians, one of whom pretended to an extraordinary criticalness of palate’ into 
‘wondering, how at such an unlikely time of the year… I could have such excellent 
Rasberry-Wine.’127 As a lesson in ingenious huswifery, the anecdote contains a covert 
riposte to detractors of the Royal Society, who criticized their interests as having no 
practical value.128 It is also, of course, intentionally funny, and provides a glimpse of the 
playful side of a figure whose aristocratic position and reputation for formidable 
learning and moral rectitude, can seem intimidating. Concurrently, it gives off a whiff of 
cruelty: the physician’s claims to ‘an extraordinary criticalness of palate’ may well be a 
pretentious affectation but gustatory acuity was also a basic constituent of professional 
competency for medical practitioners. Most importantly here, both Boyle’s experiments 
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into the changeable nature of tastes, and the directives included in the section on how 
‘to imitate by Art… the peculiar Tasts of natural Bodies,’ contribute to a cumulative 
sense of flavour as radically unstable, manipulable, and variable. As such, they 
undermine the link between tastes and the innate qualities of the material world, that 
undergirded taste’s utility as a faculty of experimental and empirical knowledge-
production for botanists and chemists, as well as for pompous physicians.   
Boyle’s ‘orrice’ root anecdote is also significant because it provides an 
illustration of the extent to which chemistry and botany drew, in their early stages, on 
the domiciliary knowledge and techniques belonging to women. 129  Chemistry’s 
affiliation to the esotericism of alchemy is matched by its kinship to the more quotidian 
culinary and cosmetic arts; similarly, botany can trace its origins to the herbal lore 
accumulated by domestic, as well as professional, practitioners of physic. 130  This 
genealogy often surfaces obliquely, in metaphors which use the kinds of tacit knowledge 
which underscore domestic and culinary expertise as points of comparison for 
experimental processes.131 In The history of the Royal-Society, for example, Sprat describes 
how to make gunpowder: the salt-peter that is one of its main ingredients, he specifies, 
must be ‘dissolved in as much water as will just take it up, and then the water must be 
boiled away till the Peter comes to the thickness of hasty-pudding.’132 When early Royal 
Society members confronted this relation to traditionally female and domestic realms, 
they strove to frame it as a matter of macho domination. Conventionally, nature is 
gendered as female: thus, in Some considerations touching the usefulness, for example, Boyle 
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asserts of ‘Physiologie’ that it ‘is not only Delightful, as it teaches us to Know Nature, 
but also as it teaches us in many Cases to Master and Command her.’133  
Conversely, however, forms of knowledge traditionally gendered as female 
could resist, and even pose a threat to, experimental science in its embryonic stages. 
Margaret Cavendish is an important figure here. Cavendish’s well-documented 
fascination with natural philosophy in general, and the new empirical and experimental 
methodologies advocated by the Royal Society in particular, is tempered by scepticism, 
especially regarding the practical utility of the Society’s interests, and the accuracy of 
their instruments.134  Her criticisms of the Society, moreover, are frequently expressed in 
terms which privilege the culinary and the domestic as a source of scientific knowledge. 
At points in her Observations upon experimental philosophy, she attempts to legitimize her 
censure of Society celebrities such as Hooke by framing it in almost maternal tones, as 
an extension of parental authority: ‘as Boys that play with watry Bubbles, or fling Dust 
into each others Eyes... are worthy of reproof rather then praise; for wasting their time 
with useless sports,’ she counsels sternly, ‘so those that addict themselves to 
unprofitable Arts, spend more time then they reap benefit thereby.’135 The marginal 
notes, which gloss ‘Bubbles’ as ‘Glass-tubes,’ and ‘Dust’ as ‘Atomes,’ make no secret of 
the targets of her punitive instincts.  
Peter Dear discusses Cavendish’s argument that microscopic evidence is 
unreliable, and distorts the world it pretends to expose. In Micrographia, Hooke had 
demonstrated how, under the microscope, the point of a needle appears rounded, and 
the apparently sharp edge of a razor blunt.136 ‘But if the edge of a knife, or point of a 
needle were naturally and really so as the microscope presents them,’ Cavendish objects 
in the Observations, ‘they would never be so useful as they are; for a flat or broad plain-
edged knife would not cut, nor a blunt globe pierce so suddenly another body.’137 As 
Dear notes, Cavendish is convinced ‘that ordinary human perceptions of the world are 
the absolute and normative ones – especially when associated with usefulness.’ 138 
                                                          
133 Boyle, Some considerations, D2r (19). 
134 ‘I have but little faith... in Telescopical, Microscopical, and the like inspections, and prefer rational and 
judicious Observations before deluding Glasses and Experiments,’ Cavendish writes. Furthermore, ‘I 
cannot perceive any great advantage’ she claims, in ‘the lately invented Art of Micrography.’ Her assertion 
that ‘inspection of the exterior parts of Vegetables, doth not give us any knowledg how to Sow, Set, 
Plant, and Graft; so that a Gardener or Husbandman will gain no advantage at all by this Art’ seems 
particularly pertinent to Grew. Cavendish, Observations, b1r, c2v, and d1r.  
135 Cavendish, Observations, D2r (11).   
136 Hooke, Micrographia, B1r-C1r (1-5). 
137 Cavendish, Observations, D1r (9). 
138 Peter Dear, ‘A Philosophical Duchess: Understanding Margaret Cavendish and the Royal Society,’ in 
Cummins and Burchell, eds., Science, Literature, and Rhetoric, 136. 
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Cavendish, however, does not only pitch domestic experience against microscopical 
evidence as a source of knowledge about the material world: she also implicitly tests the 
tactile against the visual, valorizing the palpable cutting and piercing of blade and needle 
over their appearance of bluntness. For Cavendish, then, the contest between domestic 
and proto-scientific experience as sources of knowledge is also framed in sensory terms: 
here, as the antagonism of touch and sight. Elsewhere, however, Cavendish pitches the 
doubtful ocular authority of the microscope not only against the tactile experience of 
the razorblade- or needle-wielder, but also against the culinary and gustatory expertise 
of ‘good-huswifes.’ Again, Cavendish takes umbrage with Hooke specifically. In 
Micrographia, Hooke had recorded ‘certain little baggs, bladders, or receptacles’ attached 
to the ‘stinging points’ of nettles; these bags, he asserted, were ‘full of water, or as I 
ghess, the liquor of the Plant, which was poisonous.’139 Cavendish is not impressed: 
against ‘the opinion of those, who believe that the swelling, burning, and smarting pain 
caused by the stinging of Nettles and Bees, doth proceed from a poisonous juice,’ 
Cavendish reminds the reader that ‘it is commonly known, that Nettles, when young, 
are often-times eaten in Sallets, and minced into Broths... whereas, if there were any 
poison in them, the interior parts of animal bodies, after eating them, would swell and 
burn.’ 140  According to the redoubtable Cavendish, quotidian culinary expertise and 
gustatory experience provide a corrective counterpart to the epistemological 
presumption of ocularcentric science.  
Cavendish’s gender, and her reputation as something of an eccentric, prevented 
her criticisms of the Royal Society’s methods from having any substantial repercussions; 
Thomas Shadwell’s satirical caricature of Hooke as the absurd, obsessive 
experimentalist Sir Nicholas Gimcrack in his 1676 play The Virtuoso, apparently had 
rather more impact. (Famously, Hooke returned from a performance of Shadwell’s play 
in state of extreme disgruntlement: ‘damned dogs,’ he wrote in his diary that evening, 
‘people almost pointed. Vindica Me Deus.’141) Nonetheless, Cavendish’s criticisms had 
the potential to be rather more devastating than Shadwell’s sardonic, but ultimately 
personal, defamation, for in criticising the microscope as deceptive and distorting, she 
attacked the very instruments by which early Royal Society members argued they had 
repaired what was believed to be the natural inaccuracy of the postlapsarian senses. As 
                                                          
139 Hooke, Micrographia, V6r (143). 
140 Cavendish, Observations, F2v (20). 
141 For Hooke’s response to the play, see Rhodri Lewis, ‘Robert Hooke at 371,’ Perspectives on Science 14/4 
(2006): 558. 
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Hooke writes in the preface to Micrographia, ‘by the addition of... artificial Instruments and 
methods, there may be, in some manner, a reparation made for the mischiefs, and 
imperfection, mankind has drawn upon it self.’ Specifically, ‘in respect of the Senses,’ 
Hooke advocates ‘a supplying of their infirmities with Instruments, and, as it were, the 
adding of artificial Organs to the natural; this in one of them has been of late years 
accomplisht with prodigious benefit to all sorts of useful knowledge, by the invention of 
Optical Glasses.’142 Hooke goes on to predict that just ‘as Glasses have highly promoted 
our seeing, so ’tis not improbable, but that there may be found many Mechanical Inventions 
to improve our other Senses, of hearing, smelling, tasting, touching.’143 Most pertinently here, 
Hooke suggests: 
 
that our taste may be very much improv’d, either by preparing our tast for the 
Body, as, after eating bitter things, Wine, or other Vinous liquors, are more sensibly 
tasted; or else by preparing Bodies for our tast; as the dissolving of Metals with 
acid Liquors, make them tastable, which were before altogether insipid.144 
 
Whilst Hooke’s proposals for the artificial enhancement of the sense of taste remain at 
the level of tentative conjecture, for Grew they provided a possible way to resolve the 
tension that this chapter has been tracing. As he himself was aware, Grew’s belief that 
the flavours of plants fluctuate according to circumstances including location, age, and 
the composition of the individual’s tongue, compromised his desire to discover the 
salutary uses of organic substances by identifying their tastes. If flavours are variable, 
how can they provide a consistently reliable guide to the properties of plants? Grew 
attempts to resolve the conflict between his mechanistic conception of tastes as 
contingent on the human taste organs, on the one hand, and his efforts to affix them 
decisively to medical functions, on the other, by prescribing methods of tasting that are 
supposed to improve the accuracy of the sense of taste. To achieve the end of ‘the more 
accurate Observation’ of (in this case, compounded) tastes, for example, Grew advises 
‘that not too many be tasted at one time: least the Tongue being surcharged, become less 
critical’ and ‘that the Mouth be washed with warm water betwixt every tasting.’145 So far, 
so commonsensical. A closer examination, however, reveals the fault-lines in Grew’s 
                                                          
142 Hooke, Micrographia, a1r. 
143 Ibid., b3v. 
144 Hooke, Micrographia, b4r-v. 
145 Grew, The anatomy of  plants, Tt1r (281). 
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reasoning. Grew advises that in order to perceive accurately ‘the degrees’ of different 
tastes: 
 
it will be best, To take those Bodies, whose Tasts are, as near as may be, the same 
in Specie: and that those be first tasted, which are less strong; whereby the true 
Degree will be more precisely taken.146 
 
His logic is circular. In order to observe the degrees of tastes, Grew recommends 
starting with those which are ‘less durable’ and ‘which are less strong,’ presupposing a 
prior knowledge of precisely the gradations of duration and degree that this method of 
tasting is supposed to identify. Despite Grew’s best methodological efforts, The anatomy 
of plants remains riven by a fundamental conflict between utopian ambition, according to 
which identifying the flavours of plants will allow the development of medicines able to 
restore bodily health to something approaching prelapsarian vigour, and the subjective 
realities of taste, according to which the relations between flavours and the qualities of 
things (and thus, their medicinal value) are convoluted at best and non-existent at worst. 
 
V. ‘sweeter and more plausible Studies’ 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that Grew’s work testifies to an unresolved discord 
between its author’s desire to categorically determine correlations between the flavours 
of plants and their medicinal virtues, and his understanding of tastes as circumstantial 
and contingent, produced jointly by tasting subject and tasted object. This dichotomy 
represents a wider tension in the early Royal Society. On the one hand, uses of taste to 
generate data about the material world were bolstered by taste’s prior epistemological 
associations with acts of testing and intimate experiential knowledge, as well as by the 
suggestion, influenced both by Parascelian medical theory and Protestant rhetoric, that 
acts of natural historical tasting could serve as a redemptive reversal of Adam and Eve’s 
tasting of the fruit of knowledge. On the other hand, investigations into how taste 
works as a physiological process – especially, into how the tongue receives tastes – led 
to a more complicated sense of taste experiences as shaped by a range of factors, 
including the specific form of an individual’s taste organs. In the mechanistic, tactile 
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theories of gustation adopted by Grew, and by contemporaries including Boyle, Willis, 
and van Leeuwenhoek, taste – and thus the data it produces – is deeply subjective.  
It is subjective, moreover, in a way which challenges conventional ideas about 
what subjectivity is, and its implications for natural knowledge. In particular, early Royal 
Society ideas about taste highlight the applicability of the notion of embodied 
subjectivity, which scholars of the passions have explored productively, to epistemology 
In a recent article on ‘The Sciences of Subjectivity,’ Steven Shapin notes that, whilst 
historians have increasingly recognised the role of subjectivity in the production of 
scientific knowledge, they continue to approach it as ‘a philosophical trouble,’ 
something which ‘pollutes objective knowledge.’ 147  Against this approach, Shapin 
embarks on an analysis of taste as ‘one among many practices of subjectivity.’148 Shapin 
suggests that ideas about aesthetic taste amongst eighteenth-century philosophers 
including Hume and Kant, according to whom taste is subjective, but also has the 
potential to become intersubjective, are ‘instructive’ for historians of science. 149  In 
particular, he proposes that in the cases of both aesthetic and scientific taste, the 
appearance of objectivity is produced out of intersubjectivity, or the consensus of ‘taste 
communities.’ 150  This allows us to appreciate how scientific judgement may work 
analogously to – indeed, may even be a form of – connoisseurship.151  
Scientific taste thus serves as another weapon in the important and instructive 
war that Shapin has long been waging against positivism, presentism, and objectivism in 
the history and sociology of science. I would add, however, that Shapin’s emphasis on 
the development of tastes as a process of learnt enculturation reflects a presumption 
that the subjectivity of taste is primarily social. For Shapin, both subjectivity and 
objectivity are social constructs: ‘hard political and cultural work,’ rather than 
epistemological facts. 152  Shapin shares with sensory historiography more generally a 
belief that, as Mark Jenner puts it, ‘cultural frames, screens, grids, or lenses mediate 
perception.’153 As Jenner argues, ‘this kind of approach misses entirely how sensing is 
not only shaped by cultural categories, but also is and was part of an individual’s active 
engagement with, and participation in, the world.’154 For Grew and his contemporaries, 
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153 Jenner, ‘Tasting Lichfield,’ 669.  
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it is also a function of an individual’s physiology. The subjectivity of judgements of taste 
does not reside in the interpretation of sense data in accordance with socio-cultural 
expectations and ideals. Rather, taste is a form of embodied subjectivity, attributable in 
part to the particular configuration of an individual’s specific sense organs. This kind of 
embodied subjectivity is, for key figures within early natural science, a necessary – if 
deeply problematic – condition of knowledge derived from sensation. 
 
*** 
 
In the introduction to their edited collection Making Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, 
Pamela Smith and Benjamin Schmidt comment that in the seventeenth century ‘the 
distinction between sensuality and sensory observation could be a fine one.’155 Indeed, 
both Sprat and Hooke place a heavy emphasis on the ‘sensible pleasure,’ as Sprat puts it, 
as well as the epistemological and practical value, of experimental philosophy; ‘what 
raptures’ Sprat enthuses, ‘can the most voluptuous men fancy to which these are not 
equal?’ 156  Similarly, for Hooke, ‘Experimental Philosophy... [is] a material and sensible 
Pleasure.’157 Often, the language of sweetness is used to express this pleasure; ‘great mens 
Children,’ argues Sprat, ‘should be charm’d by the allurements, of sweeter and more 
plausible Studies: And for this purpose Experiments are the fittest.’ 158  Like humanist 
learning, experimental philosophy is dulce, as well as utile. For experimentalists 
concerned with taste, this is sometimes literally the case; not everything tasted by Grew, 
Boyle, van Leeuwenhoek and their fellows was an occasion for revulsion. Sugar, writes 
van Leeuwenhoek in a letter to the Royal Society, ‘proves even smooth and soft upon 
the Tongue, affecting it with pleasure.’159 ‘The sweet savour,’ writes Thomas Willis, 
‘seems to be made, for as much as the Particles of any Body are so figured, into soft 
prickles, that they tickle the Sensory, with a soft rubbing, and from thence stir up a 
delightful Sense of Pleasure; like as if feathers were applied to the Sides, or the Soles of 
the Feet.’ 160  Echoing Helkiah Crooke’s description of taste, in his 1615 
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Mikrokosmographia, as the ‘Sense of pleasure’ (discussed in chapter 2), Willis names 
sweetness as the archetypal pleasurable sensation, and underscores the haptic 
dimensions of his description: his characteristically corpuscularian mingling of taste and 
tactility is playfully sensual. The sensual pleasures of sweetness, however, are founded 
on – and always have the potential to revert to – something quite different: acidity. In 
Grew’s words, sweetness is: 
 
produced.... most commonly, by a smoothed Acid... Hence a Sweet Taste, is 
generally founded in a Sower; So Sower Apples, by mellowing, and harsh Pears, 
by baking become sweet; the Spirit and Sulphur being hereby at once separated 
from the other Principles and brought to a nearer union with the Acid.161  
 
Sweetness, then, is founded on and enfolds its opposite: acidity, perceived by the palate 
as sourness. Conversely, as Thomas Willis writes, ‘there are many Instances, by which 
sweetness is abolished; for all sweet things too much boiled, grow bitter.’162 The sensual 
pleasure of sweetness, and the bitterness that lurks behind this pleasure, threatening to 
reassert itself, will be relevant in my next chapter. Shifting the focus from sensory 
observation to sensuality, I will explore seventeenth-century love poetry and drama 
though the lens of the ubiquitous pairing of sweet and bitter to describe the antithetical, 
but also intimately imbricated, experiences of sexual desire and betrayal.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
‘Honey secrets’: 
Erotic Sweetness and Epistemology 
 
I. ‘honey secrets’ 
 
Early in Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis (1593), the eponymous Goddess begins her 
wooing of the resistant Adonis by asking him to alight from his horse. ‘If thou wilt 
deign this favour,’ she promises, ‘for thy meed / A thousand honey secrets shalt thou 
know.’ 1  Venus’ depiction of the delights she proffers as ‘honey secrets’ unites the 
gustatory pleasures of sweetness both with erotic pleasure, and with the epistemological 
satisfaction of knowing ‘secrets.’2 Later in the poem, Adonis adopts Venus’ vocabulary 
of taste to emphasise his unreadiness for fornication. ‘Before I know myself,’ he pleads, 
‘seek not to know me,’ for ‘the mellow plum doth fall, the green sticks fast, / Or being 
early plucked is sour to taste’ (l.525-28). Adonis punningly entreats Venus to refrain 
from attempting to ‘know’ him sexually before he ‘knows’ himself in the fuller sense 
recommended by the common epigram and moral imperative nosce teipsum.3 The state of 
maturity that ought to precede sexual knowledge is figured as a transformation of taste: 
premature consummation will be sour.4 
For the seductress Venus and her reluctant beloved Adonis, the discourses of 
desire are intimately bound up both with the sense of taste, and with questions of 
knowledge. In this, they reflect what this chapter identifies as a wider early modern 
fascination with the imbrications of eroticism, gustation, and epistemology.5 One early 
                                                          
1 William Shakespeare, Venus and Adonis, in Katherine Duncan-Jones and H. R. Woudhuysen, eds., 
Shakespeare’s Poems, The Arden Shakespeare (London: Cengage, 2007), l.15-16. All subsequent line 
references (in-text) are to this edition. 
2 A pun on ‘meed’ as reward, and as the honeyed drink, ‘mead’ underscores the association of sexual and 
gustatory pleasure.  
3 Coppélia Kahn notices Adonis’ pun on ‘know’ as sexual and self-knowledge, but interprets it as 
evidence of his inability to recognise that he cannot ‘know what his self is by isolating it from the 
experiences that help to form it.’ Kahn, Man’s Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1981), 40. 
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this observation. Phenomenal Shakespeare (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 101. 
5 Chris Meads notes a pervasive dramatic association between alimentary and erotic appetites in Banquets 
Set Forth: Banqueting in English Renaissance Drama (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 29. 
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modern meaning of ‘taste’ (now obsolete), is instructive: as a verb, the word could be 
used to mean ‘to have carnal knowledge of.’6 In Shakespeare’s Cymbeline (1611; 1623), 
for example, Posthumus challenges Iachimo to test Cymbeline’s fidelity: ‘If you can 
mak’t apparant / That you have tasted her in Bed; my hand, / And Ring is yours.’7 As 
we shall see, this notional and lexical association between taste and sex derives, in part, 
from the low status of both, their joint status as base appetitive desires.  As the OED’s 
use of the King James Bible’s euphemism for intercourse – carnal knowledge – suggests, 
however, taste and sex are also allied insofar as they are both ways of knowing.8 
Following Foucault’s seminal The History of Sexuality, much of the historiography 
of erotic desire and pleasure in recent decades has been premised on a fundamental 
distinction between sex, understood as a basic biological act, and sexuality, understood 
as a product of social and cultural forces and a constituent of personal identity.9 Whilst 
the former is, in David Halperin’s words, ‘a natural fact, grounded in the functioning of 
the human body,’ the latter is ‘a cultural effect... [and] a principle of individuation in 
human natures.’ 10  Because it is a mere ‘somatic fact,’ Halperin argues, ‘sex has no 
history’; it is ‘a matter for the evolutionary biologist, not for the historian.’11 Sexuality, 
by contrast ‘does have a history,’ albeit a rather short one.12 According to Halperin, the 
notion that erotic desires and behaviours form a distinct feature of one’s subjective 
identity (that is, one’s ‘sexuality’) simply did not exist before the nineteenth century.13 In 
line with this Foucauldian chronology, a number of new historicist and cultural 
materialist studies of early modern England have traced relations been sexual 
behaviours and attitudes, and the civil, ecclesiastical, economic, and pedagogical power 
structures that are presumed to determine those attitudes and behaviours.14 What unites 
                                                          
6 ‘Taste, v.’ OED Online, accessed 26 March 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/198052. 
7 William Shakespeare, Cymbeline, ed. J. M. Nosworthy, The Arden Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 
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Greene’s translation of  Orazio Rinaldi’s The Royal Exchange, in which he lists the ‘foure degrees in Love,’ 
namely ‘1. Talke. 2. Be conversant. 3. Taste. 4. Possesse.’ Rinaldi, The Royal Exchange, trans. Robert Greene 
(London: I. Charlewood for William Wright, 1590), A4r.  
8 Katharine Eisaman Maus comments on the lop-sidedness of  the euphemism: ‘men “know” their wives, 
but the expression is not reciprocal.’ Maus, ‘Male Renaissance Poets in the Female Body,’ in James Turner, 
ed., Sexuality and Gender in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 274. 
9 Foucault argues that sexuality is a ‘set of  effects produced in bodies, behaviours, and social relations by... 
a complex political technology.’ Michel Foucault, The History of  Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. 
Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 127. 
10 David Halperin, ‘Is There a History of Sexuality?’ History and Theory 28/3 (1989): 257. 
11 Ibid., 257 n. 1. 
12 Ibid., 257. 
13 Ibid., 269. Halperin cites Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 43. 
14 See, for example, James Turner, ed., Sexuality and Gender in Early Modern Europe; Anthony Fletcher, 
Gender, Sex, and Subordination in England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Richard Rambuss, Closet 
Devotions (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999). As Bruce Smith puts it in his article ‘Premodern 
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such studies is a presumption that sexuality is only historically interesting (or visible) as 
a product of ideology and an implement of institutional authority.15 Correspondingly, 
sex is almost entirely ignored.  
Against this elision of the somatic – and particularly, of sensation – Bruce Smith 
advocates ‘erotic desire’ as the paradigmatic object of historical phenomenology. As ‘an 
extreme example’ of sense experience, Smith contends, sex resists objectification, 
highlighting ‘the basic premise of phenomenology...  you cannot know  anything apart 
from the way in which you come to know it.’16 Responding to Smith’s insistence that 
‘texts not only represent bodily experience; they imply it in the ways they ask to be 
touched, seen, heard, even smelled and tasted,’ and that the task of historical 
phenomenology is to account for these ‘presence effects,’ this chapter proposes that sex 
does have a history.17 This history, moreover, unfolds not only as shifts in how sexual 
practices are constructed by and conceptualized within the cultural realm, but also as 
transformations in how sexual acts are experienced by embodied subjects. For early 
modern authors, to write about sex was to write about the senses: their pleasures, their 
dangers, and the forms of knowledge they offer.18 Straddling, blurring, and sometimes 
dissolving altogether the line between nature and culture that the sex/sexuality 
distinction depends on, the senses offer a new way to think about erotic desire and 
pleasure: one which is both attentive to the immediacy of lived experience, and 
historically aware. An account growing out of this approach might be helpfully 
conceived of not as a history of sexuality but rather as a history of sensuality. 
It is my contention that an omnipresent association between sexual pleasure and 
the sense of taste is one distinctive feature of early modern sensuality, as it is refracted 
through texts across a range of genres. It is almost impossible to overstate the extent to 
which representations of desire and its satisfaction linger on the erotic pleasures, not 
only of sight and touch, but also of gustation. In particular, the language of sweetness is 
ubiquitous; so ubiquitous, in fact, that it can seem meaningless or bland – mere metrical 
filler. Towards the end of Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost, however, we find a 
moment which reminds us that that ‘sweet’ not only serves as a generic word for that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Sexualities,’ ‘it has… become axiomatic that sexuality, premodern or otherwise, is a function of  ideology.’ 
Smith, ‘Premodern Sexualities,’ PMLA 115/3 (2000): 320. 
15 Smith, ‘Premodern Sexualities,’ 320. 
16 Ibid., 325.  
17 Ibid., 325-26. 
18 Indeed, following the Italian scholar and physician Julius Caesar Scaliger, some authors, including 
Franics Bacon and John Cleveland, thought of  sexual pleasure itself  as a sixth sense, involving aspects of  
the other five. See Daniel P. Jaeckle, ‘The Sixth Sense in Cleveland’s ‘The Hecatomb to his Mistresse,’’ 
Notes and Queries 54/4 (2007): 412.  
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which is pleasant or attractive, but also designates a distinctive flavour associated with 
specific foodstuffs. In response to Berowne’s plea for ‘one sweet word with thee,’ the 
masked Princess (who Berowne believes to be his adored Rosalind) replies: ‘Hony, and 
Milke, and suger: there is three.’19 ‘Sweet,’ grown insipid through reiteration, is restored 
to gustatory immediacy by the Princess’ witty literalism.  
Perhaps the most conspicuous manifestation of the early modern association 
between taste and desire is the characterisation, most obviously in Petrarchan sonnet 
sequences and pastoral verse, of the beloved as a consumable, usually constituted of 
sweet fruit, honey and sugar. In Philip Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella (1591), for example, 
Astrophil is jealous that Stella’s dog is licensed to ‘tast of those sugred lips’ whilst he is 
not.20 In early modern England as today, this kind of language was strongly gendered: 
Joan Thirsk and Kim F. Hall have both described a broad cultural equation between 
women and sweet things. 21  At once avid consumers and industrious producers of 
sweetness, women were thought to crave sugary tastes more keenly than men; 
simultaneously, they served as domestic manufacturers of marchpane, suckets, and 
other sweetmeats. The saccharine vocabulary of Sidney and his fellow sonneteers, then, 
might be read as the textual residue of sense experiences: ingredients used in the 
cosmetics that women used to paint their faces were often edible, and recipe books 
include instructions on how to prepare ‘kissing comfits’ which served not only to 
counter bad breath but also to flavour the mouth. John Murrell’s 1617 A daily exercise for 
ladies and gentlewomen, for example, contains a recipe ‘to make Muscadinaes, commonly 
called kissing-Comfits,’ by beating ‘halfe a pound of double refined Sugar’ with musk, 
ambergris, and iris-root powder to form a paste, which would then be rolled out and cut 
into ‘little Lozenges.’22 The salacious associations of these kinds of sweets are evident in 
Phillip Massinger’s A Very Woman, first published in 1655, in which Almira challenges 
her brother to ‘search our pockets, and if you find there / Comfits of Amber-greece to 
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help our kisses, / Conclude us faulty.’23 Almira’s indignant rejection of comfits indexes 
her pride in her chastity; the culinary and cultural prominence of these aids to 
osculation, however, encourages us to recognize the possibility that the lips of Stella and 
her  ‘real’ counterparts did taste sugary.  
Conversely, the experiences of sexual jealousy, rejection, and betrayal are 
overwhelmingly described as characterised by bitterness, particularly in the early poetic 
anthologies.24 Thus, in Thomas Wyatt’s ‘The lover sheweth how he is forsaken’ (the 
version of ‘They flee from me...’ included in Tottel’s Miscellany), the narrator decries that 
‘all is turnde now... Into a bitter fashion of forsaking’; in a ‘complaint upon Love’ 
included in the same volume, Wyatt laments that ‘much aloes, and gall, / In bitternesse, 
my blinde life hath ytasted.’25Again, the temptation to read this kind of language as 
metaphorical should be countered by an attention to the ways in which authors 
associate love’s bitterness with the flavoured fluids of the humoral body, including gall, 
but especially tears: an anonymous poem included in Tottel’s Miscellany, ‘The lover 
accusing his love for her unfaithfulnesse,’ laments ‘the bitter teares, / That I in vaine 
have wasted’ on the traitorous lady; ‘my lips taste nought but teares,’ writes the author 
of an unattributed poem on confounded love included in the 1602 anthology A poetical 
rhapsody.26 
The literary association between sensations of sweetness and bitterness, and the 
pleasures and pains of sexual love, then, has some grounding in early modern material 
and culinary practices. Simultaneously, it is deeply conventional, with precedents in the 
classical and scriptural traditions. Two sources from these traditions, in particular, 
proved influential: Ovidian poetry, and the canticles.27 These works had been available 
                                                          
23 Philip Massinger, A Very Woman (London: for Humphrey Moseley, 1655), O1r (3). Kissing comfits also 
make appearances in Richard Brathwaite, Natures embassie (London: for Richard Whitaker, 1611), sig E5v 
(106); Richard Brathwaite, A comment upon the two tales of  our ancient, renowned, and ever-living poet Sr Jeffray 
Chaucer (London: W. Godbid for Peter Dring, 1665), D6v (44);  John Harington, An apologie (London: R. 
Field, 1596), M3r;  John Taylor, A preter-pluperfect spick and span new nocturnall (1643), A2v; and John 
Webster, The tragedy of  the Dutchesse of  Malfy  (London: Nicholas Okes for John Waterson, 1623), L4v. 
24 The opposition of bitter and sweet in relation to love has classical precedents. In his Amores, Ovid 
writes that ‘Plato calls love “something bitter,” and correctly so, because whoever loves dies. Orpheus 
calls it “bitter-sweet”, because love is voluntary death. In so far as it is death, it is bitter, and in so far as it 
is voluntary, it is sweet.’ (De amore, ii. 8, pp. I43-44). Cited in Martin Wheeler, ‘“The object whereto all his 
actions tend”: George Chapman’s Ouids Banquet of Sence and the Thrill of the Chase,’ The Modern Language 
Review 101/2 (2006): 333. 
25 Thomas Wyatt, ‘The lover sheweth how he is forsaken,’ in Songes and sonettes [Tottel’s Miscellany], G2r. 
26 Anon, ‘The lover accusing his love for her unfaithfulnesse,’ in Songes and sonettes [Tottel’s Miscellany], T1r; 
Anon, ‘Hee paints out his Torments,’ in Francis Davison, A poetical rapsody (London: V. Simmes for John 
Baily, 1602), F4r. 
27 On these ‘classical connections,’ see Uwe Baumann, ‘Food, Famine, Appetites and Eroticism in Plays 
by William Shakespeare and his Contemporaries,’ in Marion Gymnich and Norbert Lennartz, eds., The 
Pleasures and Horrors of  Eating: The Cultural History of  Eating in Anglophone Literature (Bonn: Bonn University 
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in Greek and Latin for some time, and in the seventeenth century Christopher 
Marlowe’s 1602 translation of Ovid’s Amores, published as Ovid’s elegies, and Thomas 
Heywood’s 1625 version of his Ars Amatoria, published as Loves schoole, also made the 
most explicitly sensual of Ovid’s works available to English readers in the vernacular.28 
Both works highlight the sensuality of tasting. In the fourth Elegy included in Ovid’s 
elegies, Ovid anticipates a banquet at which both his mistress, and her husband, will be 
present: ‘When thou hast tasted,’ he advises his lover, ‘I will take the cup, / And where 
thou drink’st, on that part I will sup.’29 Tasting is charged with erotic potential, serving 
as a publically acceptable substitute for the forbidden intimacies of kissing. Loves schoole 
similarly stresses the erotically incendiary effects of banqueting and, especially, of wine 
consumption: ‘In wine is lust and rancknes of desire, / Joine wine and love, and you 
adde fire to fire.’30 The Song of Songs, of course, is a very different kind of text: it 
sensuality is scriptural and – traditionally – allegorical, rather than pagan.31 Nonetheless, 
the pulsatingly sensual language of canticles offered an influential model for secular love 
poets, repeatedly associating the attractions of the beloved with those offered by 
quintessential objects of smell and taste including grapes, apples, pomegranates, honey, 
milk, wine, and ‘all the chief spices.’32 Early modern translations preserve, and in some 
cases extend, this conflation of gustatory and sexual appetites.33 
In this chapter, my investigation of taste as a mode of sexual knowledge in early 
modern literature takes two main forms. The first strand confronts the moral status of 
sexual appetites, especially the ways in which the language of taste is used to reinforce 
the relation between sensuality and sinfulness. In some contexts, the sweetness of sex is 
opposed to rational cognition. In others, however, sensual pleasure is supposed to 
provoke cognition by stimulating the sense of taste. If there is (as Aristotelian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Press, 2010), 65. 
28 See Leonard Barkan, The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis and the Pursuit of Paganism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986), for a discussion of Ovid’s permeation of Renaissance culture. For a nuanced 
account of Elizabethan Ovidianism, see Stephen Clucas, ‘Banquets of the Senses: Elizabethan Ovidianism 
and its Discontents,’ EnterText 3/1 (2003): 31-58, especially 33. 
29 Ovid, Ovid’s elegies, trans. Christopher Marlowe (Middleborough, 1602), A4v. 
30 Ovid, Loves school, trans. Thomas Heywood (Amsterdam: Nicolas Jansz. Visscher, [c. 1625]), A5r-v (9-
10).  
31 In the prefatory epistles to Francis Quarles’ ‘periphras’d’ version of the Song of Songs, Sions sonets 
(1625), Quarles denies (apparently disingenuously) the poems’ erotic content, assuring the noble dedicatee 
that ‘had these Lines beene loose, and lascivious, I had… pickt out a lesse honorable Patron.’ Quarles, 
Sions sonets (London: W. Stansby for Thomas Dewe, 1625), A3r-A4r.  
32 See especially 1:2, 1:13, 4:3, 4:11, 4:14. 
33  In Michael Drayton’s 1610 translation of 7:9, for instance – given by the KJV as ‘the roof of thy 
mouth like the best wine for my beloved, that goeth down sweetly’ – ‘the roofe’ of the beloved’s ‘sweet 
mouth, like purest wine doth tast.’ Drayton, ‘The most excellent Song which was Salomons,’ in A heavenly 
harmonie of spirituall songes (London, 1610), C2v.  
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epistemology asserts) nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses, then sensory 
pleasure, far from detracting from rational thought, in fact provides the mind with 
material for contemplation. Subsequently, in works by authors including George 
Chapman and John Cleveland, the language of taste is used to reinforce the suggestion 
that eroticism possesses a morally redemptive epistemological value.  
The question of how far it is possible to truly know another person – in particular, 
how far it is possible to take a lover’s declarations of passion as an authentic 
representation of his or her affective experience – haunts early modern love poetry. The 
second strand of my argument considers the ways in which authors cast the beloved as 
an archetypal, although frequently frustrating, object of knowledge: he or she 
simultaneously invites and forbids comprehension. The realm of erotic love thus comes 
to function as a limiting case for authors to ‘test out’ alternative routes to knowledge – 
and even, ultimately, different conceptions or definitions of what constitutes 
knowledge. With its varied epistemological associations, the language of taste is central 
to this process. In particular, in seventeenth-century works ‘taste’ is often used to 
suggest that sensuality can promote epistemic mastery of a non-ratiocinative kind; erotic 
pleasure is opposed to reason, but, through the language of taste, is also associated with 
other (perhaps more practically useful) forms of knowledge, including rhetorical 
knowledge.  
 
II. ‘Palats both for sweet, and sowre’ 
 
It is undeniable that for many early modern authors, desire is innately opposed to 
cognition. Such writers use the language of taste in order to evoke gustation’s 
association with the Fall, suggesting that sensuality is analogous to the original sin, a 
reprehensible intemperance. Echoing Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the neo-stoic writer 
Lodowick Bryskett, for instance, connects taste with wicked concupiscence. 34  ‘The 
virtue of Temperence,’ he writes in his 1606 A discourse of civill life, finds its ‘subject’ in:  
 
the concupiscible appetite; and she is exercised specially about the senses of tasting 
and feeling, but chiefly about the wanton lusts of the flesh.... Intemperance 
                                                          
34 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle asserted that ‘Temperance and self-indulgence . . . are concerned 
with the kind of pleasures that the other animals share in, which therefore appear slavish and brutish; 
these are touch and taste.’ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 56.  Quoted in Joseph Moshenska, ‘“Transported 
Touch”: The Sense of Feeling in Milton’s Eden,’ English Literary History 79/1 (2012): 5. 
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groweth principally (as we have said) out of the tast and the feeling, two senses 
that make us most like unto brute beasts, if we suffer our selves to be led by 
them, following our delights as they do: for they corrupt mans prudence, put his 
mind astray, & take away from him the light of reason.35 
 
Where a modern reader might expect sight to be paired with touch as the two senses 
most likely to stimulate desire, Bryskett identifies ‘tasting’ as touch’s sensual bedfellow. 
Bryskett’s entwined disparagement of taste and sensuality follows a strand of thought 
that can be traced back to the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo Judaeus’ 
commentary on Genesis. Philo allegorized Adam as representative of the mind, and Eve 
as representative of the dangerous allure of the senses; subsequently, some early modern 
commentators interpreted the originary act of tasting not as an epistemological, but as a 
sensual sin, motivated less by intellectual curiosity than by bodily lust.36 Thus, in his 
1651 Poems and translations, Edward Sherburne notes: ‘the apple is the Symbole of Love, 
and dedicated to Venus… Philo allegorizeth the Apple of which Eve tasted and gave to 
Adam, much to this effect.’ 37  Carnal pleasure is the forbidden fruit, and tasting it 
represents the victory of lust over cognition.  
Similarly, in his 1604 The passions of the minde, Thomas Wright denigrates the 
lapsarian senses, opposing them to reason. For Wright, the sensual passions are ‘thornie 
briars sprung from the infected roote of original sinne,’ and the ‘passions and sense are 
like two naughtie servants, who oft-times beare more love one to an other, than they are 
obedient to their Maister [i.e. reason].’38 Wright offers strong support for the critical 
presumption that contempt was the most appropriate (if not always achievable) early 
modern stance towards sensuality. Recently, however, Christopher Tilmouth has 
criticised scholars for their over-reliance on The passions, arguing that a tendency to 
accept its claims as representative has led to a ‘homogenizing’ conception of attitudes to 
the passions in the period. 39  In contrast, Tilmouth argues that ‘from the 1620s 
                                                          
35  Lodowick Bryskett, A discourse of civill life (London: R. Field for William Aspley, 1606), Bb2r (189). This 
work is ‘heavily adapted’ from Giambattista Giraldi Cinthio’s Tre dialoghi della vita civile, which is itself the 
second part of his De gli hecatommithi (1565). Richard A. McCabe, ‘Bryskett, Lodowick (c.1546–1609),’ 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 26 July 2011, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3817. See 
also Christopher Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph Over Reason: A History of the Moral Imagination from Spenser to 
Rochester (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 25. 
36 See Vinge, The Five Senses, 22-30, especially 23. 
37 Edward Sherburne, Poems and translations (London: W. Hunt for Thomas Dring, 1651), E4r (69). 
38 Thomas Wright, The passions of the minde (London: Valentine Simmes for W. Burre, 1601), B1v (2). 
39 Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph Over Reason, 7. 
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onwards… moralists would increasingly take for granted both the possibility and the 
moral value of cultivating the passions.’40 
Whilst I remain wary of a triumphalist reading of the early modern period as 
culminating in a victory for uninhibited sensuality over a destructive, residual medieval 
shame, a number of scholars, including most recently Faramerz Dabhoiwala, have 
argued that phenomena including the Protestant celebration of the sanctioned delights 
of marital sex and the libertinism of the Restoration court point towards an increased 
tolerance not only towards the passions, but of the passion of erotic love specifically, in 
the seventeenth century.41 It is my contention that the language of taste – and sweetness 
particularly – played a key role in this process of legitimization. Guillaume Du Vair’s 
1598 The moral philosophie of the Stoicks provides a revealing counterpart to Bryskett’s A 
discourse of civill life. Whilst Du Vair – in line with his stoic commitments – warns against 
the dangers of unlicensed desire, he also celebrates its nuptial value. One of the 
disadvantages of indulging in ‘filthy pleasures’ before marriage, Du Vair warns, is that ‘it 
makes [sensual pleasures] lose the sweetnesse of marriage which they alone doe taste 
which have not used it before, a sweetnes which souldereth and knitteth together the 
friendship of marriage.’ 42  Here, the mutual experience of legitimate sexual pleasure 
produces a sweetness which works instrumentally to forge conjugal harmony, and so to 
consolidate moral virtue. 
                                                          
40 Ibid., 29. Tilmouth highlights the Protestant elevation of affective piety, and emphasises the 
Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions as an alternative to stoic orthodoxy. Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph 
Over Reason, 1-30. See also Richard Strier, ‘Against the Rule of Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to 
Luther to Shakespeare to Herbert,’ in Paster, Rowe, Floyd-Wilson, eds., Reading the Early Modern Passions, 
23-24, 32. Many philosophers and moralists do prescribe a happy medium between the extremes of 
rejection and over-indulgence of the senses and passions represented respectively by Stoicism and 
Epicureanism. William Jewell, in his 1612 The golden cabinet of true treasure, takes a characteristic approach:  
‘the honest pleasures and moderate delights, which God doth offer to us,’ he writes, ‘are not either to be 
rejected or despised.’ Jewell, The golden cabinet of true treasure (London: H.L. for John Crosley, 1612), R2v 
(244). 
41 See Faramerz Dabhoiwala, ‘Lust and Liberty,’ Past and Present 207/1 (2010): 89-179, especially 90. For 
evidence of not only Protestant, but Puritan celebration of marital sex, see Theodore de Wells, ‘Sex and 
Sexual Attitudes in Seventeenth-Century England: The Evidence from Puritan Diaries,’ Renaissance and 
Reformation 24/1 (1988): 45-69, especially 45-46. See also Valerie Traub, The Renaissance of Lesbianism in 
Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 79-83. On Martin Luther’s 
conception of marital sex as a route to God, see Gail Hawkes, Sex and Pleasure in Western Culture 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 97. By 1660, a work like The Practical Part of Love could make light of the 
sinfulness of ‘venery’ in a way that would have been unthinkable one hundred years earlier. Anon, The 
Practical part of love (London, 1660), A4r-v.  
42 Guillaume Du Vair. The moral philosophie of the Stoicks, trans. Thomas James (London: Felix Kingston for 
Thomas Man, 1598), E8v (64). Similarly, for William Gouge, writing in 1622, marital sex, or what 
(following 1 Cor. 7:3) he calls ‘due benevolence,’ provides a bulwark against the sensory temptations of 
adultery. William Gouge, Of domesticall duties (London: John Haviland for William Bladen, 1622), p7r-v 
(221-22). 
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Shakespeare’s Othello (c.1603; 1622) dramatizes the tension between taste as 
bestial, sensual appetite, and taste as a mode of discrimination (and as such, a route to 
intersubjective knowledge). Early in the play, Cassio offers Desdemona an elegant 
(albeit conventional) compliment. Othello, he says, 
 
     hath atchiev’d a Maid 
   That paragons description and wilde Fame: 
   One that excels the quirkes of Blazoning pens...43  
 
Cassio implies that Desdemona poses a kind of epistemological challenge: if she cannot 
be depicted, she also cannot be known. 44  Indeed, Desdemona’s resistance to 
apprehension is translated, by various male characters, as a dubious secrecy. Noticing 
this, Stanley Cavell interprets Othello’s suspicion of his wife as an expression of 
epistemological, as well as moral, outrage: it is a response not only to the possibility that 
he might not possess his wife’s chastity, but also to the impossibility of ever knowing, 
for certain, that he does so. 45  Other scholars have explored the ways in which 
Desdemona’s body is presented as a mystery which might be understood and controlled 
if it can be accurately and comprehensively seen. Notably, Patricia Parker identifies in the 
play a ‘network of associations’ between the female genitalia and hidden knowledge, 
which prompts in the jealous Othello an ‘ocular impulse... a fascination… with exposing 
what lay hid to the scrutiny of the gaze.’46 Because this impulse, which Parker calls 
‘pornographic,’ shares its emphasis on the visual with discourses of spying and state 
surveillance, Parker suggests, erotic desire and political ambition are linked.47  
Parker’s association of sexual surveillance with ocularcentric regimes of state 
control is characteristic of new historicism’s visual and political preoccupations. The 
language of Othello, however, is not only permeated with visual metaphor; it also 
interweaves desire, sexual jealousy, and gustation. Take act three, scene three, in which 
                                                          
43 Shakespeare, Othello, in Shakespeares comedies, histories, & tragedies, Ss6v (316). 
44 H. M. Richmond calls this ‘the intangible mistress theme.’ Richmond, ‘The Intangible Mistress,’ Modern 
Philology 56/4 (1959): 217-23. 
45 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 137.  
46 Patricia Parker, ‘Othello and Hamlet: Dilation, Spying, and the “Secret Place” of Woman,’ 
Representations 44 (1993): 66. 
47 Parker, ‘Othello and Hamlet,’ 67. More recently, see also Jennifer Rae McDermott, ‘Perceiving 
Shakespeare: A Study of Sight, Sound, and Stage,’ Early Modern Literary Studies special issue 19 (2009): 5.1-
38. http://extra.shu.ac.uk/emls/si-19/mcdeshak.html. 
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Othello is transformed from a loving husband to a man wild with suspicion. He 
laments: 
 
I had been happy, if the generall Campe,  
Pioners and all, had tasted her sweet Body,  
So I had nothing knowne.48 
 
Whilst Othello draws on taste’s associations with intimate experiential knowledge (there 
is a kind of parallelism in his desire not to know that Desdemona has been tasted, or 
sexually known), in his use of the epithet ‘sweet’ he also retains its connection to 
gustatory sensation.  
Othello’s choice of verb at this critical moment is not an isolated example: 
throughout the play, he consistently links sexual and alimentary appetites. Perhaps most 
obviously, Othello’s epithets for his wife linger on her supposed flavour: they include 
‘honey,’ ‘sweeting,’ and – no less than five times – ‘sweet.’49 Initially, Othello appears to 
be invested in an association of gustatory appetite with eroticism according to which 
taste and desire are akin in being both degenerate and dangerous. Both Othello himself, 
and the malevolent Iago, frame the association between sweet tastes and sensual 
pleasures in strongly pejorative terms. Early in the play, Othello insists that his support 
of Desdemona’s request to join him in Cyprus is motivated not by ‘the pallate of my 
Appetite,’ but rather by a wish ‘to be free, and bounteous to her minde.’50 Othello’s 
association of sexual and gustatory ‘appetite’ implicitly assesses both as capricious and 
mindless. Iago’s language betrays a similar attitude: contemplating Othello and 
Desdemona’s initial state of marital bliss, and tracing a projected slippage from vision to 
gustation (or, more precisely, dis-gust), he anticipates that Desdemona’s ‘eye must be 
fed. And what delight shall she have to look on the divell?... her delicate tendernesse will 
find it selfe abus’d, begin to heave the gorge, disrellish and abhor the Moore.’51 And if 
Desdemona will naturally come to ‘disrellish’ Othello because of his putatively devilish 
appearance, Othello will be brought to feel distaste for Desdemona by Iago’s own 
machinations: whilst Othello currently finds his wife ‘lushious as Locusts’ (cassia pods, 
believed to be, in George Sandys’ words, ‘an excellent fruit’52), the suspicion of her 
                                                          
48 Shakespeare, Othello, in Shakespeares comedies, histories, & tragedies, Tt5r (325). 
49 Ibid., Tt1v (318), Tt3r (321), Tt4r (323), Tt5r (325), Vv1v (330), Vv2r (331), Vv4r (335). 
50 Ibid., Ss6r (315). 
51 Ibid., Tt1v (318). 
52 Cited in ‘locust, n.’ OED Online, accessed 15 March 2012, www.oed.com/view/Entry/109676. 
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chastity which Iago inculcates will ensure that she ‘shalbe to him shortly as bitter as 
Coloquintida’ (the fruit also known as the bitter-apple).53 For Othello and Iago, sexual 
tastes offer a fallen, irrational form of pleasure: they correspond, not to the reality of the 
thing itself (or rather, man or woman him or herself), but to arbitrary, transient, and 
manipulable predilections and revulsions.  
Conversely, a number of characters in the play, including Cassio and Brabantio 
as well as Iago and Othello, associate vision with epistemological mastery. Most 
famously, Othello’s demand for ‘Occular proofe’ of his wife’s alleged betrayal 
exemplifies his wider conflation of vision and certain knowledge (this conflation is built, 
for instance, into his assertion that that Iago ‘sees, and knowes more… than he 
unfolds,’ where the conjunctive ‘and’ suggests a presumed equivalence between seeing 
and knowing).54 For a number of critics, the disastrous consequences of this desire for 
‘ocular proof’ indicate an implicit critique of the new empirical natural philosophy 
discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis. 55  Most recently, James Knapp has 
argued that ‘Shakespeare presents us with an object (the handkerchief) so unstable that 
it becomes emblematic of the flaws endemic to empiricist (materialist) epistemologies.’56 
The failure of the visual emblem of the handkerchief to materialize the reality of 
Desdemona’s spousal fidelity represents the failure of vision to apprehend the truth of 
the material world.  
In the context of the failure of ocular proof, taste – derided by the villainous 
Iago and the misguided Othello as akin to lustful appetite – takes on a new value. In 
particular, taste comes to stand for a form of knowledge which is experiential without 
being, precisely, empirical. In her speech offering a partial vindication of female 
adultery, Emilia points to this possibility. Her argument, which hinges on women’s 
sensory equivalence to men, occurs in a passage which conjoins an attribution of female 
adultery to male cruelty with its subsequent attribution to women’s innate desire for 
novelty. ‘I do think,’ announces Emilia:  
    
  
                                                          
53 Shakespeare, Othello, in Shakespeares comedies, histories, & tragedies, Ss6r (315). 
54 Ibid., Tt5r (325), Tt4v (324). 
55 Thus John Gronbeck-Tedesco writes that Othello’s acceptance of  Desdemona’s handkerchief  as the 
requested visual evidence, ‘teaches the shortcomings of  empiricism in its early throes… “ocular proof ” is 
really a stunt performed for a man who thinks seeing is believing’ Gronbeck-Tedesco, ‘Morality, Ethics 
and the Failure of  Love in Othello,’ in Philip C. Kolin, ed., Othello: New Critical Essays (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2002), 267. 
56 James A. Knapp, ‘“Ocular Proof”: Archival Revelations and Aesthetic Response,’ Poetics Today 24/4: 
716. 
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    ... it is their Husbands faults 
If Wives do fall: (Say, that they slacke their duties, 
And powre our Treasures into forraigne laps; 
Or else breake out in peevish Jealousies, 
Throwing restraint upon us: Or say they strike us, 
Or scant our former having in despight) 
Why we have galles: and though we have some Grace, 
Yet have we some Revenge. Let Husbands know, 
Their wives have sense like them: They see, and smell, 
And have their Palats both for sweet, and sowre, 
As Husbands have. What is it that they do, 
When they change us for others? Is it Sport? 
I thinke it is: and doth Affection breed it? 
I thinke it doth. Is’t Frailty that thus erres? 
It is so too. And have not we Affections? 
Desires for Sport? and Frailty, as men have?57 
 
Poised between her initial ascription of women’s infidelity to husbandly mistreatment, 
and her suggestion that, like men, women take lovers simply as result of their natural 
‘Desires for Sport,’ and ‘Frailty,’ Emilia’s declaration that wives ‘have their Palats both 
for sweet, and sowre’ serves ambiguously to describe female rationality (women ‘have 
sense’ enough to respond negatively to mistreatment) and female corruptibility (just as 
men and women have their senses in common, so too do they share a yearning for 
novelty and pleasure). For Iago, the difference between the sweetness of cassia pods 
and coloquintida bitterness is a matter of pure affect: of irresistible desire versus sexual 
revulsion. For his wife, however, to have a palate ‘both for sweet, and sowre’ – in other 
words, to have taste – can mean to possess trivial appetitive desires for sexual ‘Sport,’ 
but it can also indicate possession of reasonable, universally shared, fundamentally 
rational preferences and aversions, guided by judgement as well as by instinct.  
Emilia’s speech, then, clears the way for an alternative interpretation of 
Othello’s preoccupation with Desdemona’s sexual sweetness. According to his, and 
Iago’s, association of taste with irrational, sinful sexual desire, Othello’s honeyed 
endearments for Desdemona might be understood (despite his own protestations to the 
                                                          
57 Shakespeare, Othello in Shakespeares comedies, histories, & tragedies, Vv3v (334). 
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contrary) to betray Othello’s enthrallment to ‘the pallate of my Appetite.’ On the other 
hand, they also prefigure Emilia’s ultimate vindication of Desdemona as ‘sweet 
Desdemona… sweet Mistris… the sweetest innocent.’58 The narrative trajectory of the 
play thus bears out Othello’s reluctant, half-unconscious perception that Desdemona is 
‘sweet.’ Despite its denigration, taste – and the sexual appetites it entwines with – 
proves a surer route to certainty than vision, offering a kind of intuitive experiential 
knowledge which the play opposes to an ocularcentric empiricism.59 Othello indicates – if 
it does not wholeheartedly endorse – a conception of gustatory and erotic tastes as 
valuable sources of intersubjective and erotic knowledge, and of sweetness as a marker 
of virtue. 
 
III. ‘my honey bee’ 
 
In a recent article on The Duchess of Malfi, Wendy Wall observes that early modern 
depictions of sensual pleasure and early modern ‘condemnations of fiction’ by ‘Puritan 
thinkers’ share a set of terms: both are characterized by the language of sweetness.60 
Wall explains this co-incidence by suggesting that anti-theatricalists adopted such 
language because of prior associations of sweetness with erotic pleasure. ‘Historically,’ 
she comments, ‘sweetness had been linked to an ethically troubling sensuality,’ and ‘its 
Renaissance incarnations gave specificity to that age-old meaning, identifying it as a 
good that smacked of gooey and illicit excess.’61 Plays were conceived of as ‘syrupy,’ 
because, like sex, ‘they had the capacity to act on the body and to discourage the use of 
reason by drawing the mind from virtue.’62 Wall’s discussion of the symbolic complexity 
of syrups in the period is rich and revealing. Nonetheless, her analysis of the moral 
valence of sweetness is somewhat one-sided. As I demonstrated in chapter 1, it was not 
only anti-theatricalists who employed syrupy analogies to describe the experience and 
effects of attending plays or reading poesy. Those on the other side of the controversy 
                                                          
58 Ibid., Vv4v-Vv5r (336-37). 
59 It is also the case that, conversely, bitterness can attest to the corrupt reality behind lovely appearance. 
In Thomas Cranley’s Amanda, or the Reformed Whore (London: John Norton, 1635), which tells the tale of 
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60 Wendy Wall, ‘Just a Spoonful of  Sugar: Syrup and Domesticity in Early Modern England,’ Modern 
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61 Ibid., 159. 
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employed similar images to opposing ends, likening devotees of the poetic arts to 
industrious and virtuous bees sucking honey from rhetorical flowers, and attributing 
their opponents’ distaste for poesy to their pathologically imbalanced humors.  
The duality of sweetness – indicative at once of erotic pleasure and literary or 
theatrical response – is apparent in the printed commonplace book Englands Parnassus 
(1600), which includes a number of excerpts from poems in which sweetness indicates 
an enthralling but dissolute and ultimately harmful sensuality. An excerpt from one 
poem by Robert Greene, for example, blazons a mistress’ breasts as ‘sweets’ from which 
‘Love suckt his sommer time,’ whilst Thomas Lodge warns that love is ‘A sugred harme, 
a poison full of pleasure.’ 63  Simultaneously, however, Englands Parnassus collates 
numerous extracts associating sweetness with literary discrimination and inspiration: an 
epigram attributed to James VI and I praises the ‘art’ of ‘poesie’ as ‘the hony we from 
Pind distill,’64 whilst a poem by Charles Fitzgeoffrey describes Homer’s works as ‘sweete 
honey-suckle, whence all Poets sprights, / Sucke the sweete honey of divine delights.’65 
Sweetness signposts the literary virtues of the classics and their utility as a source of 
rhetorical imitation: to taste the honey of Pindar or Homer is to display both readerly 
discrimination and, potentially, creative emulation. For aficionados of poesie, then, 
sweetness stands not for mindless sensuality, but for considered literary discrimination. 
In contrast to Wall’s suggestion that uses of the language of sweetness to describe 
audience’s responses to theatre figure those responses as akin to sexual desire – 
thoughtless, reasonless, corrupt – I argue that in some contexts uses of the language of 
sweetness to describe sensual pleasure intimates that desire is a form of discrimination 
akin to literary judgement. Focusing on uses of the bee trope to describe the experience 
of desire and sensual pleasure, I will suggest that, rather than participating in the 
denigration of poesy, the language of sweetness does precisely the opposite, 
contributing to a (limited and localized) rehabilitation of sensual passion.  
In chapter 1, I focused on the use of apian imagery to describe readerly 
discrimination and poetic skill. The symbolic significance of bees, however, also 
encompassed an association with erotic love: just as the former can be a source of both 
sweetness and stings, love and desire are characterised by a paradoxical mixture of 
pleasure and pain.66 I will suggest that the bee trope is fundamental to the seventeenth-
                                                          
63  Robert Allott (compiled by), Englands Parnassus: or the choysest flowers of  our moderne poets (London: For N. 
Ling, C. Burby and T. Hayes, 1600), Cc7v (398), M7r (173). 
64 The poem is attributed to ‘K. of  S.’ Albott, Englands Parnassus, Q4r (231). 
65 Allott, Englands Parnassus, Ii7r (493). 
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century re-evaluation of the status of sensual pleasure. The appropriation of this image, 
in which the bee’s tastefulness originally described erudition, readerly judgement, and 
poetic creation, by writers wishing to describe the experience of desire and sexual 
pleasure encouraged a growing sense that sexual love, too, could constitute a realm of 
discrimination and learning. Like the humanist bee, the lover exercises judgement and 
skill in his pursuit of sweetness. 
In early, sixteenth-century examples of  bee imagery, as in the following poem by 
Thomas Wyatt, the focus is on taste as an attribute of  the beloved mistress:  
 
Nature that gave the Bee so feate a grace, 
To finde hony of  so wondrous fashion:  
Hath taught the spider out of  the same place  
To fetche poison by strange alteracion,  
Though this be strange, it is a straunger case,  
With one kisse by secret operacion,  
Both these at once in your lipps to finde.67 
 
The opposition between the bee, who extracts honey from flowers, and the spider, who 
fetches poison from the same, is a conventional image for congratulatory versus critical 
modes of reading.68 The difference between the substances extracted by the bee and the 
spider resides in their dissimilar bodily practices and intrinsic constitutions: whilst the 
bee searches industriously for honey, the spider concocts venom out of his own ‘innate 
virulency,’ as the anonymous author of the 1662 The spiritual bee, or, A miscellany, put it.69 
In contrast, Wyatt’s speaker passively ‘finde[s]’ what already exists, mixed, in his 
beloved’s lips. The ‘strange’ fusion of honey and poison that the lover discovers there 
describes the ambivalence of the Petrarchan mistress, rather than different modes of 
courting, kissing, or tasting: sweetness resides in her beauty, poison in her cruelty.  
Later poets, however, use the bee trope to describe the lover’s capacity for 
judgement, as well as, or instead of, the character of the beloved. Ben Jonson’s ‘To his 
                                                          
67 Thomas Wyatt, ‘How by a kisse he found both his life and death,’ in Songes and sonettes [Tottel’s 
Miscellany], I2r. This poem is attributed to Wyatt in Thomas Wyatt, The Complete Poems, ed. R.A. Hebolz 
(London: Penguin, 1997), 97.  
68 For example, in Francis Davison’s A poetical rapsody, the frontispiece epigram reads: ‘The Bee and Spider 
by a diverse power, / Sucke Hony and Poyson from the selfe same flower.’  
69 Anon., The spiritual bee, or, A miscellany (Oxford: A. and L. Lichfield for Edward and John Forrest, 1662), 
A5r. 
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Love fearing a Corrivall,’ included in his 1629 collection A description of love, uses the 
opposition between spider and bee to describe a sexual rivalry: 
 
The pois’nous Spider and the lab’ring Bee,  
The one and selfesame flower daily suckes;  
But yet in nature much they disagree:  
For poison one, the other honie pluckes.  
 
You are the flower (you know my meaning) he  
The pois’nous Spider is, and I the Bee.70 
 
Here, the fact that the beloved ‘flower’ serves as a source both of honey and poison is 
attributed not to her dual character, but rather to the differences in ‘nature’ between the 
two men who court her: whilst the poet’s arachnid opponent gathers only poison – a 
reference, presumably, to the bitterness of jealousy and envy – she is a source of sweet 
‘honie’ for the diligent author, who uses her as inspiration for his poem. Just as the 
capacity to appreciate the sweet taste of the flowers of poesy and to ‘digest’ them into 
something new is frequently attributed to the health of the reader’s constitution, whilst a 
‘distaste’ for poesy indicates humoral corruption, so too is sensual desire linked to the 
ability to taste the authentic sweetness of the beloved.  
Jonson’s aside, ‘(you know my meaning),’ on the one hand invites his addressee 
to complete the analogy herself, signposting the conventionality of the bee / spider 
trope. On the other, it might function as a kind of textual nudge or wink, signalling a 
more explicit dimension to the description of his sweetheart as a bloom, for 
contemporaneously flowers were often euphemistically associated with the genitals.71 
The suggestion that this apparently delicate pastoral analogy is more sexually suggestive 
than it might initially appear is reinforced by Jonson’s use of ‘sucke’ and ‘plucke,’ which 
phonetically (and in the case of ‘sucke,’ which is printed with a long ‘s,’ typographically) 
insinuate an unwritten but covertly present ‘fucke.’  
The trope’s potential for prurience more fully exploited in Thomas Carew’s carpe 
diem poem ‘A Rapture,’ included in his 1640 Poems, in which the narrator urges the 
delectable Celia to ‘taste’ the ‘joys’ of  sex by describing those joys in elaborate and 
                                                          
70 Jonson, A description of love (London: Miles Flesher for Francis Coules, 1629), C6v. 
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explicit terms. 72  The following passage evokes the comparatively leisurely erotic 
pleasures which the narrator imagines will follow intercourse. The fun doesn’t stop after 
‘we, in… sweet extasie expire,’ he promises: 
 
Then, as the empty Bee, that lately bore,  
Into the common treasure, all her store...  
So will I rifle all the sweets, that dwell  
In my delicious Paradise, and swell  
My bagge with honey, drawne forth by the power  
Of servent kisses, from each spicie flower.  
I’le seize the Rose-buds in their perfum’d bed,  
The Violet knots, like curious Mazes spread  
O’re all the Garden, taste the ripned Cherry,  
The warme, firme Apple, tipt with corall berry… 
Thence climbing o’re the swelling Appenine,  
Retire into thy grove of Eglantine;  
Where I will all those ravisht sweets distill  
Through Loves Alimbique, and with Chimmique skill  
From the mixt masse, one soveraigne Balme derive,  
Then bring that great Elixar to thy hive.73 
 
The narrator’s comparison of himself to a bee serves primarily as a contrivance 
facilitating the luxurious enumeration of the pleasures – visual, olfactory, gustatory, and 
tactile – of the coital bed. A daring poem even by Carew’s ribald standards, ‘The 
Rapture’ was notorious in his time: its inclusion in his Poems led the antiquarian and MP 
Edward Dering to condemn the volume as being ‘in disgrace of Religion, &c. to the 
increase of all Vice, and withdrawing of the people from reading studdying, and hearing 
the word of God.’74 In opposing the sensual pleasures depicted by Carew’s verse to 
devout learning, Dering’s response represents a conventional opposition between 
egregious eroticism and meritorious erudition. The poem itself, however, suggests an 
alternative, portraying the lover-bee as an industrious alchemist turning the sweet 
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pleasures of Celia’s body into an aromatic ‘Balme’: semen and honey.75 The functional 
and symbolic equivalence of these apparently unrelated substances is suggested by the 
final line, which glosses this balm as an ‘Elixar’: an alchemic preparation, drug, or 
essence with the capacity to indefinitely prolong life, closely related to the philosopher’s 
stone.76 Semen and honey are united in their shared status as bulwarks against mortality: 
the former enabling procreative self-reproduction, the latter functioning as a 
preservative agent. Sex emerges as a kind of ‘Chimmique skill’: a form of esoteric and 
elite practical knowledge, effecting the transformation of the sweets of sensual pleasure 
into the preservative balm of procreation. 
The final example of the bee trope that I will consider here, found in Richard 
Barnfield’s 1594 The Affectionate Shepheard, negotiates a fine line between the merely 
suggestive and the brazenly salacious.  A pastoralized account of the courtship and 
marriage of Charles Blount (Ganymeade) and Penelope Rich (Guendolin), and of the 
unrequited passion that the poem’s narrator Daphnis (very probably an avatar for the 
author) nurses for Ganymeade, the poem engages the uninitiated reader in a tantalizing 
game of ‘guess who?,’ hinting at but never making explicit the historical alter-egos of its 
pastoral protagonists.77 For a long time overlooked by scholars made uncomfortable by 
its homoeroticism, The Affectionate Shepheard is a searching, tonally subtle, and poetically 
adroit exploration of the experience of desire; Daphnis’ narrative voice is by turns 
hostile and tender, abject and arch. It is also dense with the language of erotic tasting.  
By his own admission, Daphnis is well past the first bloom of youth: ‘Behold my 
gray head, full of silver haires, / My wrinckled skin, deepe furrowes in my face.’ 78 
Unable to entice Ganymeade with his physical charms, Daphnis tries to win him over 
with presents, especially of the edible variety: in the course of the poem, he offers 
Ganymeade a mouth-watering catalogue of delicacies ranging from ‘straw-berries, or 
Bil-berries in their prime, / Bath’d in a melting Sugar-Candie streame’ to ‘Cheese... 
Cracknells, Curds and Clowted-creame.’79 Daphnis’ advances are ultimately unsuccessful, 
but historical anecdote suggests that gourmandizing could be effectual in the service of 
seduction: the 1660 collection of bawdy tales The Practical Part of love opens with a story 
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about an old maidservant who, enamoured of her master’s young apprentice, sets about 
enticing him with tidbits: ‘she insinuated her self into him by juncketting with him,’ the 
anonymous author writes suggestively.’ 80  This literary and anecdotal connection 
between feasting and lusting was supported by dietetic and medical theory, according to 
which gastronomic over-indulgence, especially in humorally ‘hot’ food and drink, was 
supposed to provoke arousal. ‘Mistris Venus dwels at the signe of the Ivy-bush,’ 
counsels Thomas Adams, referring to the custom of hanging ivy (a symbol of Bacchus) 
outside taverns, ‘and where the belly is made a barrell, stuffed with delicious meates, 
and heating drinkes, the concupiscence will be luxurious of turpitudes.’81 As we saw in 
the last chapter, sweet foods in particular were supposed, in Thomas Muffett’s words, 
to ‘encrease natural heat’: they could serve as aphrodisiacs, prompting desire.82  
Whilst Daphnis does not exclude savoury things (such as cheese and curds) 
from his list of delights, his hopes clearly lie in the seductive potential of sweetness: in 
ripe fruit further enhanced by sugar-candy. I want to suggest, however, that his strategy 
is more complex than it might appear; the utility of sweetness as a weapon of seduction 
is not exhausted by its aphrodisiac function. Daphnis’ attempt to charm Ganymeade by 
offering him alimentary pleasures reflects Daphnis’ expressed experience of desire as 
characterised by taste sensations. 83  Ganymeade, proclaims Daphnis, is ‘a sweet-fac’d 
Boy’; his ‘sugred love is full of sweete delight.’84 In offering Ganymeade a series of 
delicious edibles, then, Daphnis offers him an image of, and experience of, his own 
sweet self. The point is driven home by Daphnis’ virtuosic exploitation of the sensual – 
and sensory – potential of poetic language. ‘Wilt thou,’ Daphnis tempts Ganymeade in 
one typically mellifluous line, ‘taste with a woodden splent the sweet lithe honey?’85 The 
adjective ‘lithe’ adds to the conventional mention of honey’s sweetness an intimation of 
its suppleness, implicitly invoking Ganymeade’s lissom body. This subtle allusion is 
reinforced by the molossus of the last three words: the deferral of the expected 
downbeat, creating a sense of the line’s tensile strength, reifies as prosody the ‘lithe’ 
elasticity of both honey, and young flesh. When the unstressed syllable finally arrives, it 
creates a feminine rhyme which implies the effeminate ease of sensuality. Read aloud, 
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Daphnis’ description of honey is felt on and in the tongue, as well as apprehended by 
the mind, materializing in language both the gustatory pleasures he proffers, and the 
erotic pleasures that he pursues. Daphnis thus evinces a subtle understanding of the 
principle that – as James Schiffer puts it, drawing on Jean Baudrillard – ‘self-seduction 
always precedes seduction of or by another.’86 Or, as Adonis puts in in Shakespeare’s 
slightly earlier poem of thwarted seduction, ‘Before I know myself, seek not to know 
me.’ Intensely aware of his own inadequacies as a suitor, Daphnis substitutes the sensual 
pleasures of delicious food – which are synonymous, in this case, with the sensual 
pleasures offered by Ganymeade himself. In offering Ganymeade sweet things, then, 
Daphnis offers him the opportunity to ‘know’ himself, in both senses of the word. 
Daphnis’ use of  the bee trope engages with The Affectionate Shepheard’s 
exploration of  the relation between self-knowledge and sexual knowledge, similarly 
employing the language of  taste to blur the boundary between the seducer and his 
beloved, subject and object of  desire. In transports of  desire, Daphnis addresses 
Ganymeade: 
 
O would to God (so I might have my fee) 
My lips were honey, and thy mouth a Bee.  
 
Then shouldst thou sucke my sweete and my faire flower  
That now is ripe, and full of  honey-berries… 
Then shouldst thou be my Waspe or else my Bee,  
I would thy hive, and thou my honey bee.87 
 
The first line of  the second stanza is enigmatic: read continuously, Daphnis wistfully 
imagines that Ganymeade might ‘sucke’ his ‘sweete… flower.’ The addition of  a comma 
(‘Then shouldst thou sucke, my sweete and my faire flower’) would, however, make the 
line more plausible in context: Daphnis is well past the first bloom of  youth, and it 
seems more likely that he is addressing Ganymeade as ‘my sweete…. Flower / That 
now is ripe,’ and wishing he would suck the ‘honey’ lips that Daphnis only possesses in 
the wistful speculative tense. Similarly, the orthographic pun on ‘bee’ in the final line can 
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be read either of  two ways: either Daphnis describes his body as a (honey-laden) hive 
and asks Ganymeade to be his ‘honey bee,’ or he asks Ganymeade to ‘bee’ the ‘honey’ 
to his dry and papery ‘hive.’88 The syntactical ambiguity results in uncertainty as to who 
is the bee, and who is flower, honey, or hive, dissolving the boundaries between subject 
and object of  desire; it enables Daphnis to appropriate some of  Ganymeade’s sweetness 
for himself, and present it back to Ganymeade as a tempting prize.   
Flattening out the passage’s cultivation of  a tension between explicit eroticism 
and euphemistic evasion, Rictor Norton asserts that ‘“sucke” obviously implies 
fellatio…. Ganymeade’s flower is his penis, “ripe” or erect, and full of  spermatic honey 
berries.’89 In support of  this assertion, Norton cites Virgil’s claim, in the Georgics, that 
bees reproduce using their mouths. 90  Norton implies that Virgil’s entomological 
solecism relocates sexual pleasure, effecting its transition from the genitals to the 
mouth. As Jonathan Woolfson has shown, however, in the early modern period the 
endurance of  the belief that bees reproduced using their mouths, ‘without the sinful 
pleasures of  sexual intercourse,’ led not to an eroticisation of  orality, but rather to an 
emblematic and agricultural emphasis on apian chastity. 91  Seventeenth-century 
translations of  Virgil disseminated this fragment of  apian folklore: the fourth book of  
the Georgicks, in the 1628 version englished by Thomas May, describes the ‘chast 
wondrous means’ by which bees ‘propagate / Their kind’:92 
  
…[bees] feele nor Venus fire,  
Nor are dissolv’d in lust, nor yet endure  
The paines of  childing travell: but from pure  
Sweet flowers, & Herbs their progeny they bring  
Home in their mouths.93 
 
Not only did bees exemplify sexual abstemiousness, they also demanded it in those who 
tended them: ‘since antiquity, beekeepers had been advised to abstain from sexual 
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intercourse days before approaching bees.’ 94  Contemporary bee-keeping manuals 
confirm this: in The feminine monarchie or a treatise concerning bees (1609), Charles Butler 
recommends that ‘if  thou wilt have the favour of  thy Bees… thou must avoid such 
things as offend them: thou must not be (1) unchast or (2) uncleanly: for impurity and 
sluttishnes (themselves being most chast and neate,) they utterly abhore.’95 From this 
perspective, using apian imagery to describe erotic experience might serve a kind of  
purifying function: because bees eschew any improper unchastity, they serve to 
legitimize the forms of  erotic experience they describe.  
Whilst the poems I have discussed use the bee trope to libidinous ends, as a 
pretext for enumerating the multi-sensual pleasures of  sex, then, they also draw on the 
bee’s proverbial associations with sexual virtue in order to obviate potential accusations 
of  indecency, framing desire instead as an expression of  literary or alchemical skill, or as 
a means to develop self-knowledge. As Edward Dering’s distressed response to Carew’s 
‘A Rapture’ makes clear, they were not always successful in their efforts. The 
connotative and rhetorical flexibility of  apian imagery, however, does mean that 
hermeneutic responsibility is shifted firmly onto the reader: the potential for a less 
lascivious interpretation is always present. Associated simultaneously with cupid and 
with chastity, with discrimination and with desire, with virtue and with vice, the bee 
trope is deeply ambivalent; what is read into it, therefore, reflects as much upon reader 
as upon author.  
Used as an emblem of  desire, the bee trope not only represents, it also engages, 
readerly discrimination, or taste. Recent attempts to historicise the anachronistic 
category ‘pornography’ as a descriptor for early modern texts have led scholars to 
reconceive the genre as defined not by a presumed authorial intention to arouse, but 
rather as a matter of  readerly reception. As Ian Moulton suggests, ‘it might make more 
sense to see pornography as a way of  reading rather than a mode of  representation’; 
similarly, Katherine Craik contends that ‘pornography emerges… as a matter not so 
much of  textual content but readerly approach… [pornography] is best understood as a 
passionate transaction between books, writers and readers.’96 This is lent credence by 
John Fletcher’s 1637 The elder brother a comedie, in which two brothers serve as suitors for 
the eligible Angellina. Whilst the younger sibling, Eustace, directs his appetite towards 
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Angellina’s ‘sweet lips,’ the elder Charles is a scholar, apparently hungry for nothing but 
learning: ‘for’s Diet,’ his manservant Andrew advises, ‘he eates and digests… Volumes.’97 
As we might expect for one so indifferent to the sensual delights of  the table, Charles’ 
erotic experience is also limited to that offered by books. In response to his uncle 
Brisac’s challenge, ‘can you finde among your bundle of  bookes... What pleasures they 
enjoy, that doe embrace / A well shap’d wealthy Bride?,’ Charles replies: 
 
Tis frequent Sir in story, there I read of  
All kinde of vertuous and vitious women...  
            ...and when  
I light upon a Portia or Cornelia,  
Crown’d with still flourishing leaves of truth and goodnesse,  
With such a feeling I peruse their fortunes,  
As if I then had liv’d, and freely tasted  
Their ravishing sweetnesse; at the present loving  
The whole sexe for their goodnesse and example.  
But on the contrary when I looke on  
A Clytemnestra or a Tullia... 
Horrour invades my faculties...98 
 
Charles’ depiction of his readerly experience as tasting ‘sweetnesse’ is simultaneously 
bibliophagic and sensual. Despite his emphasis on the virtue of the women he reads 
about, the sexual connotations of ‘ravishing,’ and lack of self-restraint implied in ‘freely,’ 
might prompt an audience to a knowing titter: his reading matter might be beyond 
reproach, but his manner of reading seems pornographic in its intensity. As Angellina 
complains later, Charles ‘makes his booke his Mistresse.’ 99  This distinctly eroticised 
scene of reading is construed, however, not as a source of shame but of edification, as 
Charles learns, through historical example, to distinguish between virtue and vice. Using 
‘sweetnesse’ to index both sensual pleasure and readerly discrimination, Charles affirms 
that an apparently innocuous text can serve as a substitute for the amorous embraces of 
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a ‘well shap’d’ wife, and that this ‘pornographic’ mode of reading is entirely 
commensurate with literary judgement and edification. 
 
IV. ‘inward taste’ 
 
In his Asylum veneris (1616), a reply to Joseph Swetnam’s The arraignment of lewd, idle, 
froward, and unconstant women (1615), Daniel Tuvil defends female learning. ‘Parents’ who 
believe that the ‘pen must be forbidden’ to their daughters on the basis that it is ‘a 
Pandar to a Virgine Chastitie, and betrayeth it, by venting foorth... amarous Passions,’ 
Tuvil claims, are ‘fond’ (foolish, rather than doting).100 The belief that study stimulates 
amorousness is misguided. In fact, the reverse is true: Tuvil suggests that amorousness 
incites a kind of mental resourcefulness akin to intelligence, for ‘affection is ingenious,’ 
and will find a way to its own satisfaction.101  
Pace Tuvil’s confidence in the ingenuity of ‘affection,’ early modern men and 
women seem to have found themselves tongue-tied and awkward in the presence of a 
potential beau.102 And where natural inventiveness faltered, a number of texts bridging 
the fluid generic boundaries between anthology, conduct book, jest book, and 
dictionary, stepped in to offer advice. The anonymous 1658 The Academy of pleasure, for 
instance, functions as a manual in the art of seduction (or less generously, a kind of 
early modern Flirting for Dummies). Promising, on the title page, to teach ‘all sorts of 
Men, Maids, Widows, &c. to Speak and Write wittily, and to bear themselves gracefully 
for the attaining of their desired ends,’ the text mingles pedagogy and pleasure: whilst 
the main body of the work consists of a collection of anecdotes, poems, letters, and 
conversations, it also includes ‘The Muses Expositor,’ a descriptive catalogue of the major 
Greek and Roman figures, and a dictionary of ‘Hard Words.’ Dialogues, meanwhile, are 
battles of wits, replete with classical similes and ingenious wordplay.103 The Academy and 
its ilk, then, promote the presumption that an impressive vocabulary is an effective 
route to venery, and that classical erudition will result in carnal satisfaction; they present 
seduction as a form of skill, coterminous with the acquisition of elite learning.  
John Cleveland – Royalist, poet, satirist and clergyman – is an artful chronicler 
of the confederacy of erotic love and learning. His poem ‘Mark Anthony’ (included in 
                                                          
100 Daniel Tuvil, Asylum veneris (London: Edward Griffin for Laurence L’isle, 1616), F7r-v (87-88). 
101 Ibid., F7v-F8r. 
102 See Mazzio, Inarticulate Renaissance, 142-43. 
103 Anon., The Academy of  pleasure (London: for John Stafford and William Gilbertson, 1656).  
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the posthumously published 1677 Clievelandi Vindiciae), which compares Antony and 
Cleopatra’s legendary liaison pejoratively to that enjoyed by the narrator, describes the 
first stages of his dalliance as a simultaneously amorous and intellectual awakening 
prompted by the taste of a kiss: ‘her warmer lips, which, when I tasted, / My duller 
spirits made me active as fire.’104 Subsequently, he frames the pleasures of his mistress’ 
company in learned terms: 
 
Mystical grammar of amorous glances;  
  Feeling of pulses, the physic of love;  
Rhetorical courtings and musical dances;  
  Numbering of kisses arithmetic prove;  
  Eyes like astronomy;  
  Straight-limb’d geometry;  
  In her Art’s ingeny  
  Our wits were sharp and keen.105 
 
Progressing from the grammar of ‘amorous glances’ and the rhetorical display of 
‘courtings’ – two of the three subjects making up the trivium of verbal sciences – to the 
mathematical quadrivium of music, arithmetic, astronomy, and finally ‘straight-limb’d 
geometry,’ the lover receives a full liberal arts education. There is, however, an 
omission: the narrator neglects to mention the third subject of the trivium, namely logic, 
replacing it instead with the ‘feeling of pulses,’ a component of the study of medicine. 
The elision is silent, but significant, for the forms of knowledge offered by sensual 
desire and pleasure were frequently positioned in opposition to logic, as productive not 
of rational cognition, but of rhetorical expertise. As Robert Burton writes in The anatomy 
of melancholy (1621): 
 
Above all the other Symptomes of Lovers, this is not lightly to be overpassed, 
that... once they be in love, they turne to their ability, Rimers, Ballet-makers, and 
Poets... The very Rusticks and Hog-rubbers, if once they tast of this Love-
liquor, are inspired in an instant. They must write and indite all in Rime.106 
                                                          
104 John Cleveland, Clievelandi Vindiciae (London: Robert Harford, 1677), G2v (84). 
105 Ibid., G3r (85). 
106 Robert Burton, The anatomy of  melancholy (Oxford: John Lichfield and James Short for Henry Cripps, 
1621), Qq8v (622). 
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Burton’s intent is satirical, but the passage offers a pointed illustration of the 
conventional association between desire and rhetorical and poetical inspiration, as well 
as of the way that this transformation is effected via ‘tast.’ In this section, I further 
interrogate the causal relation between desire and discrimination, sensuality and 
ingenuity, that this chapter has been tracing. In particular, I propose that for early 
modern authors the putative mystery of female sexuality does not only inspire an 
appetite for knowledge, it also prompts consideration of what knowledge is, and how it 
might be best achieved. Focusing on instances of what Frank Kermode has called the 
‘Banquet of Sense…. theme,’ I suggest that the conflict between Ovidian eroticism and 
chaste neo-Platonic love that this ‘theme’ stages is also a conflict between two different 
forms of knowledge. Specifically, it is a conflict between a rhetorical epistemology 
which draws on Aristotelian physiology in order to ground knowledge in sensation, and 
a Platonic epistemology that grounds knowledge in memory. Crucially, the battle 
between the two unfolds as a debate about the moral and epistemological status of the 
lower senses: especially, of taste.   
Briefly, the banquet of the senses theme constitutes a poetic and theatrical trope 
according to which the erotic pleasures offered by each of the senses are delineated in 
turn, usually starting with vision and ending with touch or taste. In an influential 
chapter in his 1971 Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne, Kermode identifies the theme as an 
inversion and debasement of the Platonic banquet schematized by Marsilio Ficino in his 
Commentary on Plato’s Symposium. 107  The Platonic banquet symbolised love which 
‘proceeded from the highest senses up to the intellect,’ representing ‘the ascent from 
sense to the higher powers of the soul, and ultimately the apprehension of the divine 
beauty.’108 In contrast, ‘the Banquet of Sense’ – which is often associated with Ovid and 
Ovidian poetry – ‘represents a descent from sight to the senses capable of only material 
gratification, what Ficino calls “bestial love”.’109 The banquet of sense theme, then, 
maps the opposition between neo-Platonic chastity and Ovidian eroticism onto the 
conventional sensory hierarchy, associating the former with vision (and, ideally, with 
surmounting the senses altogether), and the latter with the lower senses of touch and 
taste. In Jonson’s The New Inn, for example, Beaufort avows his preference for Ovidian 
                                                          
107 Frank Kermode, Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne: Renaissance Essays (London: Routledge, 1971), 68-99, 
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108 Ibid., 79, 83. 
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eroticism by invoking the gustatory pleasures of kissing: ‘I relish not these philosophical 
feasts,’ he pronounces in response to Lovel’s encomium to Platonic love, ‘Give me a 
banquet o’ sense, like that of Ovid... for my taste, / Ambrosiac kisses to melt down the 
palate.’ (III.ii.124-29) 
Whilst the banquet of  sense theme surfaces in the work of  many authors 
throughout the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it takes its name, and arguably 
receives its most sustained and complex treatment, in George Chapman’s long narrative 
poem Ovids banquet of  sense (1595), which describes Ovid’s legendary seduction of  
Corinna, daughter of  the Emperor Augustus. In Kermode’s influential interpretation, 
the fact that Ovid’s celebration of  Corinna’s sensuous beauty reverses the trajectory 
represented by the Platonic banquet, proceeding from the higher senses to the lower 
senses of  taste and touch rather than vice versa, encourages a condemnatory reading: 
the poem’s apparent valorization of  sensual love is intended by Chapman to be 
‘ironical.’110 ‘There is no question,’ Kermode informs us sternly, ‘that Ovid’s views are 
reprehensible.’ 111  Kermode’s moralistic conviction that Chapman intends outright 
condemnation of  Ovid’s sensual indulgence has been contested.112 His emphasis on 
neo-Platonic philosophy as an interpretive framework for the poem, however, has been 
consistently replicated. This disproportionate scholarly emphasis on neo-Platonism has 
led to a neglect of  the poem’s use of  Aristotelian and peripatetic natural philosophy. 
When Kermode comments that ‘Ovid’s treatment of  each sense… is, basically, 
Aristotelian, with the usual accretions,’ his tone is one of  undisguised ennui.113 Far from 
being a prosaic rehash of  scholastic doctrine, however, Chapman presents Ovid’s 
deployment of  Aristotelian ideas about the senses as an integral and effective aspect of  
his seduction of  Corinna.  
Whilst in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggested that ‘pleasures are a 
hinderence to thought, and the more so the more one delights in them, e.g. in sexual 
                                                          
110 Ibid., 99. 
111 Ibid., 86. Here, Kermode is referring specifically to the character of  Ovid in Jonson’s Poetaster. 
112 Recently, for instance, Martin Wheeler has argued that the poem ‘espouses a neo-Platonic 
epistemology but rejects its impracticable puritanism and legitimizes physical love.’ Wheeler, ‘The Thrill 
of  the Chase,’ 326. There have, however, also been apologists for Kermode’s position, including Darryl J. 
Gless and Raymond-Jean Frontain. Gless, ‘Chapman’s Ironic Ovid,’ English Literary Review 9 (1979): 21-41; 
Frontain, ‘The “Curious Frame” of  Chapman’s Ovids Banquet of  Sence: 2 Samuel 11,’ Cahiers 31 (1987): 37-
43.  
113 Kermode, Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne, 87.  Louise Vinge gives a lucid and thorough account of  the 
Aristotelian and medieval psychology that forms what she calls the ‘background’ to the poem’s account 
of  the senses, but does not fully explore its utility and significance. Louise Vinge, ‘Chapman’s Ovids 
Banquet of  Sence: Its Sources and Theme,’ Journal of  the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 38 (1975): 247. 
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pleasure, for nothing could think of  anything while absorbed in this,’ 114 the peripatetic 
insistence on the sensory basis of  cognition held out the prospect of  a more optimistic 
evaluation of  the relation between erotic pleasure and knowledge. In justifying the 
sensual pleasure he derives from Corinna’s presence, Chapman’s Ovid grasps this 
prospect with both hands:  
 
The sence is given us to excite the minde,  
And that can never be by sence exited  
But first the sence must her contentment minde, 
We therefore must procure the sence delighted,  
That so the soule may use her facultie…115 
 
Drawing on the dictate that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the sense, 
Ovid claims that, in stimulating the senses, the experiences of desire and sexual pleasure 
also provide material for the mind. Scholastic dogma is given a sensual twist: the 
‘facultie’ of cognition is inert until it is galvanized by sensory delight. Consequently, the 
naked Corinna is a ‘Mine of knowledge.’116 Similarly, Ovid makes use of faculty sensory 
physiology when he attempts to persuade Corinna to satisfy his sense of taste with a 
snog. ‘A kisse of thine,’ he tells her:   
 
... shall borrow organs of my touch  
T’advance it to that inward taste of mine  
Which makes all sence...117 
 
The kiss, Ovid suggests, will ultimately be tasted not by his lips and tongue, but by his 
‘inward taste.’ A marginal note by Chapman glosses this phrase: by ‘inward taste,’ it 
explains, Ovid ‘intends the common sence.’ Taste, then, is associated with the common 
sense. Chapman’s marginal note elaborates: Ovid ‘cals it [t]ast because it dooth, sapere in 
effectione sensuum [achieve knowledge in the action of the senses].’ 118  The association 
between gustatory taste and common sense derives from a pun on sapĕre, which means 
                                                          
114 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 135-36. 
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116 Ibid., C2v. 
117 Ibid., D4v. 
118 The translations inside the square brackets are from Sixteenth Century Poetry: An Annotated Anthology, ed. 
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both to taste, and to know or understand. Conflating the gustatory pleasures of a sweet 
kiss with the Aristotelian faculty of judgement, Ovid roots wisdom firmly in the 
practical operations of the senses, especially the ‘low’ sense of taste. 119  Kissing, he 
effectively tells Corinna, is just common sense. 
Corinna counters Ovid’s advances by lecturing him on the superiority of chaste 
neo-Platonic love: ‘you showe how weake in soule you are / That let rude sence, subdue 
your reasons skill,’ she tells him, joining the disdain of the Petrarchan mistress with the 
hauteur of an emperor’s daughter.120 In denying the epistemological value of the senses 
outright, Corinna’s words correlate with a wider cultural association between neo-
Platonic chastity and a Platonic epistemology which, in contrast to Aristotle, views 
knowledge as rooted not in sensation but in memory. In his 1590 translation of Orazio 
Rinaldi’s The Royal Exchange, for example, under the heading ‘Sence,’ Robert Greene 
warns against ‘delight in women,’ commenting that ‘Plato admitted no Auditour in his 
Academie, but such as while they were his schollers woulde abstaine from women: for he 
was wont to say, that the greatest enemie to the memorie, was venerie.’121 Greene’s 
denigration of ‘venerie’ in favour of ‘memorie’ signals assent to Plato’s assertion, in the 
Phaedo, that true knowledge derives from recalling formal, a priori concepts, or ‘ideas,’ 
supposedly implanted in our minds before birth.122 As Francis Bacon puts it in the 
Advancement of learning, in ‘Platoes opinion… all knowledge is but remembrance.’ 123 
‘Venerie’ thus distracts from the central epistemological project of remembering, or 
recalling what is lost. 
Crucially, the conflict between Ovidian seducers (and the Aristotelian 
epistemology they use to valorize erotic pleasure), and neo-Platonists such as Corinna is 
frequently articulated using the language of taste. In ‘The Antiplatonick,’ for example, 
Cleveland mocks the popularity of the doctrine of chaste Platonic love at the court of 
Charles I by associating it with unnatural appetites. ‘Virtue’s no more in Womankind,’ 
Cleveland proclaims, 
 
 
                                                          
119 John Huntingdon similarly suggests that ‘Chapman’s careful ambiguity leads a reader to see both the 
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But the Green sickness of the Mind  
Philosophy (their new Delight)  
A kind of Charcoal Appetite... 
There is no Sophistry prevails,  
Where all-convincing Love assails…124 
 
Women’s delight in ‘Sophistry’ is a form of green-sickness, an illness caused by sexual 
abstinence and characterised by a perverse desire to eat unpalatable entities such as 
‘charcoal,’ chalk, and clay (substances thought to be humorally cool, and thus possessed 
of the capacity to temper a woman’s sexual warmth, though at the expense of her 
digestive health). 125  Cleveland’s postulation of a causal relation between sexual 
abstinence and gustatory corruption, moreover, is not borne solely of his fertile 
imagination. The 1595 The Problemes of Aristotle, a pseudo-Aristotelian medical and 
physiological miscellany first published in the same year as Ovids banquet, articulates a 
widespread belief that ejaculation – for both men and women – serves as an important 
form of humoral purgation.126 ‘Copulation,’ The Problemes pronounces, ‘doth ease and 
lighten the body, cheere the minde, comfort the head and the sence.’127 Conversely, 
chastity could upset the delicate humoral balance and – importantly – discompose the 
senses, skewing one’s sensory perceptions of the material world. As such, abstinence 
from sex could have detrimental epistemological, as well as physical, consequences. The 
enforced celibacy of ‘Eunuches,’ for example, is supposed by The Problemes to cause a 
build-up of choleric ‘seed.’ ‘They have,’ it claims: 
 
much bitter choler… which aboundeth in the tongue. And therefore it 
happeneth when they doe eate honey, that the humor is stirred: and the taste it 
selfe when it hath felt the bitternes of choler, breedeth an imagination that the 
honey is bitter.128 
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Cleveland’s association of neo-Platonic chastity with gustatory error, then, finds a 
counterpart in popular physiology’s suggestion that sex is necessary to maintain the 
humoral balance needed for accurate sensing; the anonymous compiler of the Problemes 
of Aristotle might well agree with Chapman’s Ovid and with Cleveland that sensual 
delight is a necessary precondition of epistemological competence. 
The causal relation between sexual abstinence, green-sickness, and gustatory 
corruption is also evident in Fletcher’s The elder brother, in which Angellina’s father, 
Lewis, worries that his daughter’s idleness will cause her to ‘fall into the greene 
sicknesse,’ producing a perverse appetite for ‘chalke, or coals, / Leather and oatmeal, 
and such other trash.’129 In response, Angellina’s attendant Sylvia speaks up in favour of 
the benefits of marital sex. It not idleness, but abstinence, that causes green-sickness: ‘a 
game some Bedfellow,’ Sylvia pronounces, is ‘the sure Physician.’130 What is more:  
 
                                          … fathers that deny  
Their Daughters lawfull pleasure, when ripe for them, 
In some kindes edge their appetites to taste of 
The fruit that is forbidden.131 
 
Angellina is positioned simultaneously as subject and object of lust: by using the word 
‘ripe’ to indicate the maturity of Angellina’s own sexual desires, Sylvia also describes 
her, implicitly, as a fruit, tempting to an appetitive wooer and ready for plucking. 
Convinced by Sylvia’s advice, Lewis echoes her language of sensual appetite, urging his 
daughter to ‘feast thy thoughts with th’pleasures of a Bride.’ Sylvia is, however, not 
content: ‘Thoughts are but airy food Sir, let her taste them.’132 What is striking is the 
consistency with which this discussion about the dangers of chastity and virtues of 
marital coitus is articulated using the language of taste: whilst the former will cause 
unnatural ‘appetites to taste’ that are both literal (for chalk and coal) and metaphorical 
(for the forbidden fruit of premarital sex), the latter is also an act of tasting, a substantial 
pleasure which is opposed to the anticipated delights of a merely imagined feasting.  
Not only aspiring seducers including Chapman’s Ovid and John Cleveland, but 
advocates of the benefits of conjugal coitus, such as Sylvia, then, are united in their 
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deployment of the language of taste in in order to present sensual pleasure as 
productive of epistemological mastery, and / or sexual abstinence as productive of both 
ill-health and epistemological error. In the next section of this chapter, I will explore 
more fully the particular form of epistemological mastery provided by sensual pleasure: 
namely, rhetorical virtuosity. 
 
V. ‘Love’s tongue’ 
 
 In Cleveland’s ‘The Antiplatonick,’ the anticipated victory of erotic ‘Love’ over 
specious neo-Platonic ‘Sophistry’ is also, implicitly, a victory for rhetoric: ‘all-
convincing’ love triumphs because it appropriates rhetoric’s persuasive capacities.133 The 
notion that sensual desire and pleasure can incite rhetorical skill is evident in, for 
instance, Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost (1598), in which Berowne challenges 
Navarre’s conviction that disavowal of the sensory pleasures of feasting and female 
company will prove an aid to scholarship. Given that ‘the end of study’ is (as Navarre 
admits) ‘to know which else wee should not know,’ Berowne argues that prohibiting or 
limiting access to women and food perversely refigures them as apposite objects of 
knowledge.134 ‘Love’ of women, furthermore, ‘gives to every power a double power, / 
Above their functions and their offices.’ Most pertinently, ‘Love’s tongue proves dainty 
Bacchus grosse in taste’; a lover is a kind of sensory superman, able to taste with an acuity 
that outdoes even Bacchus. Subsequently, ‘when Love speakes, the voice of all the gods 
/ Make heaven drowsie with the harmonie.’135 For Berowne, then, in honing the senses, 
sexual desire also inculcates oratorical ability.  
This association between sensual desire and rhetorical facility is a common one, 
and is frequently articulated via authors’ exploitation of etymological links between the 
words ‘sweet’ and ‘persuade,’ both of which, as I noted in the introduction, derive 
ultimately from the Indo-European root word swad.  As Jeffrey Masten has shown, early 
modern writers were intensely aware of this etymological affiliation.136  In the Italian 
playwright Guidubaldo Bonarelli’s Filli di Sciro, translated by Jonathan Sidnam as the 
1655 Phillis of Scyros, for example, Amintas urges the ‘aged Nymph’ Nerea to speak in 
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favour of Niso’s suit to Celia. In response to Nerea’s objection that his faded beauty 
makes him unfit as a wooer, Amintas flatters that ‘on those lips / Where formerly 
Vermilan Roses grew,’ ‘[Love] hath plac’d honey, and the pleasing sound / Of sweet 
perswasive words.’ 137  As with Daphnis in Barnsfield’s The Affectionate Shepheard, for 
Amintas sweetly persuasive language must replace physical beauty as a weapon of 
seduction.  
For Cleveland, in ‘The senses Festival,’ the sweet pleasures offered by the 
beloved provide a lesson in the nature of persuasiveness, instructing the lover-poet in 
the rhetorical skills needed to sweet-talk her into his arms. The sweetness of persuasive 
rhetoric is borrowed from the sensual experience of its target:  
 
Now to the melting Kiss that sips  
The Jellied Philtre of her Lips;  
So Sweet there is no Tongue can prays’t,  
Till transubstantiate with a Taste,  
Inspir’d like Mahomet from above  
By th’ Billing of my Heavenly Dove.138 
 
Uniting fantastical physic with anatomical specificity, ‘philtre’ punningly denotes both a 
love potion, and the groove in the upper lip. 139  The taste of a kiss simultaneously 
represents the limits of language, and poetic inspiration: ‘so sweet’ that it evades all 
praise, it nonetheless results in poetic inspiration. Cleveland (who had Laudian 
sympathies) plays boldly with sacramental imagery; ‘transubstantiate’ inevitably recalls 
the Catholic doctrine discussed in chapter 3. Cleveland’s elision of sacramental tasting 
and kissing, moreover, evokes the medieval practice of congregational kissing of a pax – 
an image of Christ, or of the Agnus Dei, on a wooden, ivory, or metal board – as a 
substitute for lay consumption of the elements, grounding the kiss firmly in Catholic 
ritual practices. 140  From this perspective, it is significant that ‘Taste’ serves not an 
evidentiary function (as it did in Protestant polemic arguing that the senses provided a 
reliable guide to the nature of the Eucharstic elements), but an instrumental function: 
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taste does not register, but rather brings about, the transubstantiation of the lover’s 
tongue from mute adoration to inspired poeticising.  
Similarly, Chapman’s Ovids banquet of sense presents Ovid’s rhetorical ingenuity, 
deployed in his seduction of Corinna, as a result of her stimulation of his senses. In 
particular, the sound of Corinna playing the lute and singing sends Ovid into a furor 
poeticus: ‘Never was any sence so sette on fire,’ he enthuses, ‘as mine eares; / Her fingers 
to the strings doth speeche inspire.’141 And whilst Ovid intially emphasises the sense of  
hearing as a stimulant of  rhetorical creativity, he subsequently frames the sound of  
Corinna’s ‘sweete voice’ in synaesthetic terms: 
 
Me thinks her tunes flye... like Attick Bees  
To my eares hives, with hony tryed to ayre;  
My braine is but the combe, the wax, the lees,  
My soule the Drone, that lives by their affaire.  
O so it sweets, refines, and ravisheth...142 
 
Corinna’s stimulation of  Ovid’s senses, at once gustatory and aural, provides his ‘braine’ 
with the honey needed for rhetorical and poetical composition. Ovid, then, does not 
only argue that sexual sensation stimulates the mental faculties; in his ingenious and 
persuasive manipulation of  language, he also exemplifies the result of  that stimulation.  
Where scholars have noticed Ovid’s causal association between pleasurable 
sensation – especially taste – and rhetorical skill, they have represented it as mutually 
derogatory. Again, Kermode sets the tone: for him, the poetic narrative of Ovids banquet, 
and the rhetorical prowess of its protagonists, serve only to ‘adorn’ the ‘philosophic 
material.’143 More recently, Martin Wheeler has called the poem ‘poeticized philosophy,’ 
arguing that it constitutes a ‘dramatization’ of Ficino’s Commentary.144 In both cases, 
poetry and rhetoric are, tacitly, presented as epistemologically inferior to philosophy: a 
form of ornamental prettification. The association between rhetorical skill and sensory 
pleasure, then, implicates the senses in frivolous aesthetic pleasure; conversely, the 
dissipation of the senses confirms the disparagement of rhetoric. In contrast, I want to 
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emphasize the ways in which, in early modern culture, both rhetorical expertise, and the 
lower senses that are entwined with it, are epistemologically significant, offering a 
powerfully persuasive alternative way of thinking not only about how knowledge might 
be communicated, but also about how it might be conceived and achieved. 145  In 
particular, the notion that sexual tasting (and especially, the sensation of sweetness) 
serves as a source of knowledge is intimately intertwined with the conviction both that 
rhetorical skill is epistemologically valuable, and correspondingly that knowledge itself is 
rhetorical in character.  
In an essay exploring the history of rhetorical epistemology, Philippa Spoel 
points out that the process of rhetorical invention has often been thought of as one of 
‘knowledge generation.’ 146  Spoel states that, traditionally, the forms of knowledge 
generated by rhetoric have usually been conceived of as primarily logical and reasonable 
in nature. In contrast to this presumed historical association between rhetoric and logic, 
and building on the work of Donna Haraway, Spoel suggests that rhetorical invention, 
and the knowledge it generates, is ‘always situated and embodied,’ and thus inherently 
subjective. 147In particular, she traces the local, corporeal character of this rhetorical 
epistemology to the perspectival nature of vision, which is here conflated with 
knowledge: ‘emphasizing the rhetor’s embodied positionality ensures that her vision or 
knowledge claims an authority appropriate to its location and partiality, not a universal 
or transcendent authority.’148  
Spoel’s assertion that invention has, historically, been considered a means of 
‘knowledge generation,’ is helpful, and chimes with the work of scholars such as Yota 
Batsaki, Subha Mukherji, and Jan-Melissa Schramm. 149  Spoel’s suggestion that, until the 
recent work of feminist thinkers, the means of generation and the knowledge thereby 
produced have been conceived of as primarily logical in character is not, however, 
commensurate with the evidence of early modern texts. Whilst figures such as syllogismus 
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rhetoric is ‘a crucial component of early modern literature’s participation in the larger epistemological 
field,’ in part because of the fact that rhetorical ‘enargeia’ and legal ‘evidentia’ existed in a relation of 
‘coincidence.’ Yota Batsaki, Subha Mukherji, and Jan-Melissa Schramm, introduction to Fictions of 
Knowledge: Fact, Evidence, Doubt, ed. Batsaki, Mukherji, and Schramm (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), 5-6.  
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and ratiocinatio do indeed schematize the patterns and processes of logical thought, the 
mid-sixteenth century Ramist separation of logic and rhetoric led to a reconsideration 
(although not an attenuation) of the epistemological authority of the latter. 150 
Frequently, early modern pedagogues, rhetoricians, and poets stress the importance not 
of logical thought but of embodied experience as an engine of rhetorical invention, and 
of the knowledge thereby produced. For George Puttenham, for example, writing in his 
1589 The Arte of English Poesie, rhetorical skill derives from proto-empirical observation: 
 
Poets were… from the beginning the best perswaders and their eloquence the 
first Rethoricke of the world... [Poets] were the first observers of all naturall 
causes & effects in the things generable and corruptible, and from thence 
mounted up to search after the celestiall courses and influences, & yet 
penetrated further to know the divine essences and substances separate… they 
were the first Astronomers and Philosophists and Metaphisicks…151 
 
In their quest for matter (res), poets served as the ‘first observers’ of the natural, 
celestial, and divine realms: they did not merely describe the insights, but, according to 
Puttenham, founded the fields, of natural philosophy, astronomy, and metaphysics. 
Observation – a physical alertness to the material world – is at the root both of 
‘eloquence,’ and of the natural and divine sciences. 
The forms of embodied experience which underlie rhetorical invention, 
moreover, do not have to be limited to the visual. Spoel’s perspectival model represents 
rhetorical knowledge spatially: knowledge constitutes a series of ‘location[s],’ which an 
ocular subject occupies. The knowledge gained thereby might be ‘partial’ and situational, 
but it also retains a level of objectivity: any given epistemological position, or 
perspective, can only be occupied by one person at any one point, but the potential for 
sequential occupation by other ‘rhetors’ admits the possibility of replication and thus of 
verification. This model does not adequately describe the more radical conception of 
knowledge which emerges when early modern authors insist that rhetorical virtuosity is 
a product not of erotic looking, but of tasting. As a source of knowledge, taste sensations 
                                                          
150 On Peter Ramus’ separation of  logic and rhetoric, see Cynthia Sundberg Wall, The Prose of  Things: 
Transformations of  Description in the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2006), 20. 
Michel Beaujour emphasises the importance of  rhetoric to the development of  the epistemologies 
underlying the new philosophy: in particular, Bacon’s Essays ‘elaborate a new epistemology... modeled on 
the dialectic of  rhetorical invention.’ Beaujour, Poetics of  the Literary Self-Portrait (New York University 
Press, 1992), 182. 
151 George Puttenham, The arte of  English poesie (London: Richard Field, 1589), C3v (6). 
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are inherently non-replicable and unshareable, for gustation culminates in the 
consumption of its object. A rhetorical epistemology based on taste must therefore 
insist on the fundamental subjectivity of knowledge, the impossibility of replicating 
another individual’s embodied experience. Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that 
Emilia’s insistence that women, like their husbands, ‘have their Palats both for sweet, 
and sowre,’ might be taken to describe a basic capacity to distinguish or judge between 
pleasure and pain. For a number of early modern authors, this conventional pairing of 
sweet and sour (or sometimes bitterness), is fundamental to the valorisation of a 
rhetorical conception of knowledge not only as embodied and situational, but also as 
comparative and subjective.  
The idea that sweetness can only be appreciated by comparison with sourness or 
bitterness, and vice versa, was axiomatic throughout the period. The 1600 printed 
commonplace book Bel-vedére includes the aphorism ‘He cannot judge aright of fortunes power, 
/ Nor taste the sweet that never tride the sower.’152 Just as someone who has never experienced 
sour flavours cannot ‘taste,’ or know, sweetness, someone who has never experienced 
misfortune cannot ‘judge aright’ of ‘fortune.’ In her 1604 Miscelanea. Meditations. 
Memoratives, Elizabeth Grymeston includes a slightly different axiom with an identical 
meaning: ‘He cannot judge of pleasure, that never tasted paine.’153 Whilst Grymeston 
eschews mention of sweet and sour, the faculty used to judge the difference between 
good and bad fortune is the same: taste. This use of gustatory language to articulate a 
‘sense’ of the relational, comparative character of knowledge more generally is 
particularly noticeable when the form of tasting invoked is erotic: love poets frequently 
assert that wisdom grows out of the antithetical experiences of sweet desire and bitter 
jealousy. 
In chapter 1, I commented on John Florio’s use of the opposition of sweet and 
sour to describe processes of literary judgement: tasting Florio’s own ‘sour’ or immature 
works will allow his dedicatee to more fully appreciate the sweetness of other men’s 
compositions. The body of the Firste fruites itself offers a source for this pairing of sweet 
and bitter which applies it not to literary, but to erotic experience. In ‘A fine saying of 
Ariosto, touching Jelousie,’ love and jealousy are described in gustatory terms. 
Translated into English, the poem reads: 
                                                          
152 Anon., ‘Fortune is the nourse of fooles,’ in Bel-vedére, or, The Garden of the muses, compiled by John 
Bodenham (London: F.K. for Hugh Astley, 1600), L4v (152). 
153 Elizabeth Grymeston, Miscelanea. Meditations. Memoratives (London: Melch. Bradwood for Felix Norton, 
1604), H3v. 
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What sweeter state, what blisse more jocond  
Can be, then for to have an amorous hart?... 
  
Yet for al that, al bitternesse that is put  
In midst of this most delectable sweetnesse:  
Is an increasing, and making Love more faine:  
And is a way to make Love shew more perfect.  
Thirst causeth waters to taste both savery and good,  
And what food is, by fasting it is knowen.154 
 
Knowledge, the poem implies, is innately relational: just as it is only possible to 
appreciate (both in the sense of perceive, and enjoy), water and food once one has 
fasted, so too it is only possible to appreciate the ‘delectable sweetnesse’ of love once 
one has tasted the ‘bitternesse’ of jealousy. The passage’s accepting attitude to the 
vicissitudes of eros is inextricable from its conception of the nature of knowledge; both 
are anchored in, and expressed by images of, gustatory experience.   
For the Spanish physician Juan Huarte the fact that both taste and sexual 
appetites are characterised by their subjective, variable natures, makes them more, not 
less, comparable to discursive ‘understanding,’ or rhetorical knowledge. In The 
examination of mens wits, englished by Richard Carew and published in 1594, Huarte notes 
that just as some men ‘abhorre egges and milke: and others againe have a longing after 
them, and in the maner of using meates: some like rost, and some boild,’ so too ‘if we 
passe on to the facultie generative, we shall find as many appetites & varieties, for some 
men love a foule woman, and abhorre a faire… a fat wench is fulsome, and a leane hath 
their liking.’155 Correspondingly: 
 
All this varietie of strange tasts & appetites, is found in [rhetorical] 
compositions, framed by the understanding: for if we assemble 100 men of 
learning and propound a particular question, each of them delivereth a severall 
judgement, and discourseth thereof in different maner. One selfe argument to 
                                                          
154 Florio, Firste fruites, L3v-L4r (43-44). 
155 Juan Huarte, Examen de ingenios = The examination of  mens wits, trans. Richard Carew (London: Adam 
Islip for Richard Watkins, 1594), M2r (163). 
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one seemeth a sophisticall reason, to another probable; and some you shall meet 
with, to whose capacitie it concludeth as if it were a demonstration.156 
 
For Huarte, the subjective nature of gustatory and sexual tastes attests not their 
detachment from the operations of knowledge, but rather their congruity to rhetorical 
‘understanding,’ which is understood as variable not as a result of error, but in its very 
character. 
One figure in particular can be understood to exemplify the intrinsically 
relational model of knowledge implicitly promoted by those poets who suggest that the 
sweetness of sexual sensation – and conversely, the bitterness of jealousy and betrayal – 
is productive of rhetorical and epistemological accomplishment. Antitheton is a figure of 
thought which can be defined as ‘a proof or composition constructed of contraries.’157 
In The Arte of English Poesie, Puttenham cites as an example of this figure (which he calls 
‘the Quarreller’) ‘two verses where one speaking of Cupids bowe, deciphered thereby the 
nature of sensual love’: ‘His bent is sweete, his loose is somewhat sowre, / In joy 
begunne, ends oft in wofull howre.’158 The contrary gustatory sensations of sweet and 
sour provide the material for the antithetical image through which the poet deciphers, 
or reveals, something about ‘the nature of sensual love.’ 159  Knowledge is produced 
through the juxtaposition, in both gustatory sensation and in rhetorical language, of 
opposites. 
But not just of opposites. Although the relation between sweet and bitter is 
often conceived of as antithetical, it is not only conceived of as antithetical. In the 
previous chapter, I commented on how a number of experimental philosophers 
associated with the early Royal Society argue that – in Nehemiah Grew’s words – ‘a 
Sweet Taste, is generally founded in a Sower.’ Grew’s explanation of saccharinity as 
‘produced.... by a smoothed Acid’ suggests that the sweet and sour are only formally, not 
qualitatively, different: given the right conditions of culinary or experimental 
manipulation one always has the potential to be transformed into the other.160 Whilst 
the corpuscular and mechanical hypotheses that undergirded such theories were 
distinctly new-fangled, the notion that sweetness and bitterness are at the extremes of a 
                                                          
156 Ibid., M2v (164). 
157 ‘Antitheton,’ in Gideon O. Burton, The Forest of  Rhetoric, accessed 05 September 2011, 
http://rhetoric.byu.edu/Figures/A/antitheton.htm. 
158 Puttenham, The arte of  English poesie, Aa2r (175). Puttenham also notes that ‘Isocrates the Greek Oratour 
was a litle too full of  this figure’ Puttenham, The arte of  English poesie, Aa2v (176). 
159 Ibid., Aa2r (175). 
160 Grew, The anatomy of  plants, Tt5v (288). 
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single continuum reflects a much older cultural interest in nuanced relations between 
these intuitively oppositional gustatory sensations, and also between the affective states 
they represent.161 In The history of the world (1617), for example, Walter Raleigh asserts 
that ‘as all those things which are most mellifluous, are soonest changed into choller 
and bitternesse: so are our vanities and pleasures converted into the bitterest sorrowes 
and repentances.’162 Raleigh articulates his vanitas message by emphasising the notional 
and experiential proximity of the ‘mellifluous,’ or sweet, and the ‘bitternesse’ of sorrow. 
Whilst Raleigh’s use of the sweetness-bitterness coupling is conventionally moralistic, 
other early modern authors employ it in the less pious contexts that are the focus of this 
chapter. Michael Schoenfeldt suggests that ‘in the Sonnets... Shakespeare develops the 
links between the corollary appetites for food and love not so much to provide 
strategies for rendering both salutary as to explore the relevance of the necessary 
periodicity of hunger to the ebb and flow of erotic desire.’ Schoenfeldt goes on to 
explore Shakespeare’s interest in ‘the nexus at which desire is satiated, and mitigates into 
its opposite, disgust,’ highlighting in particular his use of medical and culinary practice 
to express ‘a different strategy for sustaining desire in the face of satiation’: the 
introduction of bitterness as a provocation to hunger.163 
The trope described by Schoenfeldt continued to be popular for some time: a 
number of poets suggest that the bitter aspects of erotic love are not necessarily 
unwelcome, for they serve to prevent delicious sweetness from crossing the line into 
nauseous surfeit. The notion that the sweetness of erotic pleasure might slide, if 
indulged in too ardently, into repugnance is articulated by both Thomas Carew, and 
Abraham Cowley.  In Carew’s poem of ‘Good counsell to a young Maid,’ the narrator 
advises his addressee to resist the siege of a lover, comparing the man who sues for her 
sexual favours to a pilgrim who worships the cool spring he encounters before he 
drinks, but who, once ‘quencht,’ ‘kicks her banks, and from the place / That thus fresht 
him, moves with sullen pace.’ Thus, warns the narrator, ‘shalt thou be despis’d, faire 
Maid, / When by the sated lover tasted.’ 164 Similarly, in a poem ‘Against Fruition,’ 
included in his posthumously published The mistresse (1667), Abraham Cowley warns his 
mistress that: 
                                                          
161 Mary Carruthers notes that ‘the most interesting medieval aspect of  “sweetness”.... is that it is not just 
one thing, but has a contrarian nature that includes within itelf  it opposites: bitter, salt, and sour.’ 
‘Sweetness,’ 1000. 
162 Walter Raleigh, The history of  the world (London: William Stansby for Walter Burre, 1614), G7r (69). 
163 Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves, 81-82. 
164 Carew, Poems, D5r (41).  
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Thy sweetnesse is so much within mee plac’d,  
That shouldst thou Nectar give’t would spoile the tast... 
Love, like a greedy Hawke, if we give way,  
Does over-gorge himselfe, with his own Prey;  
Of very hopes a surfet heele sustain,  
Unlesse by Feares he cast them up againe.165  
 
The pleasures of taste and the pleasures of sex are phenomenally akin: too much of 
both, and desire will metamorphose into disgust. Against this threat, bitterness provides 
a corrective counterpart. Just as bitter or sour things provoke the appetite, so too do the 
bitter agonies of a mistress’ disdain or betrayal exacerbate desire, and comparatively 
enhance the sweetness of sensual bliss. Thus, in a poem included in Tottel’s Miscellany, in 
which ‘The faithfull lover declareth his paines,’ the author describes a reawakening of 
his hopes of erotic fulfilment: 
 
So doth good hope clene put away dispaire out of my minde.  
And biddes me for to serve and suffer paciently...  
For those that care do know and tasted have of trouble,  
When passed is their wofull paine eche joy shall seme them 
double.  
And bitter sendes she now to make me tast the better,  
The plesant swete when that it comes to make it seme the 
sweter,  
And so determine I to serve...166 
 
Here, the vacillations between despair and hope, bitterness and sweetness, which 
characterise erotic love work to enhance the lover’s pleasure. In much the same way 
that a skilful cook mingles flavours, stimulating the appetite through variety, the 
mistress deals out bitterness only to enhance the promise of sweetness.   
  
                                                          
165 Abraham Cowley, The mistresse (London: for Humphrey Moseley, 1647), D2r (47). 
166 Anon., ‘The faithfull lover declareth his paines,’ in Songes and sonettes [Tottel’s Miscellany], D3v. 
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VI.  ‘Fashions grow up for tast’ 
 
In John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester’s ‘A letter from Artemiza in the town, to Chloe in 
the country’ (1680), the titular correspondent rails against those who, in choosing their 
sexual partners in adherence to popular consensus, rather than according to personal 
preference, ‘forsake… Pleasure, to pursue… Vice’: 
 
 
Their private Wish obeys the publick Voice; 
’Twixt good and bad, Whimsey decides, not Choice.  
Fashions grow up for tast; at Forms they strike;  
They know what they would have, not what they like… 167 
 
Artemiza occupies the moralist’s position with aplomb, but – unconventionally – her 
outrage is a response, not to love’s degradation by lust, but to lust’s degradation by 
social convention. The force of her indignation is turned, not on sexual license per se, 
but on the reduction of sexual license to a faddish posture, culpably devoid of genuine 
pleasure.  Taste, in this context, is degraded, associated not with discrimination between 
potential lovers, but with slavish adherence to the tyranny of ‘fashions.’ Once again, we 
return to a notion of taste as ‘apish’: imitative, something less than human.  
‘A letter from Artemiza’ stands in stark contrast to the authors and works 
explored in this chapter. Conceiving of sexual desire and pleasure in history as a matter 
neither of somatically factual sex, nor of socially constructed sexuality, but rather of 
sensuality, I have suggested that a heavy emphasis on gustatory sensation is one 
distinctive feature of early modern eroticism. This emphasis is grounded in humoral 
physiology, and can be seen to reflect the embodied experience of lovers; finely attuned 
to the relations between flavour and physicality, early modern men and women were 
also highly aware of the aphrodisiac and erotic possibilities offered by tastes. Sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century uses of the language of gustation to describe amatory 
experience, moreover, engage with wider debates surrounding the epistemological and 
moral status of this sense. Sexual tastes are often framed – for instance, by Othello – as 
brutish and irrational. Nonetheless, a number of authors – and ultimately Othello – 
exploit taste’s associations with judgement and with experiential certainly in order to 
                                                          
167 John Wilmot, Earl of  Rochester, A letter from Artemiza in the town, to Chloe in the country (1680), 2. 
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suggest that desire functions as a form of discrimination, and that sensual sweetness 
offers a reliable route to intersubjective knowledge. The bee trope is central here, 
aligning sensual arousal with literary skill. The multivalence of the bee trope, moreover, 
shifts hermeneutic responsibility for the sensual pleasure that readers derive therein 
onto those readers. Subsequently, the language of honey and sweetness, deeply 
conventional as it is, emerges as more connotatively and rhetorically complex than is 
usually supposed. In Barnfield’s The Affectionate Shepheard, for example, the love-gifts of 
sugared fruit and honey that Daphnis offers Ganymeade not only represent Daphnis’ 
hopes for the aphrodisiac effects of sweetness, they also function as an image of the 
beloved Ganymeade himself. In proffering them, Daphnis frames sex as a source of 
self-knowledge for Ganymeade, effacing his own part in the longed-for (but never 
achieved) consummation. Use of the language of taste contributes to a (limited and 
localized) rehabilitation of sensual passion in the course of the seventeenth century.  
Attending to taste, furthermore, prompts us to recognise the ways in which 
authors respond to the perceived mystery of female desire not only by striving to know 
the beloved and his or her body, but also by invoking, and comparatively assessing, the 
validity and efficacy of different definitions of knowledge itself. Specifically, works 
employing the banquet of the senses theme – notably Chapman’s Ovids banquet of sense, 
and Cavalier poetry – pitch the battle between Ovidian eroticism and chaste, neo-
Platonic love as a contest between two types of knowledge: rhetorical knowledge, which 
is grounded in the senses, and philosophical knowledge, which is grounded in memory. 
This conflict unfolds via the language of taste: whereas neo-Platonic chastity is figured, 
by Ovidian seducers, as a pathological corruption of appetites associated with green-
sickness, the sweetness of sensual pleasure is presented as coterminous with sweetly 
persuasive rhetoric. Crucially, erotic and rhetorical sweetness prove epistemologically 
valuable: paired with the bitterness of jealousy and betrayal, it offers a kind of object-
lesson in the rhetorical, relational, and situational nature of all knowledge.  
Published in the first year of the decade that would see the so-called ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ of 1688, Rochester’s ‘A letter from Artemiza’ belongs almost as much to 
the long eighteenth century as it does to the early modern period, and its anxious 
interest in social ‘Fashions,’ in the power of ‘publick Voice’ to determine private tastes, 
and in arbitrations of ‘good and bad’ directed not by judgment but by modish ‘Whimsy,’ 
it certainly anticipates many of the concerns of a later era. In a short afterword to this 
thesis, I will sketch out some of the implications of my work on early modern taste for 
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conventional ideas about the relation between taste, social propriety, and aesthetic 
discernment in the early eighteenth century. 
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AFTERWORD 
 
‘The way to know’ 
 
In his June 1712 The Spectator article on taste, Joseph Addison writes:  
 
Most Languages make use of this Metaphor, to express that Faculty of the 
Mind, which distinguishes all the most concealed Faults and nicest Perfections 
in Writing. We may be sure this Metaphor would not have been so general in all 
Tongues, had there not been a very great conformity between that Mental Taste, 
which is the Subject of this Paper, and that Sensitive Taste which gives us a 
Relish of every different Flavour that affects the Palate. Accordingly we find, 
there are as many Degrees of Refinement in the intellectual Faculty, as in the 
Sense...1 
 
In Addison’s description of the relation between ‘Mental Taste’ and ‘Sensitive Taste,’ 
the latter emerges as the standard of discrimination to which the former must aspire. 
Addison’s article (from classical Latin articulus joint, point of time, critical moment) 
forms a hinge between the early modern sense (in both ‘senses’) of taste, and later ideas 
about aesthetics and commerce.2 Taste in this latter sense emerges as a central term in 
the articulation and negotiation of anxieties surrounding a consumer culture 
characterised by conspicuous emulation of one’s neighbours. 3 Whilst the scope and 
significance of taste in the early modern period has been neglected, taste has been 
studied extensively as an expression of and bulwark against the tides of commercialism, 
particularly in an eighteenth-century context. Notably, in the introduction to their recent 
                                                          
1 Joseph Addison, The Spectator 409 (Thursday, June 19, 1712), reproduced in The Commerce of  Everyday Life: 
Selections from The Tatler and The Spectator, ed. Erin Mackie (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 383. 
2 ‘Article, n.’ OED Online, accessed 27 June 2013, www.oed.com/view/Entry/11179. 
3 On the burgeoning of consumer culture in the second half of the century, see Lorna Weatherill, 
Consumer Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain, 1660-1760 (London: Routledge, 1993), especially 328. In 
the introduction to their Consumption and the World of Goods, John Brewer and Roy Porter connect 
consumer culture not to taste specifically but to eating more generally, noting that ‘the very word, 
“consume”... suggests both an enlargement through incorporation and a withering away. Consuming is 
thus both enrichment and impoverishment.’ Introduction to Consumption and the World of Goods, 4. In the 
same volume, Brewer pursues this insight in his essay, ‘Consumption: Disease of the Consumer Society?’ 
(58-81), whilst Sidney Mintz troubles the boundary between alimentary and commercial consumption in 
his essay ‘The Changing Roles of Food in the Study of Consumption’ (261-73). 
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Gender, Taste and Material Culture in Britain and North America, 1700-1830, John Styles and 
Amanda Vickery argue that:  
 
the notion of taste provided a defence against the accusation that the 
commercial market in culture simply pandered to the baser lusts of whoever 
could afford to pay, with no regard to aesthetic value, personal morality, or the 
national good. Taste offered disinterested discernment as a corrective to the 
crude gratification of the appetites.4 
 
Styles’ and Vickery’s conception of taste as ‘disinterested discernment,’ a mode of 
discrimination purified of ‘crude appetites,’ is representative of eighteenth-century 
studies. According to the standard narrative promoted by scholars of this period, taste 
first rose to prominence in the context of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century 
consumer culture and aesthetic theory, as men including Anthony Ashley Cooper, third 
earl of Shaftesbury, Richard Steele, and Joseph Addison made a metaphor out of what 
had previously only been a physical sensation. Thus detached from the vagaries of 
physical desire, taste could serve as a faculty of aesthetic and social judgement: in the 
words of Robert Jones, ‘taste, once it is figured as a claim to a discernment which rises 
beyond immediate use or gratification, could grant its user, if successful, a prestige and 
licence in other areas of social life.’5 Or, for Denise Gigante, the eighteenth-century 
‘Man of Taste,’ was engaged in a ‘philosophical project... of sublimating tastes from the 
conceptual apparatus of appetite.’6 
As should be abundantly clear at this point, such disembodied models of taste 
are insufficient as explanatory paradigms for taste in the previous era. In the period 
addressed by this thesis, taste is a term for discrimination, but the kinds of skill and 
experience that it involves remain deeply rooted in the physical and appetitive; a very 
long way indeed from ‘disinterested discernment.’ The jurisdiction of taste, moreover, 
extends far beyond the commercial and the aesthetic. For early modern men and 
women, taste had a pivotal role to play in the arbitration of concerns including the 
                                                          
4 Styles and Vickery, introduction to Gender, Taste and Material Culture, 14-15. 
5 Robert W. Jones, Gender and the Formation of Taste in Eighteenth-Century Britain: The Analysis of Beauty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10. Notably, Shaftesbury championed what John Barrell 
has designated ‘the republic of taste,’ a community of men who identified themselves as such by claiming 
a superiority of aesthetic judgement which putatively proved their political virtue and thus licensed 
aristocratic hegemony. John Barrell, The Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt: The Body of the 
Public (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 1-68 and 73-81. 
6 Gigante, Taste, 7. 
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nature and value of empirical and experimental knowledge; the validity of different 
kinds of religious experience (from sacramental ritual to reading scripture to the 
reception of grace) in the wake of the Reformation; and the moral status of erotic 
pleasure. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, taste functioned as a permeable 
membrane between corporeal sensation and mental judgement. Thus, literary ‘taste’ 
refers to readerly discrimination, but also indicates responsiveness to the sensible 
attributes of a text, which might be gustatory as well visual, aural, tactile, and olfactory. 
The senses, moreover, do not merely provide data to be schematized subsequently as 
knowledge; they are a form of knowledge in themselves. As Helkiah Crooke writes, 
‘there must be some part of the mind present in sensation’: physical experience is 
inherently meaningful, not only a passive reception but an active seeking out of 
meaning. For Crooke – following Aristotle – taste is traditionally the least dignified of 
the senses; but it is also the most necessary. This reversal of taste’s fortunes is paralleled 
in reformist discourse, where taste emerges a route to knowledge of the divine. And 
whilst this elevation of taste is apparently based on a suppression of the physical in 
favour of the spiritual, in practice the distinction between the two proves difficult, and 
in some cases undesirable, to sustain. As a privileged locus for self-reflection and 
contemplation, physical taste plays a part in the inculcation of particularly Protestant, 
and yet essentially sensuous, form of interiority. The notion that gustation might prove 
spiritually redemptive also plays a part in the development of experimental science. For 
members of the early Royal Society, experimental acts of tasting were laden with 
spiritual significance, potentially constituting a reversal of the effects of original sin. 
Experimental gustation could also be pleasurable. The sensuality – as opposed the mere 
sensuousness – of taste is emphasized by a number of chroniclers of desire, seduction, 
and erotic pleasure in the early modern period. For a range of poets, taste in its most 
appetitive, potentially ‘brutish’ instantiation – sexual tasting – emerges as profoundly 
epistemologically significant, intimately intertwined with a relational, comparative form 
of knowledge that is allied to rhetoric. In conjoining very different ways of knowing, 
including (but not limited to) philological erudition, proto-empirical experimentation, 
devotional meditation, and intersubjective intuition, the language of taste attests to an 
unfamiliar epistemological landscape, one where the borders between what we have 
come to call the disciplines are fluid.  
In Milton’s 1671 Samson Agonistes, the blind Samson confronts the taunts of the 
giant Harapha, who has ‘come to see of whom such noise / Hath walk’t about, and 
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each limb to survey, / If thy appearance answer loud report.’ Harapha pitches aural 
report against visual evidence, but Samson’s retort invokes a different sense: ‘the way to 
know,’ he asserts, ‘were not to see but taste.’7 Samson uses ‘taste’ to in the sense of 
‘test,’ and his words hang suspended – as does Samson himself at this point in the poem 
– between macho braggadocio and divinely-inspired conviction. Try me out, he is saying 
to Harapha; come and get a piece of me, if you think you’re tough. In the context of 
Samson’s physical blindness, however, his statement also resonates with the kind of 
Protestant rhetoric discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis: ‘in divine things,’ as Edward 
Reynolds avers, ‘tasting goes before seeing.’ From this perspective, Samson’s words take 
on the force of a first glimmer of spiritual illumination that will culminate in the 
destruction of the temple at Dagon. Poised between brutish appetite and discriminative 
judgement, taste in the early modern period is certainly not a subject of universal 
approbation. In this thesis, however, I hope to have at least begun the work of 
uncovering the epistemological possibilities – as well as the perils – of this deeply 
ambivalent sense. 
                                                          
7 Milton, Samson Agonistes, in Paradise regain’d... to which is added Samson Agonistes, N1v (66). 
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